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


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**THE GREAT PROBLEMS
OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP**

**THE GREAT PROBLEMS
OF
BRITISH STATESMANSHIP**



BY

J. ELLIS BARKER

**AUTHOR OF 'MODERN GERMANY,' 'GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN,'
'THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMANY,' ETC.**

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PREFACE

THE World War has created a number of most important problems which statesmanship will have to solve during the coming Peace Congress and afterwards. These may conveniently be divided into three classes: Problems of foreign policy, such as the delimitation of the national frontiers and the creation of an international organisation devised to ensure a durable peace; economic problems, such as the re-creation of national prosperity among the war-stricken nations, the management and the repayment of the gigantic war debt, the improvement of the relations between capital and labour, &c.; problems of internal organisation, such as the reform of democratic government which, during the War, in many instances has proved disappointing because of its amateurishness, dilatoriness, improvidence, and inefficiency. All these problems will be considered in the following pages.

Nothing is permanent in this world except change. The great problems of statesmanship can be given only a temporary solution. States and nations rise, grow, stand still, decline, decay, and ultimately disappear. The civilisation and even the languages of the world empires of antiquity have vanished. Cæsar, when conquering the savage inhabitants of Britain who were dressed in skins and who ornamented themselves by painting their bodies with woad, would have laughed had a native Druid told him that the Roman Empire would fall, and that the British savages would not only conquer but civilise the larger part of the world, and create an Empire far greater than the Roman,

for he looked upon the native Briton as we do upon African negroes. The process of national agglomeration and dissolution will continue to the end of time. If we look into history we find that it takes centuries to settle permanently the territorial conflicts which are apt to arise among neighbour States. It took centuries to determine definitively the differences between Britain and France, to solve the question whether Britain should or should not possess territory on the south shore of the English Channel. For centuries France and Germany have fought for the possession of the borderland, for Alsace-Lorraine, for the control of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and for all we know they may continue for centuries to fight for these objects. For centuries Russia and Germany have fought and intrigued for the possession or the control of Poland, the Balkan Peninsula, and Constantinople, and their struggle also may be renewed. Between certain nations there exists litigation in perpetuity in respect of certain objects which are valued by either. The Peace Congress cannot bring about a permanent settlement of these great questions, for they will continue to trouble mankind. It can at best bring about a lasting one. It can give to the world a long period, perhaps a century, of peace.

The roots of nations lie deep in the past. We can understand the interests and the policy of States and gauge the character, attitude, and probable conduct of nations only by studying their history and development, their experiences, and their traditions. We can neither fully understand, nor hope successfully to solve, the great international questions, the great international quarrels, unless we are acquainted with their historical genesis and with the views and actions of the claimants in the past. Hence, in considering the great problems of diplomacy, due weight should be given not only to their present aspect and future possibilities, but also to their historic development. This has been done in the following pages. I have given in them a vast number of secret treaties, despatches, and other

documents of the highest importance which will not be found elsewhere.

Economic policy should be based not upon theory, but upon experience; not upon fancy, but upon fact. In considering the problem of developing the prosperity of Great Britain and of the Empire, of paying off the war debt, and of improving the lot of the workers, I have availed myself of the lessons afforded by England's war with Republican and Napoleonic France and by the American Civil War. Both were proportionately about as costly as the present struggle seems likely to prove. Both were followed not by industrial collapse and financial ruin, as was believed by many at the time, but by unprecedented economic development and boundless prosperity. I have endeavoured to show that the Great War, far from impoverishing Great Britain and the British Empire, should greatly enrich them, provided a wise economic policy in accordance with historical experience is pursued. The exhaustive and authoritative figures given in support of that contention will be new to most readers and should prove of the highest interest to financiers, business men, and others.

Government, rightly considered, is not a pastime, but a business. Like every business, it has its rules, which may be learned from those who have been most successful in the science and art of directing public affairs. National organisation and administration, like economic policy, should be based, not upon abstract principles, which may prove inapplicable, nor upon historic precedents, which may be misleading, but upon universal experience. In considering the inefficiency of democratic government as revealed by the War and the necessary reform of Great Britain's national organisation, I have availed myself of the views of the greatest statesmen and administrators and the soundest thinkers of all times from Aristotle, Isocrates, Thucydides, and Polybius to Cardinal Richelieu, the elder Pitt, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Alexander Hamilton, and Bismarck. The numerous quotations given

should prove of value to all who desire to be acquainted with the views of the greatest experts in national organisation.

The present volume, like my other books, is perhaps rather a storehouse of facts than an expression of my own views. I hope that, nevertheless, it will prove thoroughly readable. It may be of value to statesmen, politicians, publicists, and the general public because of the important documentary and statistical evidence which it contains.

The contents of the book are, for the convenience of readers, briefly summed up in its first chapter, 'The Peace Congress and After.' All the other chapters have previously appeared in *The Nineteenth Century and After*. They attracted a great deal of attention at the time, and many of them were reprinted *in extenso* not only on the Continent, in the British Dominions, and in the United States, but even in Japan and China. I have been urged to collect and to republish them in book form, and I am allowed to do so by the courtesy of Mr. Skilbeck, the editor of *The Nineteenth Century* review, to whom I herewith give my best thanks. The original articles have been revised, brought up to date, and organically connected, and considerable additions have been made to them.

Although it may seem immodest, I would in conclusion say a few words as to my literary activity in the past. Ever since 1900, when I began my career as a publicist, I have warned this country of the danger of a war with Germany. In all my books and in innumerable articles printed in the leading reviews and elsewhere I have urged unceasingly the necessity of diplomatic, military, and economic preparation, the necessity of abandoning the policy of 'splendid isolation' for one of alliances with France, Russia, Japan, and the United States, the necessity of strengthening, developing, and organising the Empire towards the day of trial, the necessity of strengthening the fleet, the necessity of creating a national army, the necessity of strengthening the British industries, and especially the iron and steel industry, by a policy of deliberate

development, by a protective tariff, the necessity of vastly increasing agricultural production by peasant proprietorship and various other means, the necessity of developing the neglected railway and canal systems of Great Britain, the desirability of an Anglo-American reunion, &c. I have co-operated with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Roberts, and other prominent men. It is a certain satisfaction that all the reforms which so many have urged in vain before the War seem likely to be carried out in consequence of it. The ways of Providence are wonderful. Iron is tried by fire and nations by war. A new and a greater Britain is arising. The War may not only make the British Empire a reality, but bring about an Anglo-American reunion. The War, far from being an unmitigated evil, may prove a blessing to the British race.

Many eminent people have facilitated my task by their assistance, their advice, and their encouragement. I would herewith most cordially thank them for their kindness and support.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

LONDON, June 1917.

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THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP

CHAPTER I

THE PEACE CONGRESS AND AFTER

THE Allies arrayed against Germany are practically agreed on the broad principles which will guide their action at the Peace Congress. The differences between them are rather apparent than real. The young Russian democracy has demanded a settlement 'without annexations and without indemnities.' That seems a purely negative programme. The other Powers have declared themselves in favour of a positive policy, which likewise has been summed up in two words. They have demanded a peace which is based on the principle of 'Restitution and Reparation.' Rightly considered, the two demands are identical. Men who have thrown over a Government which they detest, who have suddenly freed themselves from heavy shackles, naturally rejoice, and are apt to form in their joy vast plans which spring rather from the heart than from the head. Time is needed to awaken such men to the sober realities of this workaday world. The heady wine of democracy has had the same effect in Russia which it had in France at the end of the eighteenth century. The Russian declarations

remind one of Article VI of the French Revolutionary Constitution :

La nation française renonce à entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquêtes, et n'emploiera jamais ses forces contre la liberté d'aucun peuple.

This ideal resolution was soon forgotten. The French revolutionaries embarked upon wars of conquest, the solemn declarations notwithstanding. It is to be expected that the Russian people will before long awake to the realities of the situation.

All the democracies are fighting for the principle of liberty, for the right of nationalities to govern themselves in their own way. All are strongly opposed to the principle of absolutism, of monarchical tyranny, of race subjection and of race exploitation. They are fighting for the freedom of the oppressed nationalities. They are pledged to free the exploited races and to enable them to organise and to govern themselves in their own way. By setting free the subject nationalities, the non-German parts of Germany will be enabled to rule themselves and to choose their allegiance. The territory of Germany will be slightly reduced. By setting free the subject nationalities the Austrian and Turkish Empires, where the governing race is in a small minority, will be dissolved into their component parts. However, their dissolution cannot honestly be described as partition and be compared with the partitions of Poland. No democrat can wish to thrust back the Armenians, Czechs, Poles, &c., under their ancient yoke.

The word 'war-indemnity' has during the last few decades changed its meaning. Originally a war-indemnity signified adequate compensation for the cost of an unjust war which was exacted from the aggressor. It was a bill for damages wantonly done. It was unobjectionable from the highest moral point of view. Since the time when powerful military States have robbed the defeated nations, whom they had wantonly attacked, not only of territory upon which they

had no claim on racial grounds, but have in addition exacted from them outrageous sums of money merely in order to make their aggression both territorially and financially profitable to themselves, the word 'indemnity' has become synonymous with spoliation, and spoliation is detestable. The word 'indemnity' has acquired a bad odour. The Allies, Belgium, Serbia, France, Russia, and the rest, are certainly entitled to claim from the Central Powers compensation for their gigantic losses caused by a war which was forced upon them, but they will scarcely make a profit out of such indemnities as they may obtain. The damage done is too large. Germany and her Allies are not rich enough ever to repay their victims. They can pay no more than a tithe of the damage, and they may have to rebuild with their own labour what they have destroyed.

The territorial settlement at the Peace Congress will be effected in accordance with the principle of nationalities. Racial and State limits will be made to coincide wherever possible. However, there may be certain exceptions to the rule. Sometimes various nationalities are inextricably mixed in certain districts, and must be disentangled. Besides, the smaller States created on a racial basis must be secured against an attack from their warlike, powerful, and possibly revengeful neighbours, and they must be able to make a living; they must be economically independent. Lastly, those nations which caused the War, and which may be inclined to renew it, must give guarantees for their good behaviour in the future. They cannot be allowed to dominate their smaller neighbours strategically or economically, and may have to lose certain vantage points. Poland and Serbia must have adequate outlets to the sea. To avoid racial injustice, men of one race who, for pressing strategical or economic reasons may have to be included in another nation, should be given the option of rejoining their brothers across the frontier and be entitled to adequate compensation for disturbance.

There are a number of instances where friction may arise

between several nations through conflicting claims to territory based on racial, strategical, or economic grounds. Where there is a conflict of claims, a settlement should as a rule be effected on the principle that the weaker claim must give way to the stronger. This should, of course, not mean that the smaller Power should be sacrificed to the greater, for the settlement should be based not on might, but on justice. Differences may, for instance, arise in arranging the claims of Italy and Serbia to certain portions of the Adriatic, the future of Macedonia may become a matter of contention, &c. Most of these questions are not of first-rate importance, and they should easily be settled, although they may call for unlimited patience on the part of the assembled statesmen.

Among the greatest and most difficult problems of the Peace Congress are the problem of Constantinople, the problem of Asia Minor, the problem of Austria-Hungary, the problem of Poland, and the position of the German Empire and its Emperor. All these have been considered in the present volume.

Shortly after the revolution the representatives of the Russian democracy have waived Russia's historic claim to the possession of Constantinople on the principle of 'No Annexation and No Indemnities.' A young democracy is guided rather by the heart than by the head. It follows easily the generous impulses of the moment. By the time the Peace Congress assembles, the Russian people may have changed their representatives, and may have changed their mind as to Constantinople. It seems doubtful whether the desire of acquiring Constantinople was merely based upon the ambition of Russia's rulers. Russia's most valuable territories lie in the south, for the bleak north produces little. The Black Sea and the mighty rivers leading to it constitute Russia's principal outlet. The most precious part of Russia's foreign trade is the Black Sea trade. It is bound to increase indefinitely in value. Rather for economic than for strategical reasons Russia requires free access from

the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Russia's historic desire for the acquisition of Constantinople was principally due to the fact that she found it intolerable that the bulk of her trade should be at the mercy of the Turks. At the beginning of the War an overwhelming majority of the Duma demanded for these reasons the acquisition of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Russian people may earlier or later change their mind with regard to Constantinople. That should be remembered by statesmen and publicists before and during the Congress. Besides, it is difficult to find a satisfactory alternative solution of the problem of Constantinople. As the Narrows are of great strategical value, they cannot safely be entrusted to a small Power, for various Great Powers would endeavour to obtain influence over it. The old intrigues for the possession of Constantinople would recommence. There remains the possibility of neutralising that precious site, of entrusting the guardianship to some international body. Neutrals, unless they are powerful, may suddenly be attacked by their warlike neighbours, and international guarantees do not always act as a deterrent. That has been shown in the case of Belgium. International control, on the other hand, is apt to lead to international intrigue, as was seen in the case of Egypt and of Macedonia, and international occupation is apt to lead to war, as is proved by the example of Schleswig-Holstein. As Russia has on strategical and economic grounds the strongest claims to Constantinople, she will probably, on consideration, alter her mind, and the Powers will be wise not to take as permanent Russia's recent declarations, which some day she may regret. It would be a calamity and a danger to the peace of the world if some years hence the Russian people should say that the nations took an unfair advantage of Russia's momentary mood and deprived them of Constantinople, for which they have fought and bled for centuries, at a time when they could have had it for the asking.

The Constantinople position connects the Black Sea and

the Mediterranean on the one hand and Europe and Asia on the other. It is strategically very important, but it is far less important than Asia Minor. Asia Minor connects, separates, and dominates the three oldest and most populated Continents. It lies across the most direct route from Central Europe to Calcutta, Bombay, Canton, and Peking. Asia Minor, being surrounded by gigantic mountain ranges, vast deserts, and the sea, is a natural fortress of the greatest strength, whence Egypt, North Africa, the Caucasus, the Russian Black Sea Provinces, the Mediterranean countries, and Persia and India may easily be attacked. Asia Minor is at present sparsely populated, but is able to nourish a vast number of people. Its wealth in minerals of all kinds may be utilised for military purposes. Its central position, its impregnable natural frontiers, and its vast agricultural and mineral potentialities might become dangerous to the peace of the world. A strong military Power occupying the country might convert it into a gigantic fortress and arsenal, and provide it with numerous railways leading towards Egypt, the Caucasus, and Persia. A strong military Power controlling Asia Minor might strive for the domination of the three old continents, and its power for mischief would be enhanced by the fact that it would dominate the two issues of the Red Sea, and that it could threaten from its central position not only the Suez Canal route, but also the trade of the Mediterranean and the sea-route to India by way of the Cape. I have very fully considered the problem of Asia Minor from every point of view and have made proposals for its solution.

Austria-Hungary has about 55,000,000 inhabitants. The Austro-Germans and the Magyars number together only about 20,000,000, and they bitterly hate each other. By freeing the 35,000,000 Slavs, Roumanians, and Italians from Austrian misrule the State of the Habsburgs would be reduced to 20,000,000 people. Germany has controlled the policy of Vienna in the past by making use of the differences between the Austrians and Magyars. She has

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ruled Austria with the assistance of Budapest. The loss of her Slavs and Latins would increase Austria's dependence upon the goodwill of Berlin and of Budapest. Austria and Hungary might be forced to attach themselves to the German Empire. As a consequence of the War, Germany might be far stronger than she has been hitherto. The Allies have pledged themselves to set free the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy. The Habsburgs, who at one time were supreme in Germany, and who gave to the Hohenzollerns the Brandenburg Electorate and raised them to royal rank, have suffered grievously at the hands of their former vassals. Brandenburg-Prussia has grown great at Austria's cost. Silesia was conquered by Prussia in 1740, and the South German States were detached from Austria in 1866. Austria has been Germany's tool in bringing about the Great War. The senile Francis Joseph scarcely knew what he was doing. The Princes of the proud house of Habsburg would no doubt like to recover their independence. They have no love for Prussia and the Hohenzollerns. It seems not inconceivable that as a result of the War, Austria should recover her independence, that the Habsburg Monarchy should obtain a new lease of life. If Austria should conclude a separate peace, she would be entitled to compensation for the inevitable loss of her Slavonic and Latin citizens, and she might be given Silesia and South Germany. By receiving these, Vienna would once more rule over 30,000,000 Germans, and the 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 Magyars would no longer prove unmanageable. A balance of power would be created within Germany. Vienna might once more dominate Berlin, and if Austria should follow a liberal, tolerant, and generous policy she might once more attract to herself the smaller nations of South-Eastern Europe and overshadow Prusso-Germany. A similar situation might arise if the War should be fought to the bitter end, and if the South German States should revolt against Prussia's rule and attach themselves to Austria.

It remains to be seen whether Austria-Hungary and Ger-

many will patiently bear with their rulers if the War which they began should lead to disaster and general ruin. Possibly both the German and the Austrian peoples may revolt, but it seems more likely that the Germans will hold their Sovereign to account, for the young Austrian Emperor was not responsible for the War. Germany has a written Constitution according to which the sovereignty of the Empire lies not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of all the allied States and their rulers. The Emperor is merely the hereditary president of the federation. According to the Constitution, he is not entitled to declare war unless Germany has actually been attacked. For a war of aggression the consent of the Federal Council, which officially represents all the German States, is required. In embarking upon a war of aggression William the Second has violated the Constitution. He is not only morally but also legally responsible if disaster should overtake his country. A German defeat may lead either to the severe limitation of the Emperor's power or to the conversion of Germany into a republic. We may experience in Germany a revolution accompanied by civil war. A special chapter has been devoted to the Emperor's position.

The problem of Poland is particularly important because of the vast change which the resuscitation of that State would effect on the map of Europe. An independent Polish State of 20,000,000 inhabitants might serve as a buffer-State between Russia and Germany. The lands of the Poles possess vast agricultural, industrial, and mineral possibilities. The Polish territories are more densely populated than is France. Within the Polish zone lie the largest coalfields on the Continent of Europe. Lodz is the Russian Manchester. As Brazil is the land of the Amazon and the United States that of the Mississippi, so Poland is the country of the Vistula. On that mighty river lie the two Polish capitals, Warsaw and Cracow, and innumerable important towns. Poland may become politically and economically the Belgium of Eastern Europe, it may become a most

important industrial country, but this is possible only if she has a sufficient outlet for her manufactures and can obtain cheaply the necessary imported raw materials, such as cotton. Poland's natural harbour is Danzig, on the mouth of the Vistula. That town may become the Polish Hamburg. If Danzig should once more become Polish, East Prussia would be separated from Brandenburg by a broad belt of Polish territory, as it was in olden times. However, if the question should arise whether Brandenburg should be separated from the province of East Prussia, or whether Poland should be separated from the sea by Danzig remaining in Prussian hands, it is probable that the weaker claim would have to give way to the stronger. Agricultural Eastern Prussia, though separated from Brandenburg, would have access to the sea. If Danzig remained in Germany's hands Poland would remain cut off from the sea, and the State might languish, decline, and decay.

Many Poles desire that their country should obtain complete independence. It seems doubtful whether their wishes are wise. In the course of time Poland has grown into Russia and Russia into Poland. Her vast coalfields make Poland a natural home of the manufacturing industries. A completely independent Poland might find both the Russian and the German frontiers closed against her productions. Hence it may be best for the Poles to aim at a modified form of independence which would guarantee to them Russia's military protection in case of need and which would leave open to the Polish industries the vast and most valuable Russian markets.

The territorial claims of the various nations cannot be permanently settled at the Peace Congress, for history knows no permanent settlements. The settlement made may come up for revision. Unsatisfactory settlements often lead to war. Therefore the representatives of the Powers should avoid not only injustice, but even the appearance of injustice and of unfairness. The settlement made at the Congress of Vienna should serve them as a warning example.

It led to a series of wars in the course of which the Treaty of Vienna was torn to pieces.

The great international questions mentioned will not be definitively solved at the Peace Congress. They will occupy the nations during many ensuing decades. However, during the period immediately following the peace the problems of foreign policy will probably be overshadowed by economic problems and by questions of domestic policy. The gigantic War has created huge national debts and has destroyed incalculable values. The British War debt seems likely to amount to at least £5,000,000,000. It seems questionable whether the British people will receive any compensation from their opponents, for the devastated countries, Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Roumania, France, and Russia, have the first claim upon German indemnities. It may also happen that Britain's allies will not be able to repay the bulk of the sums advanced to them. The experience of the Napoleonic wars, when England financed the Allies, may repeat itself.

British taxation has been trebled in the course of the War, and trebled taxation may continue indefinitely. The vast war expenditures incurred may, however, not ruin Great Britain. I have shown in two lengthy chapters devoted to the economic problems that the War, far from impoverishing the country, may greatly enrich it. The twenty years' war against Republican and Napoleonic France created a gigantic burden of debt. It led to the trebling of taxation. The vast increase in taxation stimulated the latent energies of the nation. I have shown that Great Britain's industrial prosperity arose during and after the Great War, and was caused chiefly by the vastly increased demands of the tax-collector. I have further shown by most interesting and important statistics that the American workers engaged in manufacturing, mining, transport, agriculture, &c., produce per head about three times as much as their English colleagues because they employ better and three times as powerful machinery and possess a better

economic organisation, &c. It follows that Great Britain can treble her yearly output, her yearly income, and her national wealth by Americanising her industries. The Americanisation of the British industries has already begun. I have shown in the chapter, 'Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy,' that in the course of the War production per man has approximately doubled. Production per man can once more be doubled, and more than doubled, to the great benefit of the workers and of the nation as a whole. Increased production must be based upon improved machinery, and the better machinery is, the smaller is the exertion of the worker.

America's vast industrial advance, as that of Great Britain, was caused by a ruinously expensive war. The vastly increased demands of the tax-collector consequent upon the Civil War led not only to the greatest improvement in industrial production, but also to the rapid opening up of the West. The British Dominions have advanced comparatively slowly in wealth and population because life has been too easy for the inhabitants. Men work hard only if compelled. The Dominions would be forced to open up their gigantic domain with the greatest energy should they decide to take over an adequate part of the financial burden imposed by the War. The War has been fought for the benefit of future generations. It is therefore only fair that posterity should help in bearing the burden.

The War Debt should become an imperial obligation. Part of the undeveloped resources of the Empire should be assigned to its service and repayment. Part should be paid by the present generation. The Americans combine with their census of population a census of production and wealth. By taking regularly a similar census of production and of wealth throughout the British Empire, the ability of every part of the Empire to assist in bearing the financial burden caused by the War might most easily and most fairly be ascertained. Every five or ten years the financial burden might be redistributed in accordance with the changes in

wealth and income which have taken place in the meantime.

High taxation in countries of boundless latent resources is a vast advantage. It is as necessary to a State which desires to advance quickly as adequate ballast is to a ship. The Empire is four times as large as the United States. Nevertheless the United States are far wealthier than is the gigantic British Empire. The wealth of the United States is greater than that of the British Empire, not because the former has larger natural resources, but because the boundless resources of the British Empire have either been insufficiently developed or have been completely neglected. If the War should bring about the deliberate and energetic development of the Empire, and if the Imperial domain should become as highly developed as the territory of the great Republic, the wealth of the British Empire should no longer be inferior to that of the United States, but should be four times as great.

Among the internal problems of Great Britain which will come up for settlement after the War, the reorganisation of the body politic will probably occupy the foremost place. It has been treated fully in the chapter, 'Democracy and the Iron Broom of War.' Democracy has displayed its failings during the struggle. The great problem consists in combining liberty and popular government, which means control by the many, with efficiency in administration and execution. The jointly responsible Cabinet has proved improvident, dilatory, and extremely inefficient. The reform introduced by Mr. Lloyd George is only a temporary make-shift. The question will have to be settled whether the national executive should be in the hands of a single man or of an inexperienced committee. The views of the greatest statesmen of all times favour decidedly a one-man executive. The Americans, when establishing their republic, after mature consideration and deliberation, chose a one-man executive. I believe Great Britain will be wise in following America's example. The reform could most easily be

effected by making the Prime Minister solely responsible for governmental action, by making the heads of the great departments the Prime Minister's subordinates. The American Constitution proved its excellence in time of danger at the outbreak of the Civil War. In the chapter, 'How America became a Nation in Arms,' I have shown how a one-man executive saved the United States from disaster. During the Civil War the United States raised a gigantic army and defeated in the course of four years the rebellious South. That war destroyed nearly a million lives and cost two-thirds of America's national wealth. America's Civil War should be to the democracies an inspiration and a warning against unpreparedness. Had the United States possessed an army of 30,000 men, the war would either not have broken out or it would have been ended in a few weeks. Democracy has to pay dearly for its shortsightedness and neglect. It is inspiring that an unmilitary, unruly, unorganised, and peaceful people should have been able to raise a gigantic and most efficient army. Successful improvisation should, however, not blind us to the danger of neglecting military preparation in time of peace. The United States in 1861 and England in 1914 were able to create colossal armies because they were given sufficient time to organise themselves for war. The greatest latent resources and the highest patriotism would prove unavailing if in a future war a strong military Power should succeed in seizing at its outbreak the indispensable centres of resistance, such as the seats of the iron and steel industry.

From the British point of view the most important results of the War are two. The War should lead to the unification of the Empire, and it may possibly lead to the reunion of the British race. I have advocated for many years an Anglo-American reunion, and I have summed up the arguments in favour of such a reunion in the concluding chapter of this book.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE¹

As foresight is the essence of statesmanship, it seems opportune to consider the greatest and most difficult problems with which the future Peace Conference will have to deal. This is all the more necessary as some of the questions which will have to be settled may cause differences among the Allies, unless the nations and their statesmen have previously arrived at some understanding as to the great lines on which the settlement should take place. Such a preliminary agreement had unfortunately not been effected when, a hundred years ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the entire map of Europe was recast. Owing to the resulting differences and the return of Napoleon from Elba, the diplomats hastily concluded a treaty which left the greatest and most dangerous problems badly solved or not solved at all. Guided by the principle of legitimacy, they considered the claims of the rulers, but disregarded those of the nations. At the Congress of Vienna, Germany and Italy were cut up, notwithstanding the protests of the German and Italian people. It was only natural that the work done in haste and under pressure by the diplomats at Vienna led to a series of avoidable wars, and especially to the Wars of Nationality of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71, by which a united Italy and a united Germany were evolved.

The nations and their rulers seem fairly agreed as to

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, March 1915.

the broad principles on which the map of Europe should be reconstructed at a future Congress. In the first place, the desires of the various nationalities to be united under a Government of their own are to be fulfilled. In the second place, territorial rearrangement will be made which will strengthen the peaceful nations, which will make unlikely a war of revenge, and which will secure the maintenance of peace for a very long time. In the third place, the nations which have fought and suffered are to receive suitable compensation, while those which have merely looked on will presumably derive little or no advantage from the general recasting of frontiers. Apparently there are only four questions which might lead to serious disagreement among the Allies. These are the question of Austria-Hungary, the question of Poland, the question of Constantinople, and the question of Asia Minor. All four questions are closely interwoven.

Russia is a Power which is viewed by many Englishmen with a good deal of distrust. Many people in this country fear that when Germany and Austria-Hungary have been defeated, Russia will become too powerful. They ask, Where will be the counterpoise to Russia if Germany should suffer great territorial losses, and if the Dual Monarchy should no longer form a single State, but should become dissolved into its component parts in accordance with the principle of nationality? To many Englishmen who have watched with concern the constant and apparently irresistible progress of Russia in Asia, that country is a dangerous, aggressive Power. They remember that many Russian generals and writers have recommended an expedition against India; that Czar Paul, during his short and tragic reign, actually prepared such a venture; that his successor, Alexander the First, also contemplated an attack on India by land; that more than once Russia has been at war with Great Britain. However, most of those who are thinking of Russia's aggressiveness and her former hostility to England are probably unaware that

her hostility was not without cause ; that England, fearing that Russia might become too powerful, endeavoured, at the bidding of her enemies, to prevent Russia's expansion, especially in the direction of Constantinople and of the Far East ; that at the time of the Crimean War, not Russia, but England, was apparently in the wrong ; that Lord Beaconsfield prevented Russia reaping the fruit of her victory after her last war with Turkey ; that, angered by England's attitude and incited by Bismarck and his successors, Russia not unnaturally endeavoured to revenge herself upon this country in the only part where it seemed vulnerable.

The problems of Poland, of Austria-Hungary, and of Asia Minor, which will be very fully considered in other chapters, are perhaps less dangerous to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies than is that of Constantinople. The question of Constantinople has for many decades been considered the most dangerous problem in Europe. Constantinople is supposed to be a point of vital interest not only to Russia, but to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and this country as well. As the Turks have plunged into the War and have attacked the Allies, they have forfeited England's good will and traditional protection. The settlement of the problem of Constantinople can no longer be shelved. Therefore, it seems best to consider it frankly, dispassionately, and without prejudice.

We have been taught in the past that ' the possession of Constantinople will decide the fate of the world,' that ' Constantinople dominates the world,' and that ' Russia's possession of that position would be fatal to Great Britain's position in India.' In these circumstances it seems necessary not only to consider the character of Russia's foreign policy and of the Russian people, but to study the problem of Constantinople in the light of history and with special reference to Russia's future.

Since the time of Napoleon the question of Constanti-

nople has loomed particularly large, and probably unduly large, on the political horizon. Apparently the strategical importance of Constantinople is at present generally over-estimated, because the last few generations, instead of studying critically and without prejudice the real importance of that town, have been mesmerised by the pronouncements of the great Corsican warrior, and have repeated his celebrated saying that Constantinople is 'the key of the world,' although it is nothing of the kind.

According to many popular historians, Russia has 'always' tried to wrest India from England and to make herself mistress of the world by seizing Constantinople. From some of the most serious historical books, and even from dry diplomatic documents, we learn that Russia's policy of seizing with Constantinople the dominion of the world was initiated by her greatest ruler, Peter the Great, who recommended that policy to his successors in his celebrated political testament. History, as Napoleon has told us, is a *fable convenue*. Napoleon himself has skilfully created a *fable convenue* around the town of Constantinople, and most of the mistaken views as to Russia's world-conquering aims have been engendered by that great genius who has mystified England during a whole century, and who has been responsible for a century of misunderstandings between England and Russia. It seems therefore timely and necessary to consider Russia's actions in the direction of Constantinople and of India by means of the most authoritative documents existing, the vast majority of which are not given in English books. They will be new to most British readers, and they may help in destroying a century-old legend which has served Napoleon's purpose of sowing enmity between Russia and this country.

The political testament of Peter the Great, which plays so great a part in historic and diplomatic literature, has, as far as I know, not been translated into English. There are several versions of that document. The following passages, which are taken from the combined versions given

by Sokolnicki and Lesur, are those which should be of the greatest interest to English readers :

Austria should be induced to assist in driving the Turks out of Europe. Under that pretext a standing army should be maintained and shipyards be established on the shores of the Black Sea. Constantly progressing, the forces should advance towards Constantinople.

A strict alliance should be concluded with England. . . . Predominance in the Baltic and in the Black Sea should be aimed at. That is the most important point. On it depends the rapid success of the plan.

My successors should become convinced of the truth that the trade with India is the world trade, and that he who possesses that trade is in truth the master of Europe. Consequently no opportunity for stirring up war with Persia and hastening its decay should be lost. Russia should penetrate to the Persian Gulf and endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade with the East.

The influence of religion upon the disunited and Greek dissenters dwelling in Hungary, Turkey, and Southern Poland should be made use of. They should be won over. Russia should become their protector and obtain spiritual supremacy over them. . . .

Soon after opportunities will become precious. Everything should be prepared in secret for the great coup. In the deepest secrecy and the greatest circumspection the court of Versailles and then that of Vienna should be approached with the object of sharing with them the domination of the world.

In the following paragraphs the author recommends that Russia should bring about a world-war ostensibly regarding Turkey, that she should set all the other Great Powers by the ears, and while they are engaged in internecine struggles seize Constantinople, make war upon all her opponents, subdue them, and make herself supreme throughout the world.

Peter the Great died in 1725. He greatly enlarged the Russian frontiers, organised, modernised, and Euro-

peanised the country, and fought hard to give it an outlet on the Swedish Baltic, where he created Petrograd. His successors, guided by Catherine the Second, endeavoured with equal energy to give Russia a second outlet to the sea in the south, at Turkey's cost, and apparently they carried out to the letter the recommendations contained in the political testament of Peter the Great. Prophecies are usually correct if they are made after the event. The famous political testament was apparently written, not in Peter the Great's lifetime, but a century after, when Russia had succeeded in acquiring the shores of the Black Sea and had become the leader of the Slav nations belonging to the Greek Church. Peter the Great's political testament was first published in a book, '*De la Politique et des Progrès de la Puissance Russe*,' written by Lesur in 1811, at a time when Napoleon had resolved upon a war with Russia. It was published to influence European, and especially English, opinion against that country. According to Berkholz ('*Napoleon I, Auteur du Testament de Pierre le Grand*'), Napoleon himself was the author. The abrupt telegraphic style of the composition indeed greatly resembles that of its putative author. The best informed now generally consider the will of Peter the Great to be a forgery. Bismarck, who was on the most intimate terms with Czar Alexander the Second, described it as 'apocryphal' in the fifth chapter of his '*Memoirs*.' The value of Peter the Great's will as a document revealing the traditional policy and traditions of Russia is *nil*.

The desire of Peter the Great's successors to conquer the Turkish territory to the south of Russia, and to acquire for the country an outlet on the Black Sea, was not unnatural, for at a time when transport by land was almost a physical impossibility in Russia the country could be opened up and developed only by means of her splendid natural waterways and of seaports. As Russia's most fruitful territories are in the south, access to the Black Sea was for her development far more important than an

opening on the Baltic. Besides, to the deeply religious Russians a war with the Turks was, up to the most recent times, a Holy War, a kind of crusade. The Empress Catherine succeeded in conquering the shores of the Black Sea, but failed in conquering Constantinople, which she desired to take. With this object in view she proposed the partition of Turkey to Austria in the time of Maria Theresa and of Joseph the Second. According to her historian Castéra, she urged the Minister of France to advise his Government that France should join Russia for the purpose of partitioning the Turkish Empire. As a reward she offered Egypt to France, the conquest of which she believed to be easy.

Catherine's offer of Egypt to France is significant, and should be carefully noted. For centuries France, guided by a sure instinct of territorial values, had been hankering after the possession of Egypt, seeing in that country a door to the lands of the Far East and one of the most important strategical positions in the world. The great historian Sorel wrote in '*Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797*' that the possession of Egypt was '*le rêve qui, depuis les croisades, hante les imaginations françaises.*'

France hungered after Egypt. Her thinkers had planned the construction of the Suez Canal a century before de Lesseps. After the outbreak of the Revolution her historic ambition seemed likely to be fulfilled. The French Republic was at war with England and Russia. England might be attacked in India by way of Egypt, and Egypt might, at the same time, be made a base of operations for an attack upon Russia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. While England and Russia were thus being attacked a revolution should be engineered in Ireland to complete England's discomfiture. On the 23rd Germinal of the year VI—that is, on April 12, 1798—the Directoire appointed the youthful General Bonaparte commander of the Armée d'Orient, and ordered him to take Egypt, to cut the Suez Canal, and to secure to the French

Republic the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea. The aim and object of that expedition, and of the greater plan of operations of which it was to be a part, is clearly and fully disclosed in a lengthy memorandum on the foreign situation, written by Talleyrand, who at the time was the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and placed by him before the Directoire on July 10, 1798. We read in that most valuable and most interesting document :

Si Bonaparte s'établit en Egypte, quand il aura dirigé une part de ses forces contre les Anglais dans l'Inde, qui empêchera que la flotte française, pénétrant dans la Mer Noire et s'unissant à celle des Turcs, aille, pour consolider cette puissance de l'occupation de l'Egypte, l'aider à reconquérir la Crimée qui est pour elle d'un bien autre intérêt que cette région livrée depuis des siècles aux révoltes des beys ? Il n'y aura pas toujours dans la Méditerranée une nombreuse flotte anglaise. Attaqués dans l'Inde, menacés sur leurs côtes, frappés au cœur de leur puissance par l'insurrection de l'Irlande, dont les progrès peuvent d'un moment à l'autre désorganiser leur armée navale, ils doivent finir par abandonner la station qu'ils auront établie au fond de la Méditerranée, et dès lors pour que nous soyons bien reçus. La destruction de Cherson et de Sébastopol serait à la fois la plus juste vengeance de l'acharnement insensé des Russes, et le meilleur moyen de négociation avec les Turcs pour en obtenir tout ce qui pourrait consolider notre établissement en Afrique. . . .

L'expédition de Bonaparte, s'il met pied en Egypte, assure la destruction de la puissance britannique dans l'Inde.

Déjà Malte est en notre pouvoir ; ce succès miraculeux serait seul un coup terrible pour le commerce de l'Angleterre, et quand notre armement n'obtiendrait pas un autre fruit, celui-là serait suffisant. Mais des attentes encore plus sensibles sont réservées à cette nation, livrée à tous les déchirements intérieurs qu'elle a si longtemps entretenus chez nous. L'insurrection de l'Irlande, cimentée déjà par le sang de quelques victimes célèbres, paraît faire des progrès remarquables. C'est dans cette contrée que doivent aboutir maintenant tous nos efforts. Des armes, des munitions, des

hommes hâtons-nous de les y porter, rendons à l'Angleterre les maux qu'elle nous a faits. Qu'une République s'élève à côté d'elle pour son instruction ou pour son châtiment. . . .

Si nous sommes bientôt en mesure de faire ce que j'ai indiqué en parlant de la Russie, au moins d'en annoncer l'intention, je ne doute pas que la Porte ne sente le prix de ce service et n'associe ses forces aux nôtres pour repousser la Russie loin des bords de la Mer Noire.

The war programme of the French Directoire against England, which included an attack on Egypt, an expedition against India, the support of Turkey, the raising of Ireland in rebellion, and war upon British commerce, bears a curious resemblance to the comprehensive and world-wide war plans of modern Germany.

Napoleon seized the Government of France and became the heir of the grandiose world-embracing policy of the Republic. He took up the plan which was designed to destroy simultaneously the power of England and Russia and to make France all-powerful throughout the world. Catherine the Second, the great enemy of the French Revolution, had died in 1796, and had been succeeded by the weak, eccentric, violent, and scarcely sane Czar Paul the First. During the first years of his reign he also was hostile to revolutionary France and had made war upon that country, but in 1800 he quarrelled with England. Napoleon at once utilised the opportunity and persuaded him to attack England in Asia in conjunction with France. In O'Meara's book, 'Napoleon on St. Helena,' we read that Napoleon described to his Irish surgeon the invasion planned in the time of Paul the First as follows :

If Paul had lived you would have lost India before now. An agreement was made between Paul and myself to invade it. I furnished the plan. I was to have sent thirty thousand good troops. He was to send a similar number of the best Russian soldiers and forty thousand Cossacks. I was to subscribe ten millions for the purchase of camels and other requisites for crossing the desert. The King of Prussia was

to have been applied to by both of us to grant a passage for my troops through his dominions, which would have been immediately granted. I had at the same time made a demand to the King of Persia for a passage through his country, which would also have been granted, although the negotiations were not entirely concluded, but would have succeeded, as the Persians were desirous of profiting by it themselves. My troops were to have gone to Warsaw, to be joined by the Russians and Cossacks, and to have marched from thence to the Caspian Sea, where they would have either embarked or have proceeded by land, according to circumstances. I was beforehand with you in sending an Ambassador to Persia to make interest there. Since that time your ministers have been imbeciles enough to allow the Russians to get four provinces, which increase their territories beyond the mountains. The first year of war that you will have with the Russians they will take India from you.

It will be noticed that Napoleon did not suggest to Russia an advance upon India by way of Constantinople, but by way of the Caspian Sea, by a route similar to that which she would follow at the present time, when an expedition against India would be carried by the railways running from the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea towards the north-west frontier of India. That is worth bearing in mind if we wish to inquire whether Russia's occupation of Constantinople would threaten India.

Paul the First was assassinated in 1801 before he could embark upon his fantastic expedition, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Alexander the First. Born in 1777, Alexander came to the throne as a youth of twenty-four. He had been educated by the Swiss philosopher Laharpe in accordance with the principles of Rousseau. The great Polish statesman, Prince Adam Czartoryski, an intimate friend of his youth and of his maturer age, drew the following portrait of Alexander in his 'Memoirs':

Young, candid, inoffensive, thinking only of philanthropy and liberalism, passionately desirous of doing good,

but often incapable of distinguishing it from evil, he had seen with equal aversion the wars of Catherine and the despotic follies of Paul, and when he ascended the throne he cast aside all the ideas of avidity, astuteness, and grasping ambition which were the soul of the old Russian policy. Peter's vast projects were ignored for a time, and Alexander devoted himself entirely to internal reforms, with the serious intention of making his Russian and other subjects as happy as they could be in their present condition. Later on he was carried away, almost against his will, into the natural current of Russian policy, but at first he held entirely aloof from it, and this is the reason why he was not really popular in Russia.

Alexander was a good man and a great idealist. His dearest wish was to free the serfs and to make the people happy and prosperous. General Savary, Napoleon's temporary Ambassador in Russia, reported to him on November 4, 1807, the following words of the Czar: 'Je veux sortir la nation de cet état de barbarie. Je dis même plus, si la civilisation était assez avancée, j'abolirais cet esclavage, dût-il m'en coûter la tête.' Alexander the First, like the recent occupant of the throne, Nicholas the Second, was a warm-hearted idealist, a lover of mankind, and a friend of peace, anxious to elevate Russia and to introduce the necessary reforms. However, Alexander the First, like Nicholas the Second, was forced into a great war against his will.

In a number of campaigns Napoleon had subdued the Continent, and the French longed for peace. Still Napoleon desired to carry out the great policy of the Directoire, to destroy the power of England and Russia and make France supreme in the world. But as long as the Continent was ready to rise against the French, Napoleon could not safely enter upon a lengthy campaign in far-away Russia. He feared Russia as an opponent as long as Europe was unwilling to bear his yoke. An alliance with Russia would have been invaluable to him. By securing Russia's support

he could hope to hold Prussia and Austria in awe and to attack, or at least to threaten, England in India. Russia's support could best be secured by promising to her explicitly, or at least implicitly, the possession of Constantinople and by making her believe that she was not interested in the fate of the other European States, that their enslavement by Napoleon was no concern of hers. In December 1805, while he was at war with Russia, Napoleon significantly said to Prince Dolgoruki, the Czar's aide-de-camp, who had been sent to him, according to the Prince's report of the 23rd of that month, published by Tatistcheff :

Que veut-on de moi ? Pourquoi l'empereur Alexandre me fait-il la guerre ? Que lui faut-il ? Il n'a qu'à étendre les frontières de la Russie aux dépens de ses voisins, des Turcs surtout. Sa querelle avec la France tomberait alors d'elle-même. . . . La Russie doit suivre une tout autre politique et ne se préoccuper que de ses propres intérêts.

While, in vague words, Napoleon promised to Alexander the First the possession of Turkey, he endeavoured to raise the Turks against the Russians. On June 20, 1806, Napoleon dictated, in his characteristic abrupt style, the following instruction for the guidance of General Sebastiani, the French Ambassador in Turkey, which will be found in Driault, '*La Politique Orientale de Napoléon*' :

1. Inspirer confiance et sécurité à la Porte, la France ne veut que la fortifier.

2. Triple Alliance de Moi, Porte et Perse contre Russie. . .

7. Fermer le Bosphore aux Russes, fermer tous les ports, rendre à la Porte son empire absolu sur la Moldavie et la Valachie.

8. Je ne veux point partager l'Empire de Constantinople, voulût-on m'en offrir les trois quarts, je n'en veux point. Je veux raffermir et consolider ce grand empire et m'en servir tel quel comme opposition à la Russie.

In 1806 Napoleon made war upon Prussia. In October of that year the Prussians were totally defeated at Jena

and Auerstädt. The Russians came to their aid, and Napoleon feared a lengthy campaign so far from his base. On February 7 and 8, 1807, he defeated the Russians at Eylau. However, the French suffered such fearful losses that Napoleon's position was seriously endangered. Hence he urgently desired to make peace with Russia. Relying upon the youth, the generous enthusiasm, the warm-heartedness, the lack of suspicion, and the inexperience of Alexander the First, Napoleon attempted once more to convert his enemy into a friend and ally and willing tool. With this object in view he caused articles to be published in the papers advocating a reconciliation of Napoleon and Alexander in the interests of humanity, and recommending joint action by France and Russia against England, the enemy of mankind. Napoleon knew how to convey indirectly to the Czar numerous messages expressing his sorrow at the fearful and needless slaughter, his desire for peace, his goodwill for Russia, and his high esteem for Russia's youthful ruler. Alexander became interested in Napoleon's suggestions, and at last became infatuated by him. He had been fascinated by Napoleon's success. He was keenly aware of the backwardness of Russia. Desiring to advance his country, he wished to learn from his great antagonist the art of government and administration, for in Napoleon he chiefly admired the organiser. On June 14, 1807, Napoleon severely defeated the Russians at Friedland, and the Czar, following the advice of his generals, asked Napoleon for peace. A few days later the celebrated meeting of the two monarchs in a little pavilion erected on a raft anchored in the river Niemen took place. According to Tatistcheff, the Czar's first words to Napoleon were, 'Sire, je hais les Anglais autant que vous,' and Napoleon replied, 'En ce cas la paix est faite.'

On the Niemen, and at the prolonged meeting of the monarchs at Tilsit which followed, Napoleon unceasingly preached to the Czar the necessity of Franco-Russian co-operation in the interests of peace, and the necessity

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of breaking the naval tyranny of England. He suggested to Alexander that he should seize Turkey, spoke of the Turks as barbarians, and proposed that the two monarchs, after having destroyed the power of England by an attack upon India, should share between them the dominion of the world. He urged that they should conclude at the same time a treaty of peace and a treaty of alliance which provided for their co-operation throughout the world. Taking advantage of the Czar's easily aroused enthusiasm and of his lack of guile, Napoleon deliberately fooled Alexander the First and tricked him into an alliance with France by which all the advantages fell to Napoleon. How the Czar was treated is described as follows in his 'Memoirs' by Talleyrand, who drafted the Treaty of Tilsit :

In the course of the conferences preceding the Treaty of Tilsit the Emperor Napoleon often spoke to the Czar Alexander of Moldavia and Wallachia as provinces destined some day to become Russian. Affecting to be carried away by some irresistible impulse, and to obey the decrees of Providence, he spoke of the division of European Turkey as inevitable. He then indicated, as if inspired, the general basis of the sharing of that empire, a portion of which was to fall to Austria in order to gratify her pride rather than her ambition.

A shrewd mind could easily notice the effect produced upon the mind of Alexander by all those fanciful dreams. Napoleon watched him attentively and, as soon as he noticed that the prospects held out allured the Czar's imagination, he informed Alexander that letters from Paris necessitated his immediate return and gave orders for the treaty to be drafted at once.

My instructions on the subject of that treaty were that no allusion to a partition of the Ottoman Empire should appear in it, nor even to the future fate of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia. These instructions were strictly carried out. Napoleon thus left Tilsit, having made prospective arrangements which could serve him as he pleased for the accomplishment of his other designs. He had not

bound himself at all, whereas, by the prospects he held out, he had allured the Czar Alexander and placed him, in relation to Turkey, in a doubtful position which might enable the Cabinet of the Tuileries to bring forth other pretensions untouched in the treaty.

According to the Treaty of Tilsit, which was signed on July 7, 1807, Napoleon and Alexander were to support one another on land and sea with the whole of their armed forces. The alliance was defensive and offensive. The two nations were to act in common in making war and in concluding peace. Russia was to act as mediator between England and France, and to request England to give up to France and her Allies all her conquests made since 1805. If England should refuse to submit, Russia was to make war upon England. Thus the duties of the Czar under the Treaty of Alliance were clearly outlined. The corresponding advantages, however, were only vaguely hinted at. Only the last article, Article 8, treated of Turkey, and it was worded as follows :

Pareillement, si par une suite des changements qui viennent de se faire à Constantinople, la Porte n'acceptait pas la médiation de la France, ou si, après qu'elle l'aura acceptée, il arrivait que, dans le délai de trois mois après l'ouverture des négociations, elles n'eussent pas conduit à un résultat satisfaisant, la France fera cause commune avec la Russie contre la Porte Ottomane, et les deux hautes parties contractantes s'entendront pour soustraire toutes les provinces de l'Empire ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et le province de Romélie exceptées, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs.

In return for making war upon England, Alexander the First received merely the promise that in certain eventualities France and Russia would act together against Turkey, and that in the event of such joint action they would come to an understanding with a view to freeing all the European provinces of Turkey from the Turks. However, Constantinople and the Province of Rumelia

were to be reserved, and not to be partitioned by the Allies. In return for valuable service, Alexander the First received merely a vague and worthless promise.

As, in numerous conversations, Napoleon had promised to Alexander all he could desire, and as the Czar implicitly believed in his new friend, he probably did not look too closely into the wording of the one-sided treaty, and left Tilsit full of admiration for the Emperor of the French. Meanwhile Napoleon began a most cynical game with Alexander. Although the Treaty of Tilsit did not provide for the partition of Turkey, Napoleon continued using the partition of Turkey as a bait with which to secure Russia's support against England. He went even so far as to offer her, though only verbally, Constantinople itself. On November 7, 1807, Count Tolstoi, the Czar's representative in France, reported to Alexander that Napoleon had offered Constantinople to Russia in the following words :

Il (Napoléon) me dit que lui ne voyait aucun avantage pour la France au démembrement de l'empire ottoman, qu'il ne demandait pas mieux que de garantir son intégrité, qu'il le préférerait même. . . . Cependant, que si nous tenions infiniment à la possession de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, il s'y prêterait volontiers et qu'il nous offrait le thalweg du Danube, mais que ce serait à condition qu'il put s'en dédommager ailleurs.

Il consent même à un plus grand partage de l'empire ottoman s'il pouvait entrer dans les plans de la Russie. Il m'autorise à offrir Constantinople, car il m'assure de n'avoir contracté aucun engagement avec le gouvernement turc, et de n'avoir aucune vue sur cette capitale. . . . Dans la troisième supposition qui annoncerait un entier démembrement de la Turquie européenne, il consent à une extension pour la Russie jusqu'à Constantinople, cette capitale y comprise, contre des acquisitions sur lesquelles il ne s'est point expliqué.

Under unspecified circumstances Napoleon verbally

agreed to Russia's occupying Constantinople in return for equally unspecified compensations for France !

While, on November 7, 1807, Napoleon professed to be completely indifferent to Turkey's fate, and expressed his willingness to the Russian Ambassador that Russia should have Constantinople, he sent five days later, on November 12, instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, in which he frankly stated that he desired the maintenance of Turkey's integrity, and that he had put the project of partitioning Turkey before Alexander solely for the purpose of attaching him to France with the bonds of hope. In these most important instructions to Caulaincourt we read :

Cette chute de l'empire ottoman peut être désirée par le cabinet de Pétersbourg : on sait qu'elle est inévitable, mais il n'est point de la politique des deux cours impériales de l'accélérer ; elles doivent la reculer jusqu'au moment où le partage de ces vastes débris pourra se faire d'une manière plus avantageuse pour l'une et pour l'autre et où elles n'auront pas à craindre qu'une puissance actuellement leur ennemie s'en approprie, par la possession de l'Egypte et des îles, les plus riches dépouilles. C'est la plus forte objection de l'Empereur contre le partage de l'empire ottoman.

To these instructions Napoleon added himself the following marginal note emphasising his desire to preserve the integrity of Turkey :

Ainsi, le véritable désir de l'Empereur dans ce moment est que l'empire ottoman reste dans son intégrité actuelle, vivant en paix avec la Russie et la France, ayant pour limites le thalweg du Danube plus les places que la Turquie a sur ce fleuve. . . .

The instructions to M. de Caulaincourt then continued as follows :

Telles sont donc, Monsieur, sur ce point important de politique, les intentions de l'Empereur. Ce qu'il préférerait

à tout serait que les Turcs pussent rester en paisible possession de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. . . .

Et enfin, quoique très éloigné du partage de l'empire turc et regardant cette mesure comme funeste, il ne veut pas qu'en vous expliquant avec l'Empereur Alexandre et son ministre, vous la condamnerez d'une manière absolue : mais il vous prescrit de représenter avec force les motifs qui doivent en faire reculer l'époque. Cet antique projet de l'ambition russe est un lien qui peut attacher la Russie à la France et, sous ce point de vue, il faut se garder de décourager entièrement ses espérances.

After informing his Ambassador that the projected partition of Turkey was nothing but a piece of deception whereby to secure Alexander's support, Napoleon told him in the same instructions that the projected Franco-Russian expedition against India was a sham, and that he had put it forward only with the object of frightening the English into making peace. That most extraordinary and most significant passage runs as follows :

On pourra songer à une expédition dans les Indes ; plus elle paraît chimérique, plus la tentative qui en serait faite (et que ne peuvent la France et la Russie ?) épouvanterait les Anglais. La terreur semée dans les Indes Anglaises répandrait la confusion à Londres, et certainement quarante mille Français auxquels la Porte aurait accordé passage par Constantinople, se joignant à quarante mille Russes venus par le Caucase, suffiraient pour épouvanter l'Asie et pour en faire la conquête. C'est dans de pareilles vues que l'Empereur a laissé l'ambassadeur qu'il avait nommé pour la Perse se rendre à sa destination.

Napoleon's saying, 'The more fantastic an attempt to attack India will be, the more it will frighten the English,' is very amusing. There is some reason in his observation. England is more easily frightened by bogies than by realities, and one of the bogies which has frightened her most frequently during many decades is the bogey of Constantinople which Napoleon set up a century ago.

Being carried away by his enthusiasm and simple trustfulness, Alexander the First, remembering and often repeating the words which Napoleon had uttered at Tilsit, believed that Constantinople was in his grasp. However, he and his advisers doubted that the joint expedition against India projected by Napoleon was easy to carry out. According to Caulaincourt's report of December 31, 1807, Alexander the First and his minister received with some reserve the French proposals relating to that expedition. They obviously estimated more correctly the difficulties which such an undertaking would encounter owing to the vast distances and the wildness of the route. They did not share the illusions of Paul the First.

The French Ambassador in Russia was in constant and intimate relations with Alexander the First, and he reported his conversations like an accomplished shorthand-writer. According to a conversation with the Czar, which he communicated to Napoleon on January 21, 1808, Napoleon himself had admitted at Tilsit the impossibility of striking at India by a march overland. The Ambassador reported :

Alexandre I : L'Empereur (Napoléon) m'en a parlé à Tilsit. Je suis entré là-dessus en détail avec lui. Il m'a paru convaincu comme moi que c'était impossible.

L'Ambassadeur : Les choses impossibles sont ordinairement celles qui réussissent le mieux, parce que ce sont celles auxquelles on s'attend le moins.

Alexandre I : Mais les distances, les subsistances, les déserts ?

L'Ambassadeur : Les troupes de Votre Majesté qui sont venues d'Irkoutsk en Autriche ou en Pologne ont fait plus de chemin qu'il n'y en a des frontières de son empire dans l'Inde. Quant aux subsistances, le biscuit est si sain et si portatif qu'on peut en emporter beaucoup avec peu de transport. Tout n'est pas désert.

Alexandre I : Mais par où pensez-vous nos armées devraient passer ?

L'Ambassadeur : Il faudrait préalablement des conven-

tions avec la Perse et la Turquie. L'Armée française, par exemple, en ferait une avec la Porte, puisque Constantinople est son chemin naturel. Celle de Votre Majesté passerait par le Caucase, si on n'avait pas les moyens nécessaires pour lui faire traverser la mer Caspienne.

Alexandre I : Mon cher général, c'est un bien grand projet. Mais que de difficultés, pour ne pas dire plus.

While in the time of Paul the First the combined French and Russian armies were to march upon India via Warsaw and the Caspian Sea, Napoleon now proposed that the French army should march via Constantinople. He evidently sought for a pretext of occupying and controlling that town and the Straits, and with them the Russian Black Sea. Meanwhile he continued playing with Alexander. On February 2, 1808, he wrote to his Ambassador in Russia that he was on the point of arranging for an expedition to India, combined with the partition of Turkey, that a joint army of twenty to twenty-five thousand Russians, eight to ten thousand Austrians, and thirty to forty thousand Frenchmen, should be set in motion towards India ; ' que rien n'est facile comme cette opération ; qu'il est certain qu'avant que cette armée soit sur l'Euphrate la terreur sera en Angleterre.' On February 6, 1808, Napoleon told the Russian Ambassador, Count Tolstoi, according to the report of the latter, ' Une fois sur l'Euphrate, rien n'empêche d'arriver aux Indes. Ce n'est pas une raison pour échouer dans cette entreprise parce qu'Alexandre et Tamerlan n'y ont pas réussi. Il s'agit de faire mieux qu'eux.'

While Napoleon was amusing Alexander with vain hopes and fantastic proposals, the Czar had begun a very costly war with England in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Tilsit. Feeling at last that the question of Turkey was being treated dilatorily and with the greatest vagueness by Napoleon, he pressed for some more definite arrangement, and a series of non-official conferences regarding that country took place between the French Ambassador

in Russia and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Acting upon his secret instructions given above, Caulaincourt prevaricated and at first refused to consider the question of Constantinople because that position was strategically too important to be rashly disposed of. Being anxious to dispossess the Turks, largely for reasons of humanity, Alexander then proposed to make Constantinople a free town. According to Caulaincourt's report of March 1, 1808, the Czar said to the French Ambassador, 'Constantinople est un point important, trop loin de vous et que vous regardez peut-être comme trop important pour nous. J'ai une idée pour que cela ne fasse pas de difficultés, faisons-en une espèce de ville libre.'

The question arose what equivalent could be given to France if Russia should take Constantinople. At the second conference, which took place on March 2, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that France should occupy Egypt, stating, 'La France a toujours désiré l'Egypte. Sous le règne de l'impératrice Catherine, elle nous avait fait proposer par l'empereur Joseph II de nous laisser aller à Constantinople si nous lui laissions prendre l'Egypte.' The question of Constantinople itself had to be tackled. On March 4 the French Ambassador, speaking, of course, without authority, offered Constantinople to Russia, but claimed at the same time the Dardanelles for France. In other words, he suggested that although Russia might possibly be allowed to occupy Constantinople, France ought to dominate that town by the possession of the Dardanelles! Not unnaturally, the Czar, who was apprised of these demands, refused even to consider that suggestion.

In course of time, the real intentions of Napoleon were revealed to Russia. The Czar recognised that Napoleon had fooled him and had used him as a tool. The Alliance was followed by a breach between the two monarchs, by Napoleon's defeat in 1812, and by his downfall.

The most important documents quoted in these pages show conclusively that the Russian expeditions against

India prepared or discussed in the time of Napoleon were inspired not by Paul the First and Alexander the First, but by the great Corsican, that Alexander desired to acquire Constantinople chiefly owing to Napoleon's incitement, that the joint Franco-Russian expedition against India was sheer and deliberate humbug to frighten the English. In the words of the great historian Vandal, the author of the best book on Napoleon and Alexander the First :

The idea of partitioning Turkey was rather a Napoleonic than a Russian idea. Napoleon rather intended to make a demonstration than an attack. He thought that if the French troops crossed the Bosphorus, Asia would be trembling, and England's position be shaken to its very foundations ; that in view of the menace she would be willing to make peace with France.

The documents given clearly establish that Napoleon neither intended to give Constantinople to Russia, nor to attack England in India, that on the contrary he wanted Constantinople for France, and that he attached greater value to Egypt than to Constantinople. In his instructions to Caulaincourt, Napoleon confessed that his plans could be carried out only if he ruled the sea, that a premature movement on Constantinople would result in England occupying Egypt, the most valuable part of the Turkish empire. Napoleon might conceivably have given to Russia Constantinople for a time, but he would have done so only with the object of involving Russia in trouble with England. According to Villemain, he said : ' J'ai voulu refouler amicalement la Russie en Asie ; je lui ai offert Constantinople.' Commenting on these words, Vandal tells us that, in dangling the bait of Constantinople before Russia, Napoleon merely aimed at involving that country in a life-and-death struggle with England.

Rather by his threats of attacking India in company with Russia overland than by any actual attempt at carrying out that mad adventure, did Napoleon create

profound suspicion against Russia among the English, and that suspicion has been the cause of a century of Anglo-Russian suspicion, friction, and misunderstandings. At the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh opposed Russia's acquisition of Poland, fearing that that country might become dangerously strong. Replying to the expressions of the British representative's fears, Alexander sent Lord Castlereagh, on November 21, 1814, a most remarkable memorandum—the clumsy translation is that given in the British Blue Book—in which we read :

Justice established, as an immutable rule for all the transactions between the coalesced States, that the advantages which each of them should be summoned to reap from the triumph of the common cause should be in proportion to the perseverance of their efforts and to the magnitude of the sacrifices.

The necessity for a political balance in its turn prescribed that there should be given to each State a degree of consistency and of political Conventions in the means which each of them should possess in itself to cause them to be respected.

By invariably acting in accordance with the two principles which have been just stated the Emperor resolved to enter upon the war, to support it alone at its commencement, and to carry it on by means of a coalition up to the single point at which the general pacification of Europe might be based on the solid and immovable foundations of the independence of States and of the sacred rights of nations. The barrier of the Oder once overstepped, Russia fought only for her Allies : in order to increase the power of Prussia and of Austria, to deliver Germany, to save France from the frenzy of a despotism of which she alone bore the entire weight after her reverses.

If the Emperor had based his policy upon combinations of a private and exclusive interest when the army of Napoleon, collected together, so to speak, at the expense of Europe, had found its grave in Russia, His Majesty could have made peace with France ; and without exposing

himself to the chances of a war the issue of which was so much the more uncertain as it depended on the determination of other Cabinets, without imposing fresh sacrifices on his people, might have contented himself, on the one hand, with the security acquired for his Empire ; and, on the other hand, have acquiesced in the conditions which Bonaparte, instructed by a sad experience, would have been eager to propose to him. But the Emperor, in the magnanimous enterprise to which he had applied himself, availed himself of the generous enthusiasm of his people to second the desires of all the nations of Europe. He fought with disinterested views for a cause with which the destinies of the human race were connected. Faithful to his principles, His Majesty has constantly laboured to favour the interests of the Powers which had rallied round the common cause, placing his own interests only in the second rank. He has lavished his resources in order to render their united efforts prosperous under the firm conviction that his Allies, far from finding in a conduct so pure grounds for complaint, would be grateful to him for having made all private consideration subordinate to the success of an enterprise which had the general good for its object.

The Czar spoke truly. He had fought in 1813 and 1814 against Napoleon for purely ideal reasons. After Napoleon's disastrous defeat in Russia in 1812 Russia herself was secure against another attack from France. Had she followed a purely selfish policy, she would have left the Western Powers to their fate. While they were weakened in their struggle against Napoleon the powerful Russian army might have secured the most far-reaching advantages to the country, and it might certainly have taken Constantinople. In 1813 Alexander obviously joined in the war against Napoleon actuated by the wish of giving at last a durable peace to Europe. How strongly the Czar was inspired by ideal and religious motives may be seen from the Holy Alliance Treaty which he drew up in his own handwriting, and which established that henceforth all rulers should be guided in their policy solely by the dictates

of the Christian religion. That little-known document was worded as follows :

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia having in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and their hope in it alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settling the steps to be observed by the Powers in their reciprocal relations upon the sublime truths which the Holy Religion of our Saviour teaches :

They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to publish, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. In consequence their Majesties have agreed to the following Articles :—

Article 1. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the Three Contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow-countrymen they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.

Article 2. In consequence the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service,

and of testifying by unalterable goodwill the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation: the three allied Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind.

Article 3. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance.

After the Peace of Vienna an era of reaction began, and the hostility shown by the Governments to the people was attributed not to Prince Metternich, who was chiefly responsible for it, but to the Czar and to the Holy Alliance, which was considered to be an instrument of oppression. However, the fact that the Holy Alliance was a purely ideal compact is attested by Prince Metternich himself in his *Memoirs*. After describing its genesis, Metternich wrote :

Voilà l'histoire de la Sainte Alliance, qui même dans l'esprit prévenu de son auteur, ne devait être qu'une manifestation morale, tandis qu'aux yeux des autres signataires de l'acte elle n'avait pas même cette signification ; par conséquent elle ne mérite aucune des interprétations que

l'esprit de parti lui a données dans la suite. . . . Ulérieurement il n'a jamais été question, entre les cabinets, de la 'Sainte Alliance,' et jamais il n'aurait pu en être question. Les partis hostiles aux Souverains ont seuls exploité cet acte, et s'en servis comme d'une arme pour calomnier les intentions les plus pures de leurs adversaires. La 'Sainte Alliance' n'a pas été fondée pour restreindre les droits des peuples ni pour favoriser l'absolutisme et la tyrannie sous n'importe quelle forme. Elle fut uniquement l'expression des sentiments mystiques de l'Empereur Alexandre et l'application des principes du Christianisme à la politique.

Metternich described Alexander's liberal and generous views as 'chimerical, revolutionary, and jacobinic' in his letters to the Austrian Emperor, and in his Memoirs and his correspondence he prided himself that he had succeeded in regaining the Czar to reaction. Metternich and other Austrian and German statesmen strove to keep Russia backward and weak by recommending a policy of repression and persecution. Austria and Germany have been largely responsible for Russian illiberalism and Russian oppression in the past.

Let us now cast a brief glance at the events which brought about the Crimean War.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Turkey was almost continually in a state of the gravest disorder, and its downfall seemed to be imminent. Alexander the First had died in 1825, and had been succeeded by Nicholas the First. Believing a catastrophe in Turkey possible, he appointed, in 1829, a special committee, consisting of the most eminent statesmen, to consider the problem of Turkey. According to de Martens, 'Recueil des traités de la Russie,' Count Nesselrode, the Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, stated before that Committee that the preservation of Turkey was rather useful than harmful to the true interests of Russia, that it was in the interest of the country to have for neighbour a weak State such as Turkey. After thorough and lengthy discussion, the following resolutions

were adopted at a sitting presided over by the Czar himself :

(1) That the advantages of maintaining Turkey in Europe are greater than the disadvantages ;

(2) That consequently the downfall of Turkey would be opposed to Russia's own interests ;

(3) That therefore it would be prudent to prevent its fall and to take advantage of the opportunity which might offer for concluding an honourable peace. However, if the last hour of Turkey in Europe should have struck, Russia would be compelled to take the most energetic measures in order to prevent the openings leading to the Black Sea falling into the hands of another Great Power.

During the period preceding the outbreak of the Crimean War, Russia's policy was directed by the principles laid down in 1829, and the war itself was obviously due to misunderstandings between England and Russia, and to the prevalence of that distrust of Russia among Englishmen which Napoleon had created in the past. Foreseeing the possibility of Turkey's collapse, the Czar desired to provide toward such an event in conjunction with England. With this object in view, he told the British Ambassador on January 9, 1853 :

The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition ; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces ; the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs and that neither should take any decisive step.

Tenez ; nous avons sur les bras un homme malade—un homme gravement malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous échapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions nécessaires fussent prises. Mais enfin ce n'est point le moment de vous parler de cela.

Five days later, on January 14, the Czar disclosed his intentions more clearly to the British Ambassador. Fearing

that in case of Turkey's downfall England might seize Constantinople, and desiring to prevent that event in accordance with the principles laid down by the Committee of 1829 and given above, he stated :

Maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en gentleman ; si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l'Angleterre et moi, pour le reste, peu m'importe ; il m'est indifférent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l'Angleterre songe à s'établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas ; je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement ; de mon côté, je suis également disposé de prendre l'engagement de ne pas m'y établir, en propriétaire, il s'entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas ; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu si l'on doit tout laisser aller au hasard.

Commenting upon the Czar's confidential statements, the Ambassador reported that he was 'impressed with the belief that . . . his Majesty is sincerely desirous of acting in harmony with her Majesty's Government.' In a further conversation the Czar told the Ambassador on February 21 :

The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be reconstituted. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only see that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia ; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.

The intentions of the Czar, though somewhat vaguely expressed, were perfectly clear. He wished to bring about a peaceful solution of the Turkish problem in case of Turkey's downfall. In accordance with the principles laid down in 1829, he did not desire to see the Dardanelles in the hands of a first-rate Power, and was unwilling to see England

established in Constantinople and dominating the Black Sea. He was apparently quite willing that Constantinople and the Straits should be held by some small Power instead of Turkey, or that the position should be internationalised in some form or other in accordance with the ideas expressed by his brother in 1808, so long as he could feel reasonably secure that no foreign Power would seize the openings of the Black Sea and attack Russia in its most vulnerable quarter. If England should meet him in his desire to regulate the position of Constantinople in a way which would not threaten Russia's security in the Black Sea, he was quite willing that England should occupy Egypt. Possibly the idea that Russia should acquire Constantinople was at the back of his mind, but as Egypt was far more valuable than Constantinople, he had offered beforehand the most ample compensation to this country. Unfortunately, the distrust existing against Russia since the time of Napoleon was too deeply rooted. The Czar's proposals were treated almost contemptuously. In replying to the Czar, the British Government, adverting to the sufferings of the Christians living in Turkey upon which Nicholas had dwelt, stated on March 28 :

. . . The treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some Governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power.

Her Majesty's Government believe that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its Allies, and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan.

The English Government, being filled with suspicions, did not even make a serious attempt to discover the aims and intentions of the Czar. Vaguely dreading Russia, England supported Turkey against that country. Thus Great Britain has been largely responsible not only for the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, but

also for the ill-treatment of the Christians and the massacres which have taken place throughout Turkey during many decades.

What has created England's instinctive fear of Russia? If we look at the map, if we consider size to be a criterion of national strength, then Russia is immensely powerful. However, the Russo-Turkish War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the present War have shown that we need perhaps not have feared Russia's strength so much as her weakness. If Russia had been stronger, if Russia's strength had been in accordance with the views which until lately were generally held here, the present War would not have broken out. German soldiers evidently appraised the military power of Russia far more correctly than did British statesmen, who are habitually ill-informed on military matters. By opposing Russia in the past, England has worked not for her own advantage and for the security of India, but for the benefit of Germany and Austria. England's anti-Russian policy and Russia's anti-British policy were largely inspired first from Paris and then from Berlin and Vienna. That is plain to all who are acquainted with recent diplomatic history.

The century-old antagonism between England and Russia has been the work of Napoleon, of Bismarck, and of Bismarck's successors. The Russian danger, Russia's aggressiveness, and Russia's constant desire to seize India, are largely figments of the imagination. Russia has little desire to possess India. If she had it she would probably be unable to administer it. The late Czar said to Prince Hohenlohe on September 6, 1896: 'Who is to take India from the English? We are not stupid enough to have that plan.' It would be as difficult for Russia to attack India at the present day as it was in the time of the Emperor Paul. It is true Russia has now a couple of railways which run up to the Indian frontier, but India also has railways; these will facilitate the concentration of troops at any point at which that country may be attacked, and with

the development of transport by land and sea, and the growth of the Empire, the danger of an attack upon India, by Russia seems to be growing smaller from year to year. In the picturesque language of the late Lord Salisbury, England backed the wrong horse in opposing Russia's policy towards Turkey in the past.

National policy is, as a rule, in accordance with the national character. The Russians are rather dreamers than men of action, rather men of quiet thought than men of ambition. The heroes of Tolstoy and of other great Russian authors are not men of the Nietzsche type, but men of peace, idealists, desiring the best, animated by a deep sense of religion. The strong idealist strain in the Russian character has found expression not only in the idealist policy followed by Alexander the First and Nicholas the Second, but in that of other Russian Czars as well. Russia has had a Peter the Great, but she has not had a Napoleon, and she is not likely to have one. Those who believe that Russia aims at dominating the world, at conquering all Asia, and invading India, are neither acquainted with the Russian character nor with the resources, the capabilities, and the needs of the country.

Russia is a very large State. It is extremely powerful for defence, because it is protected by vast distances, a rigorous climate, and very inferior means of communication. The same circumstances which make Russia exceedingly powerful for defence make her very weak for a war of aggression. That has been seen in all her foreign wars without a single exception. Last, but not least, the Russian people and their rulers have become awakened to the necessity of modernising the country. A new Russia has arisen. Russia has made rapid progress during the last two decades, but her progress has perhaps been slower than that of other nations. Hence Russia is still very poor and backward. She has some railways, but her means of inland transport are totally insufficient. She has scarcely any roads, except a few military ones.

France has ten times the mileage of roads possessed by Russia. During the Great War we have frequently heard of the absence of roads in Poland and of the impossibility of moving troops through a sea of mud. Yet Poland is that district of Russia which is best provided with roads.

The peasants throughout Russia use still almost exclusively wooden ploughs with which only the surface can be scratched. By changing their wooden ploughs for iron ones they could plough twice as deeply and double their harvests, but they are too poor to provide modern agricultural implements. In many Russian villages no iron implements, not even iron nails, may be seen, and the methods of Russia's agriculture are still those of the Dark Ages.

The manufacturing industries of the country are in their infancy. The vast majority of the people can neither read nor write, and newspapers exist only in the large towns. If we compare the economic and social conditions of Russia with those existing in other countries, it becomes clear that the principal need of Russia is not further expansion, but internal development, and in view of the poverty of the country the development of the great Russian estate is possible only in time of peace. For her the restriction of armaments is more necessary than it is for any other Great Power. The principal interest of Russia is peace. That has become clear to every thinking Russian and to the whole Russian nation.

When the great Peace Congress assembles the question of Constantinople will come up for settlement, and from interested quarters we shall be told once more that Constantinople is 'the key of the world.' A glance at the map shows that Constantinople is not the key of the world, and is not even the key of the Mediterranean, but that it is merely the key of the Black Sea. Prince Bismarck possessed military ability of the highest kind, and, being keenly aware that foreign policy and strategy must go hand in hand, he kept constantly in touch with Germany's leading soldiers. He clearly recognised the fallacy of

Napoleon's celebrated epigram. Hence, when a member of the Reichstag, referring to the Eastern Question, spoke of the Dardanelles as the key to the dominion of the world, Bismarck smilingly replied, 'If the Dardanelles are the key to the dominion of the world it obviously follows that up to now the Sultan has dominated the world.' Constantinople has been possessed by various States, but none of them has so far dominated the world. In Bismarck's words, Constantinople has disagreed with all the nations which have possessed it hitherto. Why that has been the case will presently be shown.

So far Constantinople has not given a great accession of strength to the nations which have held it. Far from considering Constantinople in the hands of Russia as a source of strength, Bismarck rather saw in it a source of weakness and of danger. He wrote in his 'Memoirs': 'I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position.'

Russia is almost invulnerable as long as she can defend herself with her best weapons, her vast distances, her lack of railways and roads, and her rigorous climate. But the same elements become disadvantageous to Russia's defence if a highly vulnerable point near her frontier can be attacked. In the Crimean War Russia almost bled to death because of the difficulty of sending troops to the Crimea. Her failure in Manchuria arose from the same cause.

At present Russia possesses only one point of capital importance on the sea, St. Petersburg, which can comparatively easily be attacked by an army landed in the neighbourhood. If she occupies Constantinople, she must be ready to defend it, and a very large number of troops will be required to protect the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Straits against an enemy.

It is not generally known that the Constantinople position is not circumscribed but very extensive, and that it is not easy to defend it against a mobile and powerful

enemy, especially if it is simultaneously attacked by land and sea. The small maps of Turkey are deceptive. It is hardly realised that the distance from the entrance of the Dardanelles to the exit of the Bosphorus is nearly two hundred miles. Strategists are agreed that a Power holding Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles must possess territory at least as far inland as the Enos-Midia line—that is, the line from the town of Enos opposite the island of Samothraki to the town of Midia on the Black Sea. A straight line connecting these two towns would be 120 miles long, or exactly as long as the distance which separates London from Cardiff, Paris from Boulogne, or Strasburg from Coblenz. It is clear that a large army and extensive fortifications are needed to defend so broad a front against a determined attack. In addition, Russia would have to defend the shore of the Gulf of Saros and the sea-coast of the peninsula of Galipoli against a landing. This shore-line extends to about one hundred miles. Lastly, she would have to defend the opening of the Dardanelles and to prevent an attack upon the Constantinople position across the narrows from the Asiatic mainland.

It would be difficult enough to defend this vulnerable and extensive position if it was organically connected with Russia. It will of course be still more difficult to defend it in view of the fact that Roumania and Bulgaria, two powerful States, separate Russia from Constantinople. Russia can reach Constantinople only by sea unless she should succeed in incorporating Roumania and Bulgaria in some way or other, or unless the entire north of Asia Minor should fall into Russia's hands, enabling that country to create a land connection between her Caucasian provinces and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora and the two Straits. Both events appear unlikely.

The Constantinople position, if held by Russia, would be detached from that country. The Russian troops garrisoning it would be cut off from the motherland in case of war. Hence they would have to be prepared for

a sudden attack and to be always strong enough to defend the peninsula unaided for a very long time. They would have to be provided with gigantic stores of food and of ammunition. It is therefore clear that Russia would require a very large permanent garrison for securing the integrity of Constantinople. In case of war she would undoubtedly require several hundred thousand men for that purpose. Possibly she would need as many as 500,000 men if a determined attack by land and sea was likely ; and herein lies the reason for the opinion of the Commission of 1829 that it would be to Russia's advantage if the *status quo* at Constantinople was not disturbed, if a weak Power was in the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

There are two points of very great strategical importance in the Eastern Mediterranean : the position of Constantinople and Egypt ; and Egypt is undoubtedly by far the more important of the two. When in 1797 Napoleon reached the Adriatic he was struck by the incomparable advantages offered by the position of Egypt, and he earmarked that country for France in case of a partition of Turkey. A year later he headed an expedition to Egypt, not merely in order to strike at England, but largely, if not chiefly, in order to conquer that most important strategical position for France. While the Sea of Marmora and the Straits are merely the connecting links between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Egypt, especially since the construction of the Suez Canal, is the connecting link of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, of Europe and Asia, of the most populated continents and the busiest seas. Hence the Suez Canal route is, and will remain for centuries, the most valuable strategical and trade route in the world, and it is of course of particular importance to the nation which possesses India. Bismarck said to Busch :

Egypt is as necessary to England as is her daily bread, because of the Suez Canal, which is the shortest connection between the Eastern and Western halves of the British

Empire. The Suez Canal is like the nerve at the back of the neck which connects the spine with the brain.

Those who believe in Napoleonic epigrams will find several remarkable epigrams relating to Egypt. The great Corsican said to Montholon, 'Si j'étais resté en Egypte, je serais à présent empereur d'Orient. . . . L'Orient n'attend qu'un homme.' He said to Las Cases, 'De l'Egypte j'aurais atteint Constantinople et les Indes; j'eusse changé la face du monde.' He dictated to Gourgaud, 'Qui est maître de l'Egypte l'est de l'Inde.' The last maxim should be particularly interesting to Englishmen. How great a value Napoleon attached to Egypt will be seen from his 'Memoirs' dictated to Las Cases, Gourgaud, and Montholon at St. Helena, and from volumes xxix., xxx., and xxxi. of his 'Correspondence.'

If we wish to compare the relative importance of Constantinople and of the Suez Canal, we need only assume that another Power possessed Egypt and Great Britain Constantinople. While Constantinople would be useless to Great Britain, the occupation of Egypt by a non-British Power would jeopardise Britain's position in India and her Eastern trade. Napoleon, with his keen eye for strategy, told O'Meara :

Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell India to the English. Turkey must soon fall, and it will be impossible to divide it without allotting some portion to France, which will be Egypt. But if you had kept Alexandria, you would have prevented the French from obtaining it, and of ultimately gaining possession of India, which will certainly follow their possession of Egypt.

In the sailing-ship era the position of Constantinople was far more important to England than it is at present. Then Russia, dominating Constantinople, might conceivably have sent a large fleet into the Mediterranean and have seized Malta, Egypt, and Gibraltar before England could have received any news of the sailing of the Russian armada.

With the advent of the electric cable, wireless telegraphy, and steam shipping, that danger has disappeared.

From the Russian point of view Constantinople is valuable partly for ideal, partly for strategical reasons, and partly because the Narrows are economically of the highest importance to Russia. Their closure destroys the most important part of Russia's sea trade.

The glamour of Constantinople and its incomparable position on the Golden Horn has fascinated men since the earliest times. Constantinople might become the third capital of Russia, and it would, for historical and religious reasons, be a capital worthy of that great Empire. From the strategical point of view Russia desires to possess Constantinople not for aggression, but for defence, for protecting the Black Sea shores. Whether, however, she would be wise in accepting Constantinople, even if it were offered to her by all Europe, seems somewhat doubtful. It is true that Constantinople dominates the Black Sea. At the same time Constantinople is dominated by the lands of the Balkan Peninsula. In Talleyrand's words: 'Le centre de gravité du monde n'est ni sur l'Elbe, ni sur l'Adige, il est là-bas aux frontières de l'Europe, sur le Danube.' Similarly Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, one of Napoleon's best generals, said in his 'Memoirs' that Wallachia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria were, in his opinion, the key of the Orient. He thought that the security of Europe was less threatened by Russia possessing Constantinople, supposing the Austrians occupied the countries at the mouth of the Danube, than if Constantinople was held by French and English troops while the Russians were masters of the lower Danube. The reasoning of Talleyrand and Marmont seems faultless. It will probably be confirmed by the British strategists, who ought to be consulted by our statesmen on the strategical value of Constantinople. A demonstration of the Balkan States, especially if it were backed by their Central European supporters, against the 120 miles of the Enos-Midia line would obviously convert

the Constantinople position from a strategical asset into a very serious strategical liability. It is true that in the event of a Russian attack upon India, England could no longer attack Russia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. However, as Constantinople is a far more valuable point to Russia than the Crimea or Odessa, and as the Balkan States themselves may desire to possess Constantinople, it is obvious that by occupying it Russia would not increase her power, but would merely expose herself to greater dangers than heretofore.

Various proposals have been made for dealing with Constantinople and the Straits after the expulsion of the Turks. Some have advocated that Constantinople should be given to Russia, some that the position should be given to some small Power, such as Bulgaria, or be divided between two or more Powers, one possessing the southern and the other the northern shore; others have recommended that that much coveted position should be neutralised in some form or other. The importance of Constantinople to Russia lies in this, that it is the door to her house, that he who holds Constantinople is able to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Consequently Russia and Russia's principal opponents would continue to strive for the possession of the Narrows, supposing they had been given to some small Power, to several Powers in joint occupation, or had been neutralised. The struggle for Constantinople can obviously end only when the town is possessed by a first-rate Power. That seems the only solution which promises finality, and the only Power which has a strong claim upon the possession of Constantinople is evidently Russia.

Until recently it seemed possible that Constantinople would become the capital of one of the Balkan States or of a Balkan Confederation. Many years ago Mazzini, addressing the awakening Balkan nations, admonished them: 'Stringetevi in una Confederazione e sia Constantinopoli la vostra città anfizionica, la città dei vostri poteri centrali, aperta a tutti, serva a nessuno.' The internecine

war of the Balkan States has destroyed, apparently for ever, the possibility that Constantinople will belong to the Balkan peoples, and perhaps it is better that it is so. Constantinople might have proved as fatal an acquisition to the Balkan peoples as it has proved to the Turks, and for all we know it may not prove a blessing to Russia.

Those who fear that Russia might become a danger to Europe in the future, and who would therefore like to see the *status quo* preserved both in Austria-Hungary and at Constantinople—at first sight Austria-Hungary, as at present constituted, appears to be an efficient counterpoise to Russia—seem very short-sighted. I think I have shown that Russia's acquisition of Constantinople, far from increasing Russia's military strength, would greatly increase her vulnerability. Hence the possession of Constantinople should make Russia more cautious and more peaceful. Similarly, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary into its component parts—an event which at present is contemplated with dread by those who fear Russia's power—would apparently not increase Russia's strength or the strength of Slavism, but would more likely be disadvantageous to both. The weakness of Austria-Hungary arises from its disunion. Owing to its disunion the country is militarily and economically weak. If Austria-Hungary should be replaced by a number of self-governing States these will develop much faster. Some of these States will be Slavonic, but it is not likely that they will become Russia's tools. Liberated nations, as Bismarck has told us, are not grateful, but exacting. The Balkan nations which Russia has freed from the Turkish yoke, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Roumania, have promptly asserted their independence from Russia, and have developed a strong individuality of their own. The Slavonic nationalities of Austria-Hungary also would probably assert their independence. For economic reasons the small and medium-sized nations in the Balkan Peninsula and within the limits of present-day Austria-Hungary would probably combine, and if they

were threatened from Russia they would naturally form a strong political union. A greater Austria-Hungary, a State on a federal basis, would arise in the place of the present State, and, strengthened by self-government, the power of that confederation would be far greater than that possessed by the Dual Monarchy.

Since the time when these pages were written the Russian autocracy has disappeared and has been replaced by the republic. Many of the Russian democratic leaders have proclaimed that they are opposed to the autocratic policy of conquest, that they do not wish to possess Constantinople. It remains to be seen whether the new leaders of Russia will abandon the century-old aim of their country. Not only the Russian sovereigns but the Russian people themselves have for centuries striven to control the Narrows which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, guided not merely by ambition but by the conviction that Russia required an adequate outlet to the sea for economic reasons. The Russian sovereigns who tried to conquer Constantinople followed, therefore, not a personal but a national policy. When, at the beginning of the War, Russia's war aims were discussed in the Imperial Duma, practically all the speakers demanded the acquisition of Constantinople. The wealthiest districts of Russia lie in the south. The north is largely barren. The productions of Southern Russia go towards the Black Sea by the magnificent Russian rivers and by railways. The War has shown that the Power which controls the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles can blockade Russia, can strangle the economic life of the country. That is a position which may appear undesirable even to the most enthusiastic Russian democrats and to the most convinced anti-annexationists. After all, a great nation requires adequate access to the sea.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF ASIATIC TURKEY¹

THE problem of Constantinople has perplexed and distressed the world during many centuries. Numerous wars have been waged, and innumerable lives have been sacrificed by the nations desiring to possess or control that glorious city and the wonderful Narrows which separate Europe from Asia and which connect the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the East and the West, the Slavonic and the Latin-Germanic world. Hitherto it was generally believed that an attempt to settle the question of Constantinople would inevitably lead to a world war among the claimant States, that their agreement was impossible. Hence diplomats thought with dread of the question of Constantinople, which seemed insoluble. The Great War has broadened men's minds, and has bridged many historic differences. It has created new enemies, but it has also created new friends, and it appears that the problem of Constantinople will peacefully and permanently be settled when the Entente Powers have achieved their final victory. However, while we may rejoice that the ever-threatening problem of Constantinople has at last been eliminated, it seems possible that another, a far greater and a far more dangerous one, may almost immediately arise in its place. The question of Asiatic Turkey is forcing itself to the front, and it may convulse the world in a series of devastating

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1916.

wars unless it be solved together with the other great questions which will come up for settlement at the Peace Congress.

Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. Not only the map of Europe, but that of the world, will have to be re-drawn. The coming settlement will be greater, and may be far more difficult, than that made at Vienna a hundred years ago. It would therefore not be surprising if those of the assembled statesmen who are not sufficiently acquainted with the significance, the importance, and the danger of the problem of Asiatic Turkey should say, 'We have our hands full. Let us not touch the question of Asiatic Turkey. That is a matter for another generation.' That attitude is understandable, but it should not deter those statesmen who realise the portent and the peril of the Turco-Asiatic problem, and the danger of leaving it in abeyance, from impressing upon their less well-informed colleagues the necessity of a settlement.

The question of Asiatic Turkey is undoubtedly a far more difficult question than that of Constantinople. Constantinople and the Straits are, as I have shown, not the key to the Dominion of the World, as Napoleon the First asserted, but merely the key to the Black Sea. Former generations, uncritically repeating Napoleon's celebrated dictum, have greatly overrated the strategical importance of that wonderful site. The importance and value of Asiatic Turkey on the other hand can scarcely be exaggerated, for it occupies undoubtedly the most important strategical position in the world. It forms the nucleus and centre of the Old World. It separates, and at the same time connects, Europe, Asia, and Africa, three continents which are inhabited by approximately nine-tenths of the human race.

If we wish clearly to understand the importance of Asiatic Turkey, we must study its position not only from the strategical point of view, but also from the religious and from the economic points of view.

Asiatic Turkey occupies a most commanding position, both for war and for trade. A glance at a map shows that Asiatic Turkey is the link and the bridge which connects Africa with Asia and both with Europe. It occupies a position whence three continents may easily be threatened and attacked. The strategical importance of a site depends obviously not only on its geographical position, but also on its military value, on the facilities which it offers both for defence and for attack. Looked at from the defensive point of view, Asiatic Turkey forms an enormous natural fortress of the greatest strength. The waters of the Black Sea, of the Mediterranean, of the Red Sea, and of the Persian Gulf efficiently shelter the larger part of its borders, while its land frontiers are equally powerfully protected by gigantic waterless deserts and lofty mountain ranges. Range after range of mountains protect Asiatic Turkey towards Russia and Persia. The non-Turkish part of Arabia is a torrid desert, and one of the least-known and least-explored countries in the world. In the south-west Asiatic Turkey is protected by the barren waste of the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and the Sahara. Thus, Asiatic Turkey enjoys virtually all the advantages of an island, being surrounded on all sides by the sea and sandy and mountainous wastes.

Asia Minor is the nucleus, the territorial base, and the citadel of Asiatic Turkey. High mountain walls rise on its Black Sea and Mediterranean shores, and it is sheltered towards the south by the mighty Taurus chain of mountains which stretches from the Gulf of Alexandretta, opposite Cyprus, to the Persian frontier. Thus the Taurus forms a wall of defence from 7,000 to 10,000 feet high against an enemy advancing upon Asia Minor from the east or from the south, from the Red Sea and Syria, or from the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia.

The best defence is the attack. The importance of a fortress lies not so much in its strength for purely passive defence as in its usefulness as a base for an attack. An

impregnable fortress which cannot serve as a base of attack because it lies on an inaccessible mountain or on an out-of-the-way island can safely be disregarded by an enemy, and is therefore militarily worthless. Asiatic Turkey is a natural fortress which possesses vast possibilities for attack, for it borders upon some of the most valuable and most vulnerable positions in the world, and it is able to dominate them and to seize them by a surprise attack. In the north it can threaten the rich Caucasian Provinces of Russia and their oil-fields with Tiflis, Batum, Baku. From its 600 miles of Black Sea coast it can attack the rich Russian Black Sea provinces with the Crimea, Odessa, Nikolaëff, and Kherson. It can easily strike across the narrow Bosphorus at Constantinople. Towards the west of Asia Minor, and in easy reach of it, lie the beautiful Greek and Italian islands in the *Ægean*, which until recently belonged to Turkey, and lies Greece itself, which for centuries was a Turkish possession. West of Turkish Syria lie the Suez Canal, Egypt, Erythrea, and the Italian and French Colonies of North Africa.

A powerful Asiatic Turkey can obviously dominate not only the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Suez Canal, but the very narrow entrance of the Red Sea near Aden, and that of the Persian Gulf near Muscat as well. It must also not be forgotten that only a comparatively short distance, a stretch of country under the nominal rule of weak and decadent Persia, separates Asiatic Turkey from the Indian frontier. It is clear that Asiatic Turkey, lying in the centre of the Old World, is at the same time a natural fortress of the greatest defensive strength and an ideal base for a surprise attack upon Southern Russia, Constantinople, the *Ægean* Islands, Greece, the Suez Canal, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, and India.

Time is money. From year to year international traffic tends more and more toward the shortest and the most direct, the best strategical, routes. Asia Minor lies across one of the greatest lines of world traffic. It lies

across the direct line which connects London, Paris, and Berlin with Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Canton, and Shanghai. The enormous mountains of Afghanistan and of Tibet and the great Russian inland seas compel the main railway lines connecting Europe and Asia which undoubtedly will be built in the future to be led *via* Constantinople and Asia Minor, and not *via* Russia and Southern Siberia. Year by year the importance of the land route to India and China by way of Asia Minor will therefore grow. Year by year the strategical value of the railways running through Asia Minor from Constantinople towards Mosul and Baghdad will increase. Asiatic Turkey commands by its position the shortest, and therefore the best, land route to India and China, the route of the future. By commanding the Suez Canal and the Narrow Straits which lead from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf, that country is able to threaten with a flank attack the sea route to India and China not merely in one but in three places. As the opening of the Persian Gulf lies not far from the Indian coast, it is obvious that a strong Power holding Asiatic Turkey would be able to threaten with its navy not only the Mediterranean route to India and the Far East, but the Cape route as well.

The strategical position of Asiatic Turkey curiously resembles that of Switzerland. Being surrounded by lofty mountains, vast deserts, and the sea, Nature has made Asiatic Turkey an impregnable fortress, another Switzerland. However, while little Switzerland dominates by its natural strength and strategical position merely three European States—Germany, France, and Italy—Asiatic Turkey dominates the three most populous, and therefore the three most important, continents of the world.

Asiatic Turkey looks small on the ordinary maps; but it is, as the table on page 60 shows, a very large and extremely sparsely populated country.

Asiatic Turkey is three and a half times as large as Germany, and nearly six times as large as the United

Kingdom. Its population is quite insignificant. Compared with Asiatic Turkey even Russia is a densely populated country. Asiatic Turkey is at present almost a desert, although it may be made to support a very large population, for it possesses vast possibilities, as will be shown further on. The country has certainly room for at least a hundred million inhabitants.

Austria-Hungary has become an appendage of Germany, and Turkey a German vassal State. During many decades patriotic Germans dreamed of creating a Greater Germany, reaching not merely from Hamburg to Trieste, but from Antwerp to Aden, to Koweyt and perhaps to Muscat and

	Square Miles	Inhabitants at Last Census	Population per Square Mile
Asiatic Turkey . . .	699,342	19,382,900	28.0
United Kingdom . . .	121,633	45,370,530	372.6
Germany	208,780	64,925,993	310.4
France	207,054	39,601,509	189.5
Spain	194,783	19,588,688	100.5
European Russia. . .	1,862,524	122,550,700	64.6

far into Southern Persia. German thinkers were attracted towards Asiatic Turkey not only because of its great past and its vast economic possibilities, but also because of its matchless position at a spot where three continents meet, whence three continents may be dominated, whence Russia and the British Empire may most effectively be attacked, whence the rule of the world may be won. The present War undoubtedly was largely a war for the control of Asia Minor.

In the middle of the last century leading German economists and thinkers who exerted a most powerful influence upon German statesmanship and upon German public opinion, such as Wilhelm Roscher, Friedrich List, Paul de Lagarde, Ferdinand Lassalle, J. K. Rodbertus, Karl Ritter, the great Moltke, and others, writing long before the unification of Germany, advocated the creation

of a Greater Germany embracing all the German and Austro-Hungarian States and the acquisition of Asia Minor in some form or other, and dreamt of the creation of an organic connection between Berlin and Baghdad by including the Balkan States in an Austro-German Federation. The creation of a Greater Germany, stretching from the North Sea to the Bosphorus, and across the Straits to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, was lately advocated unceasingly by many Pan-Germans. The acquisition of Asia Minor was urged by many eminent writers and men of action, such as Hasse, Dehn, Rohrbach, Sprenger, Sachau, Von der Goltz, Kärger, Naumann, Schlagintweit, and many others. I would give a characteristic example out of many. Professor Dr. A. Sprenger, the former director of the Mohammedan College of Calcutta, wrote in his book 'Babylonia the Richest Land of Antiquity, and the most Valuable Field of Colonisation at the Present Time,' published in 1886 :

The Orient is the only territory of the earth which has not yet been seized by the expanding nations. It is the most valuable field of colonisation. If Germany does not miss its opportunity and seizes it before the Cossacks have put their hands upon it, the whole German nation will gain by the colonisation of the East. As soon as several hundred thousand German soldier-colonists are at work in that glorious country the German Emperor can control the fate of Western Asia and the peace of all Asia.

Similar views were expressed by many eminent Germans. The Baghdad Railway was evidently not merely a financial enterprise of the Deutsche Bank, undertaken for the development of Asia Minor. Konia, the natural capital of Asiatic Turkey, lying on the Baghdad Railway, is situated almost exactly midway between Berlin and Karachi.

Let us imagine the Turkish Government in Asia replaced by that of a strong and ambitious military Power. Such a Power would develop the country in every way, and would

double and treble its population. It would open the country in every direction by means of railways. It would construct lines capable of carrying a vast amount of traffic towards the Russian, Egyptian, and Persian frontiers, and it would continue the latter, 'on economic grounds,' through Persia towards Baluchistan, towards India. It would create a powerful navy and construct strong naval bases on the shores of the Black Sea and near the southern openings of the Red Sea and of the Persian Gulf. Having done all this, it would be able to throw at the shortest notice an immense army either across the Bosphorus into Constantinople, or across the Suez Canal into Egypt, or across Persia into India. A strong European military Power, firmly settled in Asiatic Turkey, disposing of 2,000,000 Turkish-Asiatic soldiers and of a sufficiency of railways and of a fleet, could make Constantinople and Egypt almost untenable. It could gravely threaten Southern Russia and India and the most important sea-route of the world. At the same time, such a Power, if it should become a danger, could not easily be dislodged or defeated, because the enormous defensive strength of the country would make its resistance most formidable.

If we wish clearly to understand the strategic importance of Asiatic Turkey and the dangers with which the world might be threatened from that most commanding point, we need not draw upon the imagination, but may usefully turn towards the history of the past. In the Middle Ages a small but exceedingly warlike Power arose within the borders of Asiatic Turkey. Using as their base of operations that most wonderful position where three continents meet, Mohammedan warrior tribes swept north, south, east, and west. They rapidly overran and conquered Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Spain, Sicily, and even invaded France and Italy. They conquered all the lands around the Black Sea, and subjected to themselves Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, and Northern India as far as the Indus and the Syr-Daria, the ancient Jaxartes. They crossed the Straits, seized

Constantinople, the whole Balkan Peninsula, and Hungary, and advanced up to the walls of Vienna. They seized the rule of the sea. The word 'admiral,' from 'amir,' the Arabic word for 'chief, commander,' the same word as 'ameer' or 'emir,' reminds us of their former naval pre-eminence.

The strategical value of Asiatic Turkey is very greatly increased by the vast religio-political importance of the country. Asiatic Turkey contains the holy places of Christianity and of Islam. Mecca and Medina exercise an infinitely greater influence over Mohammedanism than Jerusalem and Bethlehem do over Christianity. Mecca and Medina give an enormous power to the nation which possesses or controls these towns. Asiatic Turkey is not only the religious, but also the physical centre of Mohammedanism. From Asiatic Turkey Mohammedanism spread in every direction. Starting thence it conquered all North Africa down to the tenth degree of northern latitude, and expanded eastward as far as Orenburg and Omsk in Russia, and penetrated through Afghanistan as far as Delhi and Kashmir in India. The followers of Mohammed form a solid block which stretches from the west coast of Morocco and from Sierra Leone across Asia Minor deeply into Russia and Siberia and into India.

Lying in the centre of the Mohammedan world, Asiatic Turkey would be an ideal spot whence to organise and to govern a great Mohammedan Federation or Empire. Mohammedanism may conceivably have a new lease of life. Pan-Islamism need not necessarily remain an idle dream. A strong leader and able organiser, possessed of the necessary prestige, might make it a reality. Turkey as the guardian of Mecca and Medina, and therefore of Islam, has naturally exercised little influence over the Islamic world. The Mohammedans throughout the world have rejected with scorn the Turks as their leaders, because they have incurred the contempt of their brother Mohammedans by their moral and material degeneration. However, it seems not impossible that a strong military

Power controlling the Holy Places might succeed once more in controlling all Islam, and might thus be able to utilise the serried ranks of 300,000,000 Mohammedans against its enemies. That idea was probably in the German Emperor's mind when, on November 8, 1898, speaking in the ancient town of Damascus and addressing his Mohammedan guests, he emphatically proclaimed: 'May the Sultan of Turkey, and may the three hundred million Mohammedans throughout the world who worship him as their Caliph, be assured that the German Emperor will be their friend for all time.' Since then the German Emperor has assumed the rôle of Protector of Islam.

Mahomet was a warrior. Islam is a conqueror's creed. A strong military Power, controlling Mecca and Medina, might bring about a revival of conquering Mohammedanism, and might make Pan-Islamism a dangerous reality. The greatest Mohammedan Powers are the British Empire, Russia, and France. British India alone has 70,000,000 Mohammedans, all French North Africa is Mohammedan, and Russia has no less than 20,000,000 Mohammedan citizens. The religio-political importance of Asia Minor is so very great that its control by a strong military Power might endanger not only France, Russia, and the British Empire, but the whole world. France, Russia, and the British Empire desire the maintenance of peace, and are therefore most strongly interested in preventing a revival of a fanatically aggressive Mohammedanism, especially if it be directed by a non-Mohammedan Power for non-Mohammedan ends.

• The economic importance of Asiatic Turkey is exceedingly great. Asiatic Turkey is the oldest and by far the most important nucleus of Western civilisation. All the most glorious seats of ancient power and culture had the misfortune of being conquered by Turkish barbarians. The wonderful empires of Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt, Phœnicia, Lydia, Media, Carthage, Persia, Greece, Palestine, and the Arab Empire were seized by the followers of Sultan

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Othman and his successors, and wherever the Turks went they created nothing except disorder, ruin, and utter desolation. The country which gave rise to the far-famed towns of Babylon, Nineveh, Seleucia, Ctesiphon, Opis, Artemita, Apollonia, Corsote, Thapsacus, Baghdad, Ilium, Pergamon, Magnesia, Smyrna, Sardes, Susa, Ephesus, Tralles, Miletus, Halicarnassus, Antiochia, Laodicea, Iconium, Tarsus, Berytus, Sidon, Tyre, Damascus, Palmyra, Memphis, Thebes—this country became a wilderness. Poverty-stricken villages, or mere heaps of debris, indicate the sites of nearly all the greatest and most flourishing cities of the Ancient World.

How great and how general is the desolation of Asiatic Turkey, which formerly was one of the most densely populated countries of the world, may be seen from the following figures :

	Square Miles	Inhabitants	Population per Square Mile
Asia Minor	199,272	10,186,900	52
Armenia and Kurdistan	71,990	2,470,900	34
Mesopotamia	143,250	2,000,000	14
Syria	114,530	3,675,100	33
Turkish Arabia	170,300	1,050,000	6
Total Asiatic Turkey .	699,342	19,382,900	28

The most densely populated vilayet of Asia Minor is that of Trebizond, with 76 people per square mile. It is followed by Ismid with 71, Smyrna with 64, and Brussa with 64 people per square mile. How small the population is even in the most favoured and most advanced vilayets of Asia Minor may be seen by the fact that all Bulgaria has a population of 116·4 per square mile, Serbia 144·0, and Italy 318·5 per square mile. The cultivated part of Egypt had, according to the census of 1907, a population of 915 per square mile, but it should now amount to about 1000 per square mile.

How wonderfully countries which have been under the withering rule of the Turk may flourish when this rule has been abolished may be seen by the example of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Egypt. In 1882, in the year of England's intervention, the population of Egypt was, according to the census of that year, 6,831,131. At the census of 1907 it came to 11,287,359, and by now it should amount to about 13,000,000. During the brief span of England's occupation the population of Egypt has doubled, and its wealth has grown prodigiously. Between 1879 and 1881, three particularly favourable years, Egypt's imports amounted on an average to £7,000,000 per year. In 1913 they came to £27,000,000.

Trade by itself produces but little. The vast wealth of ancient Babylonia, Assyria, Lydia, Media, Persia, Phœnicia, and of the glorious Greek towns on the Western Coast of Asia Minor was founded on the broad and solid basis of agriculture. Asiatic Turkey was in ancient times famous for its agricultural wealth. Numerous existing ruins show that even the uplands in the interior abounded in large and prosperous towns. At present Asia Minor has only 10,000,000 inhabitants. From a statement contained in the '*Historia Naturalis*' of Pliny, we learn that Pompey subjected in the war against Mithridates a population of 12,183,000. If we deduct from that number the pirates against whom he fought, the soldiers of Mithridates, the inhabitants of Crete, and those of Armenia and the Caucasus, together about 3,000,000, and add the inhabitants of Western Asia Minor who, according to Beloch, should then have numbered from 8,000,000 to 9,000,000, the whole of Asia Minor—that is, the territories this side of the Euphrates—should have contained between 17,000,000 and 18,000,000 people two thousand years ago.

Asiatic Turkey has large stretches of good soil and an excellent climate. Cereals of every kind, cotton, rice, and tobacco flourish. On the lower slopes of the west figs, olives, and grapes grow in profusion and in perfection,

and in the higher altitudes flourish the pine, the fir, the cedar, the oak, and the beech. Agriculture, aided by modern methods of production and transportation, should be able to nourish an enormous population in that favoured land, and should make it once more highly prosperous. Besides, Asiatic Turkey is extremely rich in minerals, including coal, gold, silver, nickel, mercury, copper, iron, and lead, but these resources have so far remained practically untouched. Under a good Government Asia Minor may once more become an exceedingly wealthy and well-peopled country. The possession or the control of Asiatic Turkey will produce both power and wealth. A military State controlling it would convert its wealth into power. Under its direction Asiatic Turkey would not become a second Egypt but another military State, and its mineral wealth would lead to the establishment of enormous arsenals and armanent factories.

On the Turkish coast there are numerous excellent bays and inlets where in olden times flourishing city States carried on an active trade. Under the Turkish Government these old harbour works, like the old towns, roads, and canals, have been destroyed or have been allowed to fall into ruin. In many places good harbours could be constructed at moderate expense, and the revival of agriculture and the exploitation of the mineral resources of the country would once more create a flourishing coast trade, would recreate the old Greek settlements.

Asiatic Turkey is economically very important, not only because it is possible to increase enormously its stunted power of production, but also because, with the building of railways, an enormous passenger and goods traffic may be developed on the direct line which connects Central Europe with India and China *via* Asia Minor. The intercourse between East and West is rapidly increasing. The Suez Canal traffic came in 1870 to 436,609 tons net. In 1876 it came to 2,096,771 tons, in 1882 to 5,074,808 tons, in 1901 to 10,882,840 tons, and in 1912 to 20,275,120 tons

net. The geographical position of Asia Minor on the shortest trade route connecting the East with the West, which enriched Phœnicia, and which made Sidon and Tyre the merchants of the Ancient World and the founders of a far-flung sea-empire, may greatly enrich its inhabitants.

The Turks have no gifts either for government or for business. Their administration in all its branches is a byword for corruption, neglect, disorder, and incompetence, and as the Turks display the same qualities, or rather defects, in business, their trade is carried on almost entirely by foreigners, especially by Western Europeans, Greeks, and Armenians. In their vast Asiatic provinces the Turks possess, admittedly, one of the richest countries in the world, a country which imperatively calls for development.

Asiatic Turkey is the stronghold of the Turkish race. However, only a part of the inhabitants are Turks. In Western Asia Minor, and especially in the harbour towns, live about 1,500,000 Greeks. Smyrna is a Greek town. In Eastern Asia Minor, near the Russian frontier, dwell about 2,000,000 Armenians. Chiefly in the south there are about 10,000,000 Arabs. Besides these there are numerous other races—Syrians, Kurds, Circassians, Jews, &c.

Wherever the Turks rule, they rule by misrule, by persecution, by extortion, and by massacre. The Greeks in the west, the Armenians in the east, and the Arabs in the south sigh for freedom from Turkish oppression. Hitherto Europe has been horrified chiefly by Turkish misrule in the Balkan Peninsula, the sufferings of which have overshadowed the equally scandalous misrule in Asiatic Turkey. When the Turks have lost Constantinople and have been finally driven out of Europe their singular capacity for misgovernment will find full scope in their Asiatic provinces. They will become a gigantic Macedonia, and the outrageous treatment of the Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs will bring about in Asia Minor the same disorders which hitherto prevailed in the Turkish part of the Balkan Peninsula. Here, as in the Balkans, the sufferings

of the subject nationalities will arouse among other, and especially among the related, nations a desire to interfere and to protect the unfortunate peoples against their masters.

The facts given in these pages allow us, then, to draw the following conclusions :

1. Asiatic Turkey occupies a position of great defensive strength and of great potential danger to its neighbours, a position which dominates the three old continents. A powerful military State, possessing or controlling the country, would be able to threaten its neighbours in some highly vulnerable quarters. It would be able to convert it into an enormous military camp, and it might mobilise Islam throughout the world and bring about a gigantic catastrophe.

2. The great latent wealth of Asiatic Turkey, its matchless position for trade and commerce, and the fearful neglect from which it suffers are bound to arouse among all progressive nations a keen desire to open up the country by means of railways and harbours, and to exploit its precious agricultural and mineral resources.

3. The presence of subject nationalities—Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, &c.—in Asia Minor, who are likely to suffer persecution at the hands of the ruling Turks, is bound to bring about a desire for intervention on the part of other Powers. In view of the commanding position occupied by Asia Minor and the possibility of some nation or other wishing to make use of that country for aggressive purposes, the European Powers may as little be able to act in harmony in endeavouring to create good order in Asiatic Turkey as they were in European Turkey. Once more philo-Turkish and anti-Turkish Powers may struggle for ascendancy. Consequently the same intrigues and counter-intrigues, dangerous to the peace of the world, of which during four centuries Constantinople was the scene, might take place in Konia or wherever the Turks should place their new seat of Government.

Apparently the problem of Asiatic Turkey is insoluble.

If we look merely at the world-commanding strategical position of Asiatic Turkey and the danger which its occupation by a strong, enterprising, and ambitious military Power would involve, not merely for its neighbours, but for the whole world, the best solution of the problem would seem to consist in preserving the integrity of Asiatic Turkey under unrestricted Ottoman rule. It is obvious that if one military nation should occupy part of Asiatic Turkey other nations would become alarmed and, fearing that that most valuable strategical position should fall entirely under the control of that military State which had first encroached upon its integrity, the other States interested in Asiatic Turkey would naturally endeavour to secure shares also. A general scramble for Turkish territory would ensue. Asiatic Turkey would be partitioned. Russia, France, Italy, Greece, and Great Britain, and perhaps other nations as well, would divide the country among themselves. Its commanding position would generate mutual suspicion among the sharing nations. A tension similar to that which prevailed among the Balkan States would prevail in Asia Minor. Dangerous friction would ensue which might lead to a world-war for the control of Asia Minor. The policy of partition would obviously be most dangerous to the peace of the world.

The policy of preserving the integrity of Asiatic Turkey in its entirety and of abstaining from all interference with the Turkish Government would, of course, prevent these evils, but unfortunately that policy is not a practicable one. As Asiatic Turkey is one of the richest, and at the same time one of the most neglected, countries in the world, and as it lies right across one of the most necessary and most valuable of the world's highways—across the direct line which connects Central Europe with India and China—the importance of which is bound to increase from year to year, the citizens of various nations would naturally seek to develop the country by means of railways, public works, &c. History would soon repeat itself. Under the

cloak of economic development, important strategical railways, threatening one or the other of the States bordering on Asiatic Turkey, would be constructed. Thus the economic exploitation of the strategical centre of the world by private enterprise would in all probability lead to a scramble among the Great Powers for spheres of influence, and to an economic partition of Asia Minor which might be quite as dangerous as a complete territorial partition.

If the Powers should desire to make Asiatic Turkey a purely Turco-Asiatic buffer State, a No-man's-land as far as Europe is concerned, stipulating that both its political and economic integrity should be preserved, leaving the Turks entirely to themselves and solemnly binding themselves to abstain from both political and economic interference in its affairs, the difficulty would by no means be overcome. Turkish misgovernment, Armenian, Greek, or Arab massacres, or some grave political incident, might cause some Power or Powers to interfere. Then international intrigues similar to those which formerly took place about Constantinople would begin, and they would be far more dangerous, because they would concern a position which is not merely the key to the Black Sea, but which is indeed the key to the dominion of the world. Besides, as Asiatic Turkey occupies a most valuable position for effecting a flank attack either upon Russia in the very vulnerable south, or upon the British Empire in Egypt and Asia, the enemies of Russia and of Great Britain would obviously endeavour to stir up trouble between the two countries. They would strive to bring about a struggle between Russia and England for the control of Asiatic Turkey. They would probably try once more to recreate the army of an independent Turkey and to hurl it at Russia or at Great Britain or simultaneously at both countries.

Unfortunately it appears that the policy of leaving Asiatic Turkey alone would be quite as dangerous as that of partitioning it. Therefore a third policy ought to be found.

The strategical position of Asiatic Turkey closely resembles, as has been shown, that of Switzerland. Switzerland is a small natural fortress which separates, and dominates, three important Central European States. Asiatic Turkey is a gigantic natural fortress which separates, and dominates, the three most populous continents. Switzerland has been neutralised, not for the sake of the Swiss, but for the sake of all Europe. The fact that Switzerland was permanently neutralised for the security of Europe may be seen from the diplomatic documents signed by the Allied Powers a century ago. A Declaration made at the Congress at Vienna on March 20, 1815, which will be found in Klüber's 'Acten des Wiener Congresses,' stated :

Les puissances appelées, en exécution du 6^e art. du traité de Paris du 30 mai 1814, à régler les affaires de la Suisse, ayant reconnu que l'intérêt général demande que le corps helvétique jouisse des avantages d'une neutralité permanente . . . déclarent, qu'aussitôt que la *diète helvétique aura accédé*, en bonne et due forme, aux articles contenus dans la présente convention, il sera expédié, au nom de toutes les puissances, un *acte solennel*, pour reconnaître et garantir la *neutralité permanente de la Suisse* dans ses nouvelles frontières.

It will be observed that Switzerland was to be made permanently neutral for the 'intérêt général.' The 'acte solennel' above mentioned was signed in Paris on November 20, 1815, and it stated :

. . . Les puissances qui ont signé la déclaration de Vienne du 20 mars, *reconnaissent*, d'une manière formelle et authentique, par le présent acte la *neutralité perpétuelle* de la Suisse, et lui *garantissent l'inviolabilité* de son *territoire*, circonscrit dans ses nouvelles limites, telles qu'elles sont fixées par le congrès de Vienne et la paix de Paris d'aujourd'hui. . . .

Les puissances signataires de la déclaration du 20 mars font connaître, d'une manière authentique, par le présent acte, que la neutralité et l'inviolabilité de la Suisse, ainsi

que son indépendance de toute influence étrangère, est conforme aux véritables intérêts de la politique européenne.

It will be noticed that the 'acte solennel' emphasised the previous declaration by stating that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland was 'conforme aux véritables intérêts de la politique européenne.'

It is noteworthy that Russia has been one of the most convinced and one of the most determined champions of Swiss neutrality. In the instructions which, on January 14, 1827, Count Nesselrode, perhaps the greatest Russian diplomat of modern times, sent on behalf of the Cabinet to M. de Severine, the Russian Minister to the Swiss Confederation,¹ we read :

Par sa position géographique la Suisse est la clef de trois grands pays. Par ses lumières et ses mœurs, elle occupe un rang distingué dans la civilisation Européenne. Enfin par les actes des Congrès de Vienne et de Paris, elle a obtenu la garantie de son organisation présente, de sa neutralité, et de son indépendance. . . .

Dès que la diplomatie, participant aux améliorations de tout genre qui s'opéraient en Europe, eut pour but dans ses combinaisons les plus profondes et les plus utiles, d'établir entre les diverses puissances un équilibre qui assurât la durée de la paix, l'indépendance de la Suisse devint un des premiers axiomes de la Politique. Les Traités de Westphalie la consacèrent, et il est facile de prouver, l'histoire à la main, qu'elle ne fut jamais violée sans que l'Europe n'eût à gémir de guerres et de calamités universelles.

Lors de la révolution française, la Suisse éprouva fortement la secousse qui vint ébranler les deux mondes. Son territoire fut envahi, des armées le franchirent, et des batailles ensanglantèrent un sol que les discordes des états avait longtemps respecté.

Lors de la domination de Buonaparte, la Suisse eut sa part du despotisme qui pressait sur le continent. Finalement apparut l'Alliance avec ses nobles triomphes, et la

¹ The full text may be found in A. C. Grenville Murray's *Droits et Devoirs des Envoyés Diplomatiques*.

Suisse, qui avait été bouleversée pendant la tourmente révolutionnaire, et asservie pendant le régime des conquêtes, redevint indépendante et neutre du jour où les droits des Nations recouvèrent leur empire, et où la paix fut le vœu du Monarque dont le changement était le salutaire ouvrage.

Ce fut alors que la Confédération Helvétique occupa la pensée de l'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse mémoire, et alors aussi que son indépendance reçut par les actes de 1814 et 1815 une sanction solennelle, qui compléta et assura le rétablissement solide de la tranquillité générale.

La Suisse est par conséquent, on peut le dire, un des points sur lesquels repose l'équilibre de l'Europe, le mode d'existence politique dont elle jouit forme un des élémens du système conservateur qui a succédé à trente années d'orages, et la Russie doit souhaiter que cet état continue à ne relever et à ne dépendre d'aucun autre.

Elle y est intéressée comme puissance, que ses principes et le sentiment de son propre bien portent à vouloir la paix. Elle en a le droit, comme puissance qui a signé les actes de 1814 et 1815.

The irrefutable arguments advanced with such force, clearness, and eloquence by Count Nesselrode with regard to Switzerland apply obviously still more strongly to the closely similar, but far more important, case of Asiatic Turkey.

A State which has been permanently neutralised by international agreement can preserve its neutrality only if it is sufficiently strong and well governed. If it is weak its neutrality may be disregarded, as was that of Belgium. If it is badly governed and suffers from internal disorders it cannot be strong, and foreign nations will find reasons for interfering in its domestic affairs. When, in the course of the last century, Switzerland was torn by internal dissensions, the great guarantors of its permanent neutrality and independence became alarmed. They were anxious to intervene, and as they took different sides their intervention nearly led to a great war.

If the arguments given so far should, on examination, be found to be unchallengeable, it would appear that the problem of Asiatic Turkey can be solved only by making that country another Switzerland—a strong, independent and well-governed neutral buffer State.

Can Turkey be regenerated and converted into another Switzerland? At first sight the task seems hopeless. The experience of centuries certainly supports those who doubt it. The Turkish Government, both under the rule of the Sultans and under a nominally constitutional régime, has proved a continuous cause of oppression and revolt, of dissatisfaction and misery, of conspiracy and rebellion. In fact, the Turkish Government, in whatever hands, is, and always has been, a public nuisance, a scandal and a public danger, a danger not only to Europe, but to the Turks themselves. The experience of centuries has shown that the Turks cannot govern other peoples, that they cannot even govern themselves. This being the case, it follows that Turkey requires, for its own security and for that of the world, guardians, or a guardian, appointed by Europe. Only then can we hope for peace and order, happiness and prosperity, in that unfortunate land.

The problem of appointing European guardians, or a guardian, for Asiatic Turkey is complicated by the fact that various European Powers possess strong separate interests in that country. Before considering the way in which good government might be introduced in a neutralised Asiatic Turkey we must therefore consider the special interests of various nations which, of course, have to be safeguarded.

Russia has a twofold interest in that country—a sentimental and a practical one. In the Caucasian Provinces of Russia, close to the Turkish border, dwell about 2,000,000 Armenians. Their brothers in Turkey have suffered from outrageous persecution. The fearful massacres among them from 1894 to 1897 are still in everybody's memory. Not unnaturally, the Russian Armenians and the Russian

people themselves desire that the Armenians in Asiatic Turkey should be humanely treated. With this object in view the Russian Press has demanded that Turkish Armenia should be ceded to Russia.

As I have shown in the chapter on 'The Future of Constantinople' in considering the strategical question, the possession of Constantinople would be for Russia perhaps not so much an asset as a liability. Constantinople and the Straits cover a very large area. Its defence requires a very considerable military force and will by so much weaken the strength of the Russian Army. Furthermore, its defence entails considerable difficulty because Russia can reach Constantinople only by sea. As Roumania and Bulgaria separate Russia from Constantinople on the European side of the Black Sea, Russia can secure an organic connection with that town only from the Asiatic side, by acquiring the whole of the Turkish south coast of the Black Sea. It would not be unnatural, and indeed quite understandable, if Russian patriots should wish, or at least hope, that Russia should not only acquire Constantinople and Turkish Armenia, but that she should in addition obtain easy access to that city by a secure overland route. A narrow strip of coast would, of course, suffice for constructing a railway from Southern Russia to the Bosphorus. However, as that route would be liable to be cut by the Turks at many points in case of war, an attempt to link the Bosphorus to Southern Russia would probably involve Russia against her will in an attempt to occupy a large part, or the whole, of Asia Minor, for thus only could the safety of the Black Sea coast railway be assured. That would be a very large and a very venturesome undertaking which might have incalculable consequences to Russia and to the world, for Russia would create, on a very much larger scale, a position similar to that which would arise if Germany should seize Switzerland.

Greece has, on the ground of nationality, a claim on Smyrna, the busiest harbour of Asia Minor, which is

practically a Greek town, and on certain coastal districts, especially about Smyrna, which are largely inhabited by Greeks. Naturally she would like, with the strip of coastal territory which is primarily Greek, a proportionate sphere of the hinterland.

Italy retains the Island of Rhodes, which, by the way, is very largely peopled by Greeks, and she is supposed to be desirous of obtaining a piece of the mainland from the neighbourhood of that island to Syria to the French sphere. The sphere claimed on her behalf is rather extensive. It contains the excellent harbour of Adalia, in the neighbourhood of which she has secured concessions, and includes territories of considerable agricultural and mineral potentialities where large numbers of Italian emigrants may be able to find a home.

Great Britain has important claims upon Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and upon Arabia, as will be shown later on.

France has strong historic and economic claims upon Asiatic Turkey, especially upon Syria with the Holy Places of Christianity, and upon Cilicia, which adjoins it. Her historic claims are so very interesting and important that it is worth while to consider them somewhat closely.

From the earliest ages France has followed a twofold policy towards Islam. She has been the most determined defender of Christendom against conquering Mohammedanism when the latter was a danger to the world. At the same time, considering a strong Turkey a necessary factor in Europe, she has for centuries endeavoured to support that country. France concluded her first alliance with Turkey in 1535 and remained Turkey's ally up to the Peace of Versailles. Since then her place as Turkey's champion has been taken by Germany.

On October 18, 732, Charles Martel signally defeated the all-conquering Arabs near Tours and thus saved Europe to Christianity. In the year 800, Charlemagne sent an Embassy to the great Arab ruler, Haroun-al-Rashid, the

Caliph of Baghdad, the hero of the 'Arabian Nights Tales,' and received from him the keys of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. Henceforward France became the guardian of the Holy Tomb, and the protectress of Christianity against Islam. In the Crusades, which were undertaken to rescue the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels, France played a leading part. Godefroy de Bouillon defeated Soliman, besieged and took the Holy City in 1099 and was elected King of Jerusalem. Owing to the prominent position occupied by the French as leaders of all Christianity, European Christians in general became known in the East as Franks and are still so called by the people. A Frankish Kingdom existed at Jerusalem till 1291. The power of Islam grew and King Louis the Ninth, St. Louis, one of the greatest Kings of France, spent many years of his life in the East, vainly trying to wrest the Holy Land from the Moslems. His attitude, and that of ancient France, towards the Eastern Christians may be seen from the following most interesting letter which he sent on May 21, 1250, from Saint-Jean-d'Acre to 'l'emir des Maronites du mont Liban, ainsi qu'au patriarche et aux évêques de cette nation':

Notre cœur s'est rempli de joie lorsque nous avons vu votre fils Simon, à la tête de vingt-cinq mille hommes, venir nous trouver de votre part pour nous apporter l'expression de vos sentiments et nous offrir de dons, outre les beaux chevaux que vous nous avez envoyés. En vérité la sincère amitié que nous avons commencé à ressentir avec tant d'ardeur pour les Maronites pendant notre séjour en Chypre où ils sont établis, s'est encore augmentée.

Nous sommes persuadés que cette nation, que nous trouvons établie sous le nom de Saint Maroun, est une partie de la nation française, car son amitié pour les Français ressemble à l'amitié que les Français se portent entre eux. En conséquence il est juste que vous et tous les Maronites jouissiez de la protection dont les Français jouissent près de nous, et que vous soyez admis dans les emplois comme ils le sont eux-mêmes. . . . Quant à nous et à ceux qui nous succéderont sur le trône de France nous promettons de vous

donner, à vous et à votre peuple, protection comme aux Français eux-mêmes et de faire constamment ce qui sera nécessaire pour votre bonheur.

Donné près de Saint-Jean-d'Acre, etc.

Charles the Fifth, the great Habsburg Prince, who ruled over Germany, the Netherlands, the Franche Comté, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and their colonies, threatened to bring all Europe under Austria's sway. King Francis the First of France courageously opposed him and concluded in 1535 an alliance with Soliman the Magnificent, perhaps the greatest ruler of Turkey, who, in 1526, at the Battle of Mohacs, had destroyed the Hungarian armies, and who in 1529 had besieged Vienna. France discovered in Turkey a valuable counterpoise, first to the house of Austria and later on to Russia. In 1535, the same year in which she concluded the alliance with Turkey, France, who had great commercial interests in the East and who was then the leading Mediterranean Power, concluded a commercial and general treaty with Turkey, the so-called Capitulations, which were frequently renewed. These Treaties gave to France a preferential position within the Turkish dominions and made her the protectress of the Christians of all nationalities. Ever after it became a fundamental principle of French statesmanship to maintain an alliance with Turkey and with Switzerland, because both countries occupied very important strategical positions whence the central and eastern European Powers might be held in check. The celebrated Brantôme, who lived from 1527 till 1614, wrote in his '*Vie des Grands Capitains François*' :

J'ouys dire une fois à M. le Connétable [the highest dignitary of France] : que les roys de France avoient deux alliances et affinitez desquelles ne s'en devoient jamais distraire et despartir pour chose du monde : l'une celle des Suysses, et l'autre celle du grand Turc.

France had allied herself to the Turks for a threefold reason : For protecting the Christians in the East ; for

protecting and extending the French trade in the Levant ; for creating a counterpoise to the ever-expanding and dangerously strong power of the House of Habsburg. In an exceedingly important Memoir which M. de Noailles, the French Ambassador to Turkey, submitted to King Charles the Ninth in 1572, the full text of which will be found in Testa's 'Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane,' we read :

Sire, les rois, vos prédécesseurs, ont recherché et entretenu l'intelligence de Levant pour trois principales causes, la première et la plus ancienne était fondée sur leur pitié et religion, laquelle tendait à deux fins, savoir : à la conservation de Jésus-Christ en Jérusalem, avec la sureté du passage tant par terre que par mer des pèlerins qui sont conduits par vœux et dévotion à le visiter, et à la protection duquel ils ont toujours uniquement recouru aux dits rois pour empêcher que les armes des infidèles ne molestassent les terres de l'Eglise, qui sont exposées aux surprises et passages de leurs armées de mer, étant bien certain que, sans la continuelle et dévote assistance que vos prédécesseurs ont fait à l'un et à l'autre, il y a longtemps que ledit Saint-Sépulcre fût rasé, le temple de sainte Hélène converti en mosquée et toute la religion romaine détruite et désolée par les invasions circasses et turquesses.

Le second a été pour établir et conserver le trafic que vos sujets, et singulièrement ceux de Provence et Languedoc, ont de tout temps par de ça, lequel s'est tellement augmenté sous le règne du feu roi Henri et le vôtre. . . .

La troisième cause pour laquelle cette intelligence a été entretenu par vos prédécesseurs, et depuis quarante six ans étreinte par les feus rois François-le-Grand et Henri, a été pour contrepeser l'excessive grandeur de la maison d'Autriche qui avait accumulé sous la domination sienne, ou des siens, par succession ou usurpation, les meilleures couronnes et états de l'Europe hors la France, laquelle depuis ce temps-là a toujours été seule au combat, tant pour essayer de ravoir le sien que pour aller au-devant de l'ambition de Charles-Quint et de Philippe, son fils, qui ont toute leur vie troublé le mond et singulièrement l'Alle-

magne, la France et l'Italie, pour parvenir à la tyrannie de toute la chrétienté.

The Capitulations of 1535 were repeatedly amplified, especially in 1604 and 1740. The Treaty of 1604, concluded in the time of the great King Henri Quatre, is so quaint and interesting a document and it throws so strong a light upon the character of Ancient Turkey and upon the unique position which France occupied in Europe and the East three centuries ago, that it is worth while giving some extracts from it according to the text in St. Priest's '*Mémoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie*' :

Au nom de Dieu.

L'Empereur Amat [Ahmad I], fil de l'Empereur Mehemet, toujours victorieux,

Marque de la haute famille des Monarques Otthomans, avec la beauté, grandeur et splendeur de laquelle tant de pays sont conquis et gouvernez.

Moy, qui suis, par les infinies grâces du Juste, Grand et tout-puissant Créateur et par l'abondance des miracles du chef de ses prophètes, Empereur des victorieux Empereurs, distributeur des couronnes aux plus grands Princes de la terre, serviteur des deux très-sacrées villes, la Mecque et Médine, Protecteur et Gouverneur de la Sainte Hierusalem, Seigneur de la plus grande partie de l'Europe, Asie et Afrique, conquise avec nostre victorieuse espée, et espouvantable lance, à sçavoir des païs et royaumes de la Grece, de Themiswar, de Bosnie de Seghevar, et des païs et Royaumes de l'Asie et de la Natolie, de Caramanie, d'Egypte, et de tous les païs des Parthes, des Curdes, Georgiens, de la Porte de fer, de Tiflis, du Seruan, et du païs du Prince des Tartares, nommé Qerim [Crimea], et de la campagne nommée Cipulac, de Cypre, de Diarbekr, d'Alep, d'Erzerum, de Damas, de Babylone demeure des Princes des croyants, de Basera, d'Egypte, de l'Arabie heureuse, d'Abes, d'Aden, de Thunis, la Goulette, Tripoly, de Barbarie, et de tant d'autres païs, isles, destroits, passages, peuples, familles, générations, et de tant de cent millions de victorieux gens de guerre qui reposent sous l'obéissance et justice de Moy qui suis l'Empereur Amurat,

filz de l'Empereur Selim, filz de l'Empereur Solymán, filz de l'Empereur Selim. Et ce, par la grace de Dieu, Recours des grands Princes du monde, Refuge des honorables Empereurs.

Au plus glorieux, magnanime, et grand Seigneur de la croyance de Jesus-Christ, esleu [élu] entre les Princes de la nation du Messie, Médiateur des differents qui surviennent entre le peuple Chrestien, Seigneur de Grandeur, Majesté et Richesse, glorieuse Guide des plus grands, Henry IV, Empereur de France, que la fin de ses jours soit heureuse. . . .

Que les Vénitiens et Anglais en la leur, les Espagnols, Portugais, Catalans, Ragousins, Genevois, Napolitains, Florentins, et généralement toutes autres nations, telles qu'elles soient, puissent librement venir trafiquer par nos pays sous l'adveu et seureté de la bannière de France, laquelle ils porteront comme leur sauvegarde ; et, de cette façon, ils pourront aller et venir trafiquer par les lieux de nostre Empire, comme ils y sont venus d'ancienneté, obéyssans aux Consuls François, qui demeurent et résident en nos havres et estapes ; voulons et entendons qu'en usant ainsi, ils puissent trafiquer avec leurs vaisseaux et galions sans estre inquietez seulement tant que ledit Empereur de France conservera nostre amitié, et ne contreviendra à celle qu'il nous a promise.

Voulons et commandons aussi que les subjects dudit Empereur de France et ceux des Princes ses amis alliez, puissent visiter les saints lieux de Hierusalem sans qu'il leur soit mis ou donné aucun empeschement, ny faict tort.

De plus, pour l'honneur et amitié d'iceluy Empereur, nous voulons que les Religieux qui demeurent en Hierusalem et servent l'Eglise de Comame [Saint Sepulcre] y puissent demeurer, aller et venir sans aucun trouble et empêchement, ainsi soient bien receus, protégés, aydez, et secourus en la considération susdite.

Derechef, nous voulons et commandons que les Venitiens et Anglois en cela, et toutes les autres nations alienées de l'amitié de nostre grande Porte, lesquelles n'y tiennent Ambassadeur, voulans trafiquer par nos pays, ayent à y

venir sous la bannière et protection de France, sans que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, ou autres ayent à les empescher sous couleur que cette capitulation a esté insérée dans les capitulations données de nos pères après avoir esté escrites. . . .

Et pour autant qu'iceluy Empereur de France, est de tous les Roys le plus noble et de la plus haute famille, et le plus parfait amy que nos Ayeuls ayent acquis entre lesdits Roys et Princes de la créance de Jesus-Christ, comme il nous a témoigné par les effets de sa sainte amitié: sous ces considérations, nous voulons et commandons que ses Ambassadeurs qui résident à nostre heureuse Porte ayent la préséance sur l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne et sur ceux des Roys et Princes, soit en nostre Divan public ou autres lieux où ils se pourront rencontrer. . . .

Que les Consuls François jouissent de ces mesmes privilèges où ils résideront, et qu'il leur soit donné la mesme préséance sur tous les autres consuls de quelque nation qu'ils soient. . . .

Nous promettons et jurons par la vérité du grand Tout-puissant Dieu, Createur du ciel et de la terre, et par l'âme de mes Ayeuls et Bisayeuls, de ne contrarier, ni contrevenir à ce qui est porté par ce Traitté de paix et Capitulation, tant que l'Empereur de France sera constant et ferme en la considération de nostre amitié, acceptant dès à présent la sienne, avec volonté d'en faire cas et de la chérir, car ainsi est nostre intention et promesse impériale.

Escript environ le 20 may 1604.

It will be noticed that by the Treaty of 1604 the 'Empereur de France' was made the Protector of all the Christians in the East, that France was made the guardian of the holy places of Christianity, that the other great Christian nations, the Venetians, the English, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the Catalans, the citizens of Ragusa, the Genoese, the Neapolitans, and the Florentines were allowed to travel and trade freely and securely in Turkey—under the French flag and protected by the Consuls of France. At that time France was indeed 'la grande nation,' and

enjoyed the greatest prestige in the East. According to Birch's 'Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth,' 'the Turks believed for a long time that England was a Province of France.'

When, at the time of the French Revolution, nearly all Europe made war upon France, France tried once more to use Turkey against her enemies. In 1792 Citoyen Sémonville, the French Ambassador to Turkey, was given instructions by the Convention Nationale to secure Turkey's support and 8,000,000 livres were placed at his disposal, of which sum 2,000,000 were to be 'exclusively used for bribing the entourage of the Grand Vizier.' We read in that curious document :

Le nouveau ministre national doit chercher surtout à rompre la coalition formée contre la France par Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie, et le meilleur moyen d'obtenir ce résultat sera de tacher de diviser ces puissances. Il est vrai qu'on ne saurait compter sur une assistance directe à ce sujet, de la part de la Turquie, mais la Sublime-Porte pourrait être très utile en se mêlant seulement, par exemple, des affaires de Pologne, et en tachant de mettre en discorde les dites puissances dans ce pays-là. Pour atteindre plus facilement ce but, Sémonville pourra disposer de 8,000,000 de livres, dont deux millions doivent être exclusivement employés à corrompre les entours du grand vezir et du reis-effendi, et à entretenir de bons espions auprès de l'inter-nonce d'Autriche et des représentants prussien et russe ; car il est très important de s'assurer comment chacun de ces ministres représente, à sa cour, les affaires polonaises.

In 1795 Napoleon Buonaparte, then a young general only twenty-six years old, had fallen into disfavour and disgrace with the Government. He had been dismissed from the army. He lived in penury and obscurity, and was unemployed and practically destitute. In his despair, on August 30 of that year, he very humbly offered to the Comité de Salut Public his services as an artillery officer

for service in Turkey in a little-known letter which was worded as follows :

Dans un temps où l'impératrice de Russie a resserré les liens qui l'unissent à l'Autriche, il est de l'intérêt de la France de faire tout ce qui dépend d'elle pour rendre plus redoutables les moyens militaires de la Turquie.

Cette puissance a des milices nombreuses et braves, mais fort ignorantes sur les principes de l'art de guerre.

La formation et le service de l'artillerie, qui influe si puissamment dans notre tactique moderne sur le gain des batailles, et presque exclusivement sur la prise et la défense des places fortes, est encore dans son enfance en Turquie.

La Porte, qui l'a senti, a plusieurs fois demandé des officiers d'artillerie et du génie ; nous y en avons effectivement quelques-uns dans ce moment-ci, mais ils ne sont ni assez nombreux ni assez instruits pour produire un résultat de quelque conséquence.

Le général Buonaparte, qui a acquis quelque réputation en commandant l'artillerie de nos armées en différentes circonstances, et spécialement au siège de Toulon, s'offre pour passer en Turquie avec une mission du gouvernement ; il mènera avec lui six ou sept officiers dont chacun aura une connaissance particulière des sciences relatives à l'art de la guerre.

S'il peut dans cette nouvelle carrière, rendre les armées turques plus redoutables et perfectionner la défense des places fortes de cet empire, il croira avoir rendu un service signalé à la patrie, et avoir, à son retour, bien mérité d'elle.

Had the Comité de Salut Public accepted Napoleon's offer, he might have lived and died unknown to history. The world might have been spared some of the greatest wars.

Although the first French Republic was atheistic and anti-Christian, it carefully continued the traditional policy of France in the East in its threefold aspect. It strove to maintain France's supremacy in the East, desiring to use Turkey as a counterpoise to France's enemies, to dominate the Near Eastern markets and to maintain its ancient

protectorate over the Christians in the East. That may be seen from the instructions given to the French Ambassadors. In those sent by the First Consul Buonaparte to Ambassador Brune on October 18, 1802, we read, for instance :

1°. L'intention du gouvernement est que l'ambassadeur à Constantinople reprenne, par tous les moyens, la suprématie que la France avait depuis deux cents ans dans cette capitale. La maison qui est occupée par l'ambassadeur est la plus belle. Il doit tenir constamment un rang audessus des ambassadeurs des autres nations, et ne marcher qu'avec un grand éclat. Il doit reprendre sous sa protection tous les hospices et tous les chrétiens de Syrie et d'Arménie, et spécialement toutes les caravanes qui visitent les Lieux-Saints.

2°. Notre commerce doit être protégé sous tous les points de vue. Dans l'état de faiblesse où se trouve l'empire ottoman, nous ne pouvons pas espérer qu'il fasse une diversion en notre faveur contre l'Autriche, il ne nous intéresse donc plus sous le rapport du commerce. Le gouvernement ne veut souffrir aucune avarie de pachas, et la moindre insulte à nos commerçants doit donner lieu à des explications fort vives, et conduire notre ambassadeur à obtenir une satisfaction éclatante. On doit accoutumer les pachas et beys des différentes provinces à ne regarder désormais notre pavillon qu'avec respect et considération.

3°. Dans toutes les circonstances, on ne doit pas manquer de dire et de faire sentir que si la Russie et l'Autriche ont quelque intérêt de localité à se partager les états du Grand-Seigneur, l'intérêt de la France est de maintenir une balance entre ces deux grandes puissances. On doit montrer des égards à l'ambassadeur de Russie, mais se servir souvent de l'Ambassadeur de Prusse qui est plus sincèrement dans nos intérêts.

4°. S'il survient des événements dans les environs de Constantinople, offrir sa médiation à la Porte, et, en général, saisir toutes les occasions de fixer les yeux de l'empire sur l'ambassadeur de France. C'est d'après ce principe que le jour de la fête du prophète il n'y a point d'inconvenient à illuminer le palais de France selon l'usage orientale, après toutefois s'en être expliqué avec la Porte.

En fixant les yeux du peuple sur l'ambassadeur de France avoir soin de ne jamais choquer ses mœurs et ses usages, mais faire voir que nous nous estimons les uns les autres. . . .

It will be noticed that the French Republic and Napoleon the First followed in every particular the same policy in Turkey which in more recent times was pursued by Prince Bismarck and William the Second.

In the Middle Ages and in the time of the first Capitulations, France could easily act as the protectress of Christianity, for she was the strongest Power in Europe and in the Mediterranean and nearly all important States were Roman Catholic. Times have changed. The other nations no longer trade in the East under the French flag, or appeal to the French Consuls when they are in need of protection. Besides, with the rise of powerful Protestant and Greek Orthodox States and of influential Armenian, Coptic and Abyssinian Christian Churches, France can no longer act as the protectress of the Holy Sepulchre on behalf of all Christendom. She acted in that capacity for the last time during the reign of Napoleon the Third. It is not generally known that the Crimean War was not merely a war for the control of Constantinople, but was in the first place a struggle for the key to the Church in Bethlehem. Small causes often have great consequences.

As the question of the Holy Places bears directly upon France's claim to Syria, it is worth while looking into the genesis of the Crimean War. Beforehand, we must take note of the peculiar position which the various States and religions occupy at the Holy Sites. A map of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem and of the buildings attached to it is as complicated as a map of the Holy Roman Empire. Certain parts of the Church building belong to the Latin and Greek Christians in common, while others belong exclusively to Latin Christians, Greek Christians, Abyssinian Christians, Armenian Christians, Copts, Syrians, Russians, Prussians. Every carpet, picture, lamp, vase

has its owner. Of the fifteen lamps in the Angels' Chapel in Jerusalem, for instance, five belong to the Greek Church, five to the Latin Church, four to the Armenian, and one to the Coptic Church. The greatest jealousy prevails among the different Churches and nationalities. The displacement of a Greek lamp or vase by a Latin one might create a riot. Property of various Churches has been displaced, stolen or burned by other Churches and sanguinary fights have often occurred within the Holy precincts. Men of the same religion, but belonging to different Churches, are unfortunately frequently animated by a blind and passionate zeal, and religious ceremonies performed in their presence in an unorthodox manner appear to them not merely a sacrilege but a deadly insult which calls for blood. To avoid a collision, the Turks have devised the most minute regulations. Still they have not been able to prevent the Churches encroaching upon the rights of their rivals.

During the Napoleonic period, France had taken comparatively little interest in the Holy Land and the Greek Church had encroached upon the position of the Latins. That encroachment was the direct cause of the Crimean War. In 1854, when the war began, the British Government published a Blue Book of 1029 pages, containing nearly 1200 largely abbreviated documents. If their full text had been given the volume would probably have exceeded 2000 pages. That publication furnished an account of the causes of the war and was significantly entitled 'Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.' In that correspondence various Church properties, and especially the key to the Church at Bethlehem, played a very great part.

As early as May 20, 1850, Sir Stratford Canning informed Lord Palmerston :

MY LORD,—A question likely to be attended with much discussion and excitement is on the point of being raised

between the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greek Churches in this country. The immediate point of difference is the right of possession to certain portions of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

General Aupick [the French Ambassador] has assured me that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property and of express treaty stipulation. But it is difficult to separate any such question from political considerations, and a struggle of general influence, especially if Russia, as may be expected, should interfere in behalf of the Greek Church, will probably grow out of the impending discussion.

Soon the question of the key to the Bethlehem Church came to the front and monopolised the attention of all European capitals and Cabinets. On February 9, 1852, Aali Pasha wrote to M. de Lavalette :

La Grotte qui est la Sainte Crèche est aujourd'hui un lieu visité par les diverses nations Chrétiennes, et il est établi depuis un très ancien temps qu'une clef de la porte du côté du nord de la grande église à Bethléem, une clef de la porte du côté du midi de cette église, et une clef de la porte de la grotte susmentionnée, doivent se trouver entre les mains des prêtres Latins aussi. En cas donc que ces clefs ne se trouvent point en la possession des Latins, il faut qu'on leur donne une clef de chacune de ces trois portes, pour qu'ils les aient comme par le passé.

The Sultan, as the sovereign and ground landlord, was called upon to decide between the quarrelling Churches, and he endeavoured to arrange matters by a Firman which was to be publicly read. His attempt proved a failure. Consul Finn reported to the Earl of Malmesbury on October 27, 1852, from Jerusalem :

Aff Bey invited all the parties concerned to meet him in the Church of the Virgin near Gethsemane. There he read an Order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate Mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. No sooner were these words uttered than the Latins, who had come to receive

their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of celebrating Mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated instead of nailed one over the other.

The French Government backed up the Latin, and the Russian Government the Greek, Church. The religious differences soon assumed a political aspect. Russia began to threaten the Sultan with her army, and France with her fleet. Colonel Rose reported on November 20, 1852, to the Earl of Malmesbury :

The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against all her wishes and interests she has been dragged into a most dangerous and difficult dispute between the Great Powers, who found their respective claims on contradictory documents, which date from remote and dark ages. The Porte, a Mohammedan Power, is called on to decide a quarrel which involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian religious feelings, but which, in reality, is a vital struggle between France and Russia for political influence, at the Porte's cost in her dominions.

Continuing, he reported that the Sultan had been threatened by France with a blockade of the Dardanelles, while the Russian representative had declared that he would leave Constantinople unless his demands were fulfilled. A few weeks later Colonel Rose informed the Earl of Malmesbury :

The complaints of the Russian Legation here against the Porte in the Jerusalem question are two, an ostensible one and an undefined one. The first is that the Firman to the Greeks has not been read in Jerusalem in full Council, and in the presence of the patriarchs and clergy of all the different sects. The second one is as to delivery of the key of the great door of the Church at Bethlehem to the Latins.

The quarrel about the Holy Places, and especially

about the celebrated key, became more and more acrimonious. On January 28, 1858, Lord John Russell wrote regretfully from the Foreign Office to Lord Cowley :

To a Government taking an impartial view of these affairs, an attitude so threatening on both sides appears very lamentable. We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to a conflict between two of the Great Powers of Europe ; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the Heavenly Host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men—when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind—the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed.

The Latins, backed by France, possessed keys to the two side-doors of the Church at Bethlehem, but not the key of the main entrance, which was in the hands of the Greek Church. Failing to receive the key, the French Consul resolved to use force and had the main entrance broken open by locksmiths. His action led to the following protest on the part of Russia :

Nous laisserons le Ministère Français juge de la pénible surprise que nous avons éprouvée en apprenant qu'à son retour à Constantinople, après un court séjour en France, M. de Lavalette avait soulevé de nouveau la question, en exigeant de la Porte, en termes peremptoires, et sous menace d'une rupture avec la France, la suppression du dernier Firman ; l'envoi à Jerusalem d'un Commissaire Turc, avec de nouvelles instructions ; la remise au clergé Latin de la clef et de la garde de la grande Eglise à Bethléem ; le placement sur l'autel de la Grotte de la Nativité d'une étoile aux armes de la France, qui s'y trouvait, dit-on, jadis, et qui en avait été enlevée ; l'adjonction au Couvent Latin de Jerusalem d'une bâtisse attenante à la coupole du Saint Sépulcre ; d'autres concessions enfin, qui de loin peuvent paraître des minuties, mais qui, sur les lieux, et aux yeux des populations indigènes, y compris même les Musulmans, sont autant de passe-droits et d'empiétements sur les autres communautés

Chrétiennes, autant de motifs de dissensions et de haine entre elle et l'Eglise Romaine, dont on prétend soutenir par ces moyens les intérêts.

Il nous repugne de faire mention ici des scènes scandaleuses qui ont déjà eu lieu à Jerusalem par suite de ces mesures, auxquelles la Porte a eu la faiblesse de prêter la main, et qui ont déjà reçu en partie leur exécution contrairement à la teneur du dernier Firman, dont, par une autre contradiction étrange, on donnait lecture aux autorités locales au moment même où l'on chargeait celles-ci d'en violer les dispositions principales.

D'après les derniers rapports que nous avons de la Syrie et de Constantinople, les choses en étaient venues à Jerusalem à ce point de confusion et de désordre que, tandis qu'un prélat Catholique, assisté du Consul de France, appelait à son aide les serruriers de la ville pour se faire ouvrir la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, bien que l'accès lui fut ouvert par deux autres portes latérales, le Patriarche de Jerusalem, Cyrille, vieillard vénérable, et généralement connu par son esprit conciliant et la modération de son caractère, se voyait obligé de protester par écrit contre ces actes de violence, et de partir pour Constantinople, afin de porter ses plaintes et celles de sa nation au Sultan.

On February 9, 1853, Sir G. H. Seymour, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, had an important conversation with Count Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, regarding the Franco-Russian dispute, and the celebrated key occupied once more the place of honour. The British Ambassador reported :

. . . Count Nesselrode observed : ' We have no wish to demand the restoration of the key of the Bethlehem Church.' As it is always desirable to guard against misapprehensions, I ventured to enquire whether, in this case, a key meant an instrument for opening a door, only not to be employed in closing that door against Christians of other sects ; or whether it was simply a key—an emblem. Count Nesselrode replied, unhesitatingly, that his meaning was that the key was to be used in giving the Latins access to

the Church, but not to be used for securing the door against Greeks and other Christians.

At last Russia sent Turkey an ultimatum regarding the Holy Places in the form of proposals which were pressingly put forward by Prince Menchikoff, and once more the Bethlehem key was a chief object of contention. It made its appearance in the first article of that document. Commenting on that ultimatum, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, formerly Sir Stratford Canning, wrote to the Earl of Clarendon :

All the proposals or demands in question, with two or three exceptions, refer to the Greek clergy and Churches in Turkey. They amount in substance to the conclusion of a Treaty stipulating that Russia shall enjoy the exclusive right of intervening for the effectual protection of all members of the Greek Church, and of the interests of the Churches themselves ; that the privileges of the four Greek patriarchs shall be effectually confirmed, and the patriarchs shall hold their preferment for life, independently of the Porte's approval.

The Crimean War arose out of a quarrel between the Greek and Latin Churches. It was largely caused by the fact that Russia was unwilling to allow France to remain any longer the protectress of Christianity in the East.

The Holy Places have for centuries been in the guardianship of the Turks, and the Turks, being Mohammedans, have been able to act as disinterested, and therefore impartial, guardians. Great jealousy prevails between Catholics and Protestants, between the Eastern and the Western Churches. All the other Churches would keenly resent it if France, by the acquisition of Syria, should obtain the guardianship of the Holy Places, and even the Roman Catholics belonging to other nations would be dissatisfied. Russia has assumed a leading position in the Holy Land. Every year enormous pilgrimages leave Russia for Jerusalem, and on the heights which command

Jerusalem and Bethlehem the Russian Church has erected huge buildings for its pilgrims which overshadow these towns. In 1896 M. Emile Delmas wrote very truly in his book '*Egypte et Palestine*': '*La Russie qui est partout ailleurs notre amie, est, dans le Levant, notre rivale persévérante.*' France's guardianship of the Holy Places would be disliked by other nations and possibly by Russia herself. It might involve France in most serious troubles. France has strong economic interests in Syria and Cilicia, where she has built railways and harbour works, and where she possesses numerous schools, clerical establishments, &c. Syria and Cilicia possess very great agricultural and mineral possibilities. If France wishes to occupy and exploit these territories she would probably act wisely in excluding the Holy Places, putting these under an international guardianship. However, that step would no doubt greatly reduce the value of Syria in the eyes of the French people. Much of its attraction would be gone.

The control of the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea would be convenient to Russia, supposing she occupied Constantinople, but it would, as has been shown, scarcely benefit her unless she had the hinterland as well. The possession of Syria would gratify, but would only moderately benefit, France.

The control of Mesopotamia and of the Persian Gulf and of Arabia seems almost a necessity to the British Empire for strategical and economic reasons. Admiral Mahan wrote in his book '*Retrospect and Prospect*':

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiality, a 'fleet in being' there, based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a political system; and, although at present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet so placed by a division of her own, it might well require

a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position.

A glance at the map confirms Admiral Mahan's statement. However, the control not only of the Persian Gulf but of Mesopotamia also is an important British interest. India is strongly protected towards the north and north-west by enormous mountains, but can comparatively easily be invaded by way of Mesopotamia and Persia, by the road taken by Alexander the Great and other conquerors, by which, as has been shown above, the railways of the future will connect India with Central Europe. Great Britain, as India's guardian, is therefore strongly interested that that most important line of approach should not be dominated by a great military Power to India's danger. Besides, England is on India's behalf strongly interested in Mesopotamia for economic reasons. India suffers from two evils : from famine and from over-population. Mesopotamia lies at India's door and can, as will presently be shown, produce enormous quantities of food and receive many millions of immigrants. As the climate of Mesopotamia is not very suitable for Europeans, it is only logical that over-populated India should be given an outlet upon the Euphrates and Tigris. Great Britain has a good claim upon the control of Mesopotamia. She has developed the trade along its rivers. British archæologists and engineers have explored the country, and British men of action have for decades striven to recreate its prosperity. Lastly, Englishmen have conquered it.

Mesopotamia has almost unlimited agricultural possibilities. Babylonia and Assyria were the cradle of Christian civilisation and perhaps of mankind. Chapter ii. verse 8, of the Book of Genesis tells us : ' And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden ; and there he put the man whom he had formed.' The word ' Eden ' is the Sumerian word, as Assyriologists have told us, for plain. The ancient Babylonians also had a myth of a

great plain in the centre of which stood the Tree of Knowledge, and they possessed likewise the story of the Flood and of the Ark. In Genesis, chapter ii. verse 14, we read in the description of Paradise : ' And the name of the third river is Hiddekel : that is it which goeth toward the east of Assyria. And the fourth river is Euphrates.' Assyriologists tell us that the four rivers mentioned in the Bible were the Euphrates and Tigris, and two of the huge artificial canals which the ancients had constructed. In chapter x. of Genesis we are made acquainted with Nimrod, Babel, Erech, Accad, Calneh, Nineveh, and other Babylonian names. Ur on the Euphrates near Babylon was the birthplace of Abraham. The ancient Jews placed their Paradise in Eden because Eden, the Mesopotamian plain, was then the garden of the world. Herodotus, who had visited Mesopotamia and the town of Babylon, and who wrote about the year 450 B.C., has told us—the translation is Rawlinson's :

But little rain falls in Assyria, enough, however, to make the corn begin to sprout, after which the plant is nourished and the ears formed by means of irrigation from the river. For the river does not, as in Egypt, overflow the corn-lands of its own accord, but is spread over them by the hand, or by the help of engines. The whole of Babylonia is, like Egypt, intersected with canals. The largest of them all, which runs towards the winter sun, and is impassable except in boats, is carried from the Euphrates into another stream, called the Tigris, the river upon which the town of Nineveh formerly stood.

Of all the countries that we know, there is none which is so fruitful in grain. It makes no pretension, indeed, of growing the fig, the olive, the vine, or any other tree of the kind, but in grain it is so fruitful as to yield commonly two hundredfold. The blade of the wheat plant and barley plant is often four fingers in breadth. As for the millet and the sesame, I shall not say to what height they grow, though within my own knowledge, for I am not ignorant that what I have already written concerning the fruitfulness of Baby-

lonia must seem incredible to those who have never visited the country.

Among the many proofs which I shall bring forward of the power and resources of the Babylonians the following is of special account. The whole country under the domination of the Persians, besides paying a fixed tribute, is parcelled out into divisions to supply food to the Great King and his Army. Now, out of the twelve months of the year, the district of Babylon furnished food during four, the other regions of Asia during eight; by which it appears that Assyria, in respect of resources, is one-third the whole of Asia.

Quintus Curtius, who wrote about 50 B.C., told us :

The pasturage between the Tigris and the Euphrates is represented as so rich and luxuriant that the inhabitants restrain the cattle feeding lest they should die by a surfeit. The cause of this fertility is the humidity circulated through the soil by subterranean streams, replenished from the two Rivers.

The great fruitfulness of Babylonia was praised by many ancient writers, such as Theophrastus, a disciple of Aristotle, Berosus, Strabo, Pliny, &c. According to Herodotus (III. 91, 92) Babylonia and Susiana paid to Darius a tribute of 1800 talents per year, and Egypt of only 700. Apparently Mesopotamia was at the time almost twice as wealthy as Egypt. According to the ancient writers, the fruitfulness of Babylonia exceeded that of Egypt. The account of the size of the town of Babylon given by Herodotus seems at first sight exaggerated. It seems incredible that Babylon should have covered an area five times as large as that of Paris. According to the account of Herodotus the circumference of the town was 480 stades, or 56 miles. On the other hand, the circumference of the town was, according to Strabo, 985 stades; according to Quintus Curtius, 868 stades; according to Clitarchus, 865 stades; and according to Ctesias, 860 stades. Four of the estimates given are strangely similar.

As Babylon possessed an outer and an inner wall, it is assumed by many that Herodotus gave figures for the outer and the other writers for the inner line of fortifications.

Enormous towns testify to the wealth and populousness of a country. After Babylon's destruction it became a quarry and Seleucia and Ctesiphon were built with the stones of that city. The former town had, in the time of Pliny, 600,000 inhabitants, and 500,000 when destroyed by Cassius in A.D. 165. Ctesiphon, when taken by Severus in A.D. 232, must have been approximately as large, for it furnished 100,000 prisoners.

Assyria and Babylonia were the wealthiest countries of antiquity, and Mesopotamia was the richest part of the great Persian Empire. Persia's wealth was chiefly Babylonian wealth. In the Middle Ages, Baghdad arose among the Babylonian ruins, and between the tenth and eleventh centuries it had 2,000,000 inhabitants, 60,000 baths, 80,000 bazaars, &c. It was the capital of the gigantic Arab Empire, the wealth of which was founded upon the flourishing agriculture of the Babylonian plain.

In olden times Babylonia was perfectly irrigated. Under the Turks, the wonderful system of canals fell into neglect. The Babylonian plain became partly a desert and partly a swamp. Mesopotamia, which, in olden times, was the most densely populated part of the world, is at present the most sparsely peopled part of the Turkish Empire, as will be seen by reference to the table given in the beginning of this chapter. All Mesopotamia has at present only 2,000,000 inhabitants, or fourteen people per square mile.

Sir William Willcocks, a very eminent engineer, who has surveyed the country and planned a gigantic irrigation system, delivered, on March 25, 1903, before the Khedivial Geographical Society at Cairo, a lecture on the irrigation of Mesopotamia, in the course of which he stated :

We have before us the restoration of that ancient land whose name was a synonym for abundance, prosperity, and grandeur for many generations. Records as old as those of

Egypt and as well attested tell of fertile lands and teeming populations, mighty kings and warriors, sages and wise men, over periods of thousands of years. And over and above everything else there is this unfailing record that the teeming wealth of this land was the goal of all Eastern conquerors and its possession the crown of their conquests. The Eastern Power which held this land in old historic days held the East. A land such as this is worth resuscitating. Once we have apprehended the true cause of its present desolate and abandoned condition we are on our way to restoring it to its ancient fertility. A land which so readily responded to ancient science and gave a return which sufficed for the maintenance of a Persian Court in all its splendour will surely respond to the efforts of modern science and return manifold the money and talent spent on its regeneration. . . . Of all the regions of the earth, no region is more favoured by Nature for the production of cereals than the lands on the Tigris. Indeed, I have heard our former President, Dr. Schweinfurth, say, in this very hall, that wheat, in its wild uncultivated state, has its home in these semi-arid regions and from here it has been transported to every quarter of the globe. Cotton, sugar-cane, Indian corn, and all the summer products of Egypt will flourish here as on the Nile, while the winter products of cereals, leguminous plants, Egyptian clover, opium, and tobacco will find themselves at home as they do in Egypt. Of the historic gardens of Babylon and Bagdad it is not necessary for me to speak. A land whose climate allows her to produce such crops in tropical profusion, and whose snow-fed rivers permit of perennial irrigation over millions of acres, cannot be barren and desolate when the Bagdad Railway is traversing her fields and European capital is seeking a remunerative outlet.

According to the painstaking and conscientious investigations of Sir William Willcocks, the irrigable area of Mesopotamia is from two to three times as large as that of Egypt. It follows that that country should be able to nourish from two to three times as many people as Egypt, that its population might be increased from 2,000,000 to about

80,000,000. Mesopotamia might once more become one of the great granaries of the world, and owing to its position it ought obviously to become the granary of famine-stricken and over-populated India. Mesopotamia might become, and ought to become, another, and a greater, Egypt under the united efforts of Great Britain and India. Great Britain's experience in Egypt and in India in the best methods of irrigation should convert the Babylonian waste once more into a paradise.

One of the most important routes, if not the most important, of the British Empire is the sea-route from England to India and Australia by way of the Suez Canal. Admiral Mahan has stated that the control of the Persian Gulf is an important British interest because thence a flank attack may be made on the sea-route to India and China. A glance at the map shows that the control of the Red Sea is at least as important because the Red Sea is merely a prolongation of the Suez Canal. The Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are long and narrow inlets from the shores of which British shipping can easily be attacked by means of mines, submarines, and torpedo boats. It is therefore clear that Great Britain is most strongly interested in the integrity of the shores both of the Persian Gulf and of the Red Sea. Arabia forms the eastern shore of the Red Sea and the western shore of the Persian Gulf. As Great Britain is vitally interested in the integrity of the Persian Gulf and of the Red Sea, she is equally strongly interested in the integrity of Arabia. A hostile Power controlling Arabia might make both inlets untenable to Great Britain and block the Suez Canal somewhere between Suez and Aden. Great Britain and India have shown in the past that they are strongly interested in the integrity both of Southern Persia, which forms the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, and of Arabia. A hostile Power controlling Arabia could not only attack British shipping in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, but could attack the Suez Canal as well.

On the eastern shore of the Red Sea lie the Holy Places of Mohammedanism, Mecca, and Medina. All Mohammedans desire that their Holy places should be controlled by an independent Mohammedan Power, not by Christian States. Great Britain is certain to respect that wish.

If the arguments given in these pages should, after a careful scrutiny, be found correct, it would appear that the problem of Asiatic Turkey can be solved only by placing the country under a European guardianship, and the question arises whether several Powers or a single one should fill this office. As several Powers possess strong interests in Asiatic Turkey, and as the country is of the greatest strategical importance, the ideal solution would seem to be a joint guardianship exercised by some body either on behalf of all Europe or on behalf of the victorious Entente Powers. It is questionable, however, whether the Powers exercising control over one of the most valuable and important territories in the world will be able to act in harmony.

Natura non facit saltum. A guardianship should not be imposed upon Turkey by violent measures. It might be exercised by means of the strictest financial control. A European financial authority might be made to control and direct the entire expenditure of Asiatic Turkey, and might by purely financial means keep the country in order and shape its policy and internal development. If we look for a precedent we find one in the Caisse de la Dette, a Turkish organisation directed by Europeans which has managed the Turkish finances with conspicuous honesty and ability without causing serious international friction. However, the example of the Caisse de la Dette supplies a false analogy. The European nations acted in harmony, when represented by that body, because the Caisse had no political power. That power was exercised by the Sultan and his advisers. Hence, the European nations intrigued against each other not in the Caisse de la Dette but around the Sultan and his Government. If the Caisse de la Dette

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should be given control over the Turkish Government its harmony would probably come to an end and the European Powers would strive to influence the policy of Asiatic Turkey by bringing pressure to bear upon the international financial commission of supervision.

A condominium, whenever and wherever tried, has proved a failure and a danger. If the European Powers should desire to convert Asiatic Turkey into a peaceful and prosperous buffer State, into a gigantic Switzerland, by means of a European guardianship, the duty of controlling, modernising, and developing the country should be left to a single and a non-military, and therefore non-aggressive, Power acting on behalf of Europe. At first sight it would appear that some small and capable State such as Sweden, Holland or Belgium might act in that capacity. But there are several objections to trusting the guardianship of so large and so important a country to a small State. Swedes, Dutchmen, and Belgians have little experience in dealing with Mohammedans. Belonging to a small State, they would not enjoy sufficient prestige with the Turks. Last, but not least, there would always be the danger that a small State furnishing the guardians of Turkey might be influenced in its policy by the attitude of a powerful neighbour State which thus would be able to influence the guardian of Asiatic Turkey to its own advantage. If the European Powers should decide to place Turkey under a guardianship, a single, a strong, a non-military and therefore non-aggressive Power experienced in managing Mohammedans should be selected. The only Power possessing these qualifications is Great Britain. Great Britain might convert Asiatic Turkey into another, and a greater, Egypt. Outwardly it would remain an independent State with Sultan, &c. However, an inconspicuous representative of the guardian Power, called Adviser or Consul-General, would control the Turkish administrative and executive absolutely by controlling the entire finances of the country.

Asiatic Turkey, like Egypt, would not need, and should

not possess, a real army. A police force and a gendarmerie, possibly supported by a few thousand soldiers in case of internal troubles, should suffice. The entire energy of the Asiatic Turks should be concentrated upon the development of the country. Only then would Turkey cease to be a danger to other nations and to itself.

Great Britain would derive no benefit from its guardianship, except the benefit of peace. Her activity on behalf of Europe would be distinctly unprofitable to herself. It is true that the Turks would have to pay salaries to a number of British officials—a paltry matter—and that Great Britain might possibly provide some of the capital needed for developing the country. However, Great Britain will, after the War, have no capital to spare for exotic enterprises. All her surplus capital will be required for developing the Motherland and Empire. Besides, she has no superabundance of able administrators available for the service of Turkey and of other semi-civilised States. Great Britain would see in a guardianship over Turkey rather a duty than an advantage.

If the War, as seems likely, should end in the victory of the Entente Powers, France will probably receive Alsace-Lorraine and possibly further German territory. Russia will probably obtain considerable territory from Germany and Austria-Hungary and may receive Constantinople. Great Britain will obtain practically no material compensation, for the German Colonies can scarcely be considered as such. Great Britain has not fought for territory but for peace. The neutralisation of Asiatic Turkey appears to be the most necessary step for preventing the outbreak of another world-war. While Russia and France demand valuable territories as a reward, Great Britain is surely entitled to demand stability and peace as a compensation. No Englishman has expressed the wish that Great Britain should acquire Asiatic Turkey. The aim of the British Government and of all Europe should be to enable Turkey to govern herself. But in order to be able to govern herself

Turkey must be taught the art of government, and Great Britain might be her teacher.

It seems necessary for the peace of the world that Asiatic Turkey in its entirety should be neutralised, and it seems likely that its neutrality can be maintained only if order and good government are introduced into the country under the auspices of a strong but non-military and unaggressive State, such as Great Britain, which is not likely ever to use the unrivalled position occupied by the Turkish provinces as a base for attacking the neighbouring Powers with a large army. A British guardianship would of course not prevent French, Russian, Italian, and Greek capital and labour participating with England in the Government and economic development of the country, in accordance with the policy laid down by the European Powers in concert and executed by Great Britain as their appointed guardian. Thus Russia might develop Armenia, France Syria and Cilicia, Italy the district of Adalia, and Greece that of Smyrna.

If, on the other hand, the Powers should not be able to agree to a British guardianship, it would become necessary to divide Asiatic Turkey into zones of influence. In that case, the Turks would probably be restricted to a comparatively narrow territory in the centre of Asia Minor. Being cut off from the sea and lacking great natural resources, the few million Turks would scarcely be able to retain their independence for long. Asiatic Turkey in its totality would be partitioned by the Powers. Great Britain would probably claim the control, in some form or other, of both Mesopotamia and Arabia as her share. However, it seems very doubtful whether the partition of Asiatic Turkey would prove a final one. It is much to be feared that it would lead to a disaster perhaps as great as the present War.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY ¹

THE WAR, as far as the land campaign is concerned, may end in three different ways. It may end in the victory of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, it may lead to the exhaustion of the land Powers engaged in it, and may thus remain undecided, or it may result in the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In each of these three eventualities, the question as to the position and future of the Dual Monarchy will be of the very greatest interest and importance not only to all Europe but to the world.

The War has yielded a twofold surprise to all who are interested in military affairs. The Germans have fought far better, and the Austrians infinitely worse, than was generally expected. At the beginning of the War the Austrian armies utterly collapsed. It was expected by the German General Staff that their Austrian allies would be able to hold back the Russian hosts from the Austro-German frontiers until the Germans had destroyed the French armies, taken Paris, and occupied the most valuable portions of France. Instead of this, Austria suffered at the hands of Russia the most disastrous defeat in her history, a defeat compared with which her defeat at Königgrätz and France's defeat at Sedan appear unimportant. Galicia, the Bukovina, and part of Hungary, districts inhabited by about 10,000,000 people and possessed of enormous resources of every kind, with Lemberg, the third largest Austrian town, were overrun by

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November, 1914.

Russia, and even the little army of poor and war-exhausted Serbia utterly defeated the numerically far stronger Austrian forces sent against it. Prince Lichnowsky, referring to Austria-Hungary, said, not without reason, to a friend shortly before leaving London: 'Germany goes to war with a corpse hanging round her neck.'

Owing to the initial collapse of the Austrian army and the truly wonderful achievements of the Germans against heavy odds—achievements which one could frankly admire, had the German soldiers by their brutality and unspeakable crimes not covered the German name with everlasting infamy—Germany took the conduct of war completely into her own hands and Austria became a mere cypher. The Austrian army commanders and the Austrian Chief of the General Staff were dismissed, and for all practical purposes the Austrian army became an adjunct and a subordinate portion of the German army. Austria's dependence upon Germany was formerly disguised. Berlin did not wish to hurt the susceptibilities of Vienna, and allowed the Austrians to make a brave show and to pose as a Great Power. To humour their vanity, Austrian statesmen were permitted to 'lead off' when the War for the hegemony in Europe and the mastery of the world had been resolved upon in Berlin. But the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary will never again resemble those which existed before the War. The rulers and people of the Dual Monarchy have become aware that they depend upon Germany's good will for their very existence. The German people, and especially the German officers, refer to beaten and decadent Austria with undisguised contempt. Austria's independence is a thing of the past. She is at present a German vassal. What will be her future?

If Germany should be victorious in the War on land, or if the campaign should end undecided, Austria-Hungary will continue to be a German appendage and for all practical purposes a subject State. There may still be an Austrian Emperor in Vienna, but he will be a German puppet, not

only in all questions of foreign policy, but in domestic, administrative, and military matters as well. Germany will certainly not relinquish her present control over the Austrian army. *Machtpolitik*, the policy of power, will exact payment and punishment from Austria's weakness and failure. We must, therefore, reckon with the fact that if the War should end in a draw, Germany and Austria-Hungary will form a single State, possibly even in outward form. It is conceivable that Austria-Hungary will have to enter the German Federation. At any rate, it seems likely that the German Emperor will, in case of a drawn war, rule in the near future over 120,000,000 people and dispose of an active army of 12,000,000 men in case of war; that Pola, Fiume, and Cattaro will be German war harbours in addition to Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, and Emden; that a vigorous policy of Germanisation will take place throughout Austria-Hungary; that the Austrian Slavs will gradually become Germans; that the power of Germany will be doubled even if she should not be able to retain any of her conquests. If, on the other hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary should be victorious on land, Germany's predominance would become not merely European but world-wide. In that case, she would retain in the West all Belgium and a large part of Eastern France; and Holland, wedged into German territory, would undoubtedly be compelled to enter the German Federation. In the East she would annex Russian Poland, and the formerly German Baltic Provinces of Russia, Livland, Esthland, and Courland. In addition, Germany would very likely take the French colonies. Austria-Hungary would receive a portion of Western Russia and all Serbia, and she would probably punish Italy's desertion by once more converting Lombardy and Venetia into Austrian provinces. For all practical purposes Germany and Austria-Hungary would thus be a single State of 150,000,000 inhabitants, or more.

As France and Russia would be crippled for many decades, the great German Empire would dominate the

Balkan States and Turkey, and these would become German protectorates. Stretching from Calais, from Havre, or perhaps from Cherbourg, to the vicinity of Petrograd, and from the Italian plain to Constantinople, and to the lands beyond the Bosphorus far into Asia, Germany, together with her protectorates, would form a gigantic and compact State of more than 200,000,000 inhabitants. It would control the most valuable strategical positions in Europe and on the Mediterranean. It would dispose of unlimited armies, unlimited resources, and unlimited wealth. The Hohenzollerns would rule a State far larger than the Empire of Charlemagne. William the Second would rule the world, for the British Empire and the United States combined would scarcely be able to resist Germany for long. Although in the present war Great Britain should be victorious at sea, her ultimate downfall and that of the United States would probably be merely a question of time. Germany would rule the world, unless the power she had gained was wrested from her in a still greater war than the present one by the combined Anglo-Saxon, Latin, and Slav nations. A subordinate Austria-Hungary, which would vastly increase Germany's population and army and which, besides, would form a bridge between Germany and Constantinople, would evidently play a very important part in enabling Germany to recreate the Empire of Charlemagne on a vastly increased scale.

The military weakness of Austria-Hungary and her internal divisions may lead to her absorption into Germany if the land war should prove indecisive or if it should end in a German victory. In either case, Austria-Hungary might gradually become a homogeneous, centralised, Prussianised, and powerful, though dependent, State, a kind of Greater Bavaria, and her accession would enormously increase Germany's power on land and sea.

However, it seems unlikely that Germany and Austria-Hungary will be victorious, or that the War will end in

a draw. In these circumstances it is worth while considering closely the future of Austria-Hungary in case of an Austro-German defeat.

Austria-Hungary is not a modern State but a medieval survival. Modern States are erected on the broad basis of a common nationality. In modern States, State and nation are synonymous terms, and the people feel that they constitute a single family in a world of strangers. In Austria-Hungary, as in Turkey, the State is not formed by a politically organised nation. Austria-Hungary, like Turkey, is a country which is inhabited, not by a nation, but by a number of nations which have little in common and which hate and persecute one another.

The Habsburg family possesses certain very marked hereditary peculiarities. The hanging Habsburg lip and the long narrow jaws may be traced back through generation after generation as far as the fifteenth century. King Alphonso of Spain curiously resembles his great ancestor, the Emperor Charles the Fifth, who ruled four centuries ago. Certain traits of character of the Habsburg family are equally persistent, and among these the spirit of acquisitiveness is particularly marked. The Habsburgs have been the most successful family of matrimonial and land speculators known to history. While most dynasties rose to eminence by placing themselves at the head of great nations and by conducting successful wars of conquest, the Alsatian family of the Habsburgs rose from obscurity to the greatest power by acquiring territories in all parts of the world by judicious purchase, by exchange, and especially by highly profitable marriages. Spain and the countries of the New World were one of the dowries gathered in by the Habsburg princes. Four and a half centuries ago the witty Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus wrote the distich :

Bella gerant alii ! Tu felix Austria nube.
Nam quae Mars aliis dat tibi regna Venus.

(Let other nations wage war ! You, happy Austria, marry. For Venus will give you those lands which usually Mars bestows.) The Austrian Empire is not an Empire in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is the result of gigantic deals in land, and of equally gigantic matrimonial ventures. Since the earliest times the Habsburgs have cared for land, not for people. They acquired lands right and left, regardless of the nationality of the inhabitants whom they got thrown in. Thus the Habsburgs ruled at one time or another not only the ten nations which constitute Austria-Hungary, but Switzerland, Burgundy, Lorraine, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, North Africa, and the countries of the New World as well. Austria-Hungary is the residue of a much larger fortuitous collection of States and nations. Recognising that Austria-Hungary is neither a State nor a nation, but a collection of States and nations, Austrian rulers speak habitually of their peoples, not of their people, and of their lands, not of their land. The curious genesis of the Habsburg monarchy, and the fact that the so-called Dual Monarchy is in reality a multiple monarchy, is apparent from the title of its ruler, who is called Emperor of Austria, Apostolic King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomeria and Illyria, King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Austria, Grand Duke of Toscana and Cracow, Duke of Lorraine, Duke of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the Bukovina, of Upper and Lower Silesia, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, Prince of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia, Princely Count of Tyrol, &c., &c., &c.

The peoples of Austria-Hungary are organised in two self-governing States, Austria and Hungary. These are loosely connected by various links, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are a joint possession of the two States. If, for simplicity's sake, we credit each of these States with one half of the population of Bosnia and

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Herzegovina, we find that their racial composition is as follows :

Population of Austria and Half of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1910		Population of Hungary and Half of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1910	
Germans	9,950,000	Magyars	10,051,000
Czechs	6,436,000	Roumanians . . .	2,949,000
Poles	4,968,000	Germans	2,037,000
Ruthenians . . .	3,519,000	Serbians	2,006,000
Slovenes	1,253,000	Slovacks	1,968,000
Serbians	1,683,000	Croatians	1,833,000
Italians	768,000	Ruthenians . . .	473,000
Roumanians . . .	275,000		
Magyars	11,000		
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	28,863,000		21,317,000

The ten nations enumerated in this table speak ten different languages—the Serbians and Croats are one race and differ only in religion—and each of them has a strongly marked character and individuality of its own.

A composite State which is peopled by different races can be ruled comparatively easily either on democratic or on autocratic lines ; democratically if the different races have full self-government, as they have in Switzerland and Canada, and autocratically if the ruling race constitutes the majority of the population. Austria is ruled by the Germans and Hungary by the Magyars. The Germans of Austria form about one-third of the population. The Magyars are apparently about one-half of the population of Hungary ; but their number is greatly overstated. In their anxiety to Magyarise Hungary and to make a good show, they have manipulated the census statistics, as will be shown later on. Hungary has in reality only between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 *bona fide* Magyars. In other words, the ruling race, both in Austria and in Hungary, constitutes only a minority. In both halves of the Dual Monarchy one-third of the people rule over the remaining two-thirds. That is not a healthy state of affairs.

Austria and Hungary, like their ally Germany, are nominally constitutionally governed limited monarchies endowed with representative government and all the usual trappings of democracy. In reality Austria-Hungary, like Germany, is an autocracy which is governed by the ruler and for the ruler under the observation of certain Parliamentary forms. In Austria-Hungary and in Germany the Emperor is the State. The Austrian Emperor, like the German Emperor, directs the entire machinery of the government and administration in accordance with his will. Thus in Austria-Hungary, as in Germany, the bureaucracy is the State, and the officials are the servants of the Emperor-King, who appoints and dismisses them. Parliament has no power whatever over the administrative apparatus. The people of the Dual Monarchy are ruled with the assistance of the Civil Service, the army, the exceedingly powerful political police, which spies upon every citizen, the law courts, the school, the Church, and the Press, and all seven are government institutions controlled by the Emperor. Church and Press are no exception to the rule. In Germany the Emperor is the official head, the Pope, of the Protestant State Church. That perhaps accounts for his intimate relations with the Deity. The Austrian Church is Roman Catholic. Its head is nominally the Pope, but in reality it is the Emperor. In a decree published by the Emperor Leopold the Second on March 3, 1782, we read :

Although the priest's province is the cure of souls, he must also be considered as a citizen and as a State official engaged in religious work, for he can directly and indirectly exercise the greatest political influence over the people by working upon their feelings.

It may sound strange, but it is a fact that in Austria the Church is a branch of the bureaucracy. The Press of the Dual Monarchy is Government-inspired, Government-subsidised, Government-muzzled, and Government-con-

trolled to a far greater extent than it is in Germany. Every Department of State has a Press bureau of its own, and enormous sums are spent by the Government upon the Austrian Press. The judges of the Dual Monarchy, being a part of the Civil Service, possess no real independence. That may be seen by their disgraceful partisan behaviour in political prosecutions, in which they frequently brow-beat, fine, and expel from the court not only the witnesses for the defence, but even the defending solicitors.

Austria-Hungary is governed by absolutism, and absolutism can be successfully maintained only if the people are weak and ignorant. Endeavouring to keep the people in ignorance and subjection, the Austrian rulers have habitually favoured the Roman Catholic Church and opposed education. Guided by the principle '*Cujus regio, ejus et religio*,' they have persecuted Protestantism in the most savage manner, recognising in it a revolt of the people against established authority. Herein lies the reason that, although Protestantism took powerful root in the Dual Monarchy in the time of Huss, there are in Austria at present only 588,686 Protestants, as compared with no fewer than 25,949,627 Roman Catholics. While the Austrian people are poor, the Austrian Church is exceedingly wealthy and powerful. Illiteracy in Austria-Hungary is very great. From the latest issue of the '*Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*' we learn that of 10,000 recruits only 3 are illiterate in Germany, 2200 are illiterate in Austria, and 2590 in Hungary. Among the oppressed nationalities, for instance, in the Slavonic parts of Austria and Hungary, illiteracy rises to 7000 among every 10,000 recruits. While the Austrian Government always discouraged knowledge and independence among the people, keeping them down by means of the officials, the police, and the Church, it endeavoured to prevent popular dissatisfaction by encouraging amusement and not discouraging vice. The Austrian towns, which might become hotbeds of revolution, are the gayest and at the

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same time the most immoral towns in Europe. In 1910 of all the children born alive 18·25 per cent. were illegitimate in Upper Austria, 21·9 in Lower Austria, 23·0 in Styria, 23·6 in Salzburg, and 35·6 in Carinthia. In Vienna the percentage of illegitimate births is on an average about forty, according to the official statistics. Possibly they understate the facts.

While, for the sake of making their peoples obedient, the Austrian rulers forced them by the most savage persecution into a religious uniformity, they had no desire to weld them together into one nation. The old principle of the Habsburg monarchy is 'Divide et impera.' Francis the Second, who ruled Austria at the time of the Congress of Vienna, said to the French Ambassador :

My peoples are strangers to each other. That is all the better. They do not catch the same political disease at the same time. If the fever takes hold of you in France all of you catch it. Hungary is kept in order by Italian troops, and Italy is kept down by Hungarians. Everybody keeps his neighbour in order. My peoples do not understand each other, and hate each other. Their antipathies make for security and their mutual hatreds for the general peace.

Absolutism is maintained by fear. Absolute rulers in the East and the West habitually distrust their principal advisers, fearing that their power may become too great. Actuated by fear and distrust, the Austrian rulers have usually entrusted the government of the country to mediocrities and nonentities, and have treated with ingratitude the public servants who had rendered the greatest services to their country. If Austria-Hungary entered upon a war in which she was absolutely certain of victory, her armies were commanded by a member of the ruling house, so that the dynasty should receive new glory. If she was likely to lose, the command was given to officers who were afterwards dismissed and disgraced for their incompetence. Generals von Auffenberg, Dankl, and many

other leading men have shared the fate of General von Benedek, who was defeated at Königgrätz, while Admiral Tegethoff was very badly treated by the Government because he unexpectedly defeated the far stronger Italian fleet at Lissa and was made a hero by the people. Austria's stagnation is largely due to the fact that she has usually been governed and administered by mediocrities, and that her armies have been entrusted to military nonentities in time of war.

Austria-Hungary curiously resembles ancient Spain. In both countries we have seen rulers actuated by tyranny, treachery, cruelty, and jealousy. After all, the Spanish and Austrian dynasties are closely related. Both possess the same traditions and the same unbending Court ceremonial. Austria-Hungary, like ancient Spain, pursues not a national, but a purely dynastic policy. The people are merely pawns, and they are exploited, oppressed, and treated with perfidy and ingratitude. The attitude of the Austrian rulers towards their subjects will be apparent from a few examples out of many. In 1690 the Emperor Leopold the First invited 200,000 Serbs to leave their country and to settle in Austria. They were to clear the Eastern frontier provinces of the Turks and to defend them against Ottoman aggression. They were promised freedom of religion, and their nationality was to be respected. During one hundred and sixty years the Serbs and their descendants fought Austria's battles against the Turks. They fought for Austria in Italy and on the Rhine. Notwithstanding Austria's promises, they were deprived of their leaders and forcibly denationalised. Their religion was suppressed, the building of Serbian churches and convents was prohibited, and during a century printing in the Serbian language was not allowed. The books required for religious service had to be copied by hand as late as the nineteenth century. The Serbian saints were excluded from the calendar, and on the sacred days of their Church Serbs were purposely sent to forced labour. These persecutions

drove thousands of Serbs from Austria to Russia and even to Turkey, where at least they were allowed to practise their religion.

During the struggles of the Serbians with the Turks a century ago Austria disregarded their pitiful appeal for help, betrayed them to the Turks, and forced them to surrender to them by closing against them the Austrian frontier, whence alone they could obtain food. During the Revolution of 1848 the Roman Catholic Serbs of Austria, the Croatsians, loyally aided the Emperor against the Hungarian revolutionists, defeated them and reconquered Vienna. Yet after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution they were handed over to Hungary to be ill-used and oppressed. The Roumanians, who also had loyally supported their Emperor against the rebellious Magyars, were likewise handed over to their enemies, their protests notwithstanding. When the revolution broke out in Hungary, the Austrian officers stationed there were treated with the greatest duplicity by the Austrian Government. Believing that the Hungarians would succeed in making themselves independent, and fearing their hostility, the Austrian Government wished to keep them quiet and encouraged the Austrian officers in Hungary to take service under the Hungarian Government in order to allay its suspicions. A little later when, with the help of Russia, Austria succeeded in defeating the Hungarian armies, she had many of the deluded Austrian officers executed for high treason.

A king or emperor who rules over a number of different nationalities will, for convenience' sake, make one of their languages the official language of the Government. The Austrian Habsburgs, being German princes, not unnaturally made German the official language and handed over to the Austro-Germans the government of the Austrian peoples and the administration of their lands. German became the language of the upper classes, and of literature, for until lately only the upper classes in Austria could read and could afford to buy newspapers and books. Not

very long ago the Magyar, Czech, Polish, Serbian, Roumanian, Ruthenian, Slovenian, and Slovak languages, which now have a great and glorious literature, were hardly more than rude local patois used only by the common people. Books in most of these languages did not exist. The official language of the Magyars was Latin and German. The debates of the Hungarian Parliament were conducted in a mongrel Latin until a short time ago.

Joseph the Second, who ruled from 1765 to 1790, was an enthusiast and a great admirer of Frederick the Great, his contemporary. Animated, perhaps, by a premonition of the rise of a great German State outside Austria, he endeavoured to Germanise his numerous non-German possessions. He strove to Germanise the people of the monarchy by forcing upon them a centralised German administration and the German language. Acting clumsily and high-handedly, he outraged the non-German peoples and brought about a revival of their languages. Patriotic native philologists began to study the non-German patois and to elevate them into a language by purifying them. Languages which had apparently died were painfully reconstructed out of the debris at hand. Polish, Magyar, Czech, and other writers created a great and beautiful literature in their revived languages. The cultured Magyars abandoned Latin and German for Magyar, and the leaders of the other nationalities also took to their rediscovered national languages. The current of nationalism could not be stemmed. The nationalities acquired race consciousness and race pride. The rapidity with which the non-German languages have progressed even during the most recent times will be seen from the figures in table on page 118, which are taken from an official Austrian publication, 'Statistische Rückblicke auf Oesterreich,' which was published in Vienna in 1918.

Between 1882 and 1912 the number of papers and periodicals of the Czechs increased sevenfold, and those of the Poles more than fourfold. In 1882 there were two

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German papers and periodicals to every single non-German one in Austria. In 1912 the number of German and non-German papers and periodicals had become nearly equal. The huge increase of the Czech papers and periodicals is particularly noteworthy. It has been far greater than that of the other nationalities, because the reawakened nationalism has grown particularly vigorous in Bohemia, where formerly it had been most ruthlessly suppressed.

The nationalities had been murmuring for many years against Austrian misrule, and the German-Austrians also had become more and more dissatisfied with the reactionary

Newspapers and Periodicals printed in Austria.

—	German	Czech and Slav	Polish	Ruthenian	Slovenian	Italian	Various	Total Non-German
1882	912	176	89	24	27	85	65	466
1892	1252	374	108	24	30	67	90	693
1902	1817	631	238	41	57	99	92	1158
1912	2492	1209	389	65	96	130	153	2042

and oppressive methods of government which Metternich had introduced after the downfall of Napoleon in 1815. The great Revolution of 1848 shook the monarchy to its very foundations. The German, Italian, and Hungarian lands rose in arms. The Emperor and Prince Metternich had to flee from Vienna. The revolution was overcome with the greatest difficulty and with terrible bloodshed, and the reconquered lands were treated with the utmost barbarity by the victors. In 1859 the Italians rose once more against their Austrian oppressors and, with the help of France, wrested Lombardy from them. Still Italy remained dissatisfied, for Austria retained Venetia. A second war with Italy was likely. Since the early sixties, and especially since the time when Bismarck had become Prussia's Prime Minister, Prussia had begun to arm with feverish haste and was doubling her military forces. Her

attitude towards Austria became more and more menacing. It was clear to all Austrians that before long the Monarchy might have to fight a war on two fronts. In these circumstances it was, of course, most important that Austria, when at war in the south and the north, should not be attacked in the rear by the Hungarians under Kossuth's leadership. A reconciliation between Austria and Hungary was urgently required, and Vienna began to move. Austria's necessity was Hungary's opportunity. In the third volume of Kossuth's memoirs, on page 649, there is a report from Budapest dated August 16, 1861, in which we read :

The Vienna Court will not give way, but is embarking upon new and desperate experiments. In the meantime the difficulties with which it is faced are constantly increasing. Its power keeps on diminishing, and at last a moment will arrive when it will have to fulfil all that Hungary desires, merely in order to save the Habsburg dynasty.

Kossuth's forecast came true. Before 1866, when Prussia and Italy together made war upon Austria, the Magyar leaders were promised self-government. Austria was defeated by Prussia, but she prepared everything for an early war of revenge in which she reckoned upon the support of France. To defeat Prussia it was necessary to satisfy the wishes of the Magyars and to convert them from opponents into staunch and reliable supporters with the least delay. In the year following her defeat the negotiations between Vienna and Budapest were hastily concluded. By the *Ausgleich*, the compromise, of 1867, the monarchy was cut in two. Vienna was to rule Austria and Budapest Hungary. The *Ausgleich* established the Dual system. Henceforth there was to be an Empire of Austria and a self-governing Kingdom of Hungary. The monarchy became a Dual Monarchy. The non-Magyar nations in Hungary were handed over to the tender mercies of the Magyars, while the Austro-Germans continued to rule over the non-German races of Austria.

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The Magyars had revolted against alien rule. They had claimed self-government in the name of equality, liberty, and justice. However, as soon as they had obtained self-government, they denied to the non-Magyar nations of Hungary that liberty, equality, and justice which they had claimed for themselves as a natural right. A German minority oppressed and persecuted a non-German majority in the Austrian half of the monarchy, and a Magyar minority introduced worse than Austrian methods of government in the Hungarian half. However, the Austrian Germans and Hungarian Magyars did not persecute and oppress all the other nationalities, but, faithful to the principle 'Divide et Impera,' endeavoured to weaken them by giving favours here and there and setting them against one another. The Poles in Galicia were protected by the Austrians because their goodwill would be precious in case of a war with Russia. At the same time, they allowed the Poles to oppress the neighbouring Ruthenians, so that the hostility of the Ruthenians could be used as a counterpoise if the Poles should become too overbearing. Hungary patronised the Serbo-Croats for similar reasons.

The Ausgleich of 1867 divided Austria-Hungary into two States, but it did not bring about a final settlement between the two leading races. Hungary aimed at full equality with Austria, if not at supremacy. Austria, which hitherto had been supreme, resisted Hungary's claims and endeavoured to keep the control of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy in her own hands, notwithstanding Hungary's objections. In numerous matters of national concern, Vienna required the consent of Budapest, and every Austrian demand was used by the Magyars as a means for extorting fresh concessions from their unwilling partner. Year by year the friction between the two countries increased. Year by year the feelings between Austrians and Magyars became more bitter. The Hungarians openly threatened to make themselves entirely independent of Austria, and to leave her in the lurch. On many occasions they showed

their determination to achieve complete supremacy and make Austria a subordinate State. On October 1, 1909, for instance, the Hungarian Minister, Count Albert Apponyi, published a decree addressed to the educational authorities, demanding that in books and maps the words 'Austro-Hungarian Monarchy' should everywhere be replaced by the words 'Hungary and Austria.' Austrians and Magyars, Vienna and Budapest, loathe each other. In 1910 Austria-Hungary had in round figures 50,000,000 inhabitants. Of these about 18,000,000, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, form the ruling nations—the 2,000,000 Germans in Hungary are left out because they are oppressed by the Magyars—and these rule over 32,000,000 people, the subject nationalities. Now the two ruling nations are divided into 10,000,000 Germans and 8,000,000 Magyars who hate each other with the fiercest hatred, while they themselves are equally bitterly hated by the various nationalities which they try to keep down. Hobbes' 'Bellum omnium contra omnes' prevails in the Dual Monarchy. The Dual Monarchy is a Dual Anarchy, and the Anarchy which prevails in the country is largely responsible for its defeats. A State which is inhabited by ten different nations, which persecute and hate one another, cannot progress in peace and cannot offer a united front against an enemy in war.

The inter-racial relations in Austria-Hungary are most complicated. As a full and adequate account would require a book, I will briefly deal with the position of only the more important nationalities, and especially those which are most likely to be directly affected by the present War.

Galicia is inhabited by Poles and Ruthenians. The Poles, as has been previously stated, are the ruling element in Galicia, for they have been allowed by Austria to oppress the Ruthenians, and they have been given a good deal of freedom. On August 5, the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, addressed the

following appeal to the Poles in Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary :

Poles, the hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers and your forefathers may be realised. A century and a half has passed since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but the soul of the country is not dead. It continues to live, inspired by the hope that there will come for the Polish people an hour of resurrection and of fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia. The Russian Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation which obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish peoples, which it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Czar. Under his sceptre Poland will be governed again, free in her religion and her language. Russian autonomy only expects from you the same respect for the rights of the nationalities to which history has bound you. With open heart and brotherly hand Great Russia advances to meet you. She believes that the sword with which Poland struck down her enemies at Grünwald has not yet rusted. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian Armies are marching. The dawn of a new life is beginning for you, and in this glorious dawn is seen the sign of the Cross, the symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of peoples.

During the reign of the late Czar, Russia's policy towards the Poles was influenced by various currents and cross-currents. Many prominent Russians were more afraid of constitutional government, of democracy, and of internal troubles than they were of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Consequently the policy of the Russian Government towards the Poles was hesitating and somewhat contradictory. But even during the reign of the late Czar the tendency to give to the Poles self-government and freedom became constantly stronger. The leaders of the new Russian democracy have completely abandoned the reserve and the suspicions with which Polish affairs have hitherto been treated. They have whole-heartedly declared themselves in favour of giving to the Poles complete independence in accordance with the principles of liberty and nationality

which have animated the revolutionaries in converting Russia into a Republic. The outlook for the creation of an independent Poland, embracing all the Polish-speaking people, has never been fairer than it is at present.

The 5,000,000 Austrian Poles receive preferential treatment from Austria, and they have little reason to be dissatisfied with their present position. Still, if Russia carries out her programme and reconstitutes the ancient State of Poland, the Galician Poles will scarcely care to be left out. Polish independence is bound to prove more attractive than the privileges which they receive at present from Austria, and which may be withdrawn. Besides, the Galician Poles remember the wrongs which they have suffered at Austria's hands. They remember not only the partition of Poland, but also the sanguinary agricultural risings and the fearful butcheries which Austria perpetrated in Galicia in order to weaken the Poles, and the infamous extinction of the Republic of Cracow in 1846. After the Revolution of 1848 the Poles were treated worse than ever. Only after her defeat of 1866 did Austria give them greater freedom. If the Allies should be victorious, the loss of the Polish districts of Austria seems inevitable.

Germans and Austrians have frequently told us that the Poles are unfit to govern themselves, that they are unprogressive, wasteful, unthrifty, dirty, and drunken. These arguments as to Poland's unfitness to govern herself can best be refuted by the following most remarkable figures :

Polish Co-operative Societies.

—	Number	Members	Share Capital	Deposits	Loans Outstanding
			£	£	£
1900	420	297,607	1,079,929	12,420,057	12,047,717
1904	849	509,168	2,370,613	19,652,581	20,165,980
1909	1812	916,476	4,439,337	34,944,184	39,048,734
1912	2686	1,307,120	6,309,926	46,970,354	55,203,622

These most remarkable figures are taken from Michalski's

book, *Les Sociétés Coopératives Polonaises* (Lemberg, 1914). They refer to all Poland, and they show that the co-operative movement, the best test of a nation's providence and progress, has made enormous strides among the Poles. In the short space of twelve years the number of Polish co-operators has more than quadrupled, the share capital of the societies has increased about sixfold, and the deposits, which represent chiefly the savings of poor people, have increased from £12,420,057 to no less than £46,970,354. People who display such remarkable prudence in their own affairs may be entrusted with self-government.

The 3,500,000 Ruthenians who inhabit Southern Galicia and the neighbouring districts of Hungary are part of the great Slav family. They are part of the 'Little Russians,' who dwell in South Russia in the Ukraine. Desiring to weaken Russia, Austria-Hungary has lately discovered that the Ukrainians are a separate race and possess an ancient history and language. The Austrian Government, which is not at all desirous to stimulate nationalism in its own borders, has suddenly become a passionate advocate of the national and linguistic claims of the Ukrainians. In the realm of the Habsburgs the end justifies the means. Men who are the enemies of nationalism in their own country have passionately championed the national claims of Albania and the Ukraine. Government money has been spent without stint in placing the claims of the Albanian and the Ukrainian nations before the public of the principal countries, by expensive illustrated books, articles, lectures, letters to the Press, &c. Besides, Austria has thoughtfully established Ruthenian professorships at the Lemberg University. The Austrians have become enthusiastic about the Ukrainian nationality in the hope of producing a split among the Russians. According to Government-paid Austrian writers, South-western Russia, with Kiev, is Ukrainian, and claims, rightly, an individuality and an independent national existence. The Austrian Government has raised the Ukrainian question in order to foment troubles in Russia. Its

attempts are likely to prove unsuccessful. The Ruthenians and their Russian neighbours across the frontier; by whatever name they may be called, are one people, and their reunion after an Austro-German defeat is inevitable.

Until 1866 all the non-German nationalities in Austria were brutalised by the ruling race. Austrian persecution was most severely felt and most bitterly resented by that highly gifted and energetic Slav race, the unfortunate Czechs of Bohemia. The Bohemian Czechs have been ill-treated by Austria during many centuries. Johann Huss, following in Wycliffe's footsteps, introduced the Reformation there about the year 1400, partly as a protest against the degradation of the Roman Catholic Church, partly, and probably chiefly, as a protest against German domination and German brutality. Huss died a martyr. The Reformation in Bohemia was suppressed with the greatest savagery, and Bohemia was totally devastated. Germans were settled among the Czechs, Roman Catholic dragoons were quartered upon Protestant Bohemians in order to 'convert' them. The Czechs were treated as helots by the Germans settled among them up to a very recent date. When the Prussian armies invaded Bohemia in 1866 they endeavoured to raise the Czechs against the Austrians by addressing to them the following proclamation :

Inhabitants of the Glorious Kingdom of Bohemia !

In consequence of the war, which has been caused against our wishes by the Emperor of Austria, we enter your country, not as enemies and conquerors, but *full of respect for your historic and national rights*. To the inhabitants, *without regard of their calling, religion, and nationality*, we bring not war and destruction, but consideration and friendship. Do not believe, as your enemies will tell you, that we have brought about this war through lust of conquest. Austria has forced us to fight by threatening to attack us. But believe us that *we have not the slightest intention to oppose your just desire for independence and for unrestrained national development*.

Remembering the heavy and almost unbearable burdens which the Government has placed upon you in preparing for this war, we shall not impose additional taxes, nor shall we ask you to act against your convictions. We shall respect and honour particularly your holy religion. At the same time we shall not tolerate open resistance, and must punish severely all treasonable acts. We leave the issue of the war confidently to the Lord of Hosts. *If our just cause should prove victorious, the moment may perhaps arrive when the national aspirations of the Bohemians and Moravians may be fulfilled in the same way in which those of the Hungarians have been fulfilled, and then may Providence establish their happiness for all time.*

The proclamation is very interesting because it throws a strong light not only upon the dissatisfaction existing in Bohemia, but also upon Prussian methods of warfare.

Of the 6,700,000 inhabitants of Bohemia, 4,240,000, or about two-thirds, are Czechs and Slovaks, and the remaining third are Germans. In the neighbouring land of Moravia, which lies to the east of Bohemia, approximately the same proportion of Germans and Slavs obtains. Although the Czechs form the great majority of the inhabitants of Bohemia, their language was suppressed until recently. German was the official language used throughout Bohemia in the law courts and elsewhere. German inscriptions were to be seen in the Czech villages and towns. To the casual visitor, Bohemia seemed to be a German land. Step by step the Czechs have ousted the Germans. To-day Prague, that old stronghold of Germanism, is a Czech town. So great is the hatred between Czechs and Germans that there is practically no intercourse between the two nations. A German will not enter a Czech restaurant or hotel in Prague, nor will a Czech enter a German place of entertainment. The two nations have separate schools, theatres, concert rooms, banks, savings banks, co-operative societies, &c. At the German University of Prague there were in 1910-11 1726 German students and only eighty-six Czechs. At the Czech University of Prague there were in the same

year 4225 Czechs and only nine Germans. At the German Technical High Schools of Prague there were 880 Germans and thirty-seven Czechs. At the corresponding Czech establishments there were 2686 Czechs and ten Germans. In Bohemia the two nationalities follow the policy of segregation, because the Czechs absolutely refuse to associate with Germans. A similar policy of non-intercourse is noticeable between the Poles and Ruthenians at the Cracow University, where there were in 1910-11 2771 Poles and only thirty-four Ruthenians.

By their strength of character and strength of intellect, and by their great artistic and scientific achievements, the Czechs have become the leading nation among the Austrian Slavs. Their intellectual pre-eminence may be seen from the extent and from the wonderful progress of their Press, regarding which figures have been furnished on another page. The Czechs occupy a most important position in the Dual Monarchy. Owing to its mines, its fruitful soil, and its very highly developed industries, Bohemia is the most valuable possession of Austria, and the Dual Monarchy would lose it most unwillingly. Besides, Bohemia occupies a most valuable strategical position. Bohemia, with its surrounding mountain walls, is a strong natural fortress, and it lies on the most direct route from Berlin to Vienna. At present Bohemia connects Germany and Austria, Berlin and Vienna. An independent Bohemia would separate the two States and their capitals. An independent Bohemia and Moravia would border to the east upon an independent Poland. Prussia, which at present is in contact with Austria through Silesia and Bohemia, would be separated from the German districts of Austria by a solid wall of Slavonic nations if Poland, Moravia, and Bohemia should become independent States. In that case the German parts of Austria would be in contact with Germany only by means of Bavaria. That is an important fact, the political and strategical bearings of which will presently be considered.

Of the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia, two-thirds,

as has been said, are Slavs, and one-third are Germans. The Germans form a broad fringe along the Austro-German frontier. If the future frontiers of Bohemia should be determined on a racial basis, about one-third of its territory should fall to Germany. It might perhaps fall to the kingdom of Saxony, upon which it borders, and which then would regain some of its former importance, of which it was deprived by Prussia exactly a century ago. After the War the Southern States of Germany may require strengthening against Prussia, so as to create a balance of power within Germany.

As the Czechs have at last conquered for themselves a position in which they can freely use their language and develop their individuality, and as their influence in Austria-Hungary, which as yet is not great, is bound to increase, they may hesitate to cut the connection with Austria, especially as their manufacturing industries depend very largely upon the Austrian market for the sale of their productions. The action of Bohemia will probably largely depend upon that of the other nationalities. An isolated Bohemia and Moravia, being shut off from the sea, would politically, militarily, and especially economically occupy a very exposed and insecure position, unless it could enter into a federation with some of its neighbours.

South of Bohemia lie the German districts of Austria. These extend in a solid block from Switzerland and Bavaria in the west to a line about thirty miles east of Vienna. The southern border of Bohemia forms the northern frontier of the German territory of Austria, and the river Drau its southern limit. If Bohemia and Moravia should cut themselves off from German Austria, the physical connection between German Austria and Prussia would be destroyed, while direct contact between German Austria and Bavaria would be retained. Bavaria and her neighbour Baden are the most strongly Roman Catholic States of Germany. Of their joint population of 9,000,000, about 6,100,000, or two-thirds, are Roman Catholics. The easy-going

Austrians sympathise far more with the people of Bavaria and Baden than with the overbearing Prussians. An organic connection of German Austria, Bavaria, and Baden would give 20,000,000 inhabitants to German Austria, and would correspondingly weaken the power of Prussia for mischief. That block of nations might be joined by the remaining South German States, Würtemberg, Saxony, and the rest, and thus a fairly even balance of power might be produced in Germany. The German race would be divided into almost equal halves, different in character, religion, and tradition, and possessing different historic capitals. They would be extremely powerful for defence, but would presumably be less dangerous for an attack. By uniting with Bavaria and Baden, Austria would border on the Rhine. She would occupy once more a position of great political and strategical importance, not only towards Russia and the Balkan Peninsula, but also towards France. That position should secure the peace of Europe and of the world.

If Austria-Hungary should resolve to conclude a separate peace, the State of the Habsburgs might once more become the leading State of Germany. The Austrian monarch might make it a condition that he should receive compensation for the Slavonic and Latin provinces which he is likely to lose by being given not only the South German States, which until 1866 followed Austria's lead, but also Silesia, which was torn from Austria by Frederick the Great. Prussia has grown great at Austria's expense. It would be only a fit retribution if the process should be reversed, and if Vienna should regain its old supremacy. If the 10,000,000 Austro-Germans were joined by 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 South Germans and Silesians, the 10,000,000 Magyars would no longer be able to cause trouble to the Habsburg Emperors. Berlin would no longer be able to play out Budapest against Vienna. Austria's greatest internal difficulty would disappear, and so would her economic troubles. The Dual Monarchy is a poor country because

it lacks prosperous manufacturing industries. The wealth of Austria-Hungary is supposed to be only one-third of that of Germany. By acquiring the South German States and Silesia the State of the Habsburgs would both politically and economically regain its old paramountcy. Austria-Hungary would become an almost purely German State organised on a federal basis, and if the Habsburgs should act tolerantly and liberally towards the neighbour States, the Austrian Federation might be joined in course of time by some of the secondary States which will arise after the present war in the South-east of Europe.

In the south, Austria possesses two almost purely Italian districts: the Italian Tyrol, with towns such as Trento, Rovereto, Ala, Bordo, Borgo, &c., and the western part of Istria and a narrow strip of the Adriatic coast with Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Capodistria, Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, &c. The names of the towns mentioned show their Italian origin. The possession of the Italian Tyrol is a matter of vital importance to Italy. The great and wealthy plain of Lombardy is protected towards the north by a crescent of mountain walls, the Alps. Italy is protected by that powerful barrier against invasion from France and Switzerland. But by retaining the Italian Tyrol, the Trentino, after withdrawing from Italy, and by occupying the mountain passes down to the foot of the mountains as far as the Lago di Garda, Austria occupies with her army a wide breach in Italy's ramparts. Thus she can easily invade the country and strike at Verona, Padua, and Venice by marching to the east, or at Brescia and Milan by turning to the west. While the east coast of Italy is flat and open, the opposite coast of the Adriatic, occupied by Austria, is studded with an abundance of excellent natural harbours, the entrance to which is protected by high mountains and by mountainous islands lying in front of it.

The positions occupied by Austria in the Trentino, in Istria, and in Dalmatia threaten Italy's security in the north and east, and Italy is all the more reluctant to see

them remaining in Austria's hands, as they are largely inhabited by Italians, who are very badly treated by the Austrians. Possibly the disastrous fire at the Monfalcone dockyard, which took place soon after the outbreak of the Great War, was caused by the resentment of the ill-treated Italians who live in Austrian territory. Many of these unfortunate people, although born in Austrian territory, are not allowed to acquire Austrian citizenship, and not infrequently they are expelled without notice from their homes without adequate reason. Ever since 1866 the Austrians have persecuted the Italians dwelling in Austria, and have endeavoured to destroy their nationality by denying them schools, colleges, and a university. Apparently the Austrians have tried to punish the Italians who have remained under their rule for the loss of Lombardy and Venetia.

Owing to Austria's foolish policy, Italy has been filled with the bitterest hatred against the Austrians. The *Irredenta Italia*, *Unredeemed Italy*, is in the thoughts of every patriotic Italian, and frequent Austrian outrages on Italians living in Austria, on the one hand, and Italian passionate agitation in favour of their brothers who live under the Austrian yoke, on the other, keep the wound open. Many Italian societies and newspapers have been preaching war with Austria for many years. Signor Pellegrini wrote in his important book, '*Verso la Guerra? — Il dissidio fra l'Italia e l'Austria*,' published as long ago as 1906 :

I believe we cannot live any longer under an illusion which deceives us. We have lived under the impression that the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so great as to prevent her from aggressive action towards ourselves and from expansion towards the east. We have believed that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after the death of the present Emperor. These views are erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria-Hungary should become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, Austria-Hun-

gary's need to expand and to acquire new markets in the east will become all the greater. And as long as Italian commerce pursues its triumphant course in the east, the more are the opposing interests of the two nations likely to bring about the final collision. . . .

We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve the outward form of the Triple Alliance. We must ask ourselves : What are our interests ? Are we ready to defend them ? What are the conditions of the Italians who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domination ? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared with those of Austria ? What are the wishes of our people, and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula ? Is it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria ? I believe I have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our ally and our open enemy against whom we must prepare for war. . . . We have to calculate in the future with the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula.

Many similar views may be found in the writings of Enrico Corradini, Salvatore Barzilai, Vico Mantegazza, Giovanni Bertacchi, Innocenzo Cappa, Romeo Manzoni, Filippo Crispolti, Scipio Sighele, Luigi Villari, and many others, in the publications of the 'Società Dante Alighieri,' the 'Trento Trieste,' the 'Giovine Europa,' the 'Italica Gens,' and in periodicals such as *Il Regno*, *l'Italia all'Estero*, *Il Tricolore*, *La Grande Italia*. The Austrians have replied to the Italian threats with counter-threats. The 'Oesterreichische Rundschau,' the most important Austrian periodical, which is edited by Freiherr von Chlumecky, an intimate friend of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and *Danzer's Armeezeitung*, the widely read army journal, have published innumerable articles recommending an Austrian war with Italy.

On the walls of the Ducal Palace at Venice may be found some marble tablets giving the result of a plebiscite taken in the year 1866 in Venetia. They tell us that

641,000 of the inhabitants voted for a reunion of Venetia with Italy, and only 68 against it. Austria has never known how to gain the affection of the people over whom she has ruled. She occupied Venetia from 1815 to 1866. In fifty-one years she gained among the inhabitants 68 adherents and 641,000 enemies. If to-day a plebiscite should be taken in the Italian Tyrol, in Trieste, Pola, and the other Italian towns on the Dalmatian coast, the result would probably be similar. At one time or another Verona, Venice, Milan, Florence, Turin, Naples, Palermo, Lombardy, Venetia, Toscana, the southern half of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia—in fact, practically all Italy, except the States of the Church—were Austrian, but nowhere in Italy will a man be found who regrets Austria's departure or who speaks of her occupation with affection, or even with esteem. In Italy, as elsewhere, Austria has solely been an influence for evil.

Although Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, and part of Istria and Dalmatia are inhabited by many Italians, it is by no means certain that these towns and districts will revert to Italy after a defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Ports and coastal positions are of value because of the hinterland which furnishes them with trade. Large inland States lying near the coast have the strongest claims upon natural outlets towards the ocean. The Italian towns on the east coast of the Adriatic are ancient Venetian trading stations, and behind and around them live about 10,000,000 Serbs in compact masses, the Serbians in Serbia proper, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Dalmatia, and the Serbo-Croats in Croatia-Slavonia. The Italians cannot expect that a Greater Serbia will consent to be deprived of adequate harbours. Italian and Serbian claims will have to be harmonised.

Serbia does not intend seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Croatia-Slavonia by force; but if these lands are dissatisfied with Austrian rule, and wish to shake it off and unite with Serbia, the Serbs will certainly not

deny them. The Serbians in Serbia have been ill-treated in the past by Austria, as has been shown in another part of this chapter. Ever since the Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary, covetous of Serbia's territory, has endeavoured to ruin that country by preventing her gaining an outlet to the sea, by controlling her foreign trade overland and by arbitrarily interrupting and destroying it by closing the frontier against Serbia under mendacious pretexts. In 1885 the Austrians brought about war between Serbia and Bulgaria for their own ends. They favoured the outbreak of the first Balkan War, hoping for Serbia's destruction. When the Allies were victorious, Austria-Hungary prevented Serbia securing the smallest outlet on the sea, and then encouraged Bulgaria to attack that country, hoping that the second Balkan War would lead to Serbia's downfall. Having suffered so much at Austria's hands in the past, the heroic Serbians wish to make themselves secure for the future by establishing a Greater Serbia, a State of 10,000,000 inhabitants, at Austria's cost, and obtaining adequate outlets to the sea. Probably they will succeed. Their heroism and their sufferings deserve a full reward.

Of the territory of Hungary, 105,811 square kilometres contain a population of which 77·61 per cent. are Magyars, 85,026 square kilometres have a population of which only 25·68 per cent. are Magyars, and 74·82 per cent. non-Magyars. Of these, the majority are Slavs. Of the population of the remaining territory of 88,650 square kilometres, 25·09 per cent. are Magyars, while the majority are Roumanians. Of the whole of Hungary, four-tenths are essentially Magyar territory, three-tenths are essentially Slavonic territory, and three-tenths are Roumanian territory.

In a table given in the beginning of this article, the strength of the Magyars in Hungary was stated to be 10,051,000, according to the census of 1910. This figure is greatly exaggerated. In order to swell their numbers, the Magyars have manipulated the census. The citizens are asked, in the census forms which they have to fill up,

to state the language which they speak best or like best. In view of the pressure exercised by the ruling Magyars, many non-Magyars profess that they like Magyar best, even if they do not understand the language, and they appear as Magyars in the census. Besides, the ruling Magyars have put pressure upon the non-Magyars to Magyarise their names. Schoolmasters, post-office officials, and railwaymen in Government services are compelled to Magyarise their names. As a further inducement, the cost of Magyarising one's name was reduced in 1881 from 10 crowns to 10 pence. As an aristocratic Magyar name is a great advantage in society and in business, men with common non-Magyar names have provided themselves for tenpence with the most aristocratic Magyar names. Mr. Seton-Watson has told us in his excellent book, 'Racial Problems in Hungary,' that Toldy, the author, was originally called Schebel; Hunfalvy, the ethnologist, Hundsdorfer; Munkácsy, the painter, Lieb; Arminius Vámbéry, Bamberger; Petöfi, the poet, Petrovič; Zsedényi, the politician, Pfannschmied; Irányi, Halbschuh; Helfy, Heller; Komlóssy, Kleinkind; Polónyi, Pollatschek, &c. The Magyars have Magyarised all non-Hungarian place-names. Ancient Pressburg was turned into Pozsony, Hermannstadt into Nagy-Szeben, Kirchdrauf into Szepes-Váralja, &c.

According to official Hungarian statistics, the Magyars are about one-half of the Hungarian population. According to the most reliable non-Magyar authorities, they are only about one-third, numbering from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000. In Hungary, as in Austria, one-third of the population rules over the remaining two-thirds.

On paper Hungary is the most liberal country in the world. It has possessed a Parliament and a Constitution since the dawn of its history. However, under the cloak of liberalism and legality, Hungary exercises the most arbitrary and tyrannous government over the non-Magyars.

Although Magyars and non-Magyars are on paper equal before the law, and are nominally fully represented in the

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Parliament at Budapest, the representatives in the Hungarian Parliament represent neither the subject nationalities nor the masses of the people, but only the Magyar oligarchy. This is strikingly proved by the following table, which shows the composition of the Hungarian Parliament during the five last electoral periods :

Result of Hungarian Elections.

—	Magyars, including a few Non- descripts	Socialists	Roumanians	Slovaks	Serbs	Total
1896	412	0	1	0	0	413
1901	408	0	0	4	1	413
1905	402	1	8	1	1	413
1906	387	0	14	7	5	413
1910	404	1	5	3	0	413

Of the 413 members of the Hungarian Parliament about 400 are Magyars. The preponderant number of non-Magyars and the numerous Socialists send the remaining thirteen members. As representation shapes legislation, the legislation of Hungary is pro-Magyar and hostile to the non-Magyars, to the Socialists, and to the common people. Of the men of voting age only about one-fourth are given the franchise. As a high property qualification is required, only the well-to-do can vote. The non-Magyars of Hungary are poor, partly because the Magyars settled in the rich plains whence they drove the non-Magyars, partly because in districts where Magyars and non-Magyars dwell together, the former have secured for themselves the greater part of the wealth and the best land by violence and by political pressure.

The non-Magyars are disfranchised not only by a high property qualification, but by deliberate violence and trickery. If we look into the electoral statistics we find that the more Roumanian a county is, the fewer voters does it possess. We find further that the larger a con-

stituency is, the farther from its centre is placed the solitary polling booth. At election time bridges are often broken down or declared unsafe for the passage of vehicles, in order to force opposition voters either to walk impossible distances, or lose their vote, and with the same object in view all the horses in the outlying villages are often placed under veterinary supervision at the last moment. The voting is not secret, but public, and by word of mouth. Non-Magyars are thus publicly terrorised into voting orally for Magyar members. Thousands of voters are disqualified for flimsy reasons by the presiding Magyar when intending to vote for the opposition candidate. Often hundreds and thousands of voters, who have travelled all day to the polling booth, are prevented by large forces of military and gendarmes from voting or from entering the village where the poll takes place. At election times Hungary mobilises her whole army in order to terrorise the opposition voters, and if these insist upon their legal right of voting, they are frequently attacked by armed mobs or shot down by the gendarmes and the military. Every Hungarian election is accompanied by bloodshed. According to *Danzer's Armeezeitung* of June 6, 1910, Hungary mobilised for the election of that year 202 battalions of infantry, 126 squadrons of cavalry, and in addition had Austrian troops sent from Lower Austria, Styria, and Moravia to Hungary. The cost of 'maintaining order' was estimated by the journal named at from 15,000,000 crowns to 20,000,000 crowns.

The Magyars monopolise not only Parliament but the Civil Service, the law, and the schools as well. Although, according to the Law of Nationalities, the State should erect schools of all kinds for the non-Magyar races, it has never erected a single secondary school where any other language but Magyar is used. Instead of this it has Magyarised the few existing non-Magyar secondary schools and dissolved the rest. Of the thirty-nine intermediate schools in the Slovak counties, not a single one provides

instruction in the language of the people, and in the districts inhabited by Ruthenians the same condition prevails. Of the eighty-nine secondary schools directly controlled by the State none are non-Magyar.

The ruling Magyars most effectively prevent the non-Magyar people from improving their condition by excluding them from the intermediate schools and the universities. As the Magyars form nominally one-half, but in reality only one-third, of the population, they should furnish at best one half of the scholars and students at the intermediate schools and universities.

In reality the overwhelming majority of those who attend the higher educational establishments are Magyars. According to the Magyar statistics for the year 1911, 49,482 pupils attending the classical intermediate schools were Magyars, and only 11,181 were non-Magyars. For every non-Magyar there were nearly five Magyars. In the non-classical intermediate schools there were 2316 non-Magyars and 8872 Magyars. In the intermediate schools for girls there were only 572 non-Magyars and 5746 Magyars. In the training schools for male teachers there were 1021 non-Magyars and 3856 Magyars. In those for female teachers there were 481 non-Magayars and 4886 Magyars. In the maternity schools there were 56 non-Magyars and 448 Magyars. In the music schools there were 2313 non-Magyars and 7471 Magyars. In the post and telegraph school there were 28 non-Magyars and 255 Magyars. As all those who wish to enter into a professional career or into Government service must have passed through the intermediate schools, the vast preponderance of Magyar pupils at these schools effectively prevents large numbers of non-Magyars from becoming doctors, lawyers, teachers, civil servants, judges, military officers, &c. In 1911 there were at all the Hungarian universities 10,658 Magyar students and only 1273 non-Magyar students. For every non-Magyar student there were eight Magyars. We can, therefore, not wonder that Magyars occupy all the best

places in Hungary, especially as in making appointments Magyars are favoured and non-Magyars discouraged.

Franz Deák, one of the greatest Hungarian statesmen, said in a speech delivered on January 23, 1872 :

Every nationality has a right to demand ways and means for the education of its children. If we wish to force the children of the nationalities dwelling in Hungary to study in the Magyar language, although they do not know it, or know it only slightly, we should make it impossible for them to make progress. Parents would in vain spend their money upon education, and the children would waste their time. If we desire to win over the nationalities, then we must not endeavour to Magyarise them at any price. We can Magyarise them only if we make them satisfied citizens of Hungary who are fond of the life and conditions prevailing in it.

Notwithstanding the warning of Deák and of other founders of the Hungarian State, the ruling Magyars have endeavoured to force the Magyar language upon the non-Magyars by the most tyrannous means. If we look at the educational statistics, we find that the non-Magyar schools are rapidly decreasing in number and the Magyar schools rapidly increasing. In purely non-Magyar districts Magyar schools are planted, and in order to force the children to learn Magyar from the cradle, compulsory kindergarten schools are opened in the non-Magyar districts, where children from three to six years old have to attend.

Notwithstanding the most far-reaching guarantees that the character and language of the other nationalities would be respected, Magyar is the official language in Hungary. All public proclamations and notices are issued in Magyar, and the proceedings in the law courts take place in that language, even when neither prosecutor nor defendant understands it. Roumanian peasants, ignorant of Magyar, and living in purely Roumanian districts, have to employ Magyar in their intercourse with the authorities, and if they go to law they have to provide themselves with costly

and often inefficient translators and interpreters. Local government, even in practically purely non-Magyar districts, is monopolised by Magyars. The non-Magyars are strangers in their own country.

Numerically the most important non-Magyar race in Hungary are the Roumanians. According to the official statistics, they number 2,949,000. In reality their number is greater, and close to them live 275,000 Roumanians in the Austrian Bukovina.

A glance at the map shows that the kingdom of Roumania possesses a very awkward shape. It consists of two long and narrow strips of land which are joined together at a right angle. The land lying in the hollow of that angle consists of the Austrian Bukovina and of the Hungarian districts of Transylvania and the Banat. Owing to its awkward shape, the concentrated Roumanian army can defend the national territory only with great difficulty against an invader. The acquisition of the Austrian and Hungarian territories, inhabited nearly exclusively by Roumanians, would fill up the hollow and would convert Roumania into a shapely and easily defensible State.

The Roumanians in the kingdom of Roumania have during many years observed with sorrow and indignation the pitiful position of their brothers who live under Magyar rule, and their leaders have frequently and most emphatically warned the Hungarian Government that its anti-Roumanian policy might have very serious consequences to Hungary. When, in November, 1868, Count Andrassy intimated to King, then only Prince, Charles of Roumania that Roumania and Hungary should go hand in hand, King Charles replied, according to his Memoirs :

I recognise the advantages of a complete understanding between Hungary and Roumania. However, I must make this reservation—that I can work hand in hand with Hungary only when Hungary has changed her policy towards the Roumanians in Transylvania. I cannot abolish the natural sympathies which exist between the Roumanians on both

sides of the political boundary. I am therefore entitled to expect that the Hungarian Government will do everything that is right and fair in dealing with the real interests of its Roumanian subjects. In expressing this wish I do not intend to be guilty of political interference. I lay stress upon this point only because it is the principal condition for bringing about a good understanding between the two countries. Being a constitutional monarch, who owes his position to the election of the people, I am obliged to be guided by public opinion in as far as that opinion is reasonable. An open and sincere policy of kindness and goodwill on the part of the Hungarian Government towards its non-Magyar subjects would most ably support me in a policy which I am prepared to enter upon.

Hungary has disregarded the emphatic and frequent warnings of King Charles and of the leading Roumanian statesmen and publicists. Austria-Hungary was foolish enough to persecute her Italian and Roumanian citizens after the outbreak of the present War, believing that the taking of hostages and the execution of leaders would assure their fidelity. Fidelity cannot be secured by fear. If, as appears likely, Austria-Hungary should break up, Roumania will certainly see that the Roumanians on her border will be re-united to the motherland.

The subject nationalities in Austria-Hungary have been ruled by misrule, and most of them are profoundly dissatisfied. I have shown in these pages that some of the larger nations of the Dual Monarchy are likely to be absorbed by their neighbours. Galicia, with 8,000,000 people, is likely to be divided between Russia and Poland; the Roumanian districts, with 4,000,000 inhabitants, should fall to Roumania; the Serbian district, with 6,000,000 people, may go to the Serbs; and the Italian district, with nearly 1,000,000 inhabitants, may become Italian. Bohemia may once more become an independent State. The smaller subject nations of Austria-Hungary may be expected to follow the example of the greater. Austria-Hungary seems

likely to disintegrate on racial lines. In the South-East of Europe may arise a Poland with 20,000,000 inhabitants, a Serbia with 10,000,000 inhabitants, a Hungary with 10,000,000 inhabitants, and an Austria with 10,000,000.

Many people, fearing the danger of Russia, advocate that Austria-Hungary should be preserved in its present state so as to act as an efficient counterpoise to the Russian colossus. The preservation of the Dual Monarchy is particularly strongly urged by those who fear the Pan-Slavonic danger, who believe that the Slavonic nations in the Balkan Peninsula and in Austria-Hungary will amalgamate with Russia, that Russia will, through Serbia and Bohemia, stretch out its arms as far as the Adriatic and Bavaria. That fear seems scarcely justified. The Slavonic nations outside Russia have looked to Russia as a deliverer when they were oppressed, but these nations have a strongly marked individuality of their own, and they have no desire, after having painfully acquired their freedom, to be merged into Russia and to disappear in that gigantic State. In the spring of 1908 representatives of the Austrian Slavs attended a great Slavonic Congress at Petrograd. Mr. Karel Kramarz, a prominent Czech politician, was at the head of the Austrian delegation, and he made to the Congress the following declaration.

The Slavonic movement and Slavonic policy must be based on the principle that all Slavonic nations are equal, and their aim must consist not in an endeavour to form all Slavs into a single nation, but to develop the individual character of each of the Slavonic peoples. The aim of all Slavs should be in the first instance to increase their own national consciousness and strength, and in the second to secure their mutual co-operation for promoting their common welfare, ensuring their progress in every way and defending themselves against German aggression.

This declaration is characteristic of the Slavs not only in Bohemia but elsewhere. The Bulgarians and Serbians

differ greatly, although they are neighbours, and they are not likely to amalgamate. Democratic Serbia will merge itself neither in Bulgaria nor in Russia. The Czechs also have a nationality and individuality of which they are proud. A number of small and medium-sized Slav States are likely to arise in the South-East of Europe. Those who desire to re-build Austria-Hungary after its downfall are insufficiently acquainted with the difficulty of such an undertaking. Besides, they should remember that diplomacy can correct, but must not outrage, Nature; that a lasting peace cannot be re-established in Europe by perpetuating Austria's tyranny over her unhappy subject nations. After all, Europe's security and peace are more important than a mechanical balance of power. We have no reason to fear Russia's aggression. There is no reason to believe that she intends to swamp her Western neighbours. After the present War, Russia will be exhausted for decades. Her task for the future consists in organising and developing her colossal territories, providing them with roads and railways, and improving the conditions of the people. Besides, if in twenty or thirty years Russia should embark upon a great war of conquest in the West, she would have to fight nations which will be much stronger than they are at present. The prevention of the actual German danger is far more important than the prevention of a highly problematical Slav peril of the future.

Austria-Hungary has outlived her usefulness. She has always been a bad master to the unfortunate nations who have come under her sway. Since 1907, the year when William Tell raised the Swiss in revolution against the Habsburgs, the history of Austria is a long history of the revolts of their subject nations. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary is merely the last incident in its recent evolution. In 1859 Austria-Hungary lost her supremacy over Italy. In 1866 she lost her supremacy over Germany. By the present War she will probably lose her supremacy over the Slavs. A nation may rule over other nations only

if it treats them with justice. Austria has always ruled with barbaric methods. The atrocious acts of which Germany has been guilty in Belgium and France were taught by Austria. In her campaign against Serbia she has, as usual, taken thousands of hostages among her own peoples in order to prevent their rising against the tyranny of Vienna, and she has, as usual, made barbarous war upon the weak and the helpless. Austria-Hungary is an anachronism in a modern world. The Dual Monarchy is, and has always been, only a factor for evil. In Germany's crime Austria-Hungary has been an accomplice and an accessory before the fact. Austria-Hungary has existed during many years, not owing to its own strength, but owing to Europe's toleration. Austria-Hungary is another Turkey. Her hour has struck. The Empire of the Habsburgs in its present form is likely to disappear. In its place will arise a number of independent States possessing a national basis which in time may federate for mutual protection.

The present War has a twofold object. It is a war waged to destroy the curse of militarism and to free the subject nations from their bondage. Many people have asked by what name the present War should be known to history. It might fittingly be called the War of Liberation. Small nations, whether they are called Belgium and Holland, or Bosnia and Bohemia, are entitled to life and liberty. We need not deny the small nations which should take the place of Austria-Hungary their inborn right to life and prosperity. It is true that small States, especially if they have no outlet to the sea, are greatly hampered. The future, and especially the economic future, probably belongs to the great nations. Still, the small nations can survive, and if they cannot survive singly they can live and prosper by voluntary co-operation. The small nations which are arising in the Balkan Peninsula and in that part of Europe which is now called Austria-Hungary, may be expected to conclude arrangements with their friends and sympathisers for mutual defence. A

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great State may arise in South-Eastern Europe. Federalism may provide the bond which Habsburg absolutism, Habsburg selfishness, and Habsburg tyranny failed to create. The provision of an efficient counterpoise to Russia may, and should be, left to Nature and to natural evolution.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF POLAND¹

A CENTURY ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the question of Poland proved extremely difficult to solve. It produced dangerous friction among the assembled Powers, and threatened to lead to the break-up of the Congress. The position became so threatening that, on January 3, 1815, Austria, Great Britain, and France felt compelled to conclude a secret separate alliance directed against Prussia and Russia, the allies of Austria and Great Britain in the war against Napoleon. Precautionary troop movements began, and war among the Allies might have broken out had not, shortly afterwards, Napoleon quitted Elba and landed in France. Fear of the great Corsican re-united the Powers.

Because of the great and conflicting interests involved, the question of Poland may prove of similar importance and difficulty at the Congress which will conclude the present War. Hence, it seems desirable to consider it carefully and in good time. The consideration of the Polish Question seems not only useful but urgent.

Henry Wheaton, the distinguished American diplomat and jurist, wrote in his classical 'History of the Law of Nations': 'The partition of Poland was the most flagrant violation of natural justice and International Law which has occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism.' In Koch's celebrated 'Tableau des Révolutions de l'Europe,' written by a diplomat for the use of diplomats, and published

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, January, 1915.

in 1825, when the partition of Poland was still fresh in men's minds, we read :

The partition of Poland must be considered the forerunner of the total revolution of the whole political system of Europe which had been established three centuries before. Hitherto numerous alliances had been formed and many wars had been undertaken with a view to preserving weak States against the ambitions of strong ones. Now three Great Powers combined to plunder a State which had given them no offence. Thus the barriers which had hitherto separated right from arbitrary might were destroyed. No weak State was any longer secure. The European balance of power became the laughing-stock of the new school, and serious men began to consider the European equilibrium a chimera. Although the Courts of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna were most strongly to blame, those of London and Paris were not free from guilt by allowing without protest the spoliation of Poland to take place.

The Polish problem is not only a very great and extremely interesting problem, but it is unique of its kind. It can be understood only by those who are acquainted with the history of Poland and of its partitions. Many Englishmen are unacquainted with that history. Most believe that Russia has been the worst enemy of the Poles, that she caused the partitions, that Germany and Austria-Hungary were merely her accomplices, and that Great Britain has never taken a serious interest in Polish affairs.

Polish history, as usually taught, is a tissue of misconceptions and of falsehoods. In the following pages it will be shown that not Russia, but Prussia, was chiefly responsible for the partitions of Poland and for the subsequent oppression of the Poles, that Russia and Austria were, in their Polish policy, merely Prussia's tools and dupes, and that England, well informed by able and conscientious diplomats, has with truly marvellous insight and consistency unceasingly recommended the adoption of that liberal and enlightened policy towards Poland which seems likely

to prevail at last. History has wonderfully vindicated the wisdom and the far-sightedness of British statesmen in their treatment of Polish affairs from the middle of the eighteenth century to the present day. A brief *résumé* of the largely secret or unknown inner history of Poland and of its partitions is particularly interesting, because it throws a most powerful light on the true character and the inner workings of Prusso-German, Russian, and Austrian diplomacy from the time of Frederick the Great, of the Empress Catherine the Second, and of the Empress Maria Theresa to that of Bismarck, Bülow, and Bethmann-Hollweg. I would add that much of the material given in the following pages has never been printed, and has been taken from the original documents.

Frederick the Great wrote in his 'Exposé du Gouvernement Prussien,' his Political Testament, which was addressed to his successor :

One of the first political principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we Prussians have an alliance with Russia, and thus we have our back free of danger as long as the alliance lasts.

He wrote in his 'Histoire de Mon Temps' :

Of all neighbours of Prussia the Russian Empire is the most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical position, and those who will rule Prussia after me should cultivate the friendship of those barbarians because they are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense number of their mounted troops. Besides, one cannot repay them for the damage which they may do to us because of the poverty of that part of Russia which is nearest to Prussia, and through which one has to pass in order to get into the Ukraine.

These two passages summarise and explain Prussia's policy towards Russia during the last century and a half, and furnish a key to her subtle and devious Polish policy.

During the Seven Years' War Russia had given to Prussia the hardest blows. Guided by the considerations given above, Frederick the Great was most anxious to make peace and to conclude an alliance with Russia. He stated in his 'Memoirs on the Events following the Peace of Hubertusberg of 1763,' referring, like Julius Caesar, to himself in the third person :

England's faithlessness (during the Seven Years' War) had broken the bonds between Prussia and that country. The Anglo-Prussian alliance, which had been founded upon mutual interests, was followed by the most lively hostility and the most serious anger between the two States. King Frederick stood alone on the field of battle. No one was left to attack him, but at the same time no one was ready to take his part. That position of isolation was tolerable as long as it was only temporary, but it could not be allowed to continue. Soon a change took place. Towards the end of the year negotiations were begun with Russia with a view to concluding a defensive alliance with that country. . . .

The King of Prussia desired to obtain influence over Russia. . . .

The power of the Russians is very great. Prussia still suffers from the blows which she had received from them during the Seven Years' War. It was obviously not in the interest of the Prussian King to contribute to the growth of so terrible and so dangerous a Power. Therefore two ways were open : Prussia had either to set bounds to Russia's conquests by force, or she had to endeavour to take skilful advantage of Russia's desire for expansion. The latter policy was the wiser one, and the King neglected nothing in order to carry it into effect.

The desired opportunity of concluding an alliance with Russia arose owing to the death of the Empress Elizabeth, his great opponent, which took place on January 5, 1762. Her successor, the foolish and imbecile Peter the Third, became a tool in Frederick's hands. He made peace with Prussia on May 5, 1762, and five weeks later, on June 8,

he concluded with Frederick a treaty of alliance to which the following secret articles were appended :

Articles Secrets :

. . . Comme l'intérêt de S.M.I. de toutes les Russies et de S.M. le roi de Prusse exige qu'on porte un soin attentif à ce que la république de Pologne soit maintenue dans son droit de libre élection, et qu'il ne soit permis ni concédé à personne d'en faire un royaume héréditaire, ou bien même de s'ériger en prince souverain, LL.MM. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le roi de Prusse se sont promis mutuellement et se sont engagées de la manière la plus solennelle, à ce que, dans tous les cas et dans toutes les circonstances, si quelqu'un et qui que ce soit voulait entreprendre de dépouiller la république de Pologne de son droit de libre élection, ou d'en faire un royaume héréditaire, ou de s'ériger soi-même en souverain, LL.MM. de Russie et de Prusse ne le permettront pas ; mais qu'au contraire elles écarteront, repousseront et mettront à néant de toutes manières et par tous les moyens, des projets si injustes et si dangereux aux puissances voisines, en se concertant mutuellement, en réunissant leurs forces et même en ayant recours aux armes, si les circonstances l'exigeaient. De plus, les deux puissances s'uniront pour faire tomber le choix sur un Piast, après la mort du roi actuel Auguste II, et elles se concerteront sur le choix du candidat le plus convenable.

Articles Séparés :

. . . S.M.I. de Russie et S.M. le roi de Prusse, voyant avec beaucoup de chagrin la dure oppression dans laquelle vivent, depuis bien des années, leurs coreligionnaires de Pologne et de Lithuanie, se sont réunies et alliées pour protéger de leur mieux tous les habitants de la Pologne et du grand-duché de Lithuanie, qui professent les religions grecque, réformée et luthérienne, et qui y sont connus sous le nom dissidents, et veulent faire tous leurs efforts pour obtenir du roi et de la république de Pologne, par des représentations fortes et amicales, que ces mêmes dissidents soient réintégrés dans leurs privilèges, libertés, droits et prérogatives qui leur avaient été accordés et concédés par le passé.

Exactly a month later, during the night from July 8

to 9, Czar Peter was deposed and his wife, Catherine the Second, was elevated to the throne. On July 17 Peter the Third was assassinated.

By the Secret Articles quoted, Russia and Prussia pledged themselves to maintain with their whole united strength the right of free election in Poland, to prevent the establishment of a hereditary Polish kingship, to cause the election of a 'Piaśt' suitable to Russia and Prussia in case of the death of the ruling King, Augustus the Second. By the Separate Article given above, Russia and Prussia further agreed to protect with all their power the Poles belonging to the Russian Orthodox and to the Lutheran religion who at the time did not enjoy full citizen rights in that Roman Catholic State.

Many years before that treaty of alliance was concluded, when Russia was disunited, weak and overrun by Eastern hordes, Poland was a powerful State. It had conquered large portions of Russia, including the towns of Moscow and Kieff. Hence, many Russians saw in Poland their hereditary enemy and endeavoured, not unnaturally, to keep that country weak and disunited. Poland was a republic presided over by an elected king. All the power was in the hands of a numerous and mostly impecunious nobility. The State was weak because of two peculiar institutions—an elected king, who might be either a Pole or a stranger, and the *Liberum Veto*. In consequence of the latter the resolutions of the Polish Diet had to be unanimous. The Veto of a single man could prevent the passage of any measure and cripple the Government. The *Liberum Veto*, possessed by the numerous aristocracy, and the election of a king, whose power was jealously circumscribed by the ruling nobility, made anarchy and disorder permanent in Poland, and weakened that country to the utmost. While patriotic Poles desired to establish the strength and security of the State by reforming their Government, by abolishing the *Liberum Veto*, replacing it by majority rule, and by making kingship hereditary, their

enemies wished to perpetuate Polish anarchy in order to take advantage of it. In the Treaty of Constantinople, concluded between Turkey and Russia in 1700, during the reign of Peter the Great, we find already an attempt on Russia's part to perpetuate disorder and anarchy in Poland by 'guaranteeing' the preservation of the vicious Polish constitution. In Article Twelve of that Treaty we read :

Le czar déclare de la manière la plus formelle qu'il ne s'appropriera rien du territoire de la Pologne, et qu'il ne se mêlera point du gouvernement de cette République. Et comme il importe aux deux empires d'empêcher que la souveraineté et la succession héréditaire ne soient point attachées à la couronne de Pologne, ils s'unissent à l'effet de maintenir les droits, privilèges et constitutions de cet Etat. Et au cas que quelque puissance qui que ce soit envoyât des troupes en Pologne, ou qu'elle cherchât à y introduire la souveraineté et la succession héréditaire, il sera non seulement permis à chacune des puissances contractantes de prendre telles mesures que son propre intérêt lui dictera, mais les deux Etats empêcheront, par toutes les voies possibles, que la couronne de Pologne n'acquière la souveraineté et la succession héréditaire ; que les droits et constitutions de la République ne soient point violés ; et qu'aucun démembrement de son territoire ne puisse avoir lieu.

Following the policy which Peter the Great had initiated with some reason against Poland, Russia and Prussia agreed by the Secret Articles quoted not only to keep Poland weak and distracted by preserving the constitutional disorder of that country, and preventing all reform, but they further agreed to use all their influence with a view to having elected a king suitable to themselves. Besides, they agreed to create the most serious difficulties to the Republic by protecting the non-Roman Catholic Poles. In her secret instructions, sent on November 6, 1763, to Count Keyserling and Prince Repnin, her Ambassadors in Warsaw, Catharine the Second, acting in conjunction with Frederick the Great, gave orders that the gentle

Count Poniatowski, her former favourite and lover, should be elected. She placed large funds at the disposal of her Ambassadors for the purpose of bribery, and gave directions that, if the Poles should oppose Poniatowski's election, Russian troops, acting in conjunction with Prussian soldiers, should treat all opponents to the Russo-Prussian candidate as rebels and enemies. We read in that most interesting secret document :

. . . Il est indispensable que nous portions sur le trône de Pologne un Piast à notre convenance, utile à nos intérêts réels, en un mot un homme qui ne doive son élévation qu'à nous seuls. Nous trouvons dans la personne du comte Poniatowski, panetier de Lithuanie, toutes les conditions nécessaires à notre convenance, et en conséquence nous avons résolu de l'élever au trône de Pologne. . . .

. . . Que si quelqu'un osait s'opposer à cette élection, troubler l'ordre public de la république, former des confédérations contre un monarque légitimement élu ; alors, sans aucune déclaration préalable, nous ordonnerons à nos troupes d'envahir en même temps sur tous les points le territoire polonais, de regarder nos adversaires comme rebelles, perturbateurs, et de détruire par le fer et par le feu leurs biens et leurs propriétés. Dans ce cas, nous nous concerterons avec le roi de Prusse, et vous, de votre côté, vous vous entendrez avec son ministre résident à Varsovie.

Soon it was whispered that Russia and Prussia had agreed to partition Poland. These rumours were indignantly and most emphatically denied by Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second. Frederick the Great made on January 24, 1764, the following public declaration through his Ambassador in Warsaw :

. . . Les faux bruits qui se sont répandus dans le royaume et que les ennemis de la tranquillité publique ne cessent de divulguer, que les cours de Prusse et de Russie voulaient profiter des circonstances présentes pour démembrer la Pologne ou la Lithuanie, et que le concert de ces deux cours tendait uniquement à y faire des acquisitions aux dépens

de la république ; ces bruits, qui sont aussi dénués de vraisemblance que de fondement, ont porté le soussigné à les contredire, non-seulement de bouche, mais aussi par une note préalable remise au prince primat. . . .

. . . Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse ne travaille et ne travaillera constamment qu'à maintenir les Etats de la république en leur entier. S.M. l'impératrice de Russie ayant le même en vue, ce n'est que dans un pareil but que le roi s'est concerté avec elle.

The statement of the Prussian Ambassador was followed by a letter from Frederick the Great himself to the Prince Primate of Poland on July 24, in which the King, in sonorous Latin phrases, stated that he was most anxious 'ut libertates et possessiones reipublicae, sartae omnino et intactae maneant. Haec est sincera et constans animi nostri sententia.' Catharine the Second, with similar unequivocal directness, publicly declared :

. . . Si jamais l'esprit de mensonge a pu inventer une fausseté complète, c'est lorsqu'on a audacieusement répandu que, dans le dessein que nous avons de favoriser l'élection d'un Piast, nous n'avions pour but que de nous faciliter les moyens d'envahir, par son secours ou son concours, quelque morceau du territoire de la couronne de Pologne ou du grand-duché de Lithuanie, pour le démembrer du royaume et le mettre sous notre domination par usurpation. Ce bruit, si peu fondé et inventé aussi mal à propos, tombe de lui-même comme dénué de toute sorte de vraisemblance.

The British diplomats hesitated to accept these solemn declarations. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Ambassador to Poland, reported on June 15, 1763, from Dresden to his Government, enclosing the Empress's Declaration of May 2, 1763 :

The enclosed declaration of the Empress of Russia appears to me to be very vague ; the idea here is that there is certainly an understanding between the King of Prussia and that Sovereign to divide the major part of the Polish Do-

minions between them. I cannot by any means adopt this sentiment, conceiving it to be inconsistent with the interest of either of them. The manner in which that unfortunate country is treated on both sides shows that they are as much absolute masters of it as possible, and that without awakening the jealousy of their neighbours. Russia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to herself that barrier. I can easily imagine Polish Prussia and the town of Dantzic to be tempting objects to the King of Prussia, but would even Russia, on whatever amicable footing she may be, permit him to make so formidable an acquisition on that side and so dangerous for the Baltick Navigation when in the hands of so great a Prince ?

By bribery and persuasion, and by ruthless intimidation, supported by the threatening presence of a large body of Russian troops brought into the Polish capital, the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors secured in 1764 the election of Count Poniatowski to the Polish throne. He reigned in the name Stanislaus Augustus. Soon after his election the Empress Catharine, supported by Frederick the Great, demanded that the dissenters of Poland should be given equal rights with the Roman Catholics, and these demands were backed by force.

In his 'Memoirs' Frederick the Great described this as follows :

Towards the end of 1765 the Polish Diet came again together. The Empress of Russia had declared herself Protectress of the Dissenters, part of whom belonged to the Greek religion. She demanded that they should be permitted to exercise their religion freely and to obtain official positions on a footing of equality with the other Poles. This demand was the cause of all the disturbances and wars which soon broke out. The Prussian Ambassador handed to the Polish Diet a memoir demonstrating that his Master, the King of Prussia, could not view with indifference the abolition of the *Liberum Veto*, the introduction of new taxation, and the increase of the Polish Army, and the Polish Republic acted in accordance with Prussia's representations.

The Dissenters were hostile to the ruling Poles. In view of the existence of the *Liberum Voto*, by means of which a single dissident could bring the machinery of Parliament and Government to a standstill, the demands made by Russia and Prussia could be fulfilled only if the *Liberum Veto* was replaced by majority rule. However, acting in accordance with their secret treaty, Russia and Prussia opposed that most necessary reform. The demands made by Russia and Prussia on behalf of Dissenters were particularly unwarrantable if we remember that even now Poles cannot obtain 'official positions on a footing of equality' either in Prussia or in Russia. However, notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the request, the new King, who possessed far more patriotism than Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second had believed, promised to fulfil their demands if he was given sufficient time. Sir G. Macartney, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported on November 28 (December 7), 1766 :

The King of Poland five months ago declared to Mr. Panin by his Minister that if Russia would act moderately he would undertake in this Diet to obtain for the dissidents the free exercise of their religion, and in the next he would endeavour, nay promise, to render them not only capable of Juridicatory Starosties, but of being elected to the Nunciature. Unfortunately this proposal did not content the Court of Petersburg. She [the Empress] thought it possible to obtain everything she demanded, and did not comprehend the difficulty, the impossibility, of persuading a Great Assembly [the most august part of which consists of Ecclesiasticks] to grant all at once without hesitation free participation of their privileges to a set of men whom they have been taught to look upon as equally their spiritual and temporal enemies. The King of Prussia by his minister here endeavours by all methods, *per fas et nefas*, to irritate this Court against the Poles, and as an indiscreet zeal for religion has never been reckoned among that Monarch's weaknesses, his motives are shrewdly suspected to be much deeper than they are avowed to be.

Driven to despair by the threats of armed interference, made by the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors, King Stanislaus Augustus appealed on October 5, 1766, to Catharine the Second in a most touching private letter, which, alluding to their former intimacy and love, ended as follows :

Lorsque vous m'avez recommandé au choix de cette nation, vous n'avez assurément pas voulu que je devinasse l'objet de ses malédictions ; vous ne comptiez certainement pas non plus élever dans ma personne un but aux traits de vos armes. Je vous conjure de voir cependant que si tout ce que le prince Repnin m'a annoncé se vérifie, il n'y a pas de milieu pour moi : il faut que je m'expose à vos coups, ou que je trahisse ma nation et mon devoir. Vous ne m'auriez pas voulu roi, si j'étais capable du dernier. La Foudre est entre vos mains, mais la lancerez-vous sur la tête innocente de celui qui vous est depuis si longtemps le plus tendrement et le plus sincèrement attaché ? Madame, De Votre Majesté Impériale le bon frère, ami et voisin,

STANISLAS-AUGUSTE, roi.

The King pleaded in vain. Catharine the Second and Frederick the Great were freethinkers. Their championship of the rights of the Dissenters was merely a pretext for crippling Poland completely and for interfering in that country with a view to partitioning it. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Ambassador in Poland, sent on October 29, 1766, a despatch to his Government, in which we read :

I had another long conversation with the King, who represented to me in the most touching colours the situation of his affairs and the manner in which he thinks himself and the nation treated. He saw himself, he said, upon the brink of the most serious danger ; that he was determined to suffer all rather than betray his country, or act like a dishonest man ; that Her Imperial Majesty had never pretended to more than procuring the Protestants the full exercise of their religion, and that he had laboured for many

months past on that plan ; that this sudden and violent resolution of the Empress to put them on a level with his other subjects convinced him that religion was only a pretext, and that she and the King of Prussia, repenting of having placed a man on the throne that worked for the elevation of his country, were taking measures to overset what they themselves had done ; that he awaited the event with the utmost tranquillity, conscious of having ever acted on the principles of Justice and Patriotism.

The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell, confirmed in his despatches the views of his colleagues in Petersburg and Warsaw as to the ultimate aims of Russia and Prussia in Poland. He wrote, for instance, on November 22, 1766 :

Neither the Empress of Russia nor the King of Prussia would wish to see such an alteration in the constitution of Poland as could not fail to render the Republick more independent, more powerful, and of more weight and importance than it has hitherto been in Europe.

Before the first partition of Poland the Province of East Prussia was separated from the rest of the Kingdom of Prussia by Polish territory. The present Province of West Prussia, with Thorn, Dantzic, and the mighty River Vistula, formed then part of Poland. Frederick strove to acquire that province, and with this object in view he had advocated the partition of Poland with Russia. However, an event occurred which seriously affected the King's plans. In 1768 war broke out between Russia and Turkey. It was long drawn out and, to Frederick's dismay, Russia proved victorious. The King strongly desired the existence of a powerful Turkey friendly to Prussia, which, in case of need, might afford valuable support to Prussia by attacking Russia in the flank or Austria in the rear. The King wrote in his 'Memoirs' :

It was in no way in Prussia's interest to see the Ottoman Power altogether destroyed. In case of need excellent use

could be made of it for causing a diversion either in Hungary or in Russia in the event that Prussia was at war either with Austria or with the Muscovite Power.

Germany's traditional philo-Turkish policy was originated not by Bismarck and William the Second, but by Frederick the Great.

During a long time Frederick strove to bring about a war between Russia and Austria by telling the Austrians that if Russia should conquer large portions of Turkey she would become too powerful, and would become dangerous to Austria herself, that Austria should not tolerate the Russians crossing the Danube. As his attempts at involving these two States in war proved unsuccessful, he resolved to divert Russia's attention from the Balkan Peninsula to Poland, and for greater security he wished to make use of Austria as a tool and a partner in his designs. As Maria Theresa, the Austrian Empress, refused to take a hand in the partition of Poland, he began to work upon her son and successor. Joseph the Second, born in 1741, was at the time young, enthusiastic, inexperienced, hasty, vain, and he thirsted for glory. He envied Frederick's successes. Playing upon his vanity and upon that of Prince Kaunitz, the leading Austrian statesman, Frederick the Great obtained their support for partitioning Poland. After a long but fruitless resistance against her son and her principal adviser, Maria Theresa signed, it is said with tears in her eyes, on March 4, 1772, the Partition Treaty. However, in signing it, she expressed her dissent and disapproval in the following prophetic phrase :

Placet, puisque tant et de savants personnages veulent qu'il en soit ainsi ; mais, longtemps après ma mort, on verra ce qui résulte d'avoir ainsi foulé aux pieds tout ce que jusqu'à présent on a toujours tenu pour juste et pour sacré.

To preserve the appearance of legitimacy the partitioning Powers wished to receive the consent of the Polish Diet to

their act of spoliation. Frederick the Great describes how that consent was obtained. After mentioning that each of the partitioning Powers sent an army to Poland to overawe the people, and that Warsaw was occupied by troops, he wrote in his 'Memoirs':

At first the Poles were obstinate and rejected all proposals. The representatives did not come to Warsaw. Having grown tired of the long delay, the Court of Vienna proposed to appoint a day for the opening of the Diet, threatening that in case of the non-appearance of the delegates, the three Powers would partition not merely part but the whole of the country. If, on the other hand, the cession of the outlying districts was effected by voluntary agreement, the foreign troops would be withdrawn from Poland. That declaration overcame all difficulties. The Treaty of Cession was signed with Prussia on the 18th of September, and Poland was guaranteed the integrity of her remaining provinces. . . . The Poles, who are the most easy-going and most foolish nation in Europe, thought at first that they could safely consent because they would be able to destroy the work of the three Powers within a short time. They argued thus in the hope that Russia might be defeated by Turkey.

At the first partition Prussia, Austria, and Russia were, according to their treaty concluded with Poland, to take certain vast but clearly defined territories from that unhappy State. However, by fraud and violence they greatly exceeded the stipulated limits. Frederick the Great tells us with his habitual cynical candour:

The Poles complained loudly that the Austrians and Prussians increased their shares without limit. There was some reason for these complaints. The Austrians used a very wrong map of Poland on which the names of the rivers Sbruze and Podhorze had been exchanged, and making use of this pretext enlarged their portion very greatly beyond the limits agreed upon by the Treaty of Partition. The basis of the Treaty had been that the shares of the three

Powers should be equal. As the Austrians had increased their share, King Frederick considered himself justified in doing likewise, and included in Prussia the districts of the old and the new Netze.

Careful study of the 'Memoirs' and of the diplomatic and private correspondence of the time shows convincingly that Frederick the Great was the moving spirit, and that he was responsible for the first partition of Poland, that Russia and Austria were merely his tools and his dupes. He has told us in his 'Memoirs' that he sent the original plan of partition to Petersburg, attributing it to the fertile brain of a visionary statesman, Count Lynar. The late Lord Salisbury wrote in his valuable essay 'Poland,' published in the *Quarterly Review* in 1868, in which, by the by, he treated the claims of the Poles with little justice :

By a bold inversion of the real degrees of guilt the chief blame is laid on Russia. Prussia is looked upon as a pitiful and subordinate accomplice, while Austria is almost absolved as an unwilling accessory. . . .

To Frederick the Great of Prussia belongs the credit of having initiated the scheme which was actually carried into execution. It is now admitted, even by German historians, that the first partition was proposed to Catharine by Prince Henry of Prussia on behalf of his brother Frederick, and with the full acquiescence of Joseph, Emperor of Germany. Frederick had never been troubled with scruples upon the subject of territorial acquisition, and he was not likely to commence them in the case of Poland. Spoliation was the hereditary tradition of his race. The whole history of the kingdom over which he ruled was a history of lawless annexation. It was formed of territory filched from other races and other Powers, and from no Power so liberally as from Poland.

The fact that Frederick the Great was responsible for the first partition of Poland is acknowledged not only by leading German historians, but even by the German school-books. As an excuse, it is usually stated that necessity

compelled Frederick to propose that step because the anarchy prevailing in Poland made impossible its continued existence as an independent State. However, German writers never mention that the Poles themselves earnestly wished to reform the State, and that Frederick not only opposed that reform but greatly increased disorder by putting his own nominee on the Polish throne, by causing civil war to break out in the country, by raising the Polish Dissenters against the Government, by occupying Poland in conjunction with Russia, by interfering with its elections and Government, and by bribing and overawing its Legislature by armed force.

The second partition of Poland in 1793 is perhaps even more disgraceful to Prussia than was the first, because it involved that country and her King in an act of incredible treachery. Frederick the Great died in 1786. His successor, Frederick William the Second, was a worthless individual, and he brought about the second partition by means which his uncle would have disdained. Mr. M. S. F. Schöll, a German diplomat of standing, described in Koch's classical '*Tableau des Révolutions de l'Europe*,' which is still much used by students of history, and especially by diplomats, the infamous way in which Prussia betrayed Poland at the time of the second partition in the following words :

While in France, during the Revolution, the nation was seized by a sudden rage and abolished all institutions and all law and order, giving itself up to excesses which one would have thought to be impossible, another nation in the North of Europe, which was plunged in anarchy and oppressed by its neighbours, made a noble effort to establish good order and to throw off its foreign yoke.

The Poles had persuaded themselves that they might be able to change their vicious Constitution and to give renewed strength to the Government of the Polish Republic during a time when Russia was occupied with wars against Sweden and Turkey. An Extraordinary Diet was convoked at Warsaw, and in order to abolish the inconvenience of

the *liberum veto*, which required unanimity of votes, it adopted the form of a Confederation. The Empress, Catharine the Second of Russia, approached the Polish Diet and endeavoured to conclude with it an alliance against the Turks. Her plan was spoiled by the King of Prussia, who, in consequence of arrangements made with England, did all in his power to rouse the Poles against the Russians. He encouraged them by offering them his alliance to undertake the reformation of their Government which Prussia had recently guaranteed. A Committee of the Polish Diet was instructed to draw up a plan of a Constitution designed to regenerate the Republic.

The resolution taken by the Diet was likely to displease the Empress of Russia, who considered that step as a formal breach of the Treaty between Russia and Poland concluded in 1775. As the Poles could foresee that the changes which they desired to effect were likely to involve them in differences with the Empress of Russia, they ought before all to have thought of preparing their defence. However, instead of improving their finances and strengthening their army, the Diet lost much in discussing the projected new Constitution. Prussia's protection, of which they had officially been assured, made the Poles too confident. The alliance which the King of Prussia actually concluded with the Republic on March 27, 1790, gave them a feeling of absolute security. King Stanislaus Augustus hesitated a long time as to the attitude which he should adopt. At last he joined that party of the Diet which desired to draw Poland out of the humiliating position in which she had fallen. The new Constitution was proclaimed on May 8, 1791.

Although that Constitution was not perfect, it was in accordance with Poland's conditions. It corrected the vices of her ancient laws, and although it was truly Republican in spirit, it avoided the exaggerated ideas to which the French Revolution had given rise. The throne was made hereditary. The absurd *liberum veto* was abolished. The Diet was declared permanent and the legislative body was divided into two chambers. The lower one was to discuss laws. The upper one, the Senate, presided over by the King, was to sanction them and to exercise the veto. The

executive power was entrusted to the King and a Council of Supervision composed of seven responsible Ministers. . . .

The exertions made by the Poles for ensuring their independence aroused Russia's anger. As soon as the Empress of Russia had concluded peace with Turkey, she induced her supporters in Poland to form a separate confederation which aimed at revoking the innovations which the Diet of Warsaw had introduced. It strove to bring the old Polish constitution once more into force. That confederation was concluded on the 14th of May 1792, at Targowice, and the Counts Felix Potocki, Rzewuski, and Branicki were its leaders.

The Empress of Russia sent an army into Poland in support of the new Confederation, and made war against those Poles who were in favour of the new constitution. Only then did the Poles seriously think of vigorous counter measures. The Diet decreed that the Polish Army should be placed on a war footing, and a loan of 88,000,000 florins was arranged for. However, when the Prussian Ambassador was asked to state what assistance the King, his master, would give in accordance with his pledges contained in the Treaty of Alliance of 1790—according to Articles 3 and 4 he was to furnish the Republic with 18,000 men, and in case of need with 30,000 men—he gave an evasive answer which threw the patriotic party into despair.

The refusal of the Polish Diet to sanction a commercial proposal by which Poland would have abandoned the towns of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia had angered that monarch against the Poles, and the Empress of Russia did not find it difficult to obtain the Prussian King's consent to another partition of the country. The aversion which the sovereigns felt against everything which resembled the French Revolution, with which, however, the events in Poland, where King and nation acted in harmony, had nothing in common except appearances, strongly influenced the Berlin Court and caused it to break the engagements which it had contracted with the Republic.

The Poles understood the danger of their position. Their enthusiasm cooled, and the whole Diet was seized with a feeling of consternation. Having to rely on their

own strength, and being torn by dissensions, the Poles were unable to face their Russian opponents with success. The patriotic party was unfortunate in the campaign of 1792. After several victories the Russians advanced upon Warsaw and King Stanislaus, who was easily discouraged, joined the Confederation of Targowice, denounced the Constitution of the 3rd of May, and subscribed on the 25th of August 1792 to all the conditions which the Empress of Russia prescribed. An armistice was declared, and in consequence of its stipulations the Polish Army was reduced. In virtue of the Convention of Petersburg of the 23rd of January 1793, concluded between Prussia and Russia, the Prussian troops entered Poland and spread throughout the country, following Russia's example. Proclamations of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg were published, by which these States took possession of those districts of the country which their troops had occupied. The adoption by Poland of the principles of 1789 and the propagation of the democratic principles of the French by the Poles were given as reasons for the second partition of Poland. . . .

The partitioning Powers renounced once more all rights and claims to the territories of the Republic, and bound themselves to recognise, and even to guarantee, if desired, the Constitution which the Polish Diet would draw up with the free consent of the Polish nation.

Notwithstanding the reiterated promises of respecting the integrity of the much-reduced country, the third partition took place in 1795.

From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia treated Poland as a *corpus vile*, and cut it up like a cake, without any regard to the claims, the rights, and the protests of the Poles themselves. Although history only mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven. There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred to; and these were followed by arbitrary redistributions of the Polish territories in 1807, 1809, and 1815. In none of these were the inhabitants consulted or even considered. The Congress of Vienna established the independence of

Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered herself 'threatened' by the existence of that tiny State, seized it in 1846.

While Prussia, Austria, and Russia, considering that might was right, had divided Poland amongst themselves, regardless of the passionate protests of the inhabitants, England had remained a spectator, but not a passive one, of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the Allies with strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression to her sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After all, no English interests were involved in the partition. It was not her business to intervene. Besides, she could not successfully have opposed single-handed the joint action of the three powerful partner States, especially as France, under the weak Louis the Fifteenth, held aloof. However, English statesmen refused to consider as valid the five partitions which took place before and during the Napoleonic era.

The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers of Europe were fixed by general consent. As Prussia, Austria, and Russia refused to recreate an independent Poland, England's opposition would have broken up the Concert, and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent the injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious to maintain the unity of the Powers and the peace of the world, England consented at last to consider the partition of Poland as a *fait accompli*, and formally recognised it, especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the Poles of just and fair treatment under representative institutions. Article 1 of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly :

Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, obtiendront une représentation et des institutions nationales réglées d'après le mode d'existence politique que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils appartiennent jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder.

By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognised not explicitly, but merely implicitly, the partition of Poland, and she did so unwillingly and under protest. Lord Castlereagh stated in a Circular Note addressed to Russia, Prussia, and Austria that it had always been England's desire that an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own, should be established, which, separating Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should act as a buffer State between them ; that, failing its creation, the Poles should be reconciled to being dominated by foreigners, by just and liberal treatment which alone would make them satisfied. His Note, which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom, force, and restraint, was worded as follows :

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present Note concerning the affairs of Poland may be entered on the Protocol, has no intention to revive controversy or to impede the progress of the arrangements now in contemplation. His only object is to avail himself of this occasion of temperately recording, by the express orders of his Court, the sentiments of the British Government upon a European question of the utmost magnitude and influence.

The Undersigned has had occasion in the course of the discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not now be gone into, repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the part of his Court, to the erection of a Polish kingdom in union with and making a part of the Imperial Crown of Russia.

The desire of his Court to see an independent Power, more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a distinct Dynasty, and as an intermediate State between the three great Monarchies, has uniformly been avowed, and if the Undersigned has not been directed to press such a measure, it has only arisen from a disinclination to excite, under all the apparent obstacles to such an arrangement, expectations which might prove an unavailing source of discontent among the Poles.

The Emperor of Russia continuing, as it is declared, still to adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy of Warsaw which is to fall under His Imperial Majesty's dominion, together with his other Polish provinces, either in whole or in part, into a kingdom under the Russian sceptre; and their Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the Sovereigns most immediately interested, having ceased to oppose themselves to such an arrangement—the Undersigned adhering, nevertheless, to all his former representations on this subject has only sincerely to hope that none of those evils may result from this measure to the tranquillity of the North, and to the general equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful duty to anticipate. But in order to obviate as far as possible such consequences, it is of essential importance to establish the public tranquillity throughout the territories which formerly constituted the kingdom of Poland, upon some solid and liberal basis of common interest, by applying to all, however various may be their political institutions, a congenial and conciliatory system of administration.

Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.

The Undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with the general sentiments which he has had the satisfaction to observe the respective Cabinets entertained on this subject, ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish nation are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be

placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a determination will best tend to conciliate the general sentiment to their rule, and to do honour to the several Sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course will consequently afford the surest prospect of their living peaceably and contentedly under their respective Governments. . . .

This despatch was sent on January 12, 1815, a century ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century has been filled with sorrow for the Poles and with risings and revolutions, as Lord Castlereagh clearly foretold.

In their reply, the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian representatives promised to act in accordance with England's views. However, soon after the overthrow of Napoleon, reaction set in. The promises made to the peoples at the Congress of Vienna, and the claims of the nationalities, were disregarded. Representative government was either not established, or, where established, was destroyed. Under the guidance of Prince Metternich, the evil genius of Austria, an era of petty tyranny and of persecution began. An example will show how the Poles were treated. On May 15, 1815, King Frederick William the Third of Prussia, on taking possession of the Polish territories which fell to him under the Treaty of Vienna, addressed the following proclamation to the inhabitants :

Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland ! In again taking possession of the district of the former dukedom of Warsaw, which originally belonged to Prussia, I wish to define your position. You also have a Fatherland, and you receive proof of my appreciation for your attachment to me. You will be incorporated in the Prussian Monarchy, but you need not abandon your nationality. You will take part in the constitution which I intend granting to my faithful subjects, and you will receive a provincial constitution similar to that which the other provinces of my State will receive. Your religion shall be respected, and the clergy

will receive an income suitable to its position. Your personal rights and property will be protected by the laws which will be made with your collaboration. The Polish language shall be used side by side with the German language in all public transactions and affairs, and every one of you shall be able to obtain official positions, honours, and dignities according to his ability.

In 1813, at the beginning of the War of Liberation against Napoleon, Frederick William the Third had solemnly promised a constitution to the Prussian people. At that moment he needed their help. That promise, which was received with the greatest enthusiasm, was renewed in the document given above and in many others, but it was not kept, although the King lived till 1840. He and his successors treated the Poles with absolute faithlessness. Not a single one of the promises made to them in the Proclamation quoted was observed. During a century Prussia has disregarded her pledges of fair and equal treatment. Instead the Poles were persecuted and oppressed in Prussia, and their persecution in Austria, and especially in Russia, was largely, if not chiefly, due to Prussia's instigation.

Since the time of Frederick the Great, and in accordance with his advice given in the beginning of this chapter, Prussian statesmen, distrusting and fearing Russia, aimed at maintaining the most intimate relations with that country, for Russia's support was most valuable, while her hostility was dangerous. Fearing and distrusting Russia, they strove to keep that country weak. Animated by fear and distrust, they aimed at possessing themselves of a powerful weapon which could be used against the Northern Power in case of need.

These three purposes of Prussian statesmanship could best be served by inducing Russia to pursue in her Polish districts a policy which exasperated the Poles, which created disaffection on her most vulnerable frontier. Russia was an autocracy, and the Poles, remembering their ancient Republic, have always been democratically inclined. An

autocrat is naturally afraid of revolution and conspiracy. Taking advantage of these feelings, Prussia succeeded during more than a century in influencing and guiding Russia's policy to her advantage. She unceasingly pointed out to the Czar that the three States which brought about the partition of Poland were equally interested in combating democracy and revolution. The Poles were depicted to the Russians as born revolutionaries and anarchists.

Russia had good reason to fear a Polish rising on her western, her most vulnerable, frontier, on which dwell nearly 12,000,000 Poles. The Poles are exceedingly warlike, and Russia has in the past found it extremely difficult to suppress their risings. Besides, an invader could always hope to raise the Poles against the Czar by promising them liberty, as was done by Napoleon the First in 1812. Prussian statesmen never tired of pointing out to the Czar that the danger of a Polish revolution could be overcome only by severe repressive measures taken jointly with Prussia. Thus Prussia and Russia were to remain partners, being jointly interested in the persecution of Poland. Poland's unhappiness was to be the cement of the two States. For the same reason for which Frederick the Great desired to preserve disorder in Poland, his successors desired to see chronic dissatisfaction prevail in Russia's Western Provinces.

Prussia contemplated with fear the possibility of Poland receiving her independence. It is clear that the re-creation of an independent Poland within the limits of 1772 would affect Russia only slightly, but would damage Prussia very severely. The Prussian Poles dwell in dense masses in Southern Silesia, one of the wealthiest coal and industrial centres of Germany, and in the provinces of Posen and Western Prussia. If the province of Posen should once more become Polish, the distance which separates Berlin from the eastern frontier of Germany would be reduced to about one half. The capital would be in danger. If

the province of West Prussia, with the mouth of the Vistula and the port of Danzig, should once more become Polish, Prussia's position in the province of East Prussia would be jeopardised, for Polish territory would once more separate it from the rest of the Monarchy. Russia, on the other hand, with her boundless territories, could easily bear the loss of her Polish provinces, especially as her capitals lie far from the frontier. Prince Bülow stated, not without cause, in the Prussian Diet on January 19, 1903: 'The Polish question is, as it has ever been, one of the most important, nay, the most important, question of Prussia's policy.'

In modern Russia there have always been absolutist and liberal-minded Czars and a reactionary and a progressive party. Those who depicted Russia as a land of pure and undiluted absolutism, and her Czars as a race of cruel and unenlightened despots, were not acquainted with Russian history. While the reactionary party in Russia favoured the policy of oppressing the nationalities, the liberal-minded were in favour of a wisely limited constitutionalism. They desired to give representative institutions to the people and some suitable form of self-government to the Poles.

In 1859 Bismarck became the Prussian Ambassador in Petrograd. At that time Russia was recovering from the effects of the Crimean War, and many of the most enlightened Russians had become convinced that her defeat was largely due to her backwardness, that her backwardness was caused by her unprogressive institutions, that a more liberal policy in the widest sense of the word was needed. The Czar himself and his principal adviser, Prince Gortchakoff, were in favour of Liberalism and of Constitutionalism. Both desired to give greater freedom to the Poles. However, Bismarck, following the policy of Frederick the Great, resolutely opposed their policy in Prussia's interest. Owing to his persuasiveness and personal magnetism, that great statesman obtained the ascendant over the Czar and induced him to pursue a reactionary policy towards

the Poles. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, reported to Earl Russell on March 26, 1868 :

I have had a curious conversation with the Prussian Ambassador, and not altogether without importance, as showing that the Prussian Government has, if possible, greater repugnance to the restoration of Polish independence than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself. Adverting to the well-known desire of the Emperor to accomplish this event, Count Goltz said that it was a question of life and death to Prussia. . . . In the course of this conversation Count Goltz said that M. de Bismarck, while Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, had strenuously and successfully opposed the few concessions made to Poland by the present Emperor.

In his 'Memoirs' Prince Bismarck candidly described his anti-Polish policy in Russia as follows :

In the higher circles of Russian society the influences which made for Poland were connected with the now outspoken demand for a constitution. It was felt as a degradation that a cultivated people like the Russians should be denied institutions which existed in all European nations, and should have no voice in the management of their own affairs. The division of opinion on the Polish question penetrated the highest military circles. Those Russians who demanded a constitution for themselves pleaded at times in excuse for the Poles that they were not governable by Russians, and that as they grew more civilised they became entitled to a share in the administration of their country. This view was also represented by Prince Gortchakoff.

The conflict of opinion was very lively in St. Petersburg when I left that capital in April, 1862, and it so continued throughout my first year of office. I took charge of the Foreign Office under the impression that the insurrection which had broken out on January 1st, 1863, brought up the question not only of the interests of our Eastern provinces, but also that wider one, whether the Russian Cabinet were dominated by Polish or anti-Polish proclivities, by an effort after Russo-Polish fraternisation in the anti-German Pan-

slavist interest or by one for mutual reliance between Russia and Prussia.

For the German future of Prussia the attitude of Russia was a question of great importance. A philo-Polish Russian policy was calculated to vivify that Russo-French sympathy against which Prussia's effort had been directed since the peace of Paris, and indeed on occasion earlier, and an alliance (friendly to Poland) between Russia and France, such as was in the air before the Revolution of July, would have placed the Prussia of that day in a difficult position. It was our interest to oppose the party in the Russian Cabinet which had Polish proclivities, even when they were the proclivities of Alexander II.

That Russia herself afforded no security against fraternisation with Poland I was able to gather from confidential intercourse with Gortchakoff and the Czar himself. Czar Alexander was at that time not indisposed to withdraw from part of Poland, the left bank of the Vistula at any rate—so he told me in so many words—while he made unemphatic exception of Warsaw, which would always be desirable as a garrison town, and belonged strategically to the Vistula fortress triangle. Poland, he said, was for Russia a source of unrest and dangerous European complications; its Russification was forbidden by the difference of religion and the insufficient capacity for administration among Russian officials.

. . . Our geographical position and the intermixture of both nationalities in the Eastern provinces, including Silesia, compel us to retard, as far as possible, the opening of the Polish question, and even in 1863 made it appear advisable to do our best not to facilitate, but to obviate, the opening of this question by Russia. It was assumed that liberal concessions, if granted to the Poles, could not be withheld from the Russians; Russian constitutionalists were therefore philo-Polish.

Russia's history has often been most unfavourably affected, and the clearly expressed will of the Czar himself been totally deflected, by the incompetence of a single powerful individual. The Czar Alexander was a kindly,

liberal-minded, and broad-minded man, and he was, as we have learned from the testimony of Bismarck and Lord Cowley, very favourable to the Poles and to their aspirations. He intended to give the Poles a full measure of self-government, and he entrusted an eminent Pole, Count Wielopolski, an old revolutionary of 1830, with that difficult task. Wielopolski, though probably well meaning, was tactless, rash, and inclined to violence. Some of his measures had caused dissatisfaction among the Poles and had led to riots. Wielopolski resolved to rid himself of his opponents, who were chiefly young hot-headed enthusiasts, by enrolling them in the army, and sending them for a long number of years to Siberia and the Caucasus. By his orders numerous young men, belonging to good families, were to be arrested in their beds by soldiers during the night of January 1, 1863. In the words of Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, 'the opposition was to be kidnapped.' That foolish and arbitrary step led to a widespread revolt and a prolonged but hopeless struggle between Polish guerillas and Russian soldiers. Bismarck, who had unceasingly recommended a policy of reaction while he was in Petrograd, made the best use of his opportunity, and he did so all the more readily as Prince Gortchakoff was a friend not only of Poland but also of France. Foreseeing a struggle between Prussia and France, Bismarck desired to obtain Russia's goodwill, to create differences between that country and France, and to discredit the Francophile Prince Gortchakoff with the Czar. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Lord Russell on March 21, 1863 :

Prince Hohenzollern, in speaking to me some days ago with regret of the foreign policy of the Prussian Government, said that one of its principal objects has been the overthrow of Prince Gortchakoff, whose wish to promote an alliance between France and Russia is, they believe, the only obstacle in the way of re-establishing the relations which existed between the three Northern Courts previously to the Crimean War.

Bismarck exaggerated to the Czar the scope, character, and consequences of the Polish revolt to the utmost, and while France and England expressed their sympathy with the Poles, and reproached Wielopolski for his blundering, Bismarck hastened to demonstrate his attachment to Russia and his devotion to the Czar by offering Prussia's assistance in combating the revolutionists. On January 22, 1863, the first sanguinary encounter took place. Ten days later, on February 1, General Gustav von Alvensleben was despatched by Prussia to the Czar with proposals for joint action against the Poles. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed on February 12 to Earl Russell :

Insurrection in Poland extending, and numbers of Russian troops said to be insufficient for its suppression. . . . Two corps of observation are forming on the frontier, and assistance, if required, will be afforded by Prussia. Bismarck says Prussia will never permit the establishment of an independent kingdom of Poland.

Two days later the British Ambassador telegraphed :

. . . General Alvensleben, who is now in Warsaw, having arrived there two days ago from St. Petersburg, has concluded a military convention with the Russian Government, according to which the two Governments will reciprocally afford facilities to each other for the suppression of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland. . . .

The Prussian railways are also to be placed at the disposal of the Russian military authorities for the transport of troops through Prussian territory from one part of the kingdom of Poland to another. The Government further contemplate, in case of necessity, to give military assistance to the Russian Government for the suppression of the insurrection in the kingdom ; but I am told that no engagement has yet been entered into with respect to the nature or extent of such assistance. In the meanwhile, however, four corps of the Prussian Army are concentrating on the

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frontiers under the command of General Waldersee, whose headquarters are at Posen.

To demonstrate Prussia's zeal for Russia, one third of the Prussian Army was placed at Russia's service on the Polish frontier, to help in suppressing the rising of a number of men armed chiefly with scythes and pistols.

For reasons given in these pages, Bismarck was alarmed by the possibility that the Czar might establish an independent Poland on Prussia's border. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Earl Russell on February 14, 1868 :

M. de Bismarck, in acquainting me a few days ago with his intention to take measures in concert with the Russian Government to prevent the extension of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland, said the question was of vital importance to Prussia, as her own existence would be seriously compromised by the establishment of an independent kingdom of Poland. I asked whether he meant to say that if Russia found any difficulty in suppressing the insurrection, the Prussian Government intended to afford them military assistance ; and he not only replied in the affirmative, but added that if Russia got tired of the contest and were disposed to withdraw from the kingdom—a course which some Russians were supposed to think advantageous to her interests—the Prussian Government would carry on the war on their own account. . . .

The Emperor William the First, who at the time was only King of Prussia, frankly said to the British Ambassador, according to his telegram on February 22, 1868 :

It was equally the duty and the interest of Prussia to do everything in her power to prevent the establishment of an independent Polish kingdom, for if the Polish nation could reconstitute themselves as an independent State, the existence of Prussia would be seriously menaced, as the first efforts of the new State would be to

recover Dantzic, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal consequences to Prussia were too evident to require him to point them out.

While Prussia, for purely selfish reasons, advocated a policy of persecution and repression towards the Poles, which would only increase their resentment to the advantage of Russia's enemies, Great Britain, following her traditional policy of disinterested detachment and wise humanity, recommended once more the adoption of a liberal policy towards the Poles in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. Earl Russell sent to the British Ambassador in Petrograd on March 2, 1868, the following most remarkable despatch :

MY LORD,—Her Majesty's Government view with the deepest concern the state of things now existing in the kingdom of Poland. They see there, on the one side, a large mass of the population in open insurrection against the Government, and, on the other, a vast military force employed in putting that insurrection down. The natural and probable result of such a contest must be expected to be the success of the military forces. But that success, if it is to be achieved by a series of bloody conflicts, must be attended by a lamentable effusion of blood, by a deplorable sacrifice of life, by widespread desolation, and by impoverishment and ruin, which it would take a long course of years to repair.

Moreover, the acts of violence and destruction on both sides, which are sure to accompany such a struggle, must engender mutual hatreds and resentments which will embitter, for generations to come, the relations between the Russian Government and the Polish race. Yet, however much Her Majesty's Government might lament the existence of such a miserable state of things in a foreign country, they would not, perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal expression of their sentiments were it not that there are peculiarities in the present state of things in Poland which take them out of the usual and ordinary condition of such affairs.

The kingdom of Poland was constituted and placed in connection with the Russian Empire by the Treaty of 1815, to which Great Britain was a contracting party. The present disastrous state of things is to be traced to the fact that Poland is not in the condition in which the stipulations of that Treaty require that it should be placed. Neither is Poland in the condition in which it was placed by the Emperor Alexander I, by whom that Treaty was made. During his reign a National Diet sat at Warsaw and the Poles of the kingdom of Poland enjoyed privileges fitted to secure their political welfare. Since 1832, however, a state of uneasiness and discontent has been succeeded from time to time by violent commotion and a useless effusion of blood. Her Majesty's Government are aware that the immediate cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately enforced upon the Polish population; but that measure itself is understood to have been levelled at the deeply-rooted discontent prevailing among the Poles in consequence of the political condition of the kingdom of Poland.

The proprietors of land and the middle classes in the towns bore that condition with impatience, and if the peasantry were not equally disaffected they gave little support or strength to the Russian Government. Great Britain, therefore, as a party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a Power deeply interested in the tranquillity of Europe, deems itself entitled to express its opinion upon the events now taking place, and is anxious to do so in the most friendly spirit towards Russia, and with a sincere desire to promote the interest of all the parties concerned. Why should not His Imperial Majesty, whose benevolence is generally and cheerfully acknowledged, put an end at once to this bloody conflict by proclaiming mercifully an immediate and unconditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects, and at the same time announce his intention to replace without delay his kingdom of Poland in possession of the political and civil privileges which were granted to it by the Emperor Alexander I in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815? If this were done a National Diet and a National Administration would in all probability content the Poles and satisfy European opinion.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff and give him a copy of it.

Earl Russell's wise suggestions were sympathetically received at Petrograd, and on March 31, Czar Alexander published in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* a manifesto in which he stated that he did not desire to hold the Polish nation responsible for the rebellion, and promised to introduce a system of local self-government in Poland, admonishing the rebels to lay down their arms. Unfortunately, they did not do so. A prolonged campaign was necessary to re-establish order in Poland, and meanwhile the Czar had been so much embittered through the agitation of the Russian reactionaries and their Prussian friends, and by the follies of some of the Polish leaders, that he deprived Poland of her constitution. Urged on by the statesmen at Berlin, another period of repression began. On February 23, 1868, Poland was absolutely incorporated with Russia, and the use of the Polish language in public places and for public purposes was prohibited.

Ever since, Bismarck and his successors have endeavoured to create bad blood between Russia and her Polish citizens, being desirous of retaining Russia's support at a time when she was drifting towards France. Solely with the object of demonstrating to Russia the danger of the Polish agitation Bismarck introduced in 1886 his Polish Settlement Bill, by which, to the exasperation of the Prussian Poles, vast territories were bought from Polish landowners and German peasants settled on them. When the Conservative party wished to oppose that policy in the Prussian Parliament as being unpractical, its leader was, according to Professor Delbrück's testimony, expressed in his book '*Regierung und Volkswille*,' urged by the Chancellor to vote for the Bill because its passage was necessary 'for reasons of foreign policy.'

During a century and a half Russia's Polish policy has been made in Germany. During 150 years Russia has perse-

cutted and outraged the Poles at Prussia's bidding and for Prussia's benefit. The confidential diplomatic evidence given in these pages makes that point absolutely clear.

Until recent times Russia was a very backward nation, and, not unnaturally, she endeavoured to learn the arts of government and of civilisation from Germany, her nearest neighbour. Unfortunately, Germany did not prove a fair and unselfish friend to Russia. Germany aimed not so much at advancing Russia as at benefiting herself. German rulers and statesmen saw in the Russians good-natured savages to be exploited. Impecunious German princes and noblemen went to Russia to make a fortune, and poor German princesses married Russian princes. Thus German influence became supreme not only in the Russian Army and Administration, but even within the Imperial Family.

During 150 years German influence was supreme in Russian society. While, during this period, Prussia, and afterwards Germany, unceasingly urged Russia to oppress and ill-treat her Poles, England consistently recommended Russia to adopt liberal treatment as being in Russia's interest.

One of the first British diplomatic despatches dealing with the partition of Poland is that of Mr. Thomas Wroughton, dated June 15, 1763, and given in these pages. In that remarkable document the forecast was made that Russia would scarcely consent to a partition of Poland, partly because such a partition would strengthen Prussia too much, partly because an independent Poland would form an efficient buffer State between herself and the Western Powers. He wrote: 'Russia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to herself that barrier.' Since then Russia has more than once had occasion to regret that she was the direct neighbour of Prussia, and that she had given large Polish districts to that country.

Soon after the beginning of the present War the Grand

Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, addressed an appeal to the Poles of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary in which he promised them the re-creation of a kingdom of Poland, comprising all Poles dwelling within Russia, Austria, and Germany, under Russia's protection. The full text of that remarkable manifesto will be found in the chapter 'The Problem of Austria-Hungary.' The enemies of Russia have sneeringly described that document as a death-bed repentance, and have complained that it was not issued by the Czar himself. Of course, the Grand Duke acted in the name and on behalf of the Czar. That needs no explanation. If the Czar was not of the Grand Duke's mind he would of course have disavowed him. Besides, Russia's resolve to give full liberty to the Poles was not born from the stress of the War. It was formed long ago. However, it was obviously impracticable to give full self-government to the Russian Poles without laying the foundation of a Greater Poland. Hence such a step on Russia's part would have met with the most determined opposition and hostility in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it would most probably have been treated as *casus belli*. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, informed Earl Russell, on March 26, 1863, 'The Russian Government could make no concessions of any value to the Polish Provinces which would not lay the foundation of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland.' Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, informed his Government on April 6, 1863, that 'The restoration of the Polish State on the basis of nationality will assuredly not be effected while the strength of Russia and Germany remains unbroken. During the struggle, whatever may be the fate of Poland, the frontier of France would be pushed to the Rhine.' That remarkable prophecy seems likely to come true.

Formerly there was no Polish nation. The Poles consisted of 150,000 nobles and of many millions of ill-treated serfs. Hard times and misfortune have welded the Poles into a

nation. The property-less serfs have become prosperous farmers, and the people of the middle and of the upper class have become earnest workers. Between 1900 and 1912 the deposits in the Polish Co-operative Societies have increased from £12,420,057 to £46,970,354. In every walk of life Poles have achieved most remarkable successes. Although education among the Poles, especially among those in Russia and Austria-Hungary, is still extremely backward—there are only two Polish universities—the Poles have created a most wonderful literature. The Polish literature is the richest among the Slavonic literatures, and it need not fear comparison with any of the Western literatures. In music and in science also Poles have accomplished great things. Among the leading modern writers is Sienkiewicz, among the greatest living musicians is Paderewski, among the leading living scientists is Madame Curie-Sklodowska. Formerly, the Poles were thriftless and incompetent in business and agriculture. How wonderfully they have changed may be seen from the fact that in the Eastern Provinces of Germany they are rapidly ousting the Germans, although these receive most powerful support from the State. Notwithstanding the enormous purchases of land made under the Settlement Acts, by which £35,000,000 have been devoted to the purchase of Polish land for German farmers, the Germans have on balance since the year 1896 lost 250,000 acres of land to the Poles in the Polish districts.

The Poles are to a certain extent to blame for their misfortunes. In the past they have lacked self-command and a sense of proportion. It is noteworthy that during the revolution of 1863 Polish leaders published in Paris maps of an independent Poland, which comprised large and purely Russian districts with towns such as Kieff, on the ground of historical right. Yet Kieff was the cradle of the Russian Orthodox faith.

In Western Russia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia, there dwell about 20,000,000 Poles. If the War should end, as it is likely to end, in a complete victory of the

Allies, a powerful independent State of Poland will arise. The united Poles will receive full self-government under the protection of Russia. They will be enabled to develop their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely that they will separate themselves entirely from Russia. Their position will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada, and if the Russians and Poles act wisely they will live as harmoniously together as do the French-speaking 'habitants' of Quebec, and the English-speaking men of the other provinces of Canada. Federation should prove a guarantee of freedom and a bond between the two peoples.

Russia need not fear that Poland will make herself entirely independent, and only the most hot-headed and short-sighted Poles can wish for complete independence. Poland, having developed extremely important manufacturing industries, requires large free markets for their output. Her natural market is Russia, for Germany has industrial centres of her own. She can expect to have the free use of the precious Russian markets only as long as she forms part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the heartiest goodwill prevails between Russians and Poles. The old quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common struggle. The moment is most auspicious for the resurrection of Poland.

While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland, Russia is largely to blame for the repeated revolts and insurrection of her Polish citizens. The late Lord Salisbury, who as a staunch Conservative could scarcely be described as an admirer of the Poles, and who in his essay 'Poland,' printed in 1868, treated their claims rather with contempt than with sympathy, wrote in its concluding pages :

Since 1815 the misgovernment of Poland has not only been constant but growing. And with the misgovernment the discontent has been growing in at least an equal ratio. Yet they ought not to have been a difficult race to rule. The very abuses to which they had been for centuries exposed should have made the task of satisfying them easy.

Russian statesmen might well bear in mind the recommendations of that great statesman as to the way by which Russia might satisfy her Poles. Lord Salisbury wrote :

The best that can be hoped for Poland is an improved condition under Russian rule. The conditions which are needed to reconcile the Poles to a Russian Sovereign are manifest enough and do not seem very hard to be observed. The Poles have not only been oppressed but insulted, and in their condition insult is harder to put up with than oppression. A nation which is under a foreign yoke is sensitive upon the subject of nationality. . . . If Russia would rule the Poles in peace she must defer to a sensibility which neither coaxing nor severity will cure. All the substance of power may be exercised as well through Polish administrators as through Russian. The union between the two countries may for practical purposes be complete, though every legal act and every kind of scholastic instruction be couched in the Polish language.

It would be hazardous, and it would probably be foolish, to separate Poland completely from Russia. Poland has grown into Russia and Russia into Poland. After all, it cannot be expected that Russia will abandon her principal and most promising industrial district with two of her largest towns. In politics one should endeavour to achieve only the practical. The question therefore arises : How much self-government will Russia grant to Poland ? Will she give her a separate legislation, taxation, post office, coinage, finances, army ? The arrangement of these details may prove somewhat difficult. It is to be hoped that during the negotiations between Poles and Russians regarding a settlement the Poles will endeavour to be cool and reasonable, and that the Russians will be trusting and generous. Happily, a spirit of hearty goodwill is abroad in Russia.

The greatest grievance of the Polish nation is not that it lives under foreign rule, but that it lives under oppression, and that it has been parcelled out among several States.

Owing to the partition of Poland, Poles have been taught to consider as enemies men of their own nationality living across the border, and they have been compelled by their rulers to slaughter each other.

In the Great War more than a million Polish soldiers have been engaged against their will in a fratricidal war. That terrible fact alone constitutes a most powerful claim upon all men's sympathy and generosity.

Although Russia has in times past treated the Poles far more harshly than has Prussia, and although the German Poles are far more prosperous than are the Russian, the Poles see their principal enemy not in Russia but in Prussia. After all, the Russian is their brother Slav, and they are proud of their big brother. Besides, they recognise that Russia has been misguided by Prussia, and that Prussia was largely responsible for Poland's partition and for Russia's anti-Polish policy. The bitterness with which the Prussian Poles hate Prussia may be seen from the Polish newspapers published in Germany, which, during many years, have successfully advocated the policy of boycotting Germans and everything German, both in business and in society. The *Dziennik Kujawski* of Hohensalza wrote on January 18, 1901 :

To-morrow the kingdom of Prussia celebrates the second century of its existence. We cannot manifest our joy, because Prussia's power has been erected chiefly upon the ruins of ancient Poland. Prussia's history consists of a number of conquests made by force and in accordance with the old Prussian principle revived by Bismarck, ' Might is better than right.' Prussia's glory has been bought with much blood and tears, and she owes her existence chiefly to Poland's destruction.

In the *Gazeta Gdanska* of November 24, 1906, published in Dantzig, we read :

The Prussian and the Russian.—If one asks a Pole whether he would rather live under German or under

Russian rule, his reply will be 'I would a hundred times rather have to do with Russians than with Germans, and the Prussians are the worst of Germans.' Many Poles will scarcely be able to tell why they hate the Prussians. Many will find their preference illogical. Still it is there. From the fullness of the heart speaketh the mouth. After all, the worst Russian is a better fellow than the very best German. That feeling lies in our blood. The Russian is our Slavonic brother, and in his heart of hearts every Pole is glad if his brother is prospering and when he can tell the world 'There you see our common Slavonic blood.' The more we hate the Prussians, the more we love the Russians.

The *Gazeta Grudzionska*, of Graudenz, wrote in March 1899 :

Take heed, you Polish women and Polish girls ! Polish women and Polish girls are the strongest protectors of our nationality. The Poles can be Germanised only when Germanism crosses our Polish doorstep, but that will never happen, if God so wills-it, as long as Polish mothers, Polish wives, and Polish maids are found in our houses. They will not allow Poland's enemies to enter. For a Polish woman it is a disgrace to marry a German or to visit German places of amusement or German festivals. As long as the Polish wife watches over her husband and takes care that he bears himself always and everywhere as a Pole, as long as she watches over his home and preserves it as a stronghold of Polonism, as long as a Polish Catholic newspaper is kept in it, and as long as the Polish mother teaches her children to pray to God for our beloved Poland in the Polish language, so long Poland's enemies will labour in vain.

Innumerable similar extracts might easily be given.

When the peace conditions come up for discussion at the Congress which will bring the present War to an end, the problem of Poland will be one of the greatest difficulty and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell in Galicia outside the great rampart of the Carpathian

mountains, which form the natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy towards the north-east. The loss of Galicia, with its oilfields and mines may be regrettable to Austria-Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To Germany, on the other hand, the loss of the Polish districts will be a fearful blow. The supreme importance which Germany attaches to the Polish problem may be seen from this, that Bismarck thought it the only question which could lead to an open breach between Germany and Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs, Bismarck said to the Italian statesman on September 17, 1877 :

There could be but one cause for a breach in the friendship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a disagreement between the two Governments concerning Polish policy. . . . If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the reconstruction of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a northern France. We have one France to look to already, and a second would become the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves entrapped between two enemies.

The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or Dantzig, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the Russian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic.

In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland, including the wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal mines, ironworks, &c., might be taken away from her; and if the Poles should recover their ancient province of West Prussia, with Dantzig, Prussia's hold upon East Prussia, with Koenigsberg, would be threatened. The loss of her Polish districts would obviously greatly reduce Germany's military strength and economic power. It

may therefore be expected that Germany will move heaven and earth against the re-creation of the kingdom of Poland, and that she will strenuously endeavour to create differences between Russia and her Allies. The statesmen of Europe should therefore, in good time, firmly make up their minds as to the future of Poland.

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN EMPEROR'S POSITION

WHILE many people have discussed whether Germany was responsible for the War, nobody has inquired whether the German Emperor, in declaring war upon Russia and France, acted in accordance with the German Constitution, or whether he exceeded his powers.

It is fairly generally assumed that the Emperor was entitled to make war upon the two countries—that the question of war and peace lay within his discretion. In the following pages it will be shown that the Emperor exceeded his carefully limited powers—that he acted unconstitutionally.

The question whether the Emperor acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally is not merely a professorial but a very practical one. British statesmen and rulers enjoy a very great latitude because the British Constitution is unwritten. They can either find for their action some precedent in the past or construct a precedent from the past. In case of need they can create a new precedent, and the question whether their action was constitutional or not is one which may be discussed by experts in constitutional law, but is incomprehensible for the broad masses of the people. In Germany matters are different. All citizens are familiar with the written Constitution, with which they are made acquainted in the schools. Popular editions with explanations can be bought in every book-shop for a few pence, while the educated are acquainted with the commentaries on the Constitution by Laband,

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Arndt, and many other writers. The question whether the Emperor, in making war upon Russia and France, acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally may in due course become a very urgent one. The German people do not object to unconstitutional action on the part of their rulers if the measures taken prove successful and beneficial. That may be seen by the ease with which the Prussian Diet passed an Act of Indemnity with regard to Bismarck's Government in opposition to the will of Parliament, when the victory of 1866 over Austria had proved that the Prussian Government had been right in increasing the army very considerably against the will of Parliament. Nothing is as successful as success. If, however, the present War should end in Germany's defeat the German people will not only ask whether Germany commenced the War, but whether the German Emperor, in declaring war, acted lawfully or unlawfully, and he may be held to account.

The widely held belief that Germany is a highly centralised State, that William the Second is the sovereign and the practically unlimited ruler of the country is erroneous. Germany is a federation of independent States. The sovereignty of the empire reposes not in the King of Prussia, but in the allied States themselves. The King of Prussia, being the most powerful of the German monarchs, is merely the hereditary president of the Federation. The best definition of the German Empire has, perhaps, been given by President Wilson in his book 'The State,' in which we read :

The German Empire is a Federal State composed of four kingdoms, seven grand-duchies, four duchies, seven principalities, three free cities, and the Imperial domain of Alsace-Lorraine, these lands being united in a great 'corporation of public law' under the hereditary Presidency of the King of Prussia. Its Emperor is its President, not its Monarch. . . . The new Empire bears still, in its constitution, distinctest traces of its derivation. It is still a distinctly Federal rather than unitary State, and the Emperor is still only its constitutional President. As Emperor he

occupies not an hereditary throne, but only an hereditary office. Sovereignty does not reside in him, but 'in the union of German Federal Princes and the free cities.' He is the chief officer of a great political corporation. . . . It is a fundamental conception of the German constitution that 'the body of German sovereigns, together with the Senates of the three free cities, considered as a unit—*tanquam unum corpus*—is the repository of Imperial sovereignty.'

The fact that the German Emperor is not the sovereign of the Empire but merely its hereditary President, that the Imperial power is possessed by the allied States themselves, is known to almost every German. In the last issue of 'Meyer's Encyclopedia' we read :

According to the Imperial Constitution of the 16th April, 1871, the German Empire is 'an everlasting confederation' which the German Princes and free towns have concluded 'for the protection of the territory of the confederation and the rights thereof as well as for the promotion of the welfare of the German people.' The Imperial power is possessed by the Allied States. Their organ is the Federal Council. The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the Prussian Crown. The Presidential rights are a Prussian privilege, and they are enumerated in the German Constitution. With the Presidency of the Confederation is connected the title German Emperor, not Emperor of Germany, for the Emperor is not sovereign of the Empire. He exercises his powers 'in the name of the Empire' or 'in the name of the Allied Governments.'

If we wish to discover whether the Emperor, in making war upon Russia and France, acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally, we should study the text of the German Constitution and the commentaries upon that document by the most authorised statesmen and professors, and especially by the allied sovereigns themselves. The preamble of the Constitution states :

His Majesty the King of Prussia in the name of the North German Confederation, His Majesty the King of Bavaria,

His Majesty the King of Württemberg, His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Baden, and His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Hesse and by Rhine, for those parts of the Grand Duchy of Hesse which are south of the river Maine, conclude an everlasting Confederation for the protection of the Territory of the Confederation and the rights thereof, as well as for the promotion of the welfare of the German people. This Confederation will bear the name 'German Empire.'

It should carefully be noted that in the short preamble it is explicitly stated that the German Empire was formed for the purpose of defence.

The fourth chapter of the Constitution, which is superscribed 'The Presidency,' consists of articles eleven to nineteen. The first portion of article eleven reads as follows :

The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the King of Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor. The Emperor has to represent the Empire internationally, to declare war, and to conclude peace in the name of the Empire, to enter into alliances and other treaties with Foreign Powers, to accredit and to receive Ambassadors.

The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place.

The purely defensive character of the German Empire is expressed not only in the short preamble of the constitution, but also in this most important article eleven, from which we learn that the German Emperor may not declare war in the name of the Empire '*unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place,*' that for the declaration of a war of aggression, 'the consent of the Federal Council is necessary.' The Federal Council is not a popular representative body, but a body which represents all the individual States themselves. In other words, the Constitution stipulates that the German Emperor

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may make war only if Germany has actually been attacked, that a war of aggression on Germany's part can be effected only by the will of the individual States united in the Federal Council.

The German Empire is the successor of the North German Confederation, which was formed by Prussia, Saxony, and various other States after the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866. The German Constitution of 1871 is almost word for word the same Constitution as that of the North German Confederation of 1867. There is only one material and important difference between the two Constitutions. It consists in the alteration which was made in the most important article eleven. That article was worded as follows in the Constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867 :

The Presidency of the Confederation appertains to the Crown of Prussia, which, in the exercise thereof, has the right of representing the Confederation internationally, of declaring war and concluding peace, of entering into Alliances and other Treaties with Foreign States, of accrediting and receiving Ambassadors in the name of the Confederation.

The King of Prussia, as President of the North German Confederation, had the right of 'declaring war and concluding peace.' As no condition was attached, he could in the name of the Confederation declare not only a war of defence but also a war of attack. That right was limited four years later, when the Prussian King and German Emperor was restricted to declaring war only if 'an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place.' The war-making power of the King of Prussia was thus limited by the express wish of the South German sovereigns, who did not desire to be dragged into a war against their will, who had seen Prussia victorious in three consecutive wars, and possibly feared that she might rashly embark upon another war which might have a less fortunate result than the previous ones. Besides, the South German

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sovereigns, and especially the King of Bavaria, did not wish to subordinate themselves to the King of Prussia. They desired that the King of Prussia as Emperor should merely be *primus inter pares* and that the fact that he was not Emperor of Germany should be expressed even in his title. He was merely to be German Emperor. Prince Bismarck has told us in his Memoirs that William the First objected to that title. He wrote :

His Majesty raised a fresh difficulty when we were fixing the form of the Imperial title, it being his wish to be called Emperor of Germany if Emperor it had to be. . . . In the final Conference of January 17, 1871, he declined the designation of German Emperor, and declared that he would be Emperor of Germany or no Emperor at all. . . . I urged that the title Emperor of Germany involved a sovereign claim to the non-Prussian dominions which the Princes were not inclined to allow ; that it was suggested in the letter from the King of Bavaria that ' the exercise of the Presidential rights should be associated with the assumption of the title of German Emperor.'

The Sovereigns of the south, and especially the Bavarian King, feared that they might become mere cyphers under Prussia's leadership, that their independence would be lost, that their individuality would be entirely merged in the German Empire. They wished to have their position guaranteed not only by the Constitution but also by binding promises made by Prince Bismarck on behalf of Prussia. On November 27, 1870, Prince Bismarck wrote to King Ludwig of Bavaria with regard to the proposed creation of a German Empire :

The title German Emperor signifies that his rights have originated from the voluntary concession of the German sovereigns and tribes. History teaches that the great princely houses of Germany never regarded the existence of an Emperor elected by them as derogatory to their high position in Europe.

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In his reply, dated December 2, 1870, King Ludwig wrote to Prince Bismarck :

I hope, and hope with assurance, that Bavaria will in the future preserve her independent position, for it is surely consistent with a loyal unreserved Federal policy, and it will be safest to obviate a pernicious centralisation.

Prince Bismarck wrote in answer to the King :

Your Majesty rightly presumes that I expect no salvation from centralisation, that I perceive in that very maintenance of the rights which the Federal Constitution secures to individual members of the Federation the form of development best suited to the German spirit, and, at the same time, the surest guarantee against the dangers to which law and order might be exposed in the free movement of the political life of to-day. The hostile position taken up by the Republican party throughout Germany in regard to the re-establishment of the Imperial dignity, through the initiative of your Majesty and of the Federal princes, proves that it is conducive to promoting the Conservative and Monarchical interests.

The King of Bavaria's fears and doubts regarding the position of Prussia were not entirely dispelled by the wording of the Constitution and by Bismarck's assurances. Hence he wrote to the Imperial Chancellor on July 31, 1874, regarding the Federal principle, and in reply Bismarck wrote on August 10 :

Apart from personal guarantees, your Majesty may securely reckon on those comprised in the very Constitution of the Empire. That Constitution rests on the federal basis accorded in the treaties of federation, and it cannot be violated without breach of treaty. Therein the Constitution of the Empire differs from every national Constitution. Your Majesty's rights form an indissoluble part of the Constitution of the Empire. They rest on the same secure basis of law as all the institutions of the Empire. Germany, in the institution of its Federal Council, and Bavaria, in its

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dignified and intelligent representation on that Council, have a firm guarantee against any deterioration or exaggeration of efforts in the direction of unitarian aspirations. Your Majesty will be able to place the fullest confidence in the security of the treaty-guarded law of the Constitution, even when I no longer have the honour of serving the Empire as Chancellor.

Not only the King of Bavaria but other sovereigns also wished to assert their independence and to guard themselves against being dragged into a war against their will by the King of Prussia. They asserted their constitutional rights on suitable occasions. For instance on June 7, 1875, at the time when it was believed that Bismarck contemplated an attack upon France, von Mittnacht, the Würtemberg Prime Minister, wrote to Prince Bismarck :

Germany places the greatest confidence in the diplomatic representation of the Empire by the Emperor and in the direction of Germany's policy by your Serene Highness. At the same time it should be pointed out that for a declaration of war in the name of the Empire the consent of the Federal Council is required unless the Federal territory is threatened with an attack.

Bismarck essayed to define the position of the Emperor and that of the other sovereigns of Germany not only in the written Constitution and in confidential letters which he exchanged with the sovereigns and statesmen of the Southern States, but also in public speeches on the Constitution. For instance, in his speech in the Reichstag on April 9, 1871, he expressly stated that the sovereignty of the Empire was not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the Allied Governments. He said :

I believe that the Federal Council has a great future because for the first time an attempt has been made by its creation to concentrate power in a federal board which exercises the sovereignty of the whole Empire although it does not deprive the individual States of the benefits of

the Monarchical Power or of their ancient republican government. The sovereignty of the German Empire does not lie in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the allied Governments as a whole. At the same time it is useful if the wisdom, or, if you like, the unwisdom, of twenty-five individual governments is brought into the deliberations of the Federal Council, for thus we obtain a variety of views which we have never had within the Government of any single State. Prussia is great, but she has been able to learn from the small and from the smallest States, and these have learned from us. . . . My experience has taught me to believe that I have made considerable progress in my political education by participating in the deliberations of the Federal Council owing to the stimulating friction provided by twenty-five German Governments, and thus I have learned a great deal in addition. Therefore I would ask you : Do not touch the Federal Council ! I see in it a kind of Palladium of our future. I see in it a great guarantee for Germany's future.

The Chancellor laid particular stress upon the fact that the German Empire was created for defence, that the existence of article eleven, quoted in the beginning of this chapter, guaranteed Germany against a wanton war of aggression. In his speech delivered in the Reichstag on November 4, 1871, he stated :

A strong guarantee for the peacefulness of the new Empire lies in this, that the Emperor has renounced the unlimited right to declare war which he possessed in his former position as King of Prussia. In this renunciation lies a strong guarantee against a wanton war of aggression. . . . The guarantee lies in this, that according to the constitution the Federal Council must consent to a war of aggression. By the right given to it by the Constitution the Federal Council cannot prevent mobilisation, but it can prevent a declaration of war. It cannot prevent preparation for war which the Emperor has recognised to be necessary, for the co-operation of the Federal Council is only required in the action of declaring war unless the war is purely a war of defence which has been forced upon Germany by an attack upon its territories.

In this respect the Federal Council may be compared to an enlarged Cabinet.

It is only fair to add that Bismarck did not disregard the possibility of Germany having to act on the aggressive. Hence he added :

As regards the theory of a war of aggression conducted by Germany for the purpose of defence which was mentioned by a previous speaker, I believe that the attack is often the most efficient form of defence. It has been a frequent occurrence, and it is very useful for a country, such as Germany, which is situated in the centre of Europe and which can be attacked from three or four directions. It may be necessary to follow the example set by Frederick the Great, who, before the Seven Years' War, did not wait until the net in which he was to be caught had been thrown over his head, but tore it to pieces. I believe that those are in error who imagine that the German Empire will quietly wait until a powerful opponent or mighty coalition consider the moment favourable for an attack. Only an unskilful diplomacy could act thus. In such a case it is the duty of the Government to select a moment for making war when the danger is smallest and when the struggle can be fought at the lowest cost to the nation and at the least danger, provided, of course, that war is really unavoidable. The nation can expect that in such a case the Government will take the initiative.

The fact that Bismarck disapproved of a war of aggression such as the present one may be clearly seen from numerous important statements of his, some of which I quoted in my book, 'The Foundations of Germany' (Smith, Elder & Co., 1916).

Naturally the professors of Constitutional Law who commented upon the Constitution expounded it in accordance with its plain meaning and with the teachings of Prince Bismarck. They taught, up to the outbreak of the present War, that the sovereignty of the country was not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the Allied States,

that the Emperor was not the monarch of Germany, but merely the President of the Confederation, and that he was not entitled to declare a war of offence except with the consent of the non-Prussian States. For instance, Professor Laband wrote in his most important standard work, '*Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches*' in four huge volumes, of which the fifth edition appeared shortly before the War :

The foundation of the North German Federation and of the German Empire was effected not by the German people but by the German States. All actions which brought about the creation of the Confederation were actions of these States. By entering into the Confederation they divested themselves of their sovereignty, but not of their individuality, as States. Their individuality continued unbroken and became the foundation of the Federal State. It follows that not the individual citizens are the members of the Empire, nor that the citizens in the aggregate possess the power of the Empire. The members of the Empire are the individual States. The German Empire is not an organisation composed of millions of members who constantly increase in numbers, but is an association of twenty-five members. . . .

It must be observed that no new legal institution has been created by re-establishing the Imperial dignity. The idea of the presidency of the Confederation has not been altered by connecting with it the title Emperor. The historical events which led to the resuscitation of the Imperial title, the reasons and motives with which the Constitution was submitted, the discussion accompanying it, and especially Article XI of the Imperial Constitution itself, show with indubitable certainty that the Emperor's position is completely identical with that of the presidency in the North German Federation, and that the Emperor, apart from his title and insignia, has no rights except the right of President. . . . The Emperor is not sovereign of the Empire. The sovereign power rests not with him, but with the German allied sovereigns and free towns as a whole. If he acts in the name of the Empire, he acts not in his own name but in the name of the Empire.

The facts given in these pages prove conclusively that, according to the German Constitution, the Emperor was not entitled to declare a war of aggression, that he acted unconstitutionally in attacking Russia and France. The question has now to be considered whether, in case the War should have an unfortunate end for Germany, the Emperor can justify his action by referring to the stipulations of the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879. It is almost universally believed, even in the best-informed diplomatic quarters, that the celebrated Dual Alliance Treaty is a defensive and offensive Treaty. That is a grave error. The Austro-German Treaty was meant to be, and is, a purely defensive instrument. This will be seen from its text and from the official note introducing it. Both the Prefatory Note and the Treaty itself were first published in the *Berlin Official Gazette* of February 8, 1888, and I herewith give the full text of both. The translation was made by the Foreign Office and it was published in vol. 78 of the *British and Foreign State Papers* :

The Governments of Germany and of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have determined upon the publication of the Treaty concluded between them on the 7th of October 1879, in order to put an end to doubts which have been entertained in various quarters of its purely defensive character, and have been turned to account for various ends. The two allied Governments are guided in their policy by the endeavour to maintain peace and to guard, as far as possible, against its disturbance ; they are convinced that by making the contents of their Treaty of Alliance generally known they will exclude all possibility of doubt on this point, and have therefore resolved to publish it.

Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany. Signed at Vienna, October 7, 1879.

Inasmuch as their Majesties the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, must consider it their inalienable duty to provide for the

security of their Empires and the peace of their subjects under all circumstances ;

Inasmuch as the two Sovereigns, as was the case under the former existing Treaty, will be enabled by the close union of the two Empires to fulfil this duty more easily and more efficaciously ;

Inasmuch as, finally, an intimate co-operation of Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe on the terms established by the stipulation of Berlin ;

Their Majesties the German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, while most solemnly promising never to allow their purely defensive Agreement to develop an aggressive tendency in any direction, have determined to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defence.

With this object their Majesties have named as their Plenipotentiaries :

His Majesty the German Emperor, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lieutenant-General Prince Henry the Seventh of Reuss, &c. ;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, His Majesty's Privy Councillor, Minister of the Imperial House and for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Julius Count Andrassy of Csik-Szeut-Király and Kraszna-Haka, &c. ;

Who have this day at Vienna, after the exchange and mutual verification of one another's full powers, agreed as follows :

Art. I.—Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement.

II.—Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party.

Should, however, in such a case the attacking Power be supported by Russia, either by an active co-operation or by military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obligation stipulated in Article I of this Treaty, for mutual assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace.

III.—This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretations, be kept secret by the two High Contracting Parties, and only be communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a special Agreement.

The two High Contracting Parties venture to hope, after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrowo, that the armaments of Russia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectation, prove to be erroneous, the two High Contracting Parties would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both.

In virtue of which the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and affixed their seals.

Vienna, October 7, 1879.

(L.S.) H. VII, P. REUSS.

(L.S.) ANDRASSY.

It will be noticed that indeed the Austro-German Alliance bears a purely pacific and defensive character. The Official Note inserted in the Government Gazette, introducing it, refers to 'its purely defensive character.' If we read the Treaty itself we find it stated in its preamble that it has been concluded 'to consolidate the peace of Europe,' that it is a 'purely defensive Agreement,' that it is 'an alliance of peace and mutual defence.' The purely defensive

character of the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance cannot be denied, nor can it be explained away. Germany was under no obligation to come to Austria's aid in a war in which that country was the aggressor. It follows that the German Emperor cannot justify his attack upon Russia and France by explaining that he was bound by treaty to come to Austria's aid. The fact that the Austro-German Treaty was a purely defensive one appears not only from the Treaty itself but from Prince Bismarck's commentaries upon the Alliance. Reference to my book, 'The Foundations of Germany,' will furnish numerous most emphatic statements of the Chancellor according to which Germany was under no obligation to help Austria, should the latter be involved in war with Russia in consequence of Austrian aggressive action in the Balkan Peninsula.

On June 15, 1888, the Emperor Frederick died and William the Second ascended the throne. A few days later, on June 25 and 27, he addressed the German Imperial and the Prussian State Parliament in person, reading to those assemblies his speech from the throne. In these addresses, which opened his reign, he solemnly promised to observe the Constitution and, in accordance with the Constitution, not to declare war unless the Empire or its Allies should actually be attacked. The Emperor stated in his speech to the Reichstag on June 25 :

The most important tasks of the German Emperors consist in securing the Empire politically and militarily against attacks from without and in watching the execution of the Imperial laws within. The foremost Imperial law is the German Constitution. It is one of the foremost rights and duties of the Emperor to observe and to protect the Constitution and the rights granted by it to the two legislative bodies of the nation and to every German, and also to the sovereign. . . .

In the domain of foreign policy I am resolved to keep peace with all nations to the best of my endeavour. My love for the German army and my position towards the

military forces will never lead me into temptation to deprive the country of the benefits of peace unless war should become a necessity, having been forced upon us by an attack upon the Empire or upon its Allies. The German Army is intended to protect our peace, and if peace is broken the Army must be able to regain it with honour. It will be able to do this with God's help owing to the strength which it has received in accordance with the recent military law which was unanimously passed. It is far from my heart to use the armed strength of the country for wars of aggression. Germany neither requires further military glory nor conquests, having established by war her justification to exist as a united and independent nation.

Our alliance with Austria-Hungary is generally known. I adhere to it with German fidelity not merely because it has been concluded but also because I recognise in this defensive alliance the foundation of the European Balance of Power.

Two days later, on June 27, William the Second, as King of Prussia, opened the two Prussian Houses of Parliament and addressed them in person as follows :

. . . Since, owing to my father's death, the throne of my ancestors has come to me, I have felt the need at the beginning of my reign to assemble you around me without delay and to give before you a solemn vow and to swear the oath prescribed by the Prussian Constitution :

I vow that I will observe the Constitution of the kingdom firmly and inviolably, and that I will rule in accordance with the Constitution and the Law. So help me God !

. . . Like King William the First, I will, in accordance with my solemn vow, faithfully and conscientiously observe the laws and the rights of the popular representation, and with equal conscientiousness I will preserve and exercise the rights of the crown, as established by the Constitution, in order to hand them on in due course to my successor on the throne. It is far from me to disturb the confidence of the people in the solidity of our legal conditions by striving to increase the rights of the crown. The legal extent of my rights, as long as these are not questioned, suffices to secure

to the State that measure of monarchical influence which Prussia requires owing to her historical development, her present position and her place in the Empire, and the feelings and habits of the people. I am of opinion that our Constitution contains a just and useful distribution of powers among the various governing factors, and for this reason, not only on account of my vow, I shall observe and protect it.

In the two most important speeches quoted, the Emperor solemnly promised to the nation on his ascent to the throne 'to observe and to protect the Constitution,' not to increase his powers 'by striving to increase the rights of the crown,' and not to declare war 'unless war should become a necessity, having been forced upon us by an attack upon the Empire or upon its Allies.' It is also worth noting that the Emperor described the Austro-German Alliance as 'this defensive alliance, the foundation of the European Balance of Power.' Nothing could be more explicit than the assurances and undertakings given in these words. The two speeches, though read by the Emperor, embody of course not merely the Emperor's views but also those of Prince Bismarck, who apparently drafted them in collaboration with the Emperor. Bismarck was an excellent judge of character. Apparently he hoped to bridle the Emperor's impetuosity by causing him to declare in the most solemn manner that he would observe the Constitution and not make war unless Germany should actually be attacked. His hopes that the solemn promises of the Emperor would restrain him during his reign have been disappointed.

According to the Constitution, every Imperial Act has to be countersigned by the Imperial Chancellor who, by countersigning, assumes responsibility for it. Of course the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor becomes a mere formality without meaning if the Emperor appoints to the Chancellorship a man without strength of character who readily countersigns the Imperial orders as they are given. Soon after his accession to the throne William the Second showed that he meant to be his own Chancellor,

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that he had no use for a Chancellor who possessed ability and independence of mind. He dismissed Bismarck and has since then appointed pliable men in his stead. Bismarck's four successors were without exception men of great pliability. Probably Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is the most pliable of them all. To the alarm and concern of the old Chancellor, the young Emperor endeavoured to govern Germany and to direct the foreign and domestic policy of the country in accordance with his personal views and moods, violating the spirit, if not the wording, of the Constitution. Considering himself the Trustee of the Empire, Bismarck endeavoured during the years of his retirement from office to create a counterpoise to the dangerous impetuosity of the Emperor, who wished to grasp all power, by recommending, on numerous occasions, the jealous preservation and defence of the Constitution. For instance, on August 10, 1891, a year after his dismissal, addressing representatives of the University Students of Germany, Prince Bismarck stated :

In order to unite Germany the individual dynasties and governments of Germany had to co-operate. All former attempts at carrying out the idea of unifying Germany were bound to fail because the dynastic forces were underestimated. . . . I see the task of the future, mainly, in preserving the existing. If I recommend preserving the existing, I mean of course that the Imperial edifice should be improved and completed. What, then, should be preserved? I would most urgently recommend you for the future to preserve the Imperial Constitution. Lay that to your heart. The Constitution is imperfect, but it was the best Constitution that could be obtained. Cultivate, then, the Constitution. Watch jealously over the Constitution, and see that the rights established by the Constitution are not diminished. I am not a friend of centralisation. I say again : Watch over the Imperial Constitution even if, later on in life, it should not please you. Do not advise any alteration unless all the States agree to it. That is the first condition for the political welfare of the Empire.

In July 1892 Prince Bismarck made a speech at Kissingen, in which he particularly dwelt on the danger to the nation of appointing to the Chancellorship an obedient official, a mere Imperial Secretary, and, foreseeing the danger of an Imperial absolutism exercised through a pliable Chancellor, demanded the creation of a counterpoise to the Emperor. He said in the course of that remarkable speech :

I should have liked to continue the work, but our young Emperor will do everything himself. . . .

The German Reichstag does not fulfil my expectations that it would be the centre of national life as I had hoped at the time of its creation. If one wishes to strengthen the Reichstag one must increase the responsibility of the Ministers. The Constitution of Prussia promises a law which will make Ministers responsible for their actions. Such a law has, however, not been promulgated, and ministerial responsibility does not apply to the Empire. Hence anyone can become Imperial Chancellor even if he is not qualified for that position. Consequently the office of Imperial Chancellor may be lowered so that the Chancellor will become merely a private secretary, whose responsibility is limited to doing what he is told without selecting what is useful or examining proposals. . . . If responsibility was enforced by law no one would become Imperial Chancellor unless he possessed the necessary qualifications. . . .

When I became Minister, the Crown was in difficulties. The King was discouraged. His Ministers refused to support him. He wished to abdicate. When I saw this I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Perhaps I have gone too far in this direction. We require a counterpoise. I believe that frank criticism is indispensable for a monarchical government. Otherwise it degenerates into an official absolutism. We require the fresh air of public criticism. Germany's constitutional life is founded on it. When Parliament becomes powerless, becomes merely an instrument of a higher will, we shall come back again in due course to the enlightened absolutism of the past. Theoretically that may be the most perfect form of government, a divine form of government.

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However, it is practically unacceptable because of human inadequacy.

In a speech delivered August 20, 1893, Prince Bismarck stated :

In our attempts at unification we must not go beyond the Constitution. The German Constitution has not only demanded vast sacrifices in human lives and in blood. It was an exceedingly difficult work to combine the opposing interests which had been at variance for centuries. It was exceedingly difficult to unite them in such a manner that at last all were satisfied or at least contented. The fact that the Constitution is touched and shaken fills me with grave cares in my old age.

On June 12, 1890, only a few months after his dismissal, Prince Bismarck said, addressing a deputation of Stuttgart citizens :

The dynasties have appeared to me a guarantee of Germany's unity. With their assistance the work of unifying Germany, which had been begun in battle, was completed. . . . I have never been an advocate of Imperial centralisation, and I have made it my task as Imperial Chancellor to protect the rights of the individual States against illegitimate encroachments.

During the eight years which Bismarck spent in retirement he frequently urged his countrymen in speech and in writing to preserve the German Constitution inviolate, not to diminish the rights of the individual States, to create a counterpoise to the Emperor's impetuosity and to his attempts at governing Germany as if it were a Greater Prussia, and not to embark upon an aggressive war, nor to support Austria should she come into collision with Russia by an attack in the Balkans, because in that case Germany was under no obligation to help Austria and had no interest in being involved in a great war over Balkan questions.

In attacking Russia and France the German Emperor

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not only violated the Imperial Constitution but he acted with an absolute disregard of the maxims of State which the creator of Modern Germany had laid down, and he cannot even plead that he was compelled to go into war because of the Austro-German Alliance. His contravention of the German Constitution may possibly in course of time assume an exceedingly serious aspect.

Prince Bismarck stated in his posthumous 'Memoirs': 'The Federal Council represents the governing power of the joint sovereignty of Germany.' According to the German Constitution, 'the consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place.' The Emperor could constitutionally and legitimately attack Russia and France only after an attack on German territory had actually occurred. In order to make an aggression legitimate, a foreign attack upon Germany had either to be brought about or to be invented. Germany went to war because, according to the official version, 'war was forced upon her,' because German territory was attacked both by Russia and France. On August 4 the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, stated in the Reichstag:

The Emperor gave orders that the French frontier should be respected under all conditions. With one single exception that order was strictly obeyed. France, which mobilised at the same hour as Germany, declared to us that she would withdraw her troops to a distance of 10 kilometres from the frontier. But what happened in reality? Flying machines throwing bombs, cavalry patrols and companies of French infantry breaking into Alsace-Lorraine! By acting thus France has broken the peace and has actually attacked Germany although a state of war had not yet been declared.

As regards the exception mentioned I have received the following report from the Chief of the General Staff:

'Of the French complaints regarding the violation of the frontier only a single one must be admitted. Against express orders a patrol of the XIV. Army Corps crossed the

frontier on the 2nd of August. Apparently it was commanded by an officer. It seems that they were shot, for only one man has returned. However, long before this single crossing of the frontier took place French flying machines have thrown bombs upon the German railway lines as far as the South of Germany, and French troops have attacked German troops protecting the frontier at the Schlucht Pass. In accordance with orders given the German troops have limited themselves entirely to the defensive.'

This is the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have entered upon Belgian territory.

According to the Report of the Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke, the French began the war by attacking by means of flying machines, &c. Since August 4, when that mendacious statement was read in the German Reichstag, it has been repeated innumerable times by German officialdom and by leading private men. In the German White Book, which was published in English for the benefit of Americans, we read :

A few hours later, at 5 P.M., the mobilisation of the entire French army and navy was ordered. On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.

In the book 'Truth about Germany—Facts about the War,' which was likewise issued for the benefit of Americans under the joint supervision of Prince Bülow and many other of the best-informed Germans, it is stated :

Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government with great reluctance had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory.

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According to the celebrated legal authority, Professor Josef Kohler, France attacked Germany not from the air but by invasion across the frontier. He wrote in the book '*Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht*,' published in 1915 :

You know that when we offered France neutrality the French replied to our offer by sending troops across the frontier, violating thus the Law of Nations established by the Hague Convention.

The German Declaration of War upon France stated :

M. le Président, the German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel ; one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honour, to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. . . .
SCHOEN.

According to Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister in Brussels, Germany was attacked by France, neither by aeroplanes, nor by an ordinary attack across the frontier, but by an attack from airships. In an interview which he asked for at 1.30 A.M. on August 3, 1914, Herr von Below Saleske made that statement, according to a Memorandum published in the Diplomatic Correspondence issued by the Belgian Government. The Memorandum runs as follows :

A l'heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre d'Allemagne a demandé à voir le Baron van der Elst. Il lui a dit qu'il était chargé par son Gouvernement de nous informer que des dirigeables français avaient jeté des bombes et qu'une patrouille de cavalerie française, violant le droit des gens,

attendu que la guerre n'était pas déclarée, avait traversé la frontière.

Lately the assertion that France began the war upon Germany, by an attack either by land or from the air, has been less frequently heard. The insistent inquiries made by German politicians at the military headquarters in Berlin and in South German towns have failed to discover the place where, according to the statement of the Chief of the General Staff which was read by the German Chancellor in the Reichstag, 'French flying machines have thrown bombs upon the German railway lines as far as the South of Germany.' When the question of responsibility for the War is judicially investigated, it will, perhaps, appear who it was that created a colourable pretext for Germany's aggression by pretending that France had been the first to strike at Germany. It will then appear whether the untrue statement of the General Staff was made by order of the Emperor, or whether it originated in the General Staff itself; whether the Emperor demanded that a pretext should be created, or whether the military leaders, especially von Moltke, who were notoriously anxious for war, invented the French attack in order to force the Emperor's hands. My impression has been for a long time that the latter was the case, as I endeavoured to show in an article published in *The Nineteenth Century and After*.¹ Very likely Herr von Jagow and the Imperial Chancellor acted perfectly *bond fide* when they explained at the critical moment that they had been unacquainted with the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. The surmise that the military leaders first brought about the diplomatic crisis, and then forced the hands of the Emperor and of the Imperial Chancellor by inventing a French attack upon Germany, is strengthened by the admission of the Secretary of State, von Jagow, and of his Under-Secretary, Herr Zimmermann, in their conversation with the French Ambassador and the Belgian Minister

¹ 'How the Army has ruined Germany,' *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1916.

in Berlin, that they were powerless, that the control of the diplomatic situation was in the hands of the military leaders.

Future investigation will probably show that the military party, by a false report, engineered a deliberate and carefully planned violation of the German Constitution, that they made the Emperor their tool. However, if the war was brought about by the pressure of the military firebrands, and by the deliberate concoction of a French attack, the Emperor cannot plead irresponsibility for his action. *Qui facit per alium facit per se.* The principal is responsible for the actions of his agents. A surgeon cannot plead that he is not responsible for a fatal operation, that he acted against his conviction, that he was forced into it by the demands of his dresser. A lawyer cannot plead immunity because he acted against his conviction, owing to the urgent advice of his clerk. If the War should end in Germany's defeat, the German Emperor may be held responsible by the German people and he cannot then shift his responsibility on to the military leaders, nor will it suffice if he should explain that he had punished the late von Moltke for his intrigue by dismissing him at the earliest opportunity.

The German Constitution is on the one hand a charter of popular liberties which grants to the German nation certain rights, such as Parliamentary representation with a democratic franchise. It is, on the other hand, a pact concluded between Prussia and the German States whereby their relations are regulated, and whereby Prussia's authority and competence as the presiding State of the Confederation are carefully determined and limited. The German Constitution delimits punctiliously the functions and powers of the Emperor-President. In accepting the Imperial Crown and in promising to observe the Constitution, the King of Prussia, as German Emperor, bound himself to observe the fundamental regulations of the Empire, which were devised not only in the interest of the dynasties or of the individual States, apart from Prussia, but in the interest of the German nation as a whole.

The minor States were, according to the Constitution, to act as a brake upon a rash and impulsive Prussian King. Hence, not only the South Germans but the Prussians also are strongly interested in the careful observance of the Constitution on the part of the King-Emperor. The sovereigns of the minor States are not merely ornamental Lords-Lieutenant but are, according to the Constitution, partners in the Imperial concern, in which they possess a controlling interest if a war of aggression is planned by the Emperor.

The sovereigns of the minor States insisted upon the limitation of the Emperor's power, not merely in their personal interest or in that of their States, but in that of all Germany, of the German nation. Hence, the limitations demanded by them, restricting the Emperor's powers with regard to the declaration of war, were considered reasonable by Bismarck and by the old Emperor and by his advisers, and they were readily assented to as being in the best interest of the nation and of the Emperor himself.

Rightly considered, the German Constitution is a deed of partnership concluded between the King of Prussia and the German sovereigns and free towns on the one hand, and between the Emperor and the German people on the other hand. The Imperial dignity was in 1871, and again in 1888, bestowed upon the King of Prussia on conditions. William the Second has broken the formal pact between himself and his brother sovereigns and between himself and the nation, notwithstanding his solemn declarations made at the time of his accession, either owing to his wilfulness or owing to his weakness, either because he wished to embark upon a war of aggression, or because he allowed himself to be forced into such a war, which violates the Constitution, by the intrigues of the military party. It seems by no means improbable that the German sovereigns and people will hold the German Emperor accountable should the War end disastrously for Germany.

CHAPTER VII

BRITAIN'S WAR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC FUTURE

A FORECAST AND A WARNING¹

LATE in 1915, Mr. Montagu stated in the House of Commons that the British War expenditure came to £5,000,000 a day, that the War was swallowing up half the national income. This was evidently a very serious understatement. Five million pounds a day is equal to £1,825,000,000 a year. According to the 'British Census of Production,' published in December, 1912, and relating to the year 1907, the national income of that year amounted to £2,000,000,000. Even the most optimistic statisticians have not seen in that figure a very great understatement. It therefore appears that the British War expenditure per day was at that time approximately equal to the entire national income per day in normal times. It need, however, scarcely be pointed out that the War, which has taken millions of able-bodied British men from the productive occupations, and which has diverted the industries from the production of useful commodities to that of war material, has very seriously diminished the true national income. Besides, with the constantly increasing numbers of the British Army, and the steadily growing financial requirements of the Allies for British loans and subsidies, the daily War expenditure of this country has continually kept on increasing. Hence, the daily cost of the War may now greatly exceed the whole of the national income.

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1915.

The vastness of Great Britain's War expenditure staggers the imagination not only of people in general but even that of financiers and statisticians. It can be visualised only by comparison. The Franco-German War of 1870-71, which lasted nine months, cost Germany £60,000,000 ; the Panama Canal, the greatest and the most expensive engineering undertaking the world has seen, cost the United States in ten years £80,000,000 ; the Boer War, which lasted three years, cost this country £250,000,000. It follows that Great Britain has spent on the War, at the comparatively moderate rate of £5,000,000 per day, every two weeks almost as much as the total cost of the Panama Canal, and that she has spent every two months considerably more than she did during the whole of the protracted campaign against the Boers.

The War has so far cost about £8,000,000,000. The national capital of Great Britain is usually estimated to amount to about £15,000,000,000. As the struggle seems likely to continue, it may eventually swallow a sum equal to one-third of the British national capital, if not more. Interest will have to be paid on the gigantic War debt. Its capital must, by purchase, gradually be reduced to manageable proportions, and in addition untold millions will be required every year for the support of the crippled and incapacitated veterans, and for the widows and orphans. Before the War, Budgets of £200,000,000 per year seemed monstrous. After the War, Budgets of £500,000,000 may seem modest. If we now remember that years of hard times followed the relatively cheap Boer War we can well understand that statesmen and business men look with grave anxiety and alarm into the future, and at the mountainous debt which Great Britain is rapidly piling up, and that they are asking themselves : Can this over-taxed country stand the additional financial burdens ? Will not the War destroy the British industries and trade, drive the country into bankruptcy and ruin, or at least permanently impoverish Great Britain ? In the following pages an attempt will be made to answer these questions.

In endeavouring to solve the great problems confronting them the most eminent statesmen and soldiers of all times have turned for their information and guidance to the experience of the past, to the teachings of history. A hundred years ago Great Britain concluded her twenty years' struggle with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, in the course of which she spent about £1,100,000,000, a sum which greatly exceeded one-third of the national capital of the time. What, then, can we learn from Great Britain's experience? How was the Napoleonic War financed? What were the consequences of that gigantic expenditure upon the British industries, British trade, and the British finances? Unfortunately, scientific history has been greatly neglected in this country. The existing accounts of the Napoleonic struggle are exceedingly unsatisfactory. They consist partly of pleasantly written popular books designed to while away the idle hours of the leisured and the uninformed, partly of books written by Party men for Party-political purposes in which are exposed the wickedness of the Tories or the stupidity of the Whigs, the narrow-mindedness of the Protectionists or the recklessness of the Free Traders. It is humiliating that an impartial documentary history of the Great War and of its economic aspects remains still to be written. The past should be a guide to the present. I propose in these pages to summarise the economic teachings of the Great War by means of most valuable evidence which will not be found in any of the histories of that struggle, and, fortified by the necessary data, an attempt will be made to apply their lesson to the present and to make a forecast of Britain's economic future.

The Great War between France and Great Britain began in 1793 and lasted, with two interruptions (1802-03 and 1814-15) until 1815. It cost this country about £1,100,000,000, but as that figure is not in accordance with tradition it may be challenged. I will therefore give my reasons for using it.

It is not easy, in analysing national expenditure during a

time of war, to state exactly what part of it is peace expenditure and what is war expenditure. Most writers on public finance have stated that the War with France cost this nation about £800,000,000. That seems to me to be far too low a figure. If we wish to ascertain the cost of a war we cannot do so by mechanically adding up all expenditure which is labelled 'War Expenditure,' for much of it will appear under civil heads. Therefore, we must endeavour to find out, firstly, how much debt was incurred for the war, and, secondly, by how much the current national expenditure, which is raised by taxation, was increased during the war and presumably owing to the war. Let us make this test, for it will furnish us with some exceedingly interesting data which will be of great value in the course of this investigation.

Before and during the Great War the British National Debt increased, according to McCulloch's 'Account of the British Empire,' as follows :

	The British National Debt	Annual Charge
National Debt in 1775	£ 128,583,635	£ 4,471,571
Debt incurred during American War, 1775-84	121,267,993	5,089,336
Total	249,851,628	9,560,907
Repaid during peace, 1784-93	10,501,480	249,277
Debt at commencement of Great War in 1793	239,350,148	9,311,630
Debt contracted during the Great War, 1793-1815	601,500,343	22,704,311
National Debt on 1st February, 1817	840,850,491	32,015,941

It will be noticed that the British National Debt grew by £601,500,000 during the Great War.

Between 1792 and 1815 the national expenditure, the Tax Revenue, and the interest paid on the National Debt increased, according to the following interesting table, which is taken from Porter's 'Progress of the Nation,' as follows.

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It deserves to be studied with care, especially as we shall have to revert to it in the course of this chapter.

National Revenue and Expenditure.

—	National Expenditure	Tax Revenue	Interest paid on National Debt
	£	£	£
1792	19,589,123	19,258,814	9,787,333
1793	24,197,070	19,845,705	9,437,862
1794	27,742,117	20,193,074	9,800,904
1795	48,414,177	19,883,520	10,810,728
1796	42,175,291	21,454,728	11,841,204
1797	50,740,609	23,126,940	14,270,616
1798	51,127,245	31,035,363	17,585,518
1799	55,624,404	35,602,444	17,220,983
1800	56,821,267	34,145,584	17,381,561
1801	61,329,179	34,113,146	19,945,624
1802	49,549,207	36,368,149	19,855,558
1803	48,998,230	38,609,392	20,699,864
1804	59,376,208	46,176,492	20,726,772
1805	67,169,318	50,897,706	22,141,426
1806	68,941,211	55,796,086	23,000,006
1807	67,613,042	59,339,321	23,362,685
1808	73,143,087	62,998,191	23,158,982
1809	76,566,013	63,719,400	24,213,867
1810	76,865,548	67,144,542	24,246,946
1811	83,735,223	65,173,545	24,977,915
1812	88,757,324	65,037,850	25,546,508
1813	105,943,727	68,748,363	28,030,239
1814	116,832,260	71,134,503	30,051,365
1815	92,280,180	72,210,512	31,576,074
1816	65,169,771	62,264,546	32,938,751
Total Tax Revenue, 1792-1815: £1,082,013,370.			

In looking over this table it will be noticed that the revenue derived from taxes increased from £19,258,814 in 1792 to £72,210,512 in 1815. Nobody can say with absolute certainty how much of this increase was due to the automatic expansion of the ordinary peace expenditure, and how much to the War. Therefore, we must make an estimate. We shall probably be fairly correct if we assume that the national expenditure, and with it the tax revenue which should provide for it, would, from 1792 to 1816, have gradually increased by, let us say, 60 per cent., that is, from £19,000,000

in round figures to £31,000,000, had there been peace. That gradual increase over the whole period under review would give us an average yearly expenditure of £25,000,000 per year, and an equally large tax revenue to balance it. During the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1915 the total British Tax Revenue should therefore have amounted to £600,000,000, had peace been maintained. As, however, the British Tax Revenue from 1792 to 1815 amounted in the aggregate to no less than £1,082,000,000, we may assume that of the revenue raised by taxes between 1792 and 1815, £482,000,000 were raised owing to the war. Hence, the true cost of the Great War should consist of £601,500,000 raised by loan, and of £482,000,000 raised by taxation, or £1,083,500,000 in all. My estimate that the British War expenditure in the Great War came to about £1,100,000,000 should err, if at all, on the side of moderation. Let us now endeavour to gauge the significance of the gigantic financial effort made by this country by looking at it from the contemporary point of view.

In 1814 Mr. P. Colquhoun, an eminent writer on economics and statistics, published his excellent 'Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire.' It was based on the Treasury statistics. According to him the whole private and public property of the nation represented a money value of £2,786,640,000. It is noteworthy that of that sum £1,200,640,000 was in respect of agricultural land alone. Manufacturing, commerce, and trade, which now are the principal wealth-creating resources of the country, were evidently of relatively small importance at the time. According to his painstaking and conscientious investigations, the national income amounted then to £490,521,872 per year. Its composition is shown in the table on page 222.

If we accept as correct my estimate that Great Britain's expenditure on the war with France amounted to about £1,100,000,000, it follows that a century ago Great Britain spent on the war a sum about equivalent to the national

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income of two and a half years, and considerably larger than one-third of the entire national capital. If, a century ago, Great Britain was able to spend on war more than one-third of the national capital, she should certainly be able to make proportionately as great a financial sacrifice at the present time, when rapidly producing machinery has taken the place of slowly producing agriculture, when capital lost or diverted by the War can more quickly be replaced. As the national capital amounts at least to £15,000,000,000, Great Britain should now be able to spend again more than one-third, or from £5,000,000,000 to £6,000,000,000, on war. If the Empire as a whole should finance the War, that amount

<i>National Income.</i>		£
From agriculture		216,817,624
From mines and minerals		9,000,000
From manufactures		114,230,000
From inland trade		31,600,000
From foreign commerce and shipping		46,373,748
From the coasting trade		2,000,000
From fisheries, excluding Newfoundland		2,100,000
From banks		3,500,000
Foreign income		5,000,000
Total		430,521,372

could easily be doubled. Of course some allowance must be made for the fact that whereas a hundred years ago British war expenditure was spread over twenty years, it will now be spread over a much shorter period. Hence, the necessary economic measures, similar to those which were taken a century ago, must not be taken dilatorily but speedily.

Before considering the consequences of the nation's gigantic expenditure upon its economic position and future, let us briefly study the means by which, a century ago, Great Britain raised the colossal funds required for the war against France, for such an investigation will supply us with some very valuable precedents.

A hundred years ago, as now, the war was paid for partly with the proceeds of loans, partly with funds pro-

vided by taxation. If, as I have endeavoured to show, the war cost this country £1,100,000,000, it appears that £600,000,000, or three-fifths, were raised by loans and £500,000,000, or two-fifths, by taxation. If we now turn back to the interesting table of national revenue and expenditure previously given, it will be seen that taxation was enormously increased during the Napoleonic era. Between 1792 and 1815 it increased from £19,258,814 to £72,210,512, or was almost quadrupled, and as the substantial increase of taxation only began in 1796, it was almost quadrupled in the small space of twenty years! How great was the financial sacrifice made by the nation during the Napoleonic wars may be seen by the fact that British taxation was generally considered to be 'intolerably high' before the war began. It was indeed very high. If we look at the table of British National Debt given in the beginning of this chapter, it appears that the National Debt had been almost exactly doubled by the costly war with the American Colonies, France, Spain, and Holland from 1775 to 1784, that this country entered the Napoleonic War with the dead weight of an enormous war debt pressing on it. From the table of National Revenue and Expenditure it appears furthermore that in 1792 no less than practically one-half of the entire national expenditure consisted of interest paid on the National Debt, that one-half of the Budgetary expenditure in time of peace was, in fact, expenditure caused by the previous wars.

During the Napoleonic War the public burdens were vastly increased. Reference to the table of National Revenue and Expenditure shows that the interest paid per year on the National Debt increased from £9,767,833 in 1792 to no less than £32,938,751 in 1816, growing no less than three and a half fold. The British national expenditure of 1792 was at the time rightly considered to be a very heavy one. It was exactly twice as large as in 1775. Yet, between 1813 and 1816 Great Britain spent on an average per year on interest on the National Debt alone

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50 per cent. more than the total amount of the British national expenditure of 1792, and three times as much as the whole national expenditure of 1775.

We have no reason to complain of the present war taxes. Compared with those established during the Napoleonic time they are very light indeed.

Now let us study the way by which Great Britain raised her war taxes during the Great War.

As the Budgets of a century ago form in their bulky original a maze in which the uninitiated are lost, I would give a useful analytical digest of the Budget revenue for the year 1815, taken from the second volume of Mr. Stephen Dowell's valuable 'History of Taxation and Taxes in England.' Details of the revenue of Great Britain, exclusive of Ireland, are shown in the table on page 225.

The revenue from taxes in Ireland for the year 1815, ending January 5, 1816, was, in British currency, equal to-£6,258,723.

It will be noticed that a century ago, as now, the direct taxes on capital and income and the taxes on luxuries such as beer, wine, spirits, sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, houses, coaches, &c., provided the bulk of the revenue. However, not only these but everything taxable was taxed. Exports, imports, and internal trade, coal and timber, raw materials used in the industries and manufactured articles produced in Great Britain, all had to pay their share. Sydney Smith, the witty Canon of St. Paul's, wrote in an article in *The Edinburgh Review* in 1820 :

We can inform Brother Jonathan what are the inevitable consequences of being too fond of glory. Taxes upon every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot. Taxes upon anything that is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste. Taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion. Taxes upon everything on earth, or under the earth, on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home. Taxes on the raw material, taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry

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DIRECT TAXES		£	£
The land tax		1,196,000	
Taxes on houses and establishments		6,500,000	
Income tax		14,600,000	
Tax on succession to property		11,297,000	
Property insured		918,000	
Property sold at auction		284,000	
Coaches and cabs		471,608	
Tonnage on shipping		171,651	
			25,433,259
TAXES ON ARTICLES OF CONSUMPTION.			
<i>Food, Drink, and Tobacco :</i>		£	£
Salt		1,616,671	
Sugar		2,957,403	
Currants, raisins, pepper, and vinegar		541,689	
Beer		3,330,044	
Malt		6,044,276	
Hops		222,026	
Drink Licenses		200,000	
Wine		1,900,772	
Spirits		6,700,000	
Tea		3,591,350	
Coffee		276,700	
Tobacco		2,025,663	
			29,406,494
<i>Raw Materials and Customs Duties :</i>			
Coal and slate		915,797	
Timber		1,802,000	
Cotton wool		760,000	
Raw and thrown silk		450,000	
Barilla, indigo, potashes, bar iron, and furs		297,000	
Hemp		285,000	
Export duties		364,417	
Various import duties		1,188,000	
			6,062,214
<i>Taxes on Manufactures :</i>			
Leather		698,342	
Soap		747,759	
Bricks and tiles		269,121	
Glass		424,787	
Candles		354,350	
Paper		476,019	
Printed goods		388,076	
Newspapers		383,000	
Advertisements		125,000	
Plate		82,151	
Various		132,116	
			4,080,721
STAMP DUTIES.			
Bills and notes		841,000	
Receipts		210,000	
Other instruments		1,692,000	
			2,743,000
Grand total			£67,730,688

of man. Taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug which restores him to health ; on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal ; on the poor man's salt and the rich man's spice ; on the brass nails of the coffin and the ribbons of the bride ; at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay. The schoolboy whips his taxed top, the beardless youth manages his taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road ; and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has paid seven per cent., into a spoon that has paid fifteen per cent., flings himself back upon his chintz bed which has paid twenty-two per cent. and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a licence of One hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten per cent. Besides the Probate large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel. His virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble and he will then be gathered to his fathers to be taxed no more.

The manner by which British taxation was increased in the course of the Great War may be gauged by comparing the peace Budget of 1792 with that of 1815. The following figures give a summary comparison :

	In 1792	In 1815
	£	£
Direct taxes	3,837,000	25,438,259
Taxes on food, drink and tobacco . . .	9,035,783	29,406,494
Taxes on raw materials and customs duties	1,467,000	6,062,214
Taxes on manufactures	1,656,000	4,080,721
Stamp duties	752,000	2,743,000

It will be noticed that the taxes on food, drink, tobacco; raw materials, imports, and on manufactures increased between 1792 and 1815 from three to four-fold, and that the stamp duties were raised at a similar ratio, while the direct taxes, that is, the taxes on the income and the property of the well-to-do, and on their establishments, increased

almost sevenfold. If we bear in mind that a century ago British foreign trade was carried on chiefly with the Continent of Europe and the United States, that during many years practically the whole Continent was closed by Napoleon to British trade, that from 1812 to 1815 Great Britain was at war with the United States, that the British Colonies were quite unimportant, that in 1800 Canada had 240,000 and Australia only 6500 inhabitants, that the only valuable British Colonies were the West Indies, that in consequence of the closing of the principal British markets business was extremely bad, that commercial failures were very numerous, that several harvests had failed, that bread was scarce and very dear, that gold had disappeared, that the forced paper currency had rapidly depreciated, so that a guinea at one time was worth twenty-seven shillings in paper, we can appreciate the economic sufferings of the British people and their determination and staying power, their civic heroism and their moral fibre. They paid during those hard times three and four times as much in taxes as they had done during the years preceding the war. As, therefore, a hundred years ago, and under far more difficult economic circumstances than those which obtain at present, the British people were able to bear a burden of taxation from three to four times as heavy as that to which they had been accustomed, the British people of to-day will also be able to pay far more in taxes than they have done hitherto, although there will, of course, be grumbling and suffering. Nations, and especially nations which live luxuriously and wastefully, have almost an infinite capacity of paying taxes. That is one of the lessons of the Great War with France.

Great Britain habitually makes war lavishly and wastefully. That lies in the national character. Out of the forty years from 1775 to 1815 nine years were spent in an enormous war with the American Colonies, France, Spain, and Holland, and twenty years in a still greater war with Republican and Napoleonic France, and her allies and vassals. During these forty years, as we may see by referring

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The textile industry, in its various branches, is the greatest British manufacturing industry, and its rise is frequently, although erroneously, attributed by many to

Population of British Towns.

—	1801	1811	1821	1831	1841
Manchester and Salford	94,876	115,874	163,635	237,832	311,009
Liverpool	82,295	104,104	138,354	201,751	286,487
Birmingham	70,670	82,753	101,722	143,986	182,922
Leeds	53,162	62,534	83,796	123,393	152,074
Sheffield	45,755	53,231	65,275	91,692	111,091
Wolverhampton	30,584	43,190	53,011	67,514	93,245
Bradford	13,264	16,012	26,307	43,527	66,715
Oldham	21,677	29,479	38,201	50,513	60,451
Preston	12,174	17,360	24,859	33,871	50,887
Bolton	17,966	24,799	32,045	42,245	51,029
Leicester	17,005	23,453	31,036	40,639	50,806
Nottingham	28,861	34,253	40,415	50,680	53,091
Macclesfield	13,255	17,143	23,154	30,911	32,629
Coventry	16,034	17,923	21,448	27,298	31,032
Huddersfield	7,268	9,671	13,284	19,035	25,066
Rochdale	8,040	10,392	12,998	18,351	24,272
Northampton	7,020	8,427	10,793	15,351	21,242

Free Trade. Measured by the quantity of raw material imported—the best test available—the British textile industries, according to Porter, developed as follows :

Imports of

—	Raw Cotton	Raw Silk	Raw Wool
Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.
1801	54,203,433	960,000 ¹	7,371,774
1805	58,878,163	—	8,069,793
1815	92,525,951	1,475,389	13,640,375
1825	202,546,869	3,604,058	43,816,966
1835	333,043,464	5,788,458	42,604,656
1845	721,979,953	6,328,159	76,913,865

Between 1801 and 1845 the importation of raw silk increased about sevenfold, that of raw wool more than tenfold, and that of raw cotton more than thirteen-fold.

¹ Ten years average.

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The British iron production increased, according to Porter, as follows :

<i>British Iron Production.</i>						
1806	258,000 tons.
1825	581,000 tons.
1835	1,000,000 tons.
1840	1,600,000 tons.
1845	1,700,000 tons.

Between 1806 and 1845 the British iron production increased nearly sevenfold.

The expansion of all the British manufacturing industries was so rapid after 1815 that they speedily acquired practically a world monopoly. In 1845 Great Britain was indeed, to use Cobden's words, the workshop of the world.

Modern manufacturing is based on coal. The commanding position which the British industries had obtained during and after the Great War can best be gauged by Great Britain's production of coal. According to R. C. Taylor's valuable 'Statistics of Coal,' a bulky handbook published in 1848, the world's production of coal in 1845 was as follows :

	Production of Coal in 1845	Percentage of World's Production
	Tons	Per Cent.
Great Britain	31,500,000	64·2
Belgium	4,960,077	10·1
United States	4,400,000	8·9
France	4,141,817	8·4
Russia	3,500,000	7·0
Austria	659,340	1·4
Total	49,161,034	100·0

In 1845 Great Britain not only produced two-thirds of the world's coal and two-thirds of the world's iron, but also worked up two-thirds of the world's raw cotton.

During the war, and during the three decades of peace which followed the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain became the workshop of the world. The predictions of Napoleon and of many statesmen, financiers, and economists, that

the enormous National Debt and the huge burden of taxation would utterly impoverish Great Britain, were triumphantly refuted. In no other period of the nation's history did its wealth progress at a more rapid rate. The principal cause which led to this marvellous economic development was, in my opinion, illogical as it may sound, the great burden which forty years of almost incessant warfare had laid upon the British people. Men do not love exertion, do not love work. They are born idlers who endeavour to enjoy life without exertion. They will not work hard—there are, of course, exceptions—unless compelled. Men, being born idle and improvident, live without labour in all climes where a kindly Nature has provided for their wants. Necessity is not only the mother of invention, but also the mother of labour, of productivity, of thrift, of wealth, of power, and of progress, and the greatest civilising influence of all is the tax-collector. The tax-collector converted the backward and happy-go-lucky British nation into a nation of strenuous and intelligent industrial workers.

Men like their comforts and their amusements, and they are apt to spend very nearly all they earn. If their taxes are suddenly very greatly increased, their first impulse is to stint themselves, but as this is a painful process, they soon endeavour to provide the money required by the tax-collector by harder work, or by more intelligent exertion. During the forty years period of almost incessant war, and during the three decades which followed the Peace of Vienna, taxes were increased enormously, and as the increased taxes could scarcely be provided for by the unpleasant virtue of thrift, the people began to exert their ingenuity and strove to increase their income by increasing production. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, two periods of greatly increased taxation, British genius was applied to money-making, to industry, and to invention in an unparalleled manner. Not chance, but the constantly and colossally growing demands of the tax-collector led to the introduction of the steam-engine, of labour-

saving machinery of every kind, of modern manufacturing, of modern commerce and banking, of railways, and of steamships.

The time when taxation was trebled and quadrupled saw the rise of inventive geniuses such as Watt, Boulton, Brindley, Trevethick, Telford, Brunel, Maudesley, Bramah, Nasmyth, George Stephenson, Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartwright, Horrocks, Smeaton, Priestly, Dalton, Faraday, Davy, Wedgwood, and many others. The resources of the country were carefully studied and energetically developed. Excellent roads were built to facilitate traffic. The activity of the Duke of Bridgewater, and of other men, gave to England the then best system of inland waterways. The Duke of Bedford, Kay, and Coke of Norfolk gave a tremendous impetus to scientific agriculture. Rowland Hill introduced the penny postage. By the perfection of the organisation of joint-stock undertakings, the building of costly railways, of factories on the largest scale, and the evolution of modern banking, were made possible.

During the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, Englishmen were the most enterprising men in the world. They not only made the principal inventions of modern industry, but they were invariably the first to exploit the industrial inventions made by other nations. Since then, English enterprise and English inventiveness have sadly declined. Most industrial inventions and improvements are made nowadays in Germany and in the United States, and the most valuable industrial inventions and discoveries made by Englishmen are exploited not in England, but in Germany and America. The British discovery of making dyes from coal-tar led to the establishment of an enormous coal-tar dye industry in Germany. Although an Englishman invented the valuable automatic loom, only a few automatic looms are to be found in this country, while hundreds of thousands are employed in the United States. Many similar instances might be given.

During the last fifty years, England has undoubtedly grown slack. Many British industries have remained stagnant or have declined, while those in the United States and in Germany have mightily expanded. Great Britain was the workshop of the world in 1845, but she occupies no longer that proud position. What is the cause, or what are the causes, of this extraordinary change? There are many causes, but the principal cause is undoubtedly this, that when England had become industrially supreme and very wealthy, the people were no longer compelled to work hard. Having established their position in the world of industry and commerce, Englishmen began to take their ease. Self-indulgence took the place of industry. Both the employers and their workers began to neglect their business at a time when necessity compelled the German and American peoples to concentrate their entire energy upon the development of their commerce and their industries.

I have endeavoured to show in these pages that the wonderful development of the British industries during the end of the eighteenth and during the first half of the nineteenth century was due not to chance, but to high taxation—that not chance, but the pressure of high taxation produced the invention of the steam-engine and of labour-saving machinery of every kind. It is to be hoped that the vastly increased demands of the tax-collector will once more stimulate inventiveness and industry in this country to the utmost, that necessity will cause Englishmen to discover new avenues which lead to prosperity, that the gigantic cost of the present War will be as easily borne as that of the Great War a century ago. However, we need not reckon upon the discovery of new processes and the invention of new machines. Great Britain can easily provide for her financial requirements, however long the War may last, by the simple process of Americanising her industries. Great Britain is blessed with an excellent climate and a most favourable geographical position. She is the only country in the world which, owing to the situation of its coalfields, can

manufacture practically on the sea-shore, whereas other nations are greatly hampered by being compelled to manufacture far inland. Besides, Great Britain possesses a gigantic and invaluable undeveloped estate in her vast Dominions and Colonies. Great Britain and the British Empire have absolutely unlimited resources which are partly not exploited at all, and partly quite insufficiently utilised.

The greatest resource of every nation is, in Colbert's words, the labour of the people. Unfortunately, the labour of the British people is very largely wasted. If we compare the productivity of labour in this country and in the United States, we find, incredible as it may sound, that American labour is about three times as efficient as is British labour, that one American worker produces approximately as much as do three British workers. This assertion can be proved by means of the British and the United States censuses of production. The British census of production refers to the year 1907 and the American census to the year 1909. The two years lie so near together that one may fairly compare the results given. There is, of course, a difficulty in comparing the efficiency of British and American labour. In the first place the industries in the two countries have not always been officially classified in the same manner. Therefore many industries, such as the iron industry, cannot be compared by means of the census figures. In the second place the qualities of American and British produce frequently differ widely. These considerations have necessarily narrowed the range of comparable figures. The following table contains statistics relating to some British and American industries which may fairly be compared. They will show conclusively that in many of the comparable industries the American workers produce approximately three times as large a quantity of goods as do their English colleagues, and that they succeed in producing three times as much, not because they work three times as hard, but because, as is also shown in the table, the United States use in the identical industries approximately three times

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as much horse-power per thousand men as does Great Britain. The following figures are extracted from a fuller table which appeared in an article of mine published in *The Fortnightly Review* for August 1918, to which I would refer those who desire further details. They were much discussed at the time, but they have hitherto not been successfully challenged.

	Production per Year	Number of Wage- earners	Horse-power Employed	Horse- power per Thousand Wage- earners	Value of Pro- duction per Wage- earner per Year
<i>Boots and Shoes :</i>	£				£
United Kingdom	20,095,000	117,565	20,171	172	171
United States	102,359,000	198,297	96,302	486	516
<i>Cardboard Boxes :</i>					
United Kingdom	2,067,000	19,844	2,288	114	106
United States	10,970,000	39,514	23,323	590	275
<i>Cement :</i>					
United Kingdom	3,621,000	18,860	60,079	3,195	192
United States	12,641,000	26,775	371,799	13,873	472
<i>Clothing :</i>					
United Kingdom	62,169,000	392,084	17,837	45	158
United States	190,566,000	393,439	65,019	165	484
<i>Cocoa, Chocolate, and Confectionary :</i>					
United Kingdom	16,171,000	54,629	19,898	346	296
United States	31,437,000	47,464	46,463	980	662
<i>Cotton Goods :</i>					
United Kingdom	132,000,000	559,573	1,239,212	2,214	236
United States	125,678,400	378,880	1,296,517	3,423	332
<i>Clocks and Watches :</i>					
United Kingdom	613,000	4,448	550	125	137
United States	7,039,400	23,857	14,957	628	296
<i>Cutlery and Tools :</i>					
United Kingdom	2,047,000	12,485	5,248	420	164
United States	10,653,200	32,996	68,294	2,069	323
<i>Firearms and Am- munition :</i>					
United Kingdom	677,000	4,444	2,619	595	152
United States	6,822,400	14,715	17,840	1,214	464
<i>Gloves :</i>					
United Kingdom	1,056,000	4,532	509	113	233
United States	4,726,200	11,354	2,889	256	416
<i>Hats and Caps :</i>					
United Kingdom	5,256,000	28,420	5,142	181	149
United States	16,598,000	40,079	23,524	588	414

	Production per Year	Number of Wage- earners	Horse-power Employed	Horse- power per Thousand Wage- earners	Value of Production per Wage- earner per Year
<i>Hosiery :</i>	£				£
United Kingdom	8,792,000	47,687	7,784	163	184
United States	40,028,600	129,275	103,709	804	309
<i>Leather Tanning and Dressing :</i>					
United Kingdom	18,289,000	26,668	22,609	847	686
United States	65,574,800	62,202	148,140	2,389	1,054
<i>Matches :</i>					
United Kingdom	862,000	3,865	1,591	408	223
United States	2,270,600	3,631	6,224	1,729	625
<i>Paint Colours and Varnish :</i>					
United Kingdom	9,127,000	10,574	14,575	1,375	863
United States	24,977,800	14,240	56,162	4,012	1,754
<i>Paper :</i>					
United Kingdom	13,621,000	40,955	172,224	4,201	330
United States	53,531,000	75,978	1,304,265	15,846	705
<i>Pens and Pencils :</i>					
United Kingdom	791,000	6,025	1,450	241	131
United States	2,539,000	6,058	4,261	710	419
<i>Printing and Pub- lishing :</i>					
United Kingdom	13,548,000	34,210	38,611	1,133	396
United States	147,757,200	258,434	297,763	1,154	572
<i>Silk :</i>					
United Kingdom	5,345,000	30,710	18,867	608	142
United States	39,382,400	99,037	97,947	989	398

The figures given, which have not been selected for the purpose of 'making a case,' show irrefutably that the British manufacturing industries as a whole are almost incredibly inefficient. Wherever we look we find that the American worker produces per year approximately three times as much as does his British colleague. Even the British cotton industry, the premier industry of the country, is, both on the spinning and on the weaving side, not provided with the best labour-saving machinery, as I pointed out very fully in an article in *The Nineteenth Century* review some years ago.¹

¹ 'Will a Tariff Harm Lancashire?—A Lesson from America,' *The Nineteenth Century and After*, August, 1912.

The comparison of production per wage-earner per year in England and the United States is based upon wholesale prices. It is true that the shop prices of many commodities are higher in the United States than in England. However, this difference is due very largely to the fact that the American retailers require a larger profit because they have larger expenses, and because the business of distribution is more costly in the United States than here because distances are greater. In most cases the wholesale prices of comparable commodities are nearly identical in both countries. The fact that the American workers produce on an average approximately three times as much as their British colleagues employed in the same industries can therefore not be gainsaid.

It is, of course, generally known that in many cases American workers employ far more perfect machinery than do their British colleagues, but it is not generally known, and it seems almost unbelievable, that the American workers employ, besides better machinery, about three times as much power as do the British workers engaged in the same trades. If we allow for the fact that the American industries possess not only better machines, but in addition three times as much power with which to drive them, it is obvious that the mechanical efficiency of the American industries is considerably more than three times as great as that of the corresponding British industries.

At the time when Great Britain was the workshop of the world, McCulloch wrote in his 'Account of the British Empire': 'A given number of hands in Great Britain perform much more work than is executed by the same number of hands almost anywhere else.' That statement, which was true in the middle of the last century, is true no longer. Unfortunately the British industries have become lamentably inefficient, not only in comparison with those of the United States, but of Germany and of other countries as well. The greatest asset of a State is its man-power. Much of the British man-power is wasted. By Americanising

the British manufacturing industries we can obviously double and treble the national output, and can thus double and treble the national income. That has been made abundantly clear by my analytical comparison.

The lamentable inefficiency of British production is apparent not only in manufacturing, but in agriculture and mining as well. The Coal Tables of 1912, published by the British Board of Trade in March, 1914, contain many interesting figures relating to coal production in England and abroad. Coal is the bread of the manufacturing industries. Its importance to the nation can scarcely be exaggerated. Let us see how British coal production compares with coal production elsewhere.

Tons of Coal Produced per Annum per Person Employed.

—	United Kingdom	United States	Australia	New Zealand	Canada
1886-90	312	400	333	359	341
1891-95	271	444	358	388	375
1896-1900	298	494	426	441	457
1901-5	281	543	437	474	495
1906-10	275	596	462	470	439
1908	271	538	500	478	422
1909	266	617	388	456	400
1910	257	618	449	478	453
1911	260	613	485	487	395
1912	244 ¹	660	542	503	472

It will be noticed that the coal production per man per year is almost twice as large in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada as it is in the United Kingdom, and that it is almost three times as large in the United States as it is in this country. This startling difference can only partly be explained by the fact that in many cases the coal seams are thicker in the United States than in Great Britain, and are to be found at a lesser depth. This startling discrepancy in output is largely, if not chiefly, ascribable to this, that the British miner, as the British industrial worker,

¹ Strike year.

is hostile to improved machinery, and is determinedly bent upon limiting output. It is ominous that, whereas British coal production per man has steadily been decreasing during the last thirty years, American, Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian coal production per man has been steadily increasing. The British miner has unfortunately succeeded in more than nullifying the technical improvements made in coal production which in other countries have greatly increased production per man.

While an increasing coal production per man in America, Australia, and New Zealand has brought about the cheapening of coal, or has at least prevented it becoming dearer, greatly increased wages notwithstanding, the reduction in the British output per man, combined with increased wages, has fatally increased the price of British coal. This will appear from the figures given in the table on page 241.

The figures given show that the British coal-miners have succeeded in reducing the output of coal per man and creating an artificial scarcity. In former years British coal was approximately as cheap as American coal, and in some years it was cheaper. Of that advantage the manufacturing industries have now been deprived. Of late years, owing to increased wages and reduced output, English coal prices have been 50 per cent. higher than American coal prices. Hence the British manufacturing industries suffer not only from insufficient output due to inefficient machinery and insufficient power to drive it, but also from unnecessarily high coal prices. McCulloch wrote in his 'Account of the British Empire':

Our coal mines have been sometimes called the Black Indies, and it is certain that they have conferred a thousand times more real advantage on us than we have derived from the conquest of the Mogul Empire, or than we should have reaped from the Dominion of Mexico and Peru. . . . Our coal mines may be regarded as vast magazines of hoarded or warehoused power; and unless some such radical change should be made on the steam engine as should very decidedly

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lessen the quantity of fuel required to keep it in motion, or some equally serviceable machine, but moved by different means, be introduced, it is not at all likely that any nation should come into successful competition with us in those departments in which steam engines, or machinery moved by steam, may be advantageously employed.

Average Value of Coal per Ton at the Pit's Mouth.

—	United Kingdom	United States	Australia	New Zealand
	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
1886	4 10	6 4½	—	—
1887	4 9½	6 6½	9 2	10 10
1888	5 0½	6 0	9 0	10 11
1889	6 4½	5 3½	8 11	11 3
1890	8 3	5 2½	8 6	11 0
1891	8 0	5 3½	8 9	11 4
1892	7 3½	5 4½	7 11	11 3
1893	6 9½	5 4	7 5	11 1
1894	6 8	5 1	6 8	11 0
1895	6 0½	4 9½	6 4	11 1
1896	5 10½	4 9½	6 2	10 10
1897	5 11	4 7½	5 11	10 0
1898	6 4½	4 5	5 9	10 0
1899	7 7	4 8½	6 1	10 0
1900	10 9½	5 3½	6 0	10 9
1901	9 4½	5 6½	7 7	10 0
1902	8 2½	5 8½	7 9	10 11
1903	7 8	6 7	7 4	10 9
1904	7 2½	5 10½	6 10	10 9
1905	6 11½	5 8	6 2	10 7
1906	7 3½	5 9½	6 3	10 7
1907	9 0	5 11½	6 10	10 7
1908	8 11	5 11½	7 4½	10 4½
1909	8 0½	5 7½	7 6½	10 10½
1910	8 2½	5 10½	7 6½	11 1½
1911	8 1½	5 10½	7 5½	10 10½
1912	9 0½	6 1	7 6½	10 11½

McCulloch, as his contemporary Mr. Cobden, believed that England was, and always would remain, the workshop of the world because this country had then virtually a monopoly in the production of coal. It has been shown on another page that this country produced in 1845 twice as much coal as did all the other countries of the world combined. By making coal artificially scarce and dear,

the British miners, who in their fatal policy have been supported by short-sighted Governments of either party, have taken away from the British industries one of the greatest advantages which they possessed and threaten to ruin them altogether.

The masters, the men, and the politicians have probably been equally responsible for the inefficiency of the British manufacturing industries and of British mining. British employers have come to consider business to be a bore, if not a nuisance. During the last few decades they were quite satisfied with the condition of their business as long as they made an income with little exertion, and they were ready to leave the supervision and direction of their affairs to a manager. They took little note of the scientific and technical progress made in other countries. They looked upon new methods, upon improved organisation, upon scientific processes of production, and upon improved machinery with indifference, if not with dislike. That indifference to progress was particularly noticeable in the case of limited liability companies, especially when they were controlled by amateur directors, or by men who had only a very small stake in the business. Compared with the United States, British transport by railway also is lamentably behindhand and inefficient, and the result is that American railway freights are far lower than British, although American railway wages are three times as high as are British wages.

While British masters were opposed to industrial progress and to all innovations from conservatism, from indifference, or from sheer laziness, their men looked upon improved organisation and machinery with positive and undisguised hostility, for they had been taught by their leaders that their greatest interest lay in a high wage and in a low output, that every increase in output injured the other workers and themselves. It seems incredible that such a foolish fallacy should have been allowed to restrict and stifle the development of the British industries. Unfor-

unately the British workers as a whole have been almost as hostile to the introduction of modern methods and improved machinery as they were in the machine-smashing era a century ago. The world is a great co-operative society. Men are paid money wages, but as they spend them in purchasing goods they are in reality paid in goods, in food, clothes, &c. A man who produces food is paid in clothes, and a man who makes clothes has to buy food. If both produce 'scientifically' as little as possible they will lack food and clothes, whatever their money wages may be. If, on the other hand, both produce much there will be abundance and prosperity. Production determines wages. Small production and high wages are incompatible. High production and high wages go hand in hand. In the United States wages are from two to three times as high as in this country because production per man is from two to three times as great; and as production is from two to three times as great, goods are very little dearer in the United States than in England, high wages notwithstanding. The result is that the very highly paid American workmen can purchase with their large wages an abundance of food, clothes, &c., and can save large amounts in addition.

In the lengthy table summarising British and American production per worker per year printed on pages 236-237, the gross value of the goods produced is given. Of course, a worker who converts in a day a piece of leather into a pair of boots worth fifteen shillings does not really produce fifteen shillings' worth of goods. To arrive at the real value of his day's work we must deduct from the value of the goods made by him the cost of the raw material and the general factory expenses. By deducting these we arrive at the net production per worker per week. Details will be found in the table on page 244. The figures given are based on the Censuses of Production.

It will be noticed that in the trades enumerated the American workers produce per week as a rule from two to three times as much, net, as their British colleagues. As

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no worker can possibly obtain for his work more than the entire value of his work, it is clear that the British worker in cardboard boxes, for instance, cannot obtain more than £1 per week unless he produces more. This table explains why wages were high in America and relatively low

Net Produce per Worker per Week.

	In the United Kingdom	In the United States
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Boots and shoes	1 7 4	3 10 0
Cardboard boxes	1 0 0	2 15 10
Butter and cheese	2 8 1	8 3 1
Cement	2 10 10	4 17 8
Clothing	1 3 11	4 7 4
Cocoa, chocolate and confectionery	1 12 3	4 18 5
Cotton goods	1 10 5	2 13 9
Clocks and watches	1 7 9	4 3 0
Cutlery and tools	1 8 1	4 1 6
Dyeing and finishing textiles	1 18 11	4 4 3
Gasworks	4 1 1	11 16 7
Firearms and ammunition	2 2 8	4 9 2
Gloves	1 11 2	3 10 9
Hats and caps	1 5 10	4 1 10
Hosiery	1 3 5	2 2 8
Leather tanning and dressing	2 5 0	4 13 1
Lime	1 13 5	3 2 4
Brewing and malting	6 7 3	19 10 5
Matches	1 13 0	7 3 1
Paint and varnish	3 16 2	12 9 3
Paper	2 2 8	5 3 5
Pens and pencils	1 9 8	4 5 9
Printing and publishing	3 13 1	7 16 11
Railway carriages, &c.	2 7 4	4 0 5
Silk	1 1 2	3 9 3
Soap and candles	2 19 8	11 7 8

in this country, up to the outbreak of the present War, in the course of which British wages have materially increased.

Unfortunately, the politicians of both parties have very largely contributed to the backwardness and stagnation which is noticeable in British business. Desiring to obtain votes, they have unceasingly flattered both masters and men. They have told the employers that Great Britain

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was the richest country in the world, and that she was industrially far ahead of all countries. They have not only not prevented the workers reducing their output to the utmost, but they have actually encouraged them in that suicidal policy by their legislation. Striving after popularity, after votes, the politicians have thus encouraged idling on the part of both employers and employees, and have opposed modern organisation and modern improvements. While encouraging labour to combine and to restrict production, they have opposed the combination of employers to increase efficiency. For decades both parties advocated Free Trade chiefly because that policy furnished an excellent party cry, furnished votes.

If we wish to ascertain the causes of British industrial stagnation and relative decline, it is well to listen to the opinion of foreign experts. Let us in this manner consider the causes of the relative decline of the British iron industry. In 1845 two-thirds of the world's iron was produced by Great Britain. German iron production was then quite unimportant. At present German iron production is far ahead of iron production in this country. According to a valuable German technical handbook, '*Gemeinfassliche Darstellung des Eisenhüttenwesens*,' Düsseldorf, 1912, the production of iron and steel in Great Britain and Germany has developed as follows :

—	Iron Production.		Steel Production.	
	In Germany	In Great Britain	In Germany	In Great Britain
	Tons	Tons	Tons	Tons
1865	975,000	4,896,000	100,000	225,000
1870	1,391,000	6,060,000	170,000	287,000
1875	2,029,000	6,432,000	347,000	724,000
1880	2,729,000	7,802,000	624,000	1,321,000
1885	3,687,000	7,369,000	894,000	2,020,000
1890	4,658,000	8,033,000	1,614,000	3,637,000
1895	5,465,000	7,827,000	2,830,000	3,312,000
1900	8,521,000	9,052,000	6,646,000	5,130,000
1905	10,988,000	9,746,000	10,067,000	5,984,000
1910	14,793,000	10,380,000	13,699,000	6,107,000

Why has Germany, whose production of iron and steel was formerly insignificant, so rapidly and so completely outstripped Great Britain, which possesses the greatest natural facilities for producing iron and steel? The German handbook mentioned is published by the Union of German Iron Masters, a purely professional association. It considers this question exclusively from a business point of view. It significantly states :

No land on earth is as favourably situated for iron production as is England. Extensive deposits of coal and iron, easy and cheap purchase of foreign raw materials, a favourable geographical position for selling its manufactures, reinforced by the great economic power of the State, made at one time the island kingdom industrially omnipotent throughout the world. Now complaints about constantly increasing foreign competition become from day to day more urgent. These are particularly loud with regard to the growing power of the German iron industry. It is understandable that Great Britain finds it unpleasant that Germany's iron industry should have become so strong. However, Germany's success has been achieved by unceasing hard work. . . .

The unexampled growth of the German industry began when, on July, 15, 1879, a moderate Protective Tariff was introduced. Until then it was impossible for the German iron industries to flourish. Foreign competition was too strong. . . .

The German Trade Unions, with their Socialist ideas, are opposed to progress. If their aspirations should succeed, the German iron industry would be ruined. An attempt on the part of the German Trade Unions to increase the earnings of the skilled workers by limiting the number of apprentices, the imitation of the policy which has been followed by the British Trade Unions, would produce a scarcity of skilled workers in Germany as it has done in England. The British iron industry should be to us Germans a warning example. The English Trade Unions with their short-sighted championship of labour, with their notorious policy of 'ca' canny' (the limitation of output), and with

their hostility to technical improvements have seriously shaken the powerful position of the British iron trade.

Most people see in Trade Unions an organisation which may become dangerous to the national industries by promoting strikes. Strikes, however, are of comparatively little danger. They are like a virulent, but intermittent, fever. The most pernicious feature of the British Trade Unions is their policy of limiting output, and their hostility to improvements in organisation and machinery. Their activity has upon the body economic an influence similar to a slow fever which leads, almost imperceptibly, to atrophy, to marasmus, and to death.

The War will be long drawn out. It may cost £4,000,000,000, £5,000,000,000, and perhaps more. It may swallow up one-third, and perhaps one-half of the national capital. It may permanently double, or even more than double, taxation. I have endeavoured to show by irrefutable evidence that the British manufacturing industries and British mining are inefficient, that, by introducing the best modern methods, British production and British income can be doubled and trebled. Unfortunately, British agriculture is as inefficient as are the manufacturing industries and mining. Space does not permit to show in detail how greatly British agricultural production might be increased. I have shown in various articles published in *The Nineteenth Century* review¹ and elsewhere that, on an agricultural area which is only sixty per cent. larger than that of this country, Germany produces approximately three times as much food of every kind as does this country. British and German agriculture are summarily compared in the tables on page 248. They are based upon the official statistics.

As the German area under woods and forests is eleven times as large as the British, and as the German woods produce far more timber per acre than do the British, the

¹ See *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September, October, and December, 1909.

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German timber production is probably about twenty times as large as the British.

The cultivated area of Germany is 60 per cent. larger than the British cultivated area. If agriculture were equally productive in both countries, Germany should produce only 60 per cent. more than does the United Kingdom. However, we find that Germany produced in 1912 about ten times as much bread-corn as the United

—	United Kingdom	Germany
	Acres	Acres
Total area	77,721,256	133,685,000
Cultivated area	46,931,637	78,632,139
Woods and forests	3,069,070	34,272,841

Production in 1912.

—	United Kingdom	Germany
	Tons	Tons
Wheat and rye	1,568,700	15,958,900
Barley	1,320,400	3,482,000
Oats	2,915,900	8,520,200
Potatoes	5,726,342	50,209,500
Hay	14,024,222	36,524,915
Cattle	11,914,635	20,182,021
Cows	4,400,816	10,944,283
Horses	Not ascertainable	4,523,059
Pigs	3,992,549	21,923,707
Sheep	28,967,495	5,803,445

Kingdom, about two-and-a-half times as much barley, about three times as much oats, about nine times as much potatoes, and about two-and-a-half times as much hay. In addition to these comparable crops Germany produced about 2,000,000 tons of sugar from nearly 20,000,000 tons of beet, and vast quantities of tobacco.

According to the latest comparable statistics, Germany has about twice as much cattle as this country, about two-and-a-half times as many milch cows, and about five-and-a-half times as many pigs. The United Kingdom is superior

to Germany only in sheep, which live largely on derelict grass land, and which are of comparatively little value, five sheep being reckoned equal in value to two pigs.

Comparison of the figures given shows that on an agricultural area which is only 60 per cent. larger than that of this country, Germany produces approximately three times as large a quantity of animal and vegetable food. The inferior productiveness of British agriculture is probably ascribable to the form of its organisation. German agriculture is based on freehold ownership, British agriculture on rent. The sense of property induces German, French, and other agriculturists to do their best. Competition for freehold farms drives up their price, and the high price of land compels German and other agriculturists working under the freehold system to increase agricultural production to the utmost. In Great Britain farmers rent their farms at so much a year. The tied-up farms are apt to remain unchanged from century to century. Fields remain unaltered, and so does cultivation. British farmers follow the old routine, and as landowners would make themselves unpopular by raising the rent, necessity does not provide the stimulus of agricultural progress which the freehold system creates in other countries. Largely for psychological reasons British agriculture is conservative and stagnant. A century ago Arthur Young wrote: 'The best manure for a field is a high rent.' British landlordism is largely responsible for British agricultural stagnation. The introduction of the freehold system would raise the price of agricultural land and would compel agriculturists to double and treble their output.

If the facts and figures given in these pages are correct—I do not think that they can be successfully challenged—it follows that Great Britain can easily pay for the War by introducing, in all her industries, the best and most scientific methods which have been so extraordinarily successful elsewhere.

The tax-collector is, as I have stated before, perhaps

the most powerful factor of industrial progress. His greatly increased demands will compel the employers of labour to increase production to the utmost, to replace labour-wasting with the best labour-saving machinery, to Americanise industry. However, the exertions of the employers will prove a failure unless the workers can be convinced that they are ruining not only the national industries but also themselves by their insane policy of antagonising all mechanical improvements and of restricting output. The politicians in power can do much to enable employers of all kinds to double and treble production by pursuing in economic matters no longer a vote-gaining policy, but a business policy recommended by the ablest business men. The expert should replace the amateur in shaping and directing national economic policy. The War might, and ought to, lead not to Great Britain's bankruptcy, but to its industrial regeneration. It should be followed by a revival of industry similar to that which took place after the Great War a century ago.

The natural resources of the British Empire are unlimited. They are far greater than those of the United States. Owing to the War and to the stimulus which high taxation will provide, a tremendous economic expansion should take place both in Great Britain and in the Dominions which might place the British Empire permanently far ahead of the American Commonwealth. However, individual unco-ordinated effort will not bring about such a revival. A united national and imperial effort under the control of a business Government which leads and inspires is needed. If politicians continue their shiftless hand-to-mouth policy, if they continue thinking mainly of votes and neglecting the permanent interests of nation and Empire, the efforts of individuals to recreate the British industries and to give to the British Empire and to this country a modern economic organisation are bound to fail.

In view of the colossal war expenditure thrift is urgently

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needed. Unfortunately, the British nation is a very improvident nation. This may be seen from the following figures :

Savings Banks Deposits.

	In the United States	In Germany	In the United Kingdom
	£	£	£
1880	163,821,000	130,690,000	77,721,000
1890	310,005,000	258,865,000	111,285,000
1900	477,944,000	441,929,000	186,006,000
1907	699,082,000	694,455,000	209,654,000
1912	945,481,000	933,980,000	235,916,000

Between 1880 and 1912 the Savings Banks Deposits increased in round figures in the United States and in Germany by £800,000,000, and in the United Kingdom by only £160,000,000, increasing about sixfold in the United States, about sevenfold in Germany, and only threefold in this country. During the five years from 1907 to 1912 they increased in round figures in the United States by £245,000,000, or 35 per cent. ; in Germany by £240,000,000, or 35 per cent. ; and in the United Kingdom by a paltry £25,000,000, or 12 per cent. The record of the Savings Banks Deposits is particularly humiliating for this country if we remember that the German and American workers have thousands of millions in freehold land and houses, co-operative societies, &c.

Of the enormous sums spent upon the War the bulk is expended in Great Britain, and goes, with comparatively unimportant deductions—the profits made by employers and middlemen—from the coffers of the well-to-do into the pockets of the working masses in the form of wages. The Government has exhorted the people repeatedly to be thrifty, and it has enforced thrift upon the moneyed by very greatly increasing direct taxation. The well-to-do are no doubt living more thriftily than they did before the War. The working masses are far more prosperous

than they have ever been. Wages have risen enormously ; but unfortunately the masses save little. They spend their vastly increased earnings largely on worthless amusements and foolish luxuries. Owing to the wholesale transference of capital from the rich to the workers taxation should be remodelled.¹ It is true that a century ago, in the war against France, practically the whole of the increased taxation was placed on the shoulders of the opulent. However, at that time wages remained low during the war. Hence the workers could not contribute much to its costs. Now the position is different. Millions which are urgently required for defence are wasted recklessly by the masses. Universal thrift is needed. The Government should, without delay, increase thrift among the masses partly by taxing worthless amusements, and partly by organising thrift among the workers. Here, also, individual attempts can achieve little. The workers must be taught that they should now put by a competence upon which they will receive unprecedentedly high interest, especially as great and widespread distress may follow the War. Employers throughout the country should be prevailed upon by the Government to give on the Government's behalf premiums for savings. All employers should be requested to induce their workers to put as large as possible a portion of their increased wages into War stock. Through the employers the Government should search out the workers in the factories and induce them to put by money week by week to their benefit and to that of the nation as a whole.

On November 2, 1915, Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons :

The financial position to-day is serious. The extent to which we here in this country are buying goods abroad in excess of our exports is more than £30,000,000 per month, against an average of about £11,000,000 per month before the War ; and at the same time we are making advances to

¹ Many of the reforms advocated in the following pages were introduced since their publication in *The Nineteenth Century* review.

our Allies and to others, which were estimated by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech to amount to a total during the current financial year, to say no more of what is to come, to £428,000,000. . . .

This is a burden which, rich as we are, resourceful as we are, we cannot go on discharging unless there is on the part of the Government, as well as on the part of individuals, the most strict and stringent rule of economy, the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure, the curtailment of charges which under normal conditions we should think right and necessary, and, if I may use a homely expression, cutting our coat according to the cloth with which we have to make it. . . . I would once more say with all the emphasis of which I am capable, that we cannot sustain the burden which this great War has laid upon us unless as individuals, as classes, as a community, and as a Government, we make and are prepared to make far greater sacrifices than we have hitherto done in the direction of retrenchment and economy.

Mr. Asquith thus recommended on November 2, 1915, retrenchment and economy in the most emphatic language. He informed the nation that thrift and the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure was most necessary on the part of individuals and the nation as a whole. Yet the nation lives approximately as luxuriously as ever. The well-to-do, whose income has been greatly reduced by the War and by additional taxation, have curtailed their expenditure to some extent, but scarcely sufficiently, while the masses of the people spend far more on luxuries than they ever did before. Theatres, restaurants, music-halls, picture theatres, and public-houses are nightly crowded, and working men who are reaping a golden harvest purchase for their family gramophones, silk dresses and furs, pianos which are often only used for show, &c. Most people undoubtedly wish to save, but they spend very freely, perhaps not so much from self-indulgence as from misplaced kindness of heart. Men and women hesitate to reduce their expenditure on luxuries because such reduction

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would inflict injury on the providers of luxuries. The thousands of millions which will be required for the conduct of the War cannot be provided by saving the odd pence. They can be found only by the wholesale reduction of expenditure on luxuries, by putting the providers of the luxuries out of business. An able worker or business man can always adjust himself to changed circumstances. Dismissed servants will be able to find more useful work in shops and factories. Dismissed gardeners can use their experience in agriculture to better advantage to the nation. Manufacturers of luxuries and their workers, and shopkeepers who deal in luxuries, can change the character of their trade. It is impossible to carry on 'business as usual' and to provide the untold millions needed for the War.

If we compare Great Britain's imports of luxuries during the first seven months of 1914 when there was peace, with the first seven months of 1915 when she was at war, we find the following :

Imports during Seven Months up to July 31.

	1914	1915
	£	£
Poultry and game	797,492	477,683
Tinned sardines	455,041	608,231
Grapes	109,336	40,103
Almonds	298,101	308,934
Oranges	1,693,206	1,982,823
Cocoa manufactures	937,785	1,385,162
Currents	331,114	543,895
Raisins	181,495	417,417
Fruit preserved in sugar	579,776	835,527
Confectionery	82,817	81,670
Ornamental feathers	1,043,126	452,082
Fresh flowers	206,837	163,306
Ivory	78,178	42,246
Cinema films, &c.	1,490,636	985,087
Watches and parts	871,611	673,221
Silk manufactures	9,824,057	8,537,989
Glaçé kid	921,648	876,193
Gloves	962,892	434,149
Motor cars, and parts	5,240,819	4,249,975

The few items in this list are representative. Space does not permit to analyse the imports of luxuries in greater detail. Production has been thrown out of gear throughout the world. Hence the imports of Great Britain have been reduced largely because the exporting nations could not export as usual. Many of the luxuries imported into Great Britain come from France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey. A glance at this list shows that in some instances the imports of luxuries have fallen severely, perhaps because the exporting countries could not send the goods. In other cases the imports of luxuries are as large as usual or even larger than usual. The importation of almonds, oranges, chocolates, currants, raisins, fruit preserved in sugar, greatly increased notwithstanding the War, while the imports of manufactured silks, confectionery, flowers, watches, and motor cars and parts diminished only slightly. If the consumption of imported luxuries was very much as usual, we may safely estimate that the consumption of home-made luxuries was also very much as usual.

Luxurious expenditure cannot easily be checked by voluntary effort, but it can easily be diminished by legislation. Amusements, especially those of the worthless kind, might be taxed, and the importation of foreign luxuries can be stopped completely, or almost completely, by prohibitive enactments. A short while ago the Government explained in the House of Commons that in blockading Germany foreign luxuries were not stopped because their importation, while not increasing Germany's military strength, weakened and damaged her financial position. One of the greatest financial problems for England consists in paying for her enormous imports. The most obvious step for improving Great Britain's financial position consists in ruthlessly cutting off the importation of all imported luxuries. The import duties put on motor cars, cinematograph films, &c., are a small step in the right direction. Import duties should without delay be put on all imported

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luxuries, and even on those manufactured necessities which can be produced in this country. The question of fiscal purism, the question of Free Trade and Tariff Reform, questions of party politics and of vote-catching, should not be allowed to undermine the financial position of this country at a time when it fights for its very life.

The War is costing Great Britain about £2,000,000,000 a year. It will probably before long cost considerably more. This country will, as I have endeavoured to show, be able to make up, and more than make up, for her War expenditure, however large it may be, by vastly increasing production, by reorganising, by Americanising, her industries. But the victory of the Entente Powers obviously depends very largely on Britain's financial strength. The immediate need of the country is therefore labour and thrift. Strenuous labour and careful thrift are required to tide this nation over the anxious months of war which will determine whether the world will become German or Anglo-Saxon, subject or free.

CHAPTER VIII

BRITAIN'S COMING INDUSTRIAL SUPREMACY ¹

It seems likely that the War will swallow approximately one-half of Great Britain's national wealth. So far it has cost this country more than £3,000,000,000. Before it is over the British war expenditure may be increased to £5,000,000,000 or £6,000,000,000. To that gigantic sum will have to be added pensions for incapacitated soldiers, war widows, and orphans, and compensation for losses caused by the War, which together may require another £1,000,000,000. If, finally, we make due allowance for the financial value of the precious lives lost it will appear that the War will absorb about £7,500,000,000, a sum which is approximately equal to one-half of Great Britain's national wealth.

Opinions as to the economic consequences of the War are divided. Some assert that the gigantic losses incurred will industrially cripple Great Britain and all Europe and that, they will greatly strengthen the industrial and financial predominance of the United States. They tell us that Great Britain will decline economically and politically, and become another Belgium; that the United States will become the leading Anglo-Saxon nation for the same reason for which Carthage became the heir to the world empire created by Phoenicia, her mother State; that Washington will eventually become the capital of a great Empire; that war-ruined and pauperised Europe will become practically an American dependency; that the world will become

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, October, 1916.

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American. That view is widely held on the other side of the Atlantic, where it is causing lively satisfaction. Other people vaguely believe that Great Britain is 'the richest country in the world,' and that the United Kingdom can easily bear the gigantic financial burden which the World War has laid upon its shoulders. In considering a great economic problem the doctrinaire turns to theory while the practical statesman applies to experience for guidance. Experience is no doubt the safer guide. Let us then consider the problem of the economic future from the practical, and particularly from the British, point of view.

The widely held opinion that Great Britain is 'the richest country in the world' is erroneous. According to the 'World Almanac and Encyclopedia' of 1916, the American equivalent of 'Whitaker's Almanack,' the national wealth of the British Isles, the British Empire, and the United States is as follows :

United Kingdom	17,000,000,000
British Empire	28,000,000,000
United States	37,547,800,000

From the same source we learn that the insurances in force came to £6,281,120,800 in the United States and only to £1,174,042,400 in Great Britain.

According to the American estimate the wealth of the United States is considerably more than twice as great as that of the United Kingdom, and is nearly 50 per cent. larger than that of the British Empire as a whole. As, during recent years, American wealth has been growing about three times as fast as British wealth, there is apparently much reason for believing that, owing to the heavy handicap imposed upon the United Kingdom by the War, the United States will in future outpace economic Great Britain at a faster and more furious rate than ever.

Let us glance at the foundations of America's vast wealth.

The United States are infinitely richer than Great

Britain because they possess a greater population and far greater *developed* natural resources. While Great Britain has 47,000,000 inhabitants the United States have 105,000,000 people. In man-power the United States are more than twice as strong as the United Kingdom. Only 6 per cent. of the inhabitants of the world are Americans, yet among the nations of the earth the United States are the largest producers of wheat, maize, oats, tobacco, cotton, timber, cattle, pigs, coal, petroleum, iron and steel, copper, silver, zinc, lead, aluminium, woollen and cotton goods, leather, silk, &c. The relatively small number of Americans produce one-fifth of the world's wheat, gold and silver, one-fourth of the world's zinc, one-third of the world's oats, iron ore, pig iron, and lead, two-fifths of the world's steel, coal, and tobacco, one-half of the world's aluminium, three-fifths of the world's copper, two-thirds of the world's cotton, petroleum, and maize. 'God's own country,' as the Americans call it, has indeed been blessed.

The United States are far ahead of all other nations not only in *developed* and *exploited* natural resources but also in mechanical outfit. The engine-power of the United States is vastly superior to that of Great Britain and of the British Empire. According to the last British and American Censuses of Production the manufacturing industries of the United States employ 18,675,376 horse-powers, while the British industries employ only 8,083,341. I have shown in the previous chapter that per thousand workers the American industries employ from two to three times as many horse-powers as do the identical British industries. An even greater superiority in the employment of labour-saving machinery will be found in mining, agriculture, inland transport, &c. Besides, the United States have available in their water-falls at least 40,000,000 horse-powers, of which, in 1908, 5,856,680 horse-powers were developed, while the water-powers possessed by the United Kingdom are quite insignificant. America's superiority in mechanical

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outfit may perhaps best be gauged from the following remarkable figures :

<i>Miles of Railway.</i>						<i>Miles</i>
United Kingdom	23,441
British Empire	134,131
All Europe	207,432
United States	254,732
The World	665,964

It is noteworthy that the 105,000,000 Americans have more miles of railway than the 440,000,000 citizens of the British Empire and the 500,000,000 inhabitants of all Europe. Several private railway systems, such as the Pennsylvania System, the Harriman System, the Gould System, and the Moore-Reid System, have about as many miles of railway as has the whole of the United Kingdom, while the mileage of the Vanderbilt System is actually 10 per cent. larger than that of the United Kingdom. Great Britain has 780,512 telephones, while the United States have no less than 9,552,107 telephones.

National wealth is either developed or undeveloped, either exploited or latent. The statistics as to the wealth of nations given refer, of course, only to the former, not to the latter, for the latent wealth is not susceptible to statistical measurement. America owes her vast wealth not to the fact that she has exceptionally great natural resources, but to the fact that her natural resources have been exploited with the utmost energy. That may be gauged from the figures of American engine and water power and from the railway and telephone statistics given. Measured by *undeveloped and unexploited* resources, by latent wealth, the British Empire, Russia, and perhaps China also, are far richer than the United States. The United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, have an area of 3,574,658 square miles, while the British Empire, not including the Colonies conquered from Germany, comprises no less than 12,808,994 square miles. Providence has distributed its favours fairly evenly. There is no reason

for believing that the United States have been given an unduly great share of the good things of this world. We may therefore conclude that the British Empire, though actually much poorer, is potentially much richer than the United States.

In *developed and exploited* resources the United States are undoubtedly far ahead of the British Empire, but in *undeveloped and unexploited* resources the British Empire is undoubtedly far ahead of the United States. It is wrong to say that Great Britain is the richest country in the world, but it may safely be asserted that, by its extent and natural resources, the British Empire, which spreads through all climes, possesses the greatest potential national wealth in the world. It is therefore obvious that the incomparable latent riches of the Empire may be converted into actual wealth and power, provided they are vigorously and wisely exploited.

Wealth depends after all not so much on the possession of great natural resources as on the action of men. Two centuries ago wealthy North America nourished only a few thousand roving Indians and a small number of white settlers and traders. An Indian, a Chinaman, or a Kaffir who, engaged at his home in agriculture or in manufacturing in the literal meaning of the word, produces perhaps a shillingsworth of wealth per day, will learn in a few weeks to produce thirty or forty shillingsworth of wealth per day if transferred to Great Britain or the United States. Land and natural resources are limited, but wealth production by the employment of the most modern methods is absolutely unlimited. In certain industries a single man can produce now more wealth than could a thousand men a century ago. Yet fifty years hence men may look with the same surprise at the automatic loom or the steam-hammer with which we look now at the hand-loom and the hand-forge.

The British Empire resembles the United States in many respects. Both extend through all climes. Both possess vast and thinly populated areas endowed with

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the greatest agricultural, sylvan, mineral, industrial, and commercial possibilities. In both only a few small patches are reserved to the manufacturing industries. In view of the resemblance of the United States and the British Empire it is clear that Britain may learn much from the example set by the Great Republic in the development of its natural resources. Moreover, half a century ago the United States passed through an experience similar to that through which Great Britain and the Empire are passing at present. The Civil War of 1861-1865, as I have shown in the chapter entitled 'How America became a Nation in Arms,' destroyed about a million lives at a time when the United States had less than 35,000,000 white and coloured inhabitants, and cost altogether about £2,000,000,000. In 1860 the national wealth of the United States amounted, according to the Census, to only £3,231,923,214. It follows that the Civil War cost a sum equivalent to two-thirds of America's national wealth. Yet the war did not impoverish the country, but, incredible as it may sound, greatly enriched it. I shall endeavour to show that the Civil War created the impetus which made the United States the richest nation in the world, and that the present War will vastly benefit the allied nations, and especially the British Empire, provided they will profit by the great and invaluable lesson furnished by the United States.

In the tenth volume of the excellent 'Life of Abraham Lincoln,' written by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, we read: 'The expense of the war to the Union (the Northern States) over and above the ordinary expenditure was about \$3,250,000,000; to the Confederacy (the Southern States) less than half that amount, about \$1,500,000,000.' According to the latest accounts the Civil War pensions, which required \$164,387,941 in 1915, have hitherto absorbed \$4,614,643,266, or nearly £1,000,000,000, and the payments will go on for many years to come. If we add to these gigantic figures the increased local expenditure in the United States during the war, the valuable property

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destroyed in the fighting, and the financial value of almost a million lives lost, it will be seen that the war has cost the United States vastly more than £2,000,000,000. The war absolutely ruined the wealthy cotton, sugar, and tobacco industries of the South, pauperised the Southern States, led to the destruction of innumerable farms and buildings in the war zone, destroyed America's shipping, closed the Southern markets to the commerce of the North and seriously hampered agriculture throughout the Union because millions of able-bodied men were drafted into the Army. How disastrously American agriculture was affected by the Civil War can best be seen from the Livestock Statistics, which give the following picture :

Farm Animals.

—	Cattle	Horses	Mules	Pigs	Sheep
1860 .	25,616,019	6,249,174	1,151,148	33,512,867	22,471,275
1867 .	20,079,729	5,401,263	822,386	24,693,534	39,385,386

Owing to the necessity of war agriculture in general had to be largely neglected. Discrimination was necessary between the essential and non-essential. The vast demand for wool for uniforms made necessary an increase in sheep. Their number grew during the war by 17,000,000. Other animals had to be neglected. Hence the number of cattle declined by 5,500,000, horses declined by 850,000, mules by 350,000, and pigs by 9,000,000. While production and trade suffered in many directions, national expenditure and taxation increased at an unprecedented and almost incredible rate. The financial burden caused by the war may be summarised in the fewest possible figures as follows :

—	National Expenditure	Cost of Army	Cost of Navy
	Dols.	Dols.	Dols.
1860 . .	63,200,876	16,472,203	11,514,650
1865 . .	1,295,099,290	1,030,690,400	122,617,434

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—					Public Debt	Annual Interest on Debt
					Dols.	Dols.
1860	:	:	:	:	59,964,402.01	3,443,687
1865	:	:	:	:	2,674,815,856.76	137,742,617

In five short years the national expenditure of the United States increased a little more than twenty-fold, chiefly owing to the cost of the army, which increased more than sixty-fold. During the same period the public debt and the interest payable on it grew more than forty-fold. To provide for this colossal financial burden the American national revenue was increased from \$41,476,299 in 1861 to \$112,094,946 in 1863, to \$322,031,158 in 1865, and to \$519,949,564 in 1866. In five years it grew almost thirteen-fold. However, notwithstanding the total ruin of the South, and the hampering influence of the war in the North, the national wealth of the United States grew at a prodigious rate between 1860 and 1870, the Census years. According to the Censuses the real and personal estate of the Americans compared in the two years as follows :

—		National Wealth	Population	Wealth per Head
		Dols.		Dols.
1860	.	16,159,616,068	31,443,321	513.92
1870	.	30,068,518,507	38,558,371	779.83

Of the ten years under consideration four years, except a few days, were occupied by the devastating war. Yet the national wealth of the United States almost doubled during the decade, and the wealth per head of population increased by almost 60 per cent. This is particularly marvellous in view of the fact that large districts of the United States were far poorer in 1870 than in 1860, for the enormous ravages caused in the South could not quickly be repaired. By 'great divisions' the wealth per head was changed. This change is shown in the tables on page 265.

It will be noticed that wealth per head increased at a

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moderate rate in the North-Central and Western States, which are chiefly devoted to agriculture, while it increased at an enormous rate in the North Atlantic Division, the principal seat of the manufacturing industries and commerce. On the other hand wealth per head declined disas-

—	United States	N. Atlantic States	N. Central States	S. Atlantic States
	Dols.	Dols.	Dols.	Dols.
1860	514	528	436	537
1870	780	1243	735	384

—	South Central States	Western States
	Dols.	Dols.
1860	598	434
1870	334	843

trously in the South Atlantic and the South-Central Divisions, the home of the defeated slave-holding States.

As the comparisons given are perhaps a little too summary it will be worth while to compare the wealth of some of the more important States in 1860 and 1870. According to the United States Censuses their wealth has changed very unequally. Statistics will be found on page 266.

While during the decade the wealth of the Southern States shrunk to one-half and even to one-third notwithstanding six years of peace, the wealth of the Northern States increased prodigiously. That of Illinois, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania grew two-and-a-half-fold, that of New York increased three-and-a-half-fold, and the wealth of the 'new' agricultural States in the West grew even more quickly. The wealth of Kansas increased sixfold, and that of Nebraska nearly eightfold. During the decade 1860-1870 the wealth of the manufacturing States and of the wheat-growing States of the Far West grew at an unprecedented rate. The simultaneous development of industry and agriculture during the decade 1860-

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1870 coincided with, and was chiefly due to, the American Civil War. That is recognised by many scientists and writers who have studied that period. Mr. E. L. Bogart, in his 'Economic History of the United States,' wrote :

The Civil War, by practically cutting off foreign intercourse, immensely hastened the growth of domestic indus-

Southern States.

—	1860	1870
	Dols.	Dols.
Alabama	495,237,078	201,855,871
Georgia	645,895,237	288,167,207
Louisiana	602,118,586	323,125,666
Mississippi	607,324,911	209,197,345
South Carolina	548,138,754	208,146,989
Texas	365,200,614	159,052,542

Northern States.

—	1860	1870
	Dols.	Dols.
Connecticut	444,274,114	774,631,524
Illinois	871,860,282	2,121,680,579
Indiana	528,835,371	1,268,180,543
Iowa	247,338,265	717,644,750
Kansas	31,327,895	188,892,014
Massachusetts	815,237,413	2,132,148,741
Minnesota	52,294,413	228,907,590
Missouri	501,214,398	1,284,922,877
Nebraska	9,131,398	69,277,483
New York	1,843,338,517	6,500,841,264
Ohio	1,173,898,422	2,235,430,300
Pennsylvania	1,416,501,848	3,803,340,112
Wisconsin	273,671,668	702,307,329

tries. The industrial revolution thus inaugurated has been compared with that in England one hundred years before. It certainly marks a turning-point in the economic development of the country as distinct as that in political life and more significant in its effects than the earlier industrial revolution, introduced in this country fifty years before by the restrictive period.

Another American writer, Katharine Coman, stated in her 'Industrial History of the United States':

The war demands, coupled with the protective tariff, induced an extraordinary activity in every department of business enterprise. Universal buoyancy and unbounded confidence in the future rendered it easy to borrow money at home and abroad. European capitalists invested readily in the United States securities, railroad bonds and mining stock, and the resources of the country were exploited as never before.

Theodor Vogelstein wrote in his book 'Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika' (Leipzig, 1910):

The manufacturing industries of the North came out of the war in a splendid condition. The enormous exertions made during the struggle, by which more than a million of the best workers were withdrawn from economic life, promoted the replacing of human labour by machine labour to an unusual extent. The necessity of paying interest on the large loans raised abroad naturally stimulated very greatly the export trade. On the other hand, imports, except of such goods as were required for the army, suffered. Lastly, the war brought with it a system of rigid protection; of a protection more severe than any American manufacturer would have thought possible in his wildest dreams. One of the greatest errors which one may encounter over and over again, even in scientific publications, is the idea that rigid American protectionism was created in 1890. . . . It is no mere coincidence that 1866, when Congress began to abolish internal war taxes, and left unaltered the corresponding import duties, saw the rise of the first American Trust.

When hostilities began between the North and the South, the United States had only a few thousand troops, and were utterly unprepared for the gigantic struggle. The vastness of the conflict, the employment of millions of soldiers, naturally created an enormous demand for weapons, and

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munitions, vehicles, railways, telegraphs, and manufactures of every kind. As the American foreign trade was very seriously restricted through reasons which will be discussed further on, and as the majority of the able-bodied men were withdrawn from the economic activities and enrolled in the army, a greatly reduced number of workers in field and factory had suddenly to provide an immensely increased output. The necessity of vastly increasing individual production compelled employers to introduce the most perfect and the most powerful labour-saving machinery available both in agriculture and in industry. Professor E. D. Fite wrote in his excellent book 'Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War':

Three things saved the harvest: the increased use of labour-saving machinery, the work of women in the fields, and the continued influx of new population.

Up to this time the use of reaping machines had been confined almost entirely to some of the large farms of the West. . . . Grain was generally sown by hand. These processes required the work of many men, so that when the able-bodied began to go to war, with large harvests left to garner, new methods and new implements were absolutely necessary if the crops were to be saved.

Immediately interest in labour-saving machinery and in the relative merits of the different machines became widespread, and next to enthusiasm over abounding crops in time of war was the most striking characteristic of the world of agriculture. . . . The old apathy was gone. The war suddenly had popularised methods of cultivation in which the agricultural papers had striven in vain for a decade to arouse interest.

The *Scientific American* of February 12, 1864, stated:

The total number of mowers manufactured increased from 35,000 in 1862 and 40,000 in 1863 to 70,000 in 1864; estimating the number for 1861 at 20,000, this would make the number for the four years 165,000, compared with 85,000 the number made in the preceding ten or twelve years.

Owing to the great improvements in agricultural machinery, agricultural production increased rapidly, and the losses caused by the war were soon made good. I have shown in the beginning of this chapter that between 1860 and 1867 the number of cattle, horses, mules, and pigs decreased very severely owing to the war. Between 1867 and 1877 the number of farm animals increased rapidly, as follows :

Farm Animals.

—	Cattle	Horses	Mules	Pigs	Sheep
1867	20,079,725	5,401,263	822,386	24,693,534	39,385,386
1877	29,216,900	10,155,400	1,443,500	28,077,100	35,804,200

The great improvement in agricultural appliances and machinery enabled a few men to do the work of many. The steam plough, the seed-casting machine, the reaper, the self-binder, and the railway made possible the opening and the vigorous exploitation of the rich agricultural plains of the West, notwithstanding the scarcity and the dearth of labour and the inaccessibility of the far-away interior. But for these machines the enormous agricultural wealth of the North American prairies would still be unutilised.

The Civil War gave a powerful stimulus to the development of the American railway system, especially as transport by the Mississippi was interrupted by the war, for the mouth of that mighty river was in the hands of the rebels. Professor Fite has told us :

The Mississippi formerly had been the outlet, carrying the grain and other produce to New Orleans, whence it was distributed in all directions. After the war closed the river, if the railroads had not been in existence, the West would have been isolated without a market ; and it was believed by some that, rather than lose this, the section would have followed its market into secession. . . .

The new routes of trade to the Atlantic coast were

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developed rapidly indeed, thanks to the wonderful increase of the crops even more than to the closing of the river. . . . The receipts and shipments of the port of Chicago grew apace, and were typical of the growth of the new routes eastward. Starting in 1838 with a shipment of 78 bushels of wheat, and gradually thereafter increasing her shipments, but never before 1860 sending out over 10,000,000 bushels of wheat and wheat flour, this new city in each year of the war shipped on the average 20,000,000 bushels of wheat and wheat flour ; her yearly corn exports, in the past never above 11,000,000 bushels, now averaged 25,000,000 bushels.

The closing of the Mississippi route, the abundance of the harvests and the vast transport requirements of the Army very greatly increased the pressure of railway traffic. It could be handled only by greatly increasing the efficiency of the railroads. Necessity thus led to the introduction of scientific railway management. Hitherto railways had been built haphazard by enterprising capitalists. Unrestricted individualism and the desire to hamper competitors had led to the introduction of at least eight different gauges, which varied from 4 feet 8½ inches to 6 feet. The war forced the railways to combine and to adopt a single gauge.

The standardisation of railways was gradually evolved. An Imperial railway system was created which found its highest expression in the Interstate Commerce Commission of 1887. The United States have private railways, but an Imperial railway system owing to the supervision and control exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission throughout the Union. During the war the weak iron rails, which rapidly wore out, were replaced by heavier iron and especially by steel rails. Stations, goods yards, and sidings were enlarged. Military and economic pressure made the rapid extension of the railway system indispensable. Notwithstanding the war the length of the American railways was increased from 80,626 miles in 1860 to 96,801 miles in 1866, or by 20 per cent. In consequence of the vast increase in railway business and of the improvements in handling

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the traffic which were introduced the American railways flourished greatly during the war. The *American Railway Record* of January 8, 1863, wrote, in reviewing the year 1862 :

The year 1862 will ever be remembered in railroading as one of the most prosperous that has ever been known. The railroads never earned so much in the whole course of their existence as they have during this much-dreaded year.

The *American Railroad Journal* of January 2, 1864, declared in reviewing the business of the year 1863 :

The railway system has greatly flourished the past year. The Companies have got out of debt or largely diminished their indebtedness, their earnings are increasing, their dividends have become regular and inviting. The past year has been, therefore, the most prosperous ever known to American railways.

Modern war is carried on by weapons and by machines. It is fought quite as much in the factory as in the field. The Civil War, while greatly promoting the development of America's agriculture and of the American railways, had not unnaturally the most far-reaching and the most striking effects upon the American manufacturing industries. Without their help the North could not possibly have won the war. Before 1861 the United States manufactured little. They imported vast quantities of manufactured goods of every kind from Europe, chiefly from Great Britain. Therefore, when the war broke out the Americans found that they lacked not only weapons and ammunition but wool and cloth for uniforms, boots, &c., as well.

The heavy cost of imported goods, the unfavourable position of the American exchange, and the disinclination to buy the commodities needed at an extortionate price and a ruinous exchange in Europe made necessary not only the rapid creation of war industries but that of general

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manufacturing industries as well. The war had totally disorganised America's foreign trade. It had stopped the exports of cotton, tobacco, and sugar which were produced in the revolted South, with which foreign imports were very largely paid for. How seriously America's foreign trade had been affected thereby may be seen by the fact that American exports shrank from \$833,576,057 in 1860 to only \$166,029,303 in 1865. They declined to one-half. During the same period imports were reduced from \$353,616,119 to \$238,745,580. However, soon after the war the American export trade expanded rapidly.

In view of the total disorganisation of the foreign trade and of the foreign exchange the United States were no longer able to buy manufactured goods in Europe and to pay for them chiefly with cotton, sugar, and tobacco. Necessity forced them to become self-supporting as far as possible. To encourage the American industries to produce those goods which hitherto were imported from abroad the American Government took a step comparable to that which the British Government took during the present War. With the intention of discouraging imports heavy taxes were imposed upon imported goods. The change effected in America's Fiscal Policy, owing to the stress of war, may be seen at a glance by the following table :

—	Customs Receipts	Duties per cent. ad valorem
1861	39,582,126	18-84
1862	49,056,398	36-19
1863	69,059,642	32-62
1864	102,316,153	36-69
1865	84,928,261	47-56
1866	179,046,652	48-33
1867	176,417,811	46-67
1868	164,464,600	48-63
1869	180,048,427	47-22
1912	304,899,360	40-12

It will be noticed that the *ad valorem* duties were twice

as high in 1862 as in 1861, and that they were considerably increased in 1865. Since then import duties have on an average been only little below 50 per cent. *ad valorem* on dutiable articles. Only during the last few years has the duty declined to an average of about 40 per cent.

Before the Civil War iron and iron ware had been one of the principal American imports. The Civil War laid the foundations of the gigantic iron and steel industry of the United States which is at present by far the largest in the world. Professor Fite wrote :

The progress of manufactures involving the raw materials of the mines was marked. Iron was used in all branches of manufacturing, and its growing consumption was an indication of general industrial progress. . . . Of all the flourishing centres of iron manufacturing Pittsburg was the largest ; here in one year six extensive iron mills were erected, and in the last year and a half of the war \$26,000,000 worth of iron and steel were manufactured.

The report of the American Iron and Steel Association of 1871 stated :

In 1860 205,000 tons of iron rails were made in the United States, the largest amount ever made in any one year up to that time ; 187,000 tons were made in 1861, 218,000 tons in 1862, 275,000 tons in 1863, 335,000 tons in 1864, and 356,000 tons in 1865. In 1853 importations reached 358,000 tons, the highest figure reached in the 'fifties ; 146,000 tons were imported in 1860, 89,000 tons in 1861, 10,000 tons in 1862, 20,000 tons in 1863, 146,000 tons in 1864, and 63,000 tons in 1865.

The Civil War was instrumental in creating the gigantic American clothing and boot and shoe industries. Professor Fite tells us :

At first uniforms were very scarce ; in the various United States garrisons, when the war came, there were only enough on hand to accommodate the regular army of 13,000 men, and but few factories were fitted for making

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cloth for military purposes. . . . When the War Department made heavy purchases of army cloth in England and France in order to meet the crisis, the almost savage cry arose in some quarters : ' Patronise home industries.' . . .

In the succeeding years the woollen factories were able to cope with the situation, and no more complaints were heard ; the millions of soldiers were clad in products of the country's own mills. The annual military consumption of wool in the height of the war was 75,000,000 pounds, for domestic purposes 138,000,000 pounds more, a total consumption for all purposes of over 200,000,000 pounds, against 85,000,000 pounds in times of peace.

The progress of the woollen factories, most of them located in New York and New England, was enormous ; every mill was worked to its fullest capacity, many working night and day, Sunday included. In all 2000 sets of new cards were erected, representing many new mills. As the report of the New York Chamber of Commerce said, the progress seemed scarcely credible. . . .

The ready-made clothing industry was as necessary for clothing the army as were the sheep farms and the woollen mills. . . . The trade thus created did supplant importations from the East side of London. By the middle of the war the importations ceased, and then the country succeeded in clothing its army of over a million men almost entirely by native industry, not only furnishing a large percentage of the wool for manufacturing all the cloth, but making the uniforms.

Much of this success was doubtless due to the sewing machine then but recently invented. . . . The manufacture of clothing was greatly stimulated. Men's shirts, which required fourteen hours and twenty minutes for making by hand, by the machine could be made in one hour and sixteen minutes. . . .

The shoe industry likewise benefited by the sewing machine ; in fact, was converted by it from a system of household manufacture to the modern factory system.

During the Civil War British cotton thread, which hitherto had had practically a monopoly in the United States;

was replaced by American cotton thread. In the words of Professor Fite :

Cotton thread continued to be used, with the more or less complete substitution of American-made for the English-made product, which had been almost the only thread sold before the war. Through the influence of the heavy war tariff three-fourths of the market came to be supplied from home. The advance in the price of 'Coats,' which finally reached four times its old value, created a chance for American manufacturers, which was readily seized upon, and a vast new industry sprang up; the Willimantic Company, with a new plant worth \$1,000,000, Green & Daniels, and other firms appeared. At Newark, New Jersey, an English firm built a very large plant to manufacture their product on this side of the tariff wall and thus reap its advantages.

The huge modern meat-packing industry of Chicago also was greatly stimulated, if not created, by the war. Professor Fite wrote :

Progress in hog-packing was centred chiefly in Chicago. The industry here had been progressing slowly for almost thirty years, when suddenly, as the result of the unusual transportation conditions arising out of the closing of the Mississippi River, the yearly output rose from 270,000 hogs in 1860, the largest number packed in any one year before the war, to 900,000.

Many other industries, too numerous to mention, owed their creation, or their powerful expansion, to the war.

Industrial efficiency and productiveness are increased not only by improved labour-saving machinery but by an improved organisation as well. Industrial co-operation and the division of labour can be carried to the greatest perfection only by a concentration of energy and direction, by manufacturing on a large scale, by eliminating unnecessary and therefore wasteful competition. Owing to the pressure

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of the war a powerful tendency towards industrial consolidation arose. Professor Fite has told us :

As soon as expansion set in it was evident that the existing industrial machinery was inadequate to the tasks imposed upon it. Industrial enterprises in the past under a system of free competition had been very numerous, and each had been conducted on a small scale ; there was no unity of effort in allied lines and over large areas of territory, while in some cases unwise laws had created inequalities. This lack of unity needed to be corrected, more harmony among common interests introduced, and unequal privileges swept away, if business was to be transacted on an increased scale. This was the fundamental reason for the sudden and pronounced tendency towards consolidation that characterised the world of capital as soon as the war began, although other factors doubtless contributed to the same end, such as internal taxes, large fortunes, the progress of inventions, peculiar transportation conditions, the tariff, high prices, and the assaults of the labouring classes. . . .

When once started, concentration of manufacturing went on swiftly. Soon after the war was over the special commissioner of the revenue noted a rapid concentration of the business of manufacturing into single vast establishments and an utter annihilation of thousands of little separate industries, the existence of which was formerly a characteristic of the older sections of the country. . . .

Never in the history of the country up to that time had there been such a strong tendency towards united and harmonious action on the part of the employing classes, whether this resulted in a complete merging of one company into another or looser and more temporary organisations to consider the subject of prices, internal taxes, the tariff, or wages ; never had there been such an incentive to consolidation and union. Combination in every line was the tendency of the hour. A determination was growing to merge small, isolated units, often hostile to each other, into larger and more harmonious groups ; big corporations supplanted smaller ones ; things were done on a more extensive scale than had ever before been attempted. Although

the new spirit appeared suddenly, it did its work thoroughly, and while it was not carried as far as at the present time, it must still be recognised that its advent created a new epoch in industrial and commercial life, the foundation for all that has come later. There was a definite turning away from the independent self-reliant localism and small units of the past, a decided right-about toward centralisation. . . .

Another element entering into the situation was the peculiar effects of internal taxes. There was a tax on the sales of most industrial products, placed finally at 6 per cent. *ad valorem*, which bore heavily on manufacturers, inasmuch as most products represented more than one process of manufacture. . . .

The manufacturer with little capital, who could afford only a small establishment, was discriminated against in favour of the rich man ; if the cotton manufacturer could afford not only to spin but also to weave, he escaped one tax ; if he could have his own dyeworks, he escaped another tax. Such a man, after enlarging his plant, could undersell his poor neighbour. Concentration in manufacturing, therefore, came to be the rule, for the more nearly complete and comprehensive the plant, the less was the tax.

During the Civil War the American manufacturing industries expanded with almost incredible vigour. Professor Fite briefly summed up the principal causes of their expansion in the following words :

For this progress of manufacturing there were many reasons. First, the ordinary needs of the country were greater than usual. . . .

Then the paper money régime was in full swing, and money was plenty and prices soaring. There was, too, the incentive of the tariff, not a session of Congress passing without some raising of these bars to foreigners. Every manufacturer, great and small, was conscious of more buoyancy and freedom as he realised that under the cloak of the supposed needs of revenue with which to wage the war he was rapidly dispensing with foreign competition with all its attendant risks ; examples of industries benefited in this way were sugar, thread, iron, steel rail, and woollen

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manufacturing. But greatest of all incentives were Government contracts, which generally have a way of bringing higher prices than ordinary sales, and which at this time became more and more lucrative as foreigners were effectually barred from competition. Fortunate the manufacturer who had such contracts, and small the number who did not have them. Contemporary opinion plainly inclined to the view that a Government contract was the manufacturer's greatest opportunity.

The best and the most imposing picture of the progress of the American manufacturing industries during the decade in which the Civil War occurred is furnished by the dry statistics of the American Censuses of 1860 and 1870. While Professor Fite in his excellent account describes to us the causes, the Censuses merely give the facts. They confirm the views expressed by Professor Fite and they show the following remarkable and almost unbelievable progress during a period of war :

—	1860	1870
Manufacturing establishments	140,433	252,148
Capital employed	\$1,009,855,715	\$2,118,208,769
Hands employed	1,311,246	2,053,996
Wages paid	\$378,878,966	\$775,584,343
Value of products	\$1,885,861,676	\$4,232,325,442

Between 1860 and 1870 the number of manufacturing establishments increased by 80 per cent. and their capital was more than doubled. The number of hands employed increased by 55 per cent., and the wages paid to them and the value of products turned out increased each by more than 100 per cent. That is truly a wonderful record. The figures given prove conclusively that the Civil War, notwithstanding its destructiveness and huge cost, did not ruin the American industries but caused their rise and prosperity.

As the table given treats summarily the American

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industries as a whole, their progress can perhaps more correctly be gauged by a more detailed comparison of their output according to the Censuses :

Value of Industrial Production.

—	In 1860	In 1870
	Dols.	Dols.
Agricultural implements	17,487,960	52,066,875
Bricks and tiles	11,263,147	29,302,016
Hosiery	7,280,606	18,411,564
Cotton goods	115,681,774	177,489,739
Indiarubber goods	5,768,450	14,566,374
Pig iron	20,870,120	69,640,498
Rolled iron	31,888,705	120,311,158
Cast iron	36,132,033	99,843,218
Forged iron	2,030,718	8,385,669
Lumber	96,715,854	210,159,327
Machinery	51,887,266	138,519,246
Nails and tacks	9,857,223	23,101,082
Sewing machines	4,255,820	13,638,706
Silk manufactures	6,607,771	12,210,662
Steel	1,778,240	9,609,986
Tobacco and snuff	21,820,535	38,388,359
Tobacco and cigars	9,068,778	33,373,685
Woollen goods	61,894,986	155,405,358
Worsted goods	3,701,378	22,090,381

Comparison of the figures given shows that between 1860 and 1870 the production of agricultural implements, bricks and tiles, indiarubber goods, pig iron, cast iron, machinery, sewing machines, cigars and woollen goods increased threefold, that the production of rolled iron and forged iron increased fourfold, and that the output of steel and worsted goods increased no less than sixfold. These figures, which have not been picked in order to make a case, but which are all those given in the American Censuses, prove that the war enormously benefited the American manufacturing industries, that the great struggle between the North and the South brought about the rapid expansion of American manufacturing which carried the United States to the first rank among industrial nations.

Nations are born in war and die in peace. Peace creates

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sloth, neglect, intrigue, and dissension. A keen sense of danger, on the other hand, is the most powerful unifying factor known to history. The hostility of Austria united Switzerland, Hungary, and Italy and is uniting the Southern Slavs. The hostility of France united Germany. The hostility of England united the quarrelling American Colonies and creased the United States. The hostility of Germany is welding the British Empire into an indissoluble whole.

Wars, though disastrous to individuals, often prove a blessing to nations. They unite and toughen men. They prepare them for the struggle of life both in the military and in the economic sphere.

Success in trade and industry, as in war, depends after all not so much on the possession of dead resources as on the intelligence, ability, energy, and industry of men. Most men are born idlers. They prefer ease and comfort to physical and mental exertion. Hence they dislike and oppose change and progress. Necessity is the mother not only of ingenuity and of invention but of labour and of thrift, and therefore of economic progress and of wealth. Herein lies the reason that the countries most blessed by Nature are often the poorest and the least progressive. Great Britain's former industrial predominance was founded not in peace but in war. It was created, as I have shown in the previous chapter, during the period 1775-1815. Of these forty years thirty were spent in colossal wars, the war with the American Colonies and their European allies, and the gigantic war with Republican and Napoleonic France. These wars gave to Great Britain her late pre-eminence in commerce and industry. Necessity, especially the enormous increase in taxation, made vastly increased production indispensable. It led to the introduction of the steam engine, of modern industry, of modern commerce, of modern agriculture, of modern transport, and of modern capitalism. It brought about the industrial revolution.

Peace and ease have almost unnoticed deprived Great

Britain of the foremost industrial position which she had obtained during the Great War, and which now is possessed by the United States. The present War should not only unite the British Empire but should once more give to the British people the foremost position in the economic world, provided they make wise and energetic use of their opportunities. On the other hand, the United States, far from enriching themselves at the cost of the fighting nations, far from coining the sweat and blood of the Allies into dollars, may, through peace and ease, fall a prey to that fatal self-complacency and stagnation from which political and industrial Britain has suffered for decades and from which she has been saved by the War. Before long the Great Republic may begin to stagnate and decline and become a victim of her undisturbed material prosperity. It seems not impossible that, owing to the War, the United States will henceforth decline, not only politically but economically as well, while Great Britain will once more become economically the leading Anglo-Saxon nation.

Let us now consider the economic effects of the War upon Great Britain and upon the Empire as a whole.

In the chapter on 'Britain's War Finance and Economic Future,' I showed by means of irrefutable figures, which have attracted the attention of the principal technical papers and of many eminent industrialists, that the American workers in factories, mines, &c., produce per head from two to three times as much as their British colleagues engaged in the same callings; that the vastly greater output of the American workers is due to the employment of far more powerful and far more efficient machinery, better organisation, a greater desire for progress on the part of the manufacturers, and a comparative absence of a deliberate limitation of output on the part of the workers. I showed that Great Britain could double and treble her income and wealth by doubling and trebling her engine-power upon the American plan and by improving her organisation. I showed that she could easily pay, and

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more than pay, for the War by Americanising her industries. Since the time when those words were printed¹ the Americanisation of British industry has begun. The pressure of necessity has brought about many of the necessary changes. The British employers have been awakened to the need of progress and reform, and the British Trade Unions have abandoned in part their fatal policy of restricting output and antagonising improved machinery.

Before the War the United Kingdom had, in round numbers, 18,000,000 male and female workers employed in agriculture, industry, commerce, domestic service, &c. Since then about 6,000,000 men have joined the Army and Navy, while, according to Mr. Montagu's statement made in the House of Commons on August 15, 1916, 2,250,000 men and women are engaged in making munitions under the Ministry of Munitions. If we estimate that, in addition to these, 750,000 men and women not under the Ministry of Munitions are engaged on war work, it appears that the War has reduced the number of British workers by exactly one-half. However, the loss in man-power is probably not 50 per cent. but about 60 per cent., because the youngest, the strongest, and the most efficient workers are either in the Army and Navy or engaged on war work. The consumption of the country is about as great as it was in peace time, for, while private demand for goods is smaller here and there, the reduction effected by the economy of some is probably counter-balanced by the increased spending on the part of the workers, and especially by the enormous demands for ordinary goods for the use of the Army and Navy. The British exports for the first seven months of 1916 were, but for £10,000,000, as large as those during the corresponding seven peace months of 1914, although, allowing for the rise in prices, they were considerably smaller.

It therefore appears that with only *one-half* of her workers Great Britain produces now approximately as

¹ September, 1915.

large a quantity of ordinary goods as she did with *all* her workers before the War. In other words, the output per worker has approximately doubled. Necessity has led to more intensive and more scientific production, to better organisation, to the introduction of the most modern methods and of the most perfect machinery, not only in the manufacture of munitions of war, but in ordinary manufacturing as well. It has been stated that during the War the United Kingdom has imported £200,000,000 worth of American machinery. The vast advance made in manufacturing will no doubt be of permanent benefit to the nation. The new and efficient processes will not be abandoned for the old and wasteful ones. Mr. Montagu stated in the House of Commons on August 15, when describing the activity of the Ministry of Munitions, according to the verbatim report :

Old-fashioned machinery and slipshod methods are disappearing rapidly under the stress of war, and whatever there may have been of contempt for science in this country, it does not exist now. There is a new spirit in every department of industry which I feel certain is not destined to disappear when we are at liberty to divert it from its present supreme purpose of beating the Central Powers. When that is done, can we not apply to peaceful uses, the form of organisation represented by the Ministry of Munitions? I am not thinking so much of the great buildings which constitute new centres of industry, planned with the utmost ingenuity so as to economise effort, filled with machines of incredible efficiency and exactitude. I wish rather to emphasise the extent to which all concerned—and each section is vital to our objects—are co-operating to obtain the best results from the material in our hands. We have the leaders of all the essential industries now working for us or co-operating with us in the Ministry. The great unions render us constant assistance in the discussion and solution of difficulties, whether with our officers or within their own body. On technical questions of the most varied character we have the advantage of the best expert advice in the country.

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We have in being, now that British industry is organised for war, the general staff of British industry. I am sure that we should sacrifice much if we did not avail ourselves of that staff to consider how far all this moral and material energy can be turned to peaceful account.

Sir W. Essex, a great industrialist, said at the same sitting :

I think the products of this Armageddon are going to be real and substantial. I know the price we shall pay for it will be enormous, but we shall not begrudge it, or a tithe or a hundredth of it, but a great by-product will be that our mechanical industry and our chemical industry, and all the industries which are touched—and hardly an industry is not touched more or less intimately—will have been revived, modernised, and invigorated to an incredible degree, and that must of necessity react on the whole industrial work of our Empire, and will not only maintain, but enormously enhance all the advantages which as a manufacturing nation we have hitherto enjoyed. . . .

These men [the leaders of industry who are co-operating with the Ministry of Munitions] are going up and down, week in and week out, month in and month out, energising the thousands of factories which are under the control of the Ministry of Munitions, bringing them up to date in their workshop methods, making them acquainted in many cases I know with tools, the like of which they had no previous knowledge of save by hearsay, bringing them up also to new methods, new systems, and organisation until—this is the common testimony of many of the proprietors of these factories—' We did not know our business until we got linked up with the Minister of Munitions.' You are able by this aggregation of the manufacturing industries of the country here employed to level up the whole, and that, I take it, would be a by-product of incalculable value to the industry of this country, and must enormously affect it for good and make for our advantage in the future competition with other races of the world.

The necessity of war has not only vastly increased the

efficiency of the existing industries, but has caused powerful new industries to arise. Vast quantities of chemicals, electrical apparatus, glass, optical-ware, machinery, tools, &c., which formerly were imported from abroad, are now manufactured in this country, especially as import prohibitions have provided a powerful stimulus. The War has greatly promoted technical education and increased technical ability, for skilled workers in enormous numbers were wanted. Hence hundreds of schools had to be created in which unskilled workers were converted into highly skilled ones. Inventiveness was stimulated by the necessity to manufacture numerous articles which hitherto were made abroad by secret processes. Last, but not least, the War has led to the creation of huge model factories for making munitions, compared with which the great Woolwich establishment is small and out of date. These giant factories will not be pulled down after the conclusion of peace, but will, of course, be adapted to the production of ordinary goods. Great Britain will undoubtedly follow in this the example set by the United States after the Civil War.

The War has doubled the manufacturing efficiency not only of Great Britain, but of France, Russia, Italy, and Japan as well. When the struggle is over, the United States will no longer compete with industrial nations possessed of an antiquated outfit whose output per man is exceedingly low owing to the use of inefficient and labour-wasting machinery and methods. During the War the most important industries of the whole world have become Americanised. The United States will henceforth have to compete on equal terms in an Americanised world. They may discover that the War has destroyed their industrial paramountcy.

The change effected by the War will be particularly striking in the iron and steel industry, the most important of all manufacturing industries. Before the struggle the United States and Germany dominated the world's iron and steel trade, and Britain's position had sunk very low indeed,

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as the following figures show, which are taken from the 'Statesman's Year Book':

—	Production of Iron in 1912	Production of Steel in 1912
	Tons	Tons
United States	29,727,000	31,251,000
Germany	17,582,000	17,024,000
United Kingdom	8,751,000	6,903,000

In 1912 the United Kingdom produced only about one-half as much iron as Germany, and one-third as much iron as the United States. In the same year the United Kingdom produced only about one-third as much steel as Germany and one-fifth as much steel as the United States.

Germany's defeat will no doubt lead to the decline of her mightiest industry. The bulk of the iron ore employed by the German iron industry came before the War from German Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the French districts close to the German frontier. The principal iron deposits on the Continent are dominated by the guns of Metz and Diedenhofen on the one hand, and of Verdun and Nancy on the other. Germany's desperate attack upon Verdun was probably largely due to the wish to deprive France of her steel. France's acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine will deprive Germany of the bulk of her iron ore and make France the proprietor of the largest iron deposits in Europe. The iron ore in sight in the small Lorraine-Luxemburg district is approximately as plentiful and as rich in metal as the iron ore of the United States.

Iron-smelting requires of course vast quantities of coal. About a ton and a half of coal is needed for every ton of iron ore. Unfortunately France has little coal, and has to import vast quantities of coal, although her iron industry is at present of comparatively little importance. The output of the French coal-mines can apparently not be greatly increased. Near the German frontier, but outside Alsace-Lorraine, on the Saar River, there are German coal-mines

which France might acquire, but these do not yield a satisfactory coke for iron-smelting. Hence Germany uses Westphalian coal for smelting the iron of Lorraine. Possessing the Lorraine ore beds, France would lack coal wherewith to smelt it. She would therefore either have to import coal from Westphalia or England for exploiting that vast resource, or she would have to send a large part of the Lorraine ore to Germany or England for smelting. Great Britain and France have been partners in war and should be partners in peace. They might jointly exploit the vast ore deposits mentioned. By co-operating, England and France might dominate not only the iron trade of Europe, but perhaps that of the world. They might leave far behind them the iron industry of the United States

In consequence of the War the industrial output of the United Kingdom, as that of the United States after the Civil War, may be doubled and trebled. The United Kingdom, like the small industrial area of the United States, will find its best and safest market for a vastly increased industrial output in the Dominions and Colonies, in its Far West. After the Civil War the United States developed their great estate with the same energy with which they had conducted the war. I have shown in the beginning of this chapter that the United States, with their comparatively small territory, have almost exactly twice as many miles of railway as has the whole of the British Empire, with its immense territory. Hundreds of thousands of miles of railway are required throughout the British Empire. The opening of the Dominions and Colonies by means of railways alone will give full employment to the vastly enlarged iron and steel industries of Great Britain and the Dominions for decades to come. The British Dominions have room for hundreds of millions of white settlers. After the end of the Civil War money had to be made to pay off the war debt. To make money, the Far West had to be opened up by means of railways and immigrants, for railways and settlement must go hand in hand. The numerous immigrants kept fully

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employed not only the American iron and steel industry which the war had created, but all the American industries which had been immensely enlarged during the struggle.

In territory and in latent resources the British Empire is far superior to the United States, but in developed and exploited resources, in industrial power, wealth, and white population, the Empire is very inferior to the Great Republic. Between 1871 and 1911 the population of the United States increased by 58,500,000, that of Germany increased by 25,400,000, while the white population of the British Empire grew by only 21,500,000. That comparison is humiliating for the British Empire. If the same rate of progress or a similar rate should continue to prevail, the British Empire would in course of time become a second-rate or a third-rate Power.

Wealth is power. The British Empire should endeavour to be the leading Anglo-Saxon nation, not only in territory, but in white population and wealth as well. Hitherto the development of the Empire has been restricted by a small-minded parochial policy of the component parts, by lack of Imperial organisation and co-operation. The great Imperial domain can be adequately protected and exploited only by the Empire as a whole, by a truly Imperial Government, by Empire-wide co-operation. Immigration and emigration, transportation by land and water, the planful opening and settlement of the vast empty spaces of the Empire, and the question of inter-Imperial trade must be settled imperially, not parochially. If that is done, there is every reason to believe that in a few decades the British Empire will be far ahead of the United States both in white population and in wealth.

It may be argued that the British Dominions and Colonies cannot be developed as rapidly as the United States, although the resources of the former are greater than those of the latter, because the United States are a single country which nature has opened up by a number of magnificent rivers. That argument is erroneous. The United States are not

a State, but a number of States, which jealously defend their State rights and which do not readily co-operate. Besides, the seas are the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Hudson of the British Empire. They do not separate, but connect the different parts.

In consequence of the Civil War, the United States standardised their chaotic railway system, as has been shown. They placed it under imperial control, and gradually evolved a unified and national system by means of the Inter-State Commerce Commission. Cheap transport and freight and equitable rates are the best means for opening up the Empire rapidly. The Governments of the Empire should learn from America's lesson and control transport by land and water throughout the Empire. At present private railway companies and shipping companies direct, divert, stimulate, or restrict the imperial trade according to their convenience, or even penalise British and facilitate foreign trade for their own benefit. The transport companies by land and sea must be taught that the interests of the Empire are more important than those of their shareholders.

An Imperial Government in the full sense of the term should investigate and take stock of the Imperial resources, for they are unknown. It is nobody's business to study and describe the resources of the Empire. No official survey has even been made of England's coal beds. The resources of the Empire are exploited, or wasted, at will by private individuals. The mineral resources of the United States have been explored and described by the American Geological Survey, which has rendered invaluable service, and of recent years the Americans have embarked upon the policy of preserving their natural resources under the guidance of their national Conservation Commission. An Imperial stocktaking is necessary. The Empire belongs to the race, not to a few capitalists. Its exploitation should be guided by national and Imperial interests. Yet such guidance need not restrict very much the activities of enterprising capitalists.

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The British race will scarcely suffice to fill up the vacant lands of the Empire. The Dominions will become keen competitors with the United States for desirable immigrants. Hitherto the bulk of European emigrants have gone to the United States, but the British Empire may be able to divert the stream. For decades men have gone to the United States not only because it was easy to make money in that country, but also because the United States were considered a home of freedom, the champion of liberty. America's prestige as a defender of freedom and liberty has probably suffered owing to her attitude during the first two years of the War. Men wishing for liberty may henceforth rather go to the British Empire than to the United States. The planful development of the Imperial domain by the building of railways and the cheapening of transport will bring hundreds of thousands of desirable emigrants to the British Empire.

The tariff policy of Great Britain and the Dominions will have the most far-reaching influence upon the economic development of the Empire. A common-sense tariff policy will further the settlement and exploitation of the Imperial estate, while a doctrinaire, a vote-catching, or sectional policy will condemn the Empire to stagnation and decline. The development of the United States has been helped immensely by the fact that they form a single market. The British Empire, like the United States, is so vast that there need be no jealousy among the component States. British industry, like the industry of Pennsylvania or Illinois, cannot provide all the manufactured goods wanted by the Empire. There is room for manufacturing centres in all parts of the Empire. A narrow spirit of monopoly and exclusion or a cosmopolitan fiscal policy advocated by doctrinaires would greatly, and perhaps fatally, hamper the Empire's development in population and wealth.

The War, as has been shown at the beginning of this chapter, may cost about £7,500,000,000. That is a colossal burden, and the British Empire should endeavour to pay off

the debt with reasonable speed. The War was waged not merely for the benefit of the United Kingdom, but for that of the British Empire as a whole. It seems therefore only fair that the British Dominions should assume their full share of the cost of the War, especially as the assumption of their part of the burden should prove highly beneficial to them.

A large increase in taxation throughout the Dominions would most powerfully stimulate production. Hitherto the development of the Empire has been hindered very seriously by the fact that too many emigrants have endeavoured to make a living not by production, but by trade and speculation. Nearly 40 per cent. of the inhabitants of Australia live in the five capital towns, while the vast expanses of the country remain empty. Nearly 50 per cent. of the inhabitants of New South Wales and Victoria live in Sydney and Melbourne. Several years ago, when I was in the West of Canada, I found that the principal industry consisted in gambling in real estate. The Dominions have developed so slowly very largely because money was too cheap, taxes were too low, and life was too easy. Men could make a good living by little work. If Great Britain should, by the unwillingness of the Dominions, be forced to take over an unduly large share of the war debt, it may be ruinous not only to the Mother Country, but to the Empire as a whole, especially if the Dominions should practise at the same time an exclusive policy towards British manufactures. Happily this seems unlikely.

The War has been waged not only for the present generation, but for future generations as well. It seems therefore only fair that part of the cost should be borne by future generations. It might be thrown in part on the latent and undeveloped resources of the Empire, which might be pooled for the purpose of repaying the war debt. The other part of the cost, to be paid by the present generation, might be allocated to the various States of the Empire according to the number of the people and their wealth per head, so that

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the burden should be borne fairly and equally by all. Periodically the allocation might be revised and a redistribution effected in accordance with changing circumstances.

The latent resources of the Empire are boundless. There is every reason to believe that the British Empire, if wisely governed and administered, will exceed the United States in white population and in wealth in a few decades. The War will apparently devour a sum equal to about one-half of Great Britain's national wealth, but that fact need not disturb us. The Civil War cost the United States a sum which was equal to about two-thirds their national wealth at the time. During the fifty years which have elapsed since its conclusion, the wealth of the United States has grown at so rapid a rate, largely in consequence of that war, that to the present generation the gigantic war cost seems almost trifling. The sum of £7,500,000,000, though equal to one-half of Great Britain's national wealth, comes only to about one-fourth of the Empire's national wealth. In a few decades the cost of the World War may appear as small to the citizens of the British Empire as that of the Civil War appears now to most Americans and that of the Napoleonic War to most Englishmen of the present. The war with Napoleon created England's economic supremacy. The Civil War created the industrial supremacy of the United States. The present War should give the industrial supremacy of the world to the British Empire.

CHAPTER IX

DEMOCRACY AND THE IRON BROOM OF WAR¹

AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PROPOSALS²

GOLD is tested by fire and nations by war. The World War has glaringly revealed the improvidence, the inefficiency, and the wastefulness of the democratically governed States. France, though utterly defeated by Germany in 1870-71, and frequently threatened by her with war since then, especially in 1905 and in 1911, when a German attack seemed almost inevitable, was quite unprepared for her ordeal. A fortnight before the fatal ultimatum was launched upon Serbia, at a moment when the tension was very great, and when Germany was possibly hesitating whether she should strike or not, Senator Humbert revealed to the world in an official report which created an enormous sensation throughout Europe, that the French fortresses were unable to resist efficiently a modern siege, that the French Army lacked heavy guns, ammunition, rifles, and uniforms, that France had in stock per soldier only a single boot, thirty years old. Belgium separates France from Germany. The numerous purely strategical railways which Germany had constructed towards the Belgian frontier had clearly revealed her hostile intentions towards her small neighbour. Belgium, having a population of 8,000,000,

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, February, 1916.

² Most of the 'proposals' contained in the following pages were carried out by Mr. Lloyd George on his taking over the premiership, eleven months after their publication in *The Nineteenth Century* review. This was probably due purely to coincidence, for the reforms introduced in the national organisation were logical and necessary.

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might easily have raised an army of 500,000 or 1,000,000 men. Such an army, supported by modern fortresses, would certainly have caused Germany to respect Belgium's neutrality. The test of war found the Belgian fortresses and army totally inadequate. Except for her Fleet, Great Britain was equally unprepared for the War. She has since then raised a huge army, but disappointment and failure have been the result of her diplomatic action in Turkey and Bulgaria, and of her military efforts at the Dardanelles, on the Vardar, in Mesopotamia, and elsewhere. Poor and backward Russia, on the other hand, surprised the world by her preparedness, and invaded Eastern Prussia and Galicia soon after the opening of hostilities.

Comparison of the improvidence, inefficiency, and wastefulness displayed by democratic France, Belgium, and Great Britain with the war-readiness and efficiency of the autocratically governed States, and especially of Germany, has clearly revealed the inferiority of democracy in warfare and in national organisation. It is easy to make sweeping generalisations. Many people have proclaimed that democracy has proved a failure, that the doom of democracy is at hand, that the iron broom of war will sweep it into the limbo of forgotten things. England has invented modern representative and democratic government. The national organisation of most civilised States is modelled upon that of this country. Let us then inquire whether democracy is indeed a failure, or whether, like every institution in this world, it has merely certain failings which can be remedied. If it possesses grave but remediable defects, let us try to find a cure. England, who has evolved representative Government, should be the first to deal with its faults and to introduce the necessary changes.

In the fourth century before Christ Aristotle wrote in his book 'Politics': 'It is not for what is ancient, but for what is useful, that men of sense ought to contend; and whatever is distinguished by the former quality cannot

be expected to possess much of the latter.' About the same time Thucydides stated in his history: 'It is the custom of mankind, even where their own country is concerned, to acquiesce with complacent credulity in the traditions of former ages without subjecting them to the test of critical examination.' Flattery and misplaced admiration are far more dangerous than honest hostility. The British Constitution has suffered more from its friends than from its enemies. It has been dealt with in innumerable books, but unfortunately most of these are written in a spirit of blind and uncritical admiration. Besides, practically all who have written on the British Constitution treat it as if it were an ancient Gothic cathedral or some other venerable relic of the past. They look upon it with awe from the point of view of the antiquary, the historian, the artist, and true believer. They do not recognise that a constitution is in the first place not a work of art, but an instrument of government. They describe to us in full detail its ancient history, the gradual changes it has undergone, its Gothic intricacies and irregularities, and its present aspects, but they fail as a rule to inquire whether it answers its practical purposes. Walter Bagehot, one of the very few men who endeavoured to consider it from the practical point of view, wrote in his book '*The English Constitution*':

The characteristic merit of the English Constitution is that its dignified parts are very complicated and somewhat imposing, very old and rather venerable; while its efficient part, at least when in great and critical action, is decidedly simple and rather modern. We have made, or rather stumbled, on a constitution which—though full of every species of incidental defect, though of the worst workmanship in all out-of-the-way matters of any constitution in the world—yet has two capital merits: it contains a simple efficient part which, on occasion and when wanted, can work more simply and easily, and better, than any instrument of government that has yet been tried; and it contains likewise

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historical, complex, august, theatrical parts which it has inherited from a long past—which take the multitude—which guide by an insensible but an omnipotent influence the associations of its subjects. Its essence is strong with the strength of modern simplicity; its exterior is august with the Gothic grandeur of a more imposing age.

In view of the experience of the World War, or, indeed, of any great war in which this country has been engaged, Bagehot's emphatic assertion that the English Constitution 'in great and critical action is decidedly simple and rather modern,' that 'when wanted it can work more simply and easily, and better, than any instrument of government that has yet been tried,' can only be described as a ludicrous travesty and perversion of fact. Unfortunately his view is representative of that of most constitutional writers.

Statesmanship is not an abstract science, not a science based upon theory, but an eminently practical science, a science which is based on experience. A serious disease should not be subjected to empiric treatment. A wise physician will carefully diagnose the case submitted to him before considering the remedy. Let us then consult some of the greatest and wisest statesmen of all times. Their opinions, which are based on unrivalled experience, will provide us with invaluable guidance, and the importance of the views given in the following pages will be greatly enhanced by the fact that most of them will be new to British readers.

Aristotle, the friend and teacher of Alexander the Great, whose book 'Politics' should be read by every statesman and politician, wrote: 'An error in the original structure of government often proves ruinous both to republics and to aristocracies.' The ancient Greeks had much experience of the practical working of democracy. They saw their democracies first assailed by the military obligarchy of Sparta and then destroyed by the Macedonian autocracy under King Philip. Their greatest thinkers believed that their

downfall was due not to the chance of war, but to 'a fatal error in the original constitution of their government.' They believed that democracy was, owing to its very nature, a less efficient form of government than monarchy. Aristotle wrote in his book 'Politics':

That which is a common concern to all is very generally neglected. The energies of man are stimulated by that which depends on himself alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, he employs with reluctance as much attention and activity as his own interest requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care, and as other men prove equally negligent, the general interest is universally abandoned. Those families are commonly the worst served in which the domestics are the most numerous.

Isocrates, one of the greatest Greek orator-statesmen, whose works are very little known, wrote in his 'Third Oration':

Democracies honour those who by delusive eloquence govern the multitude, but monarchies those who are most capable in managing the affairs of the nation. Monarchies surpass democratic governments not only in the ordinary routine of administration, but especially in war, for monarchies are more able than are democracies to raise troops, to use them to advantage, to arm in secret, to make military demonstrations, to win over some neighbours, and to overawe others.

All are acquainted with the military events which brought about the downfall of Athens, the wealthiest and most powerful Greek republic, whose fleet ruled the sea, but few know its hidden causes. In the second century before Christ the Greco-Roman Polybius, the most statesman-like historian of antiquity, who was not only a great writer, but a diplomat and general as well, and who wrote history from the point of view of the statesman, stated that Athens fell

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because a change in her constitution had deprived her of a single head. He wrote :

Athens, having been raised by the ability of Themistocles to the greatest height of power and glory, shortly afterwards sank into weakness and disgrace. The cause of this sudden change lay in the inappropriate constitution of the Government, for the Athenian State was like a ship without a captain.

His views are confirmed by Thucydides, a contemporary of Pericles, who was an eye-witness of the decline and fall of Athens. Writing in the fourth century before Christ, he tells us that in the time of Pericles, Athens, though a republic in name, was, owing to the great prestige of Pericles, a monarchy in fact, and that her greatness declined when, after his death, the State became a true democracy and a prey to party-political strife. He wrote :

Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against corruption, kept the people in order by gentle management, and was not directed by them, but was their principal director. He had not wormed himself into power by dubious methods. Therefore he was not obliged to soothe and praise their caprices, but could oppose and disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he saw them bent on projects injurious or unreasonable, he terrified them so much by the force of his eloquence that he made them tremble and desist, and when they were disquieted by groundless apprehensions, he animated them afresh into brave resolution. The State, under him, though called a democracy, was in fact a monarchy. His successors were more on a level with one another, and as every one of them aspired to be their leader, they were forced to cajole the people, and so to neglect the concerns of the public. This was the source of many grievous errors of statesmanship, as must unavoidably be the case in any great community which is possessed of large dominions.

Pericles had introduced the pernicious system of con-

verting into an object of gain those services rendered to the nation which formerly were rendered gratuitously and which had been considered a trust and an honour. He died, and politicians desirous of power endeavoured to obtain it by cajoling, flattering, and bribing the masses, by outbidding and by attacking one another. Aristotle has told us in his book, 'Politics':

Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jurymen, and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, still further debased the composition, and increased the tyranny, of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles had left imperfect, succeeding demagogues supplied. One democratical regulation followed another, until the government assumed its present form, or rather its present deformity.

Henceforth domestic politics monopolised public attention in Athens. Politicians anxious for power, for votes, filled the ears of the people with promises and with mutual denunciations, and in the heat and passion of the faction fight the national interests were completely neglected. Thucydides informs us:

Engaged in contests for power, the Athenians did not pay sufficient attention to the army abroad and were embroiled in mutual altercations at home. . . . They would not have been conquered, had not their own domestic feuds at last utterly disabled them from resisting their enemies.

Men strongly divided with regard to domestic politics and goaded to passion against one another by their leaders will not easily bury their feuds and act in common if united action is urgently wanted to preserve the State from destruction. Besides men who have become used to hear all sides cannot in any case decide quickly. If opinions differ, influence necessarily takes the place of reason, and if the opposing parties cannot unite on energetic action, a weak, and probably foolish, middle course, acceptable to both parties will be adopted after infinite procrastination and delay. Machiavelli, who, as Secretary of State to the

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Republic of Florence, knew a great deal of the practical working of democratic institutions in time of national emergency, wrote in his 'Discorsi':

In all matters of difficulty wherein courage is needed for resolving, vacillation will always be met with whenever those who have to deliberate and decide are weak. Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late and tardy, especially when they have to be made on behalf of a friend. From their lateness they help none, but hurt ourselves. Tardy resolves are due sometimes to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the perversity of those who have to determine. Sometimes they are due to the secret desire of politicians to overthrow their opponents or to carry out some selfish purpose of their own. Hence these men prevent the forming of a decision, and only thwart and hinder.

Vacillation, lateness, and tardiness are in Machiavelli's opinion the characteristics of divided counsels which are habitually found in Governments by discussion—in democracies. His statement that vacillation and delay are particularly harmful if a friendly nation requires support is strikingly illustrated by the fatal delay of democratic Britain and France in coming to Serbia's aid.

Frequently during the War the British Government has been reproached in innumerable newspaper articles that it is always too late both in its diplomatic and in its military activities, that statesmen are discussing when they should be acting, that they lack initiative, that they are always surprised by the enemy, that they are acting only after the event, that nothing is done in time. These reproaches irresistibly remind one of similar taunts levelled at the Athenians by that great statesman and patriot Demosthenes, who, like the late Lord Roberts, tried in vain to arouse the misguided and pleasure-loving citizens to a sense of the danger which threatened them from an ambitious neighbour King and his powerful national army. In his 'First Philippic,' that great orator said:

Why, Athenians, are the festivals in honour of Athenae and of Dionysus always celebrated at the appointed time—festivals which cost more treasure than is usually expended upon a whole fleet and attended by larger numbers and greater magnificence than any other event in the world—while all your expeditions have been too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegasae, and that to Potidaea? I will tell you the reason. Everything relating to your amusements is carefully studied and ordered beforehand. So everyone of you knows long before the event who is to conduct the various entertainments, what he is to receive, where he is to go, and what he has to do. Nothing is left uncertain or undetermined. But in affairs of war and in warlike preparations there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. Only when events alarm us we appoint our Trierarchs. Having done so, we dispute with them, and lastly we consider the question of supplies for war. . . . It is shameful, Athenians, that we deceive ourselves by allowing all disagreeable news to be suppressed, that we listen only to the pleasing speeches of our leaders, and that we thus delude ourselves; that by putting off everything unpleasant, we never move until it is too late; that we refuse to understand that those who would wage war successfully should not follow, but direct, events.

In the 'Fourth Philippic' Demosthenes stated:

You, Athenians, have never made the necessary disposition in your affairs, or armed yourselves, in time, but have ever been led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms you, your preparations are once more resumed in general tumult and confusion. But this is not the way to obtain success. . . . When Philip was preparing, you, instead of doing the like and making counter-preparations, remained listless, and, if anyone spoke a word of warning, shouted him down. When you receive news that any place is lost or besieged, then you listen and prepare. But the time to have heard and consulted was when you declined to listen, and the time to act and employ your preparation is now when you are hearing me. Such being your habits, you are

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the only people who adopt this singular course. Other nations deliberate before action. You deliberate after action.

While King Philip was preparing everything for his attack upon Athens, the leaders of the Athenian democracy were fighting one another for votes and influence, for place and power. Demosthenes sadly stated in his 'First Philippic':

If we sit at home listening to the mutual recriminations of our orators we cannot expect the slightest success in any direction. . . . They may promise and assert and accuse this person or that, but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs.

In his 'Oration for the Liberty of the Rhodians' we read:

You, Athenians, must fight a double battle. Like others, you have your open enemies, but you have enemies still more dangerous and alarming. You have to overcome in the first place the opposition of those of your own citizens who, in this assembly, are systematically engaged against the interests of their own country. And, as they are ever strenuous in their opposition to all useful measures, it is no wonder that many of our designs are frustrated.

Athens owed her downfall to her party-political divisions, to the fact that she had many heads, but no head, to the fact that the Athenians, engaged in an unending struggle for power, were taught to place party above country and self above the State. Trusting to their democratic orator-politicians, who desired to be popular, who desired to please, the misguided people delayed preparation and action against their enemies until it was too late.

If we study the history of Athens at its source, it becomes clear that that great republic rose to eminence during the time when it was a democracy in name but not in fact; that it was a great, efficient, and wisely governed Power as

long as it was ruled by an aristocracy and was guided by a single man of great ability, such as Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles; that it began to decline when it became a true democracy, when the controlling power in the State fell into the hands of the people, when ambitious or needy politicians and adventurers, contending for power, divided the nation, corrupted and destroyed the patriotism of the people, and taught them to exploit the State and to consider it as an institution which existed mainly to administer to their wants and their vices, to their love of ease and of self. The policy of Athens was bound to be improvident, hasty, reckless, and foolish when the affairs of State were no longer directed by the ability of the experienced few or by the wisdom of a single eminent man, but by the momentary emotions and the shortsightedness of the crowd.

In Athens public affairs were discussed and decided by the people, assembled in their thousands in the market-place. It may therefore be objected that the Athenian democracy cannot in fairness be compared with modern democracies which have evolved highly developed representative institutions. It may be said that in Great Britain not the people nor the elected representatives, but a small and select body, the Cabinet, enjoying great latitude for action, discusses policy and decides and directs in the greatest secrecy. Let us then study the cause of the decline and fall of another great commercial, maritime, and colonising republic, of Venice. The case of Venice should be particularly interesting because the Constitution of that State curiously resembles that of this country as established in the eighteenth century. In fact, it may be said that the British Constitution, as we know it now, was modelled upon that of Venice.

Venice, like Great Britain, did not possess a written and fixed Constitution. The Venetians recognised that government by a crowd is bound to be a failure. The controlling power of the State, which at first had been held by the Doge and then by representative assemblies, passed into the hands of the Council of Ten, which originally had been

merely a judicial committee. The Senate of Venice may fairly be compared to the British House of Commons, and the Council of Ten to the British Cabinet. The Council of Ten acted in conjunction with the Senate, and its power was practically unlimited. Like the British Cabinet, it carried on its work in absolute secrecy. It was not dependent upon public opinion. The Doge, the Duke, who had been all-powerful at the time when Venice rose from insignificance to greatness, had been deprived of all authority. He was a mere figure-head. He was, as we are told, 'rex in purpura, senator in curia, in urbe captivus, extra urbem privatus.' The Doge was indeed a captive in a golden cage. He was not allowed to open the despatches which were addressed to him, as the head of the State, by foreign sovereigns. His palace, and even his person, were liable to be searched at any moment. In fact, he was a prisoner of the Ten. To make his revolt unlikely, only very old and feeble men were elected Doge. He was held responsible during his lifetime with his liberty and his head, and after his death with his estate. Venice was an aristocratic republic. The people were powerless. Owing to the absence of anything resembling popular control or public opinion, the authority of the Ten, acting in conjunction with the Senate, was of the greatest.

Although much power was thus concentrated into the hands of a small secret Council, Venice declined and decayed. Government by councils and committees proved fatal to her. In 1677 was published a remarkable book, 'Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise.' It was written by Amelot de la Houssaye, a diplomat and a keen student of political affairs, who during several years was attached to the French Embassy in Venice, and who had made a special study of that wonderful State. In a chapter 'On the Principal Causes of the Decline of Venice' we read :

The Republic of Venice has had the same fate as that of Sparta. Both were flourishing as long as they were small.

Both have declined after extending their territory. Herein lies the first cause of the decline of Venice. Its second cause may be found in the slowness of its deliberations. Slowness of action, it is true, is a fault which is found in all democracies, but it is extreme in Venice. Their Senate seems to be sometimes asleep. So difficult it is at times to cause it to move.

The Venetians were advised in good time of the preparations made by Turkey for invading the Island of Crete. Nevertheless, they did not think of preparing their defence, as if they had never suffered from the perfidy of the Turks, or as if Heaven had assured them that the powerful expedition prepared by Turkey was not directed against their own possessions. Their confidence was founded upon the promises of a Turk who had told them that the military preparations of the Porte were directed against Malta. They were blind to their danger, and they refused to heed the advice of Sorance, the Venetian ambassador at Constantinople, who had warned them of their peril and entreated them unceasingly to take precautions. Fearing to offend the Turks by showing their suspicion, they did not arm, but trusted for their security to their alliance with the Turks, which had recently been renewed. Thus their fortress of Saint Theodore was taken by surprise and Candia besieged. Only then would they believe that the Turks were hostile to them. . . .

The Venetians lost Cyprus in a similar manner. They could not make up their mind what to do, although Jerome Zane, their admiral, and Pascal Cicogne, their general at Candia, urged them not to wait until attacked by the Turks, but to fight the Turkish fleet on the sea, and so prevent a hostile landing.

By similar irresolution the Senate lost in the last century the whole of the Venetian territory on the mainland. The Venetian government could not make up its mind as to the policy to be pursued until the sovereigns united in the League of Cambray had invaded the Venetian possessions. . . .

The third cause of the disorder in the affairs of Venice lies in the fact that the Senate is composed of a large

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number of members. Hence bad proposals are more likely to be adopted than good ones, especially if a bad policy is outwardly attractive, and therefore popular, while a wise policy seems unpleasant. In Venice, as in ancient Athens, wise men may propose, but fools deliberate. The resolutions are formed by a majority. The votes of fools have as much weight as the votes of wise men, and fools are more numerous than are men of understanding.

Lastly, the Venetian Senate is, in time of danger, liable to steer a middle course, which is the worst course of all. If two different policies are proposed, one brave and daring, and the other timorous and cowardly, the Venetians are apt to follow a policy which is partly brave and partly cowardly without inquiring whether it is wise and whether it will avert the danger.

The extracts given from the book of the French diplomat make it clear that Venice, in times of great emergency, when rapid and decisive action was required, was as short-sighted, vacillating, and hesitating as was Athens, that in the later centuries of her existence she was never prepared for war, and was always forestalled by her enemies, all timely warnings notwithstanding. Three centuries ago Turkey fooled Venice in exactly the same manner in which she fooled Great Britain in 1914 and in which Bulgaria fooled her in 1915. Over the grave of Venice, as over that of Athens, the words 'Too late' may be inscribed. Venice, like ancient Athens in the time of her decline, had many heads but no head. Improvidence and irresolution arising from divided counsels destroyed both.

If we survey the history of the world we find that nearly all true democracies have been exceedingly short-lived, that they have gone the way of Athens. The republics which flourished were, like Carthage and like Athens in the time of her greatest glory, aristocracies directed by single men of genius. The Republic of the Netherlands, like that of Venice, was an aristocracy. William the Silent, her Stadtholder, was her Themistocles. He established the power

of the Republic, and his successors of the House of Orange, the Princes Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William the Second, maintained it. At that time she ruled the sea, colonised the world, dominated the world's trade, and was the richest State in Europe. In 1650 the Dutch Republic changed its Constitution. It abolished the Stadtholder, whose supreme position had aroused the envy of the democrats. The politicians were established in power. From 1650 to 1672 the Netherlands were a true Republic. Her politicians quarrelled among themselves like those of Athens and Venice. Her counsels were divided, and during the twenty-two years of democratic control she experienced defeat after defeat and lost her naval supremacy, her world trade, and her greatness. The Dutch wealth and power fell to England, ruled by one man, by Cromwell. Improvidence and irresolution springing from the rule of political committees brought about her decline.

It is only natural that aristocratic or oligarchial republics have shown a greater vitality than democratic ones. Aristocratic Venice existed during nearly a thousand years. The wealth of the wealthy can be preserved only by prudence, foresight, and timely energy. It may be destroyed by a defeat, and it may be preserved or increased by a timely victory. Wealthy men are therefore apt to take more provident and more statesmanlike views in matters of foreign policy than the labouring masses, which live from day to day. Besides, the wealthy and the powerful are as a rule far better informed on foreign affairs than the poor and the ignorant, who may easily be deluded by wily agitators. If one set of politicians proposes to the people a wise and patriotic, though costly, policy of military preparedness in view of possible dangers from without, while another set promises them peace, higher wages or a reduced cost of living, and disarmament, and holds up the former policy—which is supported by the well-informed rich—and its supporters to odium, the people will readily vote for a policy of unpreparedness and for a reduction of armaments.

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Before the War the French, Belgian, and British armies were starved, and national defence was neglected because the workers were told by their leaders that not Germany, but domestic capitalism, was their greatest enemy. Before the War adequate military preparation was systematically opposed in France, Belgium, and Great Britain by politicians who pandered to the short-sighted and ill-informed masses. The story of Athens in the time of Demosthenes repeated itself.

The question now arises whether inefficiency and improvidence are inseparably connected with democracy, whether it is not possible to combine the advantages possessed by democracy with the governmental efficiency and foresight which are found in highly organised and semi-military States such as Germany, whether it is not possible to blend representative government and one-man rule. Before deciding whether this is feasible we must inquire into the causes of the governmental efficiency which is found in the most highly developed monarchical States.

The efficiency of a nation, as of any commercial or industrial undertaking, depends mainly on two factors: its organisation and its direction, its Constitution and its director or directors.

If we study the organisation of the most successful monarchies of all time, we find two different types. Some have been ruled by a prince of the greatest genius who governed in person, who was his own Prime Minister, such as Peter the Great of Russia. Some have been ruled by men of moderate, or even of small, capacity who have entrusted an able Minister with the task of government, such as Germany under William the First and Bismarck. It is frequently asserted that the combination of a William the First and of a Bismarck is unique or almost unique. That view is erroneous. A wise king rules, but does not govern. Monarchy is a business which is best carried on through a manager. The direct rule of the sovereign is dangerous for the nation and for himself, even if the monarch is a man

of the greatest genius. That may be seen by the example of Napoleon the First. For psychological reasons alone the highly technical and laborious task of government is as a rule far more ably fulfilled by a patient and painstaking Minister who lives for his work than by a high-spirited, though able, sovereign who necessarily can only devote part of his time to the dry and tedious details of administration.

The most successful States have been raised to greatness not through a great ruler but through a great statesman, such as Bismarck, working under a ruler of moderate ability. Civilisation arose in the East. Every Eastern ruler has his manager, his Vizier. Moses had his Aaron, Pharaoh his Joseph, and Solomon his Asaph. According to the Mohammedan tradition, these were the Viziers of Moses, Pharaoh, and Solomon. The foundation of the greatness of France was laid by the co-operation of the able Henry the Fourth and of Sully, his great Minister, and by Richelieu and Mazarin, who governed France in the King's name under the rule of the incapable Louis the Thirteenth and during the minority of Louis the Fourteenth. These statesmen raised France to the greatest glory and made her wealthy and powerful. Louis the Fourteenth, though personally highly gifted and well supported by great Ministers such as Colbert and Louvois, wishing to govern himself, weakened France through his impetuosity and pride. As the greatness of Germany has been established by Bismarck working under the conscientious but moderately gifted William the First, and that of France by three all-powerful Ministers, Sully, Richelieu, and Mazarin, so that of Sweden was the work of Oxenstierna, who co-operated with the great genius King Gustavus Adolphus. His work was destroyed by the rashness and pride of Charles the Twelfth as that of Bismarck seems likely to be destroyed by the pride and vanity of William the Second.

Many Englishmen are interested in the science of legislation, but only a few in that of national administration and organisation, although the latter is infinitely more important

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than the former. While the literature dealing with legislation and with domestic politics in all its branches is exceedingly vast, there is not a single book in the English language, except perhaps the American *Federalist*, which deals adequately and critically with the science of national organisation and administration. As the nation-builders of England have apparently not recorded their views as to the best form of national organisation, we must turn for information to the great constructive statesmen of the Continent and of the United States.

Richelieu, the great organiser of France, one of the wisest statesmen of all time, stated his views on government in his little-known 'Testament Politique.' It was written for the use and guidance of King Louis the Thirteenth, to whom it was dedicated, and for that of his successors and of the future Ministers of France. In Chapter VIII. 'Du Conseil du Prince,' which might be translated 'On the Cabinet,' we read :

Among statesmen it is a much debated question whether it is better that a sovereign should govern the State in person, according to his own views, or whether he should be largely guided by his Council and do nothing without its advice. Either form of government might be advocated in bulky volumes.

The worst government, in my opinion, is one which is entirely in the hands of a sovereign who is so incapable, and at the same time so presumptuous, that he pays no attention whatever to any council. The best government of all is one where the mainspring is the will of the sovereign who, though capable of deciding for himself, possesses so much modesty and judgment that he does nothing unless he is supported by good advice, acting on the principle that several eyes see more than a single one. . . .

A highly-gifted ruler is a great treasure to his State, and an able council in the fullest sense of the word is no less precious. But the co-operation of an able ruler and a good council is of inestimable value because on such co-operation is founded the happiness of States.

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There are no doubt only few sovereigns who can govern their States without assistance, but even if there were many such gifted men they should not endeavour to administer it by themselves. . . .

Many qualities are required in a good minister, and the most important are four : ability, faithfulness, courage, and industry.

The ability of ministers does not consist in that form of self-conceit which is usually found in pedants. Nothing is more dangerous for a State than men who endeavour to govern it by means of abstract principles drawn from books. Such men have completely ruined States because the rules of the past cannot always be applied to the present, for time, place, and persons differ. . . .

In considering the ability of ministers, two facts are of particular importance. In the first place, men of the greatest natural genius are often more dangerous than useful in handling affairs of State unless they have more lead than quicksilver in their composition. Many men are fertile in good ideas. They abound with original thoughts. However, such men are often so changeable in their plans that in the evening they have abandoned their intentions of the morning. They have so little staying power and logic that they change their good plans as readily as their bad ones, and never steadily pursue any policy. I may say with truth, and I know from experience, that the unsteadiness and changeableness of such people is no less dangerous in the management of national affairs than the ill-will of others.

The second fact which must be borne in mind is that nothing can be more dangerous for a State than to give a position of great authority to men who have not sufficient gifts to guide themselves, but who, nevertheless, believe that they have so much ability that they need not be guided by others. Men of that stamp can neither form a good plan for themselves nor follow the advice of those who might give them good counsel. Hence they commit constantly very great mistakes. One of the greatest vices which a public man may possess is presumption. Although humility is not required in those whose destiny it is to administer a State,

they should possess modesty. Modesty is absolutely necessary to them, especially as the most capable men are often least able to bear with assistance and advice, without which even the ablest men are little fit to govern. Men of the greatest genius, unless possessed of modesty, are so much enamoured with their own ideas that they are apt to condemn the proposals of all other people, even if their views are better than their own. Hence their natural pride and their high position are apt to make them altogether unbearable. Even the very ablest man must often listen to the advice of men whom he believes to be less able. It is prudent for a minister to speak little and to listen much, for one can profit from all kinds of advice. Good advice is valuable for itself, while bad advice confirms the good. . . .

The leading men must be industrious, as I have stated. However it is not necessary that a man directing public affairs should be working unceasingly. On the contrary, nothing is more harmful for him than unceasing labour. The nature of affairs of State makes relaxation necessary, and the more important the office is the more necessary is relaxation. The physical and mental strength of man is limited, and unceasing labour exhausts both in little time. It is necessary that those who manage affairs of State should make these their principal pre-occupation, and that they should devote to them their whole mind, their whole thought, and all their strength. Their greatest pleasure should consist not in their amusement, but in their success. Statesmen directing the affairs of a country should survey the whole world in order to be able to foresee the events of the future. Then they will be able to take measures against the evils which may come, and to carry through those measures which are required in the national interest.

As the number of the physicians is often responsible for the death of the patient, even so the number of ministers is more often harmful than advantageous to the State. I would add that no more than four ministers can be usefully employed, and one of these should be invested with superior authority. This leading minister should be the mainspring of the State. He should be like the sun in the firmament. He should be guided only by his intelligence and should guide

those around him. I hesitate to put forward this idea, for I may appear to be pleading my own cause. Still, I should find it easy to prove from Holy Writ, and from authoritative, sacred, and profane writers, the necessity of a principal minister. Besides, I would say that the confidence with which your Majesty has always honoured me during the time when I have guided the policy of France was due to your own free will. Posterity will find that the authority which I have always enjoyed in your councils has been legitimate. Therefore, I believe that I may freely speak upon the subject without being suspected of questionable motives.

The envy which naturally arises among men of equal authority, as among States of equal power, is too well known to make it necessary that I should prove at length the truth of the fact that a single minister should occupy the pre-eminent position described above. My experiences have been so convincing with regard to this principle that I think I should fail in my duty before God did I not state in formal terms in this my testament that there is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration and government to a number of men enjoying power and authority. A step which one minister desires to undertake is liable to be opposed by another, and unless the minister who possesses the best idea is at the same time most skilful in steering them through, his plans will always be brought to nought by an opponent gifted with greater power of persuasion. Each of the opposing ministers will have his followers. These will form parties in the State, and thus the strength of the country, which ought to be united, will be divided. As the sicknesses and death of man are caused by the opposing humours of his body, even so the peace of States is disturbed by the disunion and the conflict of men of equal power, who direct the fate of nations, and these dissensions are apt to produce evils which at last may bring about the downfall of the nation.

If it is true that monarchical most closely resembles divine government by its outward form, if it is true that a monarchy is superior to all other forms of government, as the greatest sacred and profane writers have told us, one may boldly state that the sovereign should entrust the manage-

ment of the State to one particular person above all others, for he cannot, or, if he could, would not, have his eye constantly on the chart and on the compass. That stands to reason. Exactly as several pilots never direct simultaneously the rudder, even so the rudder of the ship of State should never be controlled by more than one man at a time. The steersman of the ship of State may well receive the advice of other men, and he should even ask for it. Still, it is for him to examine the advice given, and to direct the course of the ship to the right or to the left according to his judgment, in order to avoid rocks and to steer his course. . . . I am well acquainted with the ability, honesty, and courage which are required in ministers of State. As the controlling minister of whom we have spoken must stand above the other ministers in power and authority, so he must be superior to them by his personal qualities. Consequently the character of the person chosen to direct the State must be carefully examined before appointment.

The sovereign must personally know the man whom he entrusts with so great a responsibility. But although the leading minister must be appointed by the sovereign, his choice should, if possible, find the approval of the public, for general approval will increase the minister's ability to do good. It is easy to depict the qualities which a principal minister should possess, but it is difficult to find these gifts united in any single person. Still, it must be stated that the happiness or the misfortune of States depends upon the choice made. Hence sovereigns are compelled either to undertake themselves the heavy burden of government, or to select a man who will so conduct the affairs of the nation that their selection is approved of in earth and in Heaven.

Richelieu believed a monarchy to be the best form of government. He thought that the best organised monarchy was not one which was governed by the monarch in person, be he ever so gifted, but one which was governed by an able monarch supported by an able Council of Ministers, because even a ruler of inferior ability could rule well by entrusting the national government to eminent Ministers. He attached the greatest value to their ability, experience, and character.

IN Richelieu's opinion, as in that of Prince Bismarck, the worst ministers are brilliant and dazzling men, lacking thoroughness, and men of book-learning and of preconceived notions, doctrinaires. Unfortunately, men of these two types easily impose upon the masses. Hence they are usually found in democratic Cabinets. Richelieu thought it most important that Ministers should possess that quiet modesty which is always found in men who thoroughly know their business, in great experts. He wished that Ministers should devote their activities entirely to their office, concentrating all their thoughts and ambitions upon their departments. He thought that the Council of Ministers should be small obviously because only a small council can deliberate in secret and can decide rapidly. He advised that the Cabinet should consist of no more than four men, that one of the four should be given authority above the remaining three, and that these three Ministers should not be the equals of the principal Minister but his assistants, his subordinates. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that Richelieu attached the very highest value to the subordination of the Ministers to a principal Minister, and that he condemned emphatically a Cabinet of Ministers possessing, at least nominally, equal authority such as those who form the British Cabinet. In Richelieu's words: 'There is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration and government to a number of men enjoying equal power and authority.' His arguments in favour of concentrating all ministerial responsibility into the hands of a single presiding and directing Minister are unanswerable. Lastly, Richelieu recommended that the position of principal Minister should be entrusted only to a man most eminent both in ability and in personal character, and that, if possible, a popular man should be chosen. The ideal Prime Minister and his ministerial assistants should not be overburdened with work, but should have sufficient leisure to be able to think ahead, and to prepare for the future, for otherwise he would be worn out with labour, and, being too much occupied with

current affairs, would be surprised by the march of events. It will be noticed that government by means of a Cabinet, as practised in this country, is in every particular diametrically opposed to the form of national organisation which the great Cardinal described as the most perfect and the most efficient.

Richelieu lived three centuries ago. Nevertheless, the broad principles of efficient government expounded by him have not been superseded. Experience has proved their worth. Let us now trace the development of modern national organisation in the best organised State, in Germany.

Brandenburg-Prussia has had the rare good fortune of having possessed some most highly gifted rulers endowed with administrative genius and ability of the highest kind : Frederick William the Great Elector, who ruled from 1640 to 1688, Frederick William the First, who ruled from 1713 to 1740, and Frederick the Great who ruled from 1740 to 1786. These three sovereigns, who together ruled during no less than 121 years, raised Brandenburg-Prussia by their personal labours from insignificance to the rank of a prosperous Great Power. They governed the country in person, and directed and controlled themselves the whole administration. They presided over the ministerial councils, heard and weighed the opinions of their counsellors, and then decided. They established the tradition that the ruler of Prussia is his own Prime Minister, a doctrine to which Richelieu was strongly opposed. Capable rulers were followed by lamentably incapable ones. The personal misgovernment of Frederick William the Second and Frederick William the Third brought about Prussia's decline and downfall.

The Napoleonic War had ended in the triumph of Great Britain. At the peace England was richer and more powerful than she was when the war began. Her prestige in Europe was unlimited. All nations desired to copy her political institutions and her economic policy. The British Government was carried on by a Cabinet of jointly

responsible Ministers, presided over by a Prime Minister. It was, therefore, only natural that Prussia, in reorganising the country, created a Cabinet of jointly responsible Ministers presided over by a Prime Minister. However, there was a profound difference between the two Cabinets. The Prussian Prime Minister was to be the King's Manager. Bismarck stated on January 24, 1882 :

In Prussia the King himself governs. The ministers may put on paper the orders which the King has given, but they do not govern. In the words of the Prussian Constitution, 'The King alone possesses the power of the executive.' Cabinet Ministers are not mentioned in that document.

The Prussian Ministers are the King's servants, not the country's.

The great characteristic of Bismarck was his clear critical faculty. He refused to believe that a form of government or an economic policy was best because it existed in England. He thought government by means of a jointly responsible Cabinet an evil, even if it were directed, or presided over, by the King who was able to order the Ministers whom he had appointed to do this or that, whether they approved or disapproved. He shared Richelieu's opinion that 'there is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration and government to a number of men enjoying equal power and authority.' He considered that joint responsibility meant irresponsibility, friction, delay, inefficiency. Therefore, when he created in 1866 the North German Federation, the forerunner of the German Empire, he concentrated all power into the hands of a single principal Minister, giving him sole responsibility and making the other Ministers his subordinates. This organisation was later on taken over by the German Empire. The Empire has only a single responsible Minister, the Imperial Chancellor, and the subordination of his ministerial assistants has been emphasised in their very title. While Prussia has a number of Ministers and a Prime Minister the

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German Empire has a Chancellor supported by a number of 'Secretaries of State.'

As the German Liberals, who loudly advocated Free Trade and Cabinet Government 'as in England' for the North German Federation and the German Empire, were opposed to the absolute supremacy of a single Minister, Bismarck had to defend this form of government on numerous occasions. He stated, for instance, in the Reichstag of the North German Federation, on April 16, 1869 :

A strong, active, and progressive Government is required. Yet it is desired that for every decision several Ministers of equal authority should be responsible. It is believed that by their appointment all the evils of this world may be cured. A man who has been at the head of a Cabinet and who has been forced to form decisions on his own responsibility is not afraid to act, though he alone is responsible, but he shrinks from the necessity of convincing seven people that his measures are really the best. That task is more difficult than that of governing a State. All members of a Cabinet have an honest and firm conviction. The more honest and the more capable Ministers are, the more difficult they will find it to give way to any other man. Every one of the Ministers is surrounded by a number of pugnacious permanent officials, who also have convictions of their own. In any case it is difficult to convince a man. One persuades a man occasionally, or gains him over through courtesy, but one has to do this seven times. I am firmly convinced, and my opinion has been created by practical experience, that government by means of a Cabinet, by means of a board, is a constitutional error and mistake which every State should endeavour to get rid of as soon as possible. I would not lend a hand to impose that mistaken institution of a Cabinet upon the North German Federation. I believe that Prussia would make an immense step forward if she would adopt the principle of the North German Federation, according to which only a single Minister is responsible.

Responsibility is possible only in the case of a single individual who in his person can be held responsible for his action. If the same individual is member of a Cabinet, he

may answer that he has been outvoted by his colleagues, or he may say that the opposition he experienced made his intended measures impracticable, that a bill he intended to bring in has been delayed for seven years because seven honest men could not agree on its text. Besides, in every board discussion the moment arrives at last when the decision has to be left to chance, to the toss of a coin.

He said in the Reichstag on December 1, 1874 :

What guarantee of moral responsibility have you in the case of any institution unless responsibility is borne by a single person ? Absolutely none. Who is responsible in a Cabinet, consisting of eight or ten independent Ministers, none of whom can take an important measure unless the majority of his colleagues support it ? Who is responsible for the resolutions of a parliamentary majority ? It is clear that it cannot be sought for in any individual, because in the case of a majority vote everybody is entitled to say that he was not in favour of the measure taken, but that others were opposed to him. . . .

I believe that national affairs can be conducted in a spirit of unity only if the Government is presided over by a man who is able to give orders. I should, of course, raise difficulties to myself if I should frivolously or too easily make use of that power. On the other hand, the ability to give orders is a weapon, the possession of which is known to all, and therefore it becomes rarely necessary to use it.

He stated in the Reichstag on November 22, 1875 :

The position of a Prime Minister of Prussia is ungrateful because of his powerlessness. One can be responsible only for that which one does with one's own free will. A board is irresponsible, for later on it is impossible to discover the men who formed the majority which passed this or that measure. Joint responsibility is a fiction. It may be very convenient to leave resolutions to a Cabinet and to say the Cabinet has resolved to do this or that. However, if you inquire how the resolution was arrived at, every Minister will shrug his shoulders and tell a different tale, for if there has been failure no one cares to assume responsibility.

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In his posthumous memoirs, his political testament, we read :

Official decisions do not gain in honesty and moderation by being arrived at collectively, for, apart from the fact that, in the case of voting by majority, arithmetic and chance take the place of logical reasoning, that feeling of personal responsibility in which lies the essential guarantee for the conscientiousness of the decision is lost directly it comes about by means of anonymous majorities. . . .

The board character of the Prussian Ministry, with its majority votes, daily compels Ministers to compromise and surrender to their colleagues. A real responsibility in high politics can only be undertaken by one single directing Minister, never by a numerous board with majority voting

Many similar pronouncements of his might easily be given.

Bismarck was a keen student of history, and had learned its lessons. He was aware that divided counsels had been responsible for confusion in policy and administration and for the downfall of States since the earliest times ; that divided councils had sapped the strength, and destroyed, kingdoms and oligarchies, aristocracies and democracies ; that no organisation can be efficient which is nominally controlled by many heads—which has no real head but at best a figurehead ; that a nation, like an army, or like a commercial undertaking, can be successfully and responsibly directed and controlled only by one man.

Richelieu and Bismarck were the greatest civilian statesmen of modern times, and Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First were the greatest military statesmen. They were certainly at least as eminent as organisers and administrators as they were as generals. Not unnaturally both were in favour of a single and undivided control of the national government and administration, and were absolutely opposed to divided control because the latter means no control, but drift, delay, inefficiency, intrigue, and disaster.

Frederick the Great stated in his ' *Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement* ' of 1777 :

If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and places it into the hands of paid men, of Ministers appointed by him, one will steer to the right and another to the left. A general plan is no longer followed. Every Minister disapproves of the actions of his predecessor, and makes changes even if they are quite unnecessary, wishing to originate a new policy which is often harmful. He is succeeded by Ministers who also hasten to overthrow the existing institutions in order to show their ability. In consequence of the numerous innovations made none can take root. Confusion, disorder, and all the other vices of a bad administration arise, and incapable or worthless officials blame the multitude of changes for their shortcomings.

Men are attached to their own. As the State does not belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest in its welfare. Hence the Government is carried on with careless indifference, and the result is that the administration, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic administration disappears. Everyone follows his own notions. No link is left which connects the directing factors. As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together the single object of measuring time, all the springs and wheels of a Government should be so arranged and co-ordinated that all the departments of the national administration work together with the single aim of promoting the greatest good of the State. That aim should not be lost sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual interests of Ministers and generals usually cause them to oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent the carrying through of the most necessary measures.

National disasters of the greatest magnitude are obviously the most searching tests of the value of the national organisation. The Seven Years' War was fought chiefly on Prussian soil. The country had been overrun by hostile troops, had

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been utterly devastated, and had in part become abandoned by man. Yet, ten years after the war the population, the income and the wealth of Prussia were considerably greater than at its beginning, as I have shown very fully in another book which supplies a mass of documentary information on Frederick the Great as an organiser and administrator.¹ In it will be found copious extracts from the King's writings, and especially from his two Political Testaments, which have not previously been published in English.

Now let us see what the administration of Napoleon the first can teach us.

Napoleon the First was an organising genius. His military triumphs proved ephemeral, but in the domain of national organisation and administration his work has endured. Professor Pariset wrote justly in the 'Cambridge Modern History':

Bonaparte directed the reorganisation of France, and never perhaps in history was a work so formidable accomplished so quickly. Order and regularity were established in every branch of the administration. The greater part of the institutions founded during the Consulate have survived to the present day, and it is no exaggeration to state that it was Bonaparte who created contemporary France.

The French Revolution had destroyed the work of eight centuries and had left nothing but ruin and disorder. The Treasury was empty. The taxes failed to come in. The paper money was greatly depreciated. No loans could be raised. The nation had repeatedly become bankrupt. The consecutive revolutionary Governments were governments of many heads. Although the revolutionary leaders were men of the greatest ability, divided councils and the influence of popular passion had caused them to adopt the most insane measures. They had madly destroyed the national organisation and the national credit. In 1796 the louis d'or of twenty-four francs was worth from

¹ *The Foundations of Germany*, Smith, Elder & Co., 1916.

6107 francs to 8137 francs in assignats. A pair of boots which cost thirty francs in gold cost about 10,000 francs in paper. In 1799, at the end of which Napoleon became First Consul, the 5 per cent. Rente reached the minimum price of seven, yielding thus $71\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to the purchaser. Unrestricted self-government had produced administrative anarchy throughout the provinces. Edmond Blanc tells us in his '*Napoleon I, ses Institutions Civiles et Administratives*':

For a long time no money had been available for constructing or repairing roads and bridges, and these had fallen into decay. Roads no longer existed. Where they had been, the ground was full of holes yards wide and deep, in which carts and carriages disappeared. Fourcroy reported that in travelling from Tours to Poitiers and to La Rochelle, and thence to Nantes, his carriage was broken six times, and that eleven times he was compelled to employ several teams of oxen for drawing it out of the mire. Carters would only proceed in numbers so as to be able to assist one another, and would frequently travel across the cultivated fields because passage through them was easier than along the so-called roads. At night the roads were unusable, and carters could often do no more than three or four miles per day.

This state of affairs had made transport by road very expensive. The internal trade of France came almost to an end. Wheat which fetched 18 francs in the market at Nantes cost 36 francs at Brest. Hence, scarcity prevailed in many departments. During the first years of the Directoire, out of 85,000 people in Rouen no less than 64,000 had to be supplied with bread by public distribution. During the Directoire and the first few years of the Consulate the problem how to feed the people was the principal preoccupation of the Government. France, like modern India, lived under the dread of impending famine.

The canals of France were as neglected as the roads. The harbours of Rochefort and Fréjus were filled with mud. The vast drainage works of the time of Louis the Fourteenth had fallen into ruin, and so had the dykes which protected the country against floods. The roads were infested with

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robbers. The administration of the law had broken down, and the prevailing insecurity had led to the standstill of business.

On December 24, 1799, Napoleon was made First Consul, and on the evening of that day he dictated to his friend Roederer a proclamation in which he promised to the people not only independence and glory, but also the creation of an orderly administration, the re-establishment of the national finances, the reform of the laws and the re-creation of the prosperity of the utterly impoverished nation. To the surprise of the world he carried out that colossal programme within a few years. He created order in the local and national government and security of the person and of property. Soon the taxes were once more regularly paid. Rapidly the laws were improved and codified. Roads, canals, and public works of every kind were constructed. A new France arose. The 5 per cent. Rente, which in 1799 had touched seven, touched 44 in 1800, 68 in 1801, and 93·40 in 1807. According to a statement which on February 25, 1813, Comte de Montalivet, Napoleon's Minister of the Interior, placed before the Corps Législatif, France spent, from 1804 to 1813 alone, the following gigantic sums on public works :

	Francs
Fortresses, arsenals, and barracks	143,669,600
Roads and highways	277,484,549
Bridges	30,605,356
Canals, river regulation, and draining of swamps	122,587,898
Sea harbours and dykes	117,328,710
Public works in Paris	102,421,187
Public buildings in the provinces	149,108,550
Imperial residences and Crown properties	62,054,583
Total	1,005,260,433

Napoleon had an unlimited power for work. His Ministers, like those of Richelieu, Bismarck, and Frederick the Great, were his servants. They were independent of Parliament. The initiative for legislation and administration was given to the Conseil d'État, a most interesting

and most valuable institution which had the same function in the State that a powerful General Staff has in an army. It contained men of the very highest ability and distinction belonging to all parties—red revolutionaries, moderates, royalists, exiled and former nobles, administrators, generals, admirals, and great lawyers. It possessed five sections for Finance, Legislation, War, Navy, Home Affairs. Each section discussed and prepared its own measures, and these were then submitted to, and discussed by, the whole council. The Code Napoléon was thus evolved. Napoleon himself took a very active part in these plenary sittings, attending often during seven or eight hours and scrutinising every proposal. As the Conseil d'État worked behind closed doors, no speeches addressed to the electors were made in it. Discussion was carried on by brief and telling argument. No time was wasted. The result was that innumerable vast reforms were brought forward at almost incredible speed, and that every Government measure was wise and was carefully worked out in all details, embodying not only the views of the technical experts but the experience of the foremost men of France as well.

Both Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First by concentrating all the administrative power into their own hands, were able to repair in a few years unprecedented ravages and to convert chaos, poverty, and starvation into order, wealth, and plenty. Boards and councils are slow-moving and timorous bodies wedded to precedent and hampered by obstruction, intrigue, and sheer stupidity. No Cabinet of Ministers could have achieved a tithe of the national reconstruction and reorganisation accomplished so rapidly by Frederick and Napoleon.

The greatest statesmen of the New World agree with the greatest statesmen of the Old in believing that the national government should be controlled and directed not by a Cabinet, not by a number of men of equal authority, but by a single individual supported by a council of able men of his own choosing, his subordinates. The founders

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of the United States placed the Executive into the hands of a practically irresponsible President who was free to appoint his Ministerial subordinates who cannot be forced out of office by a parliamentary vote. The American President is an elected king possessed of vast power, and in time of war he is the actual commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. The greatest American statesmen, the makers of the Constitution, entrusted the Executive to a single man, believing that only thus efficiency and true responsibility could be ensured. I have given their views very fully in the following chapter, to which I would refer those who desire detailed information. Alexander Hamilton, the greatest constructive statesman of the United States, wrote in the *Federalist*:

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. . . . Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have appeared to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. . . . No favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality. . . .

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy

responsibility. . . . It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. . . . 'I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction?

Alexander Hamilton's views curiously agree with those of Prince Bismarck previously given.

To the readers of these pages it will be clear that the greatest statesmen of the European Continent and of the United States were absolutely opposed to entrusting the control of the national government and administration to a Cabinet of jointly responsible Ministers, believing that efficiency was incompatible with that form of government. It will be clear to them that the greatest statesmen of modern times believed a body, such as the British Cabinet, a source of division, of weakness, and of danger; that they considered that such a body would, owing to its divided councils, create disorganisation and confusion; that joint responsibility would destroy all real responsibility; that the control of affairs by a number of men would chiefly be productive of hesitation, vacillation, and delay, and make secrecy and rapid action impossible.

Those who write or speak about the British Constitution habitually treat the control of national affairs by a number of jointly responsible directors, who are supposed to act unanimously in all matters of importance, as if this arrangement were a matter of course, as if it had existed since time immemorial and had by its very antiquity proved its excellence. They treat it as if it were the last word and the

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highest expression of national organisation. In reality the national organisation of Great Britain, which formerly was highly centralised and extremely efficient, has gradually much deteriorated. Let us see what we can learn from that most important part of Britain's history which is usually not mentioned in the text-books.

In the olden days Great Britain was governed by powerful Kings with the assistance of a Council. The local administration was entrusted to great noblemen who acted as the King's representatives, for a regular civil service with salaried officials is a very modern invention. These noblemen were paid by being allowed to exploit the land granted to them and the people dwelling thereon, and in return they had to keep order and to support the King. In course of time the power of the noblemen grew at the cost of the King, against whom they frequently revolted. They considered themselves the nation and dominated Parliament, the King's Council, and the King himself, and ruled the country. The most powerful noblemen occupied then a position not dissimilar to that now held by party leaders and, like party leaders, they fought one another for supremacy. They ruined the nation by their personal feuds. These disorders and abuses, which might have ended in England's downfall, were abolished by the energetic rulers of the House of Tudor, who reorganised the distracted and impoverished country and made it united, rich, cultured, and powerful. Professor Marriott tells us in his excellent book, 'English Political Institutions':

From 1404 to 1437 the King's Council was not merely dependent upon Parliament, but was actually nominated by them. But the result was a dismal failure. . . . The result was that while Parliament was busy in establishing its rights against the Crown, the nation was sinking deeper and deeper into social anarchy. . . . The people, reduced to social confusion by the weak and nerveless rule of the Lancastrians, emerged from the Wars of the Roses anxious for the repose and discipline secured to them by the New Monarchy.

For a century the Tudors continued to administer the tonic which they had prescribed to the patient suffering from disorder and economic anaemia. The evolution of the Parliamentary machinery was temporarily arrested, but meanwhile the people grew socially and commercially. Aristocratic turbulence was sternly repressed; extraordinary tribunals were erected to deal with powerful offenders; vagrancy was severely punished; work was found for the unemployed; trade was encouraged; the navy was organised on a permanent footing; scientific training in seamanship was provided; excellent secondary schools were established—in these and in many other ways the New Monarchy, despotic and paternal though it was, brought order out of chaos and created a New England.

Let us now briefly survey how the Fredericks and Bismarcks of the Tudor period created this New England.

About the year 1470, during the reign of King Edward the Fourth of the House of York, Sir John Fortescue, the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, wrote a most interesting and important treatise, 'The Governance of England.' A particularly remarkable chapter, the fifteenth, deals with the Cabinet question, and is entitled 'How the King's Council may be Chosen and Established.' In slightly modernised English it runs as follows:

The King's Council was wont to be chosen of great princes and of the greatest lords of the land, both spiritual and temporal, and also of other men that were in great authority and office. Which lords and officers had in their hands also many matters of their own to be treated in the Council, as had the King. Wherefore, when they came together, they were so occupied with their own matters, and with the matters of their kin, servants, and tenants, that they attended but little, and sometimes not at all, to the King's business.

And also there were but few matters of the King's, but if these same matters touched also the said counsellors, their cousins, their servants, tenants or such others as they owed favour to, what lower man was there sitting in that Council

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that durst speak against the opinion of any of the great lords? And why might not then men, by means of corruption of the servants, counsellors, and of some of the lords, move the lords to partiality, and make them also favourable and partial as were the same servants or the parties that so moved them?

Then could no matter treated in the Council be kept quiet. For the Lords oftentimes told their own advisers and servants that had sued to them for those matters how they had sped in the Council and who was against them. How may the King be counselled to refrain giving away his land, or giving officers grants or pensions of abbeyes by such great lords to other men's servants, since they most desire such gifts for themselves and their servants?

Which things considered, and also many others which shall be showed hereafter, it is thought good that the King had a council chosen and established in the form that follows, or in some other form like thereto. First that there were chosen twelve ecclesiastics and twelve laymen of the wisest and best disposed men that can be found in all parts of this land, and that they be sworn to counsel the King after a form to be devised for their oath. And, in particular, that they shall take no fee, no clothing, and no reward from any man except from the King as do the justices of the King's Bench and of the Common Pleas when they take their offices. And that these twenty-four men be permanent councillors, but if any fault should be found in them, or if the King should desire it by the advice of the majority of the Council, he should change any of them. And that every year be chosen by the King four lords spiritual and four lords temporal to be for that year of the same council, exactly as the said twenty-four councillors shall be.

And that they all have a head or a chief to rule the Council, one of the said twenty-four, and chosen by the King and holding his office at the King's pleasure, which may then be called *Capitalis consiliarius*. . . .

These councillors might continually, and at such hours as might be assigned to them, discuss and deliberate upon the matters of difficulty that have fallen to the King, and upon the policy of the realm, how the going out of money

may be restrained, how bullion may be brought into the land, how plate, jewels, and money lately taken out of the country may be got back again. For all this truly wise men will soon find the means. Also how the prices of merchandise produced in this country may be maintained and increased, and how the prices of merchandise imported into England may be lowered. How our navy may be maintained and augmented, and upon such other points of policy which are of the greatest profit and advantage to this country. How also the laws may be amended in such things in which they need reform.

Through the activity of the Council the Parliament will be able to do more good in a month by way of amending laws than they do now in a year, if the amendments proposed be debated and made ripe for their hands by the Council.

Sir John Fortescue complained that the 'greatest lords' of the King's Council, the Cabinet of the time, attended chiefly to their own business and to that of their friends and retainers, neglecting that of the King and Nation, that they practised a shameless favouritism, did not keep secret the affairs of State, and thus made a wise policy and efficient administration impossible. He proposed that a new council of twenty-four of the wisest and best-disposed men should be established, one-half being laymen, and one-half clerics. Before the Reformation the Church represented learning and was comparable to the professional classes of the present day. Besides Churchmen had learnt the art of organisation, of administration and of government through their Church. Lastly, as the Church was an international body, Churchmen were best acquainted with international affairs. Hence, ecclesiastics were the greatest administrators and diplomats of the time. The twenty-four councillors were not to be 'great lords,' corresponding to eminent politicians of the present. They were to be chosen on the ground of their capacity for business and to be permanently employed. In modern language, they were to be permanent officials, experts. They were to be reinforced by four lords spiritual,

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and four lords temporal, corresponding to Members of Parliament of the present day, but these were not to be permanent members of the Council, for they were to be chosen every year. The President of the Council, it is worth noting, was to be taken from the permanent official members, not from the powerful representatives of the nobility or the Church, and he was to act as manager for the King who was to be the real head of the Council. Sir John Fortescue wished to create a Council which combined the functions of the present Cabinet with those of Napoleon's Conseil d'État described in these pages, for the Council was to prepare all measures which were to be submitted to Parliament making them 'ripe for their hands.'

Sir John's wish to reduce the power usurped by the territorial and clerical magnates and to increase that of the King, for the Nation's good, and his wish to have the national policy and administration controlled by a king, supported by the most eminent experts, was soon to be fulfilled. In 1485 the wise and energetic Henry the Seventh came to the throne. He did not allow the powerful nobility to dominate him or his Council. He governed the country himself, supported by the ablest men of the land. The great Lord Bacon has told us :

He was of a high mind and loved his own will, and his own way ; as one that revered himself, and would reign indeed. Had he been a private man he would have been termed proud. But in a wise prince it was but keeping of distance, which indeed he did towards all ; not admitting any near or full approach, either to his power or to his secrets, for he was governed by none. . . .

To his council he did refer much and sat oft in person, knowing it to be the way to assist his power and inform his judgment. In which respect also he was fairly patient of liberty, both of advice and of vote, till himself were declared. He kept a straight hand on his nobility, and chose rather to advance clergymen and lawyers which were more obsequious to him, but had less interest in the people, which

made for his absoluteness, but not for his safety. He was not afraid of an able man, as Louis the Eleventh was ; but, contrariwise, he was served by the ablest men that were to be found, without which his affairs could not have prospered as they did. Neither did he care how cunning they were that he did employ, for he thought himself to have the master-reach. And as he chose well, so he held them up well. . . .

He was a prince, sad, serious, and full of thoughts and secret observations, and full of notes and memorials of his own hand, especially touching persons ; as whom to employ, whom to reward, whom to inquire of, whom to beware of, what were the dependencies, what were the factions, and the like ; keeping, as it were, a journal of his thoughts.

King Henry the Seventh, who had found England impoverished and distraught, left to his son, Henry the Eighth, a well-ordered and prosperous country and an overflowing treasury.

Henry the Eighth, his son, was only eighteen years old when he succeeded his father, and very naturally he was not able to govern in person through a Council. The Government was carried on by the King through a Manager, first through Cardinal Wolsey, who raised England's prestige to the highest point by his foreign policy, and afterwards through Thomas Cromwell, who carried through the Reformation. Henry's rule was of the greatest benefit to the country. In Professor Pollard's words :

Henry the Eighth took the keenest interest from the first in learning and in the navy. . . . No small part of his energies was devoted to the task of expanding the Royal authority at the expense of temporal competitors. Wales and its marshes were brought into legal union with the rest of England, and the Council of the North was set up to bring into subjection the extensive jurisdictions of the Northern Earls. . . . It was of the highest importance that England should be saved from religious civil war, and it could only be saved by a despotic government. It was necessary for the future development of England that its governmental

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system should be centralised and unified, that the authority of the monarchy should be more firmly extended over Wales and the western and northern borders, and that the still existing feudal franchises should be crushed ; and these objects were worth the price paid in the methods of the Star Chamber and of the Councils of the North and of Wales. Henry's work on the navy requires no apology ; without it Elizabeth's victory over the Spanish Armada, the liberation of the Netherlands, and the development of English Colonies would have been impossible ; and of all others the year 1545 best marks the birth of the English naval power. He had a passion for efficiency, and for the greatness of England and himself.

King Henry the Eighth died in 1547, and between that year and 1558 the country was under the rule of the child-king Edward the Sixth and of Queen Mary, Bloody Mary, of painful memory. Under their weak and only nominal rule, England was once more torn by party strife, and at the advent of Queen Elizabeth in 1558 disorganisation and poverty had become great and general. Froude has told us in his *History* :

On all sides the ancient organisation of the country was out of joint. The fortresses from Berwick to Falmouth were half in ruins, dismantled, and ungarrisoned. The Tower was as empty of arms as the Treasury of money. . . . Bare of the very necessities for self-defence, the Queen found herself with a war upon her hands, with Calais lost, the French in full possession of Scotland, where they were fast transporting an army, and with a rival claimant to her crown, whose right, by the letter of the law, was better than her own. Her position was summed up in an address to the Council as follows : ' The Queen poor ; the realm exhausted ; the nobility poor and decayed ; good captains and soldiers wanting ; the people out of order ; war with France ; the French King bestriding the realm, having one foot in Calais and the other in Scotland ; steadfast enemies, but no steadfast friends.' The Spanish Ambassador, the Conde de Feria, reported shortly after Elizabeth's accession :

'His Majesty had but to resolve, and he might be master of the situation. . . . The realm is in such a state that we could best negotiate here sword in hand. They have neither money, leaders, nor fortresses.'

The position was truly a desperate one. It seemed inevitable that Great Britain would be conquered by France and Spain. To the surprise of the world, Queen Elizabeth once more created order in the country and made Great Britain more powerful, flourishing, and cultured than she had ever been in the past. She accomplished that marvellous feat not through her own genius but through the great ability of Lord Burleigh, the Bismarck of the time. In Froude's words : The wisdom of Elizabeth was the wisdom of her Ministers, and her chief merit lay in allowing her policy to be guided by Lord Burleigh.

The golden age of the Tudors was created by three all-powerful Ministers who with heart and soul worked for their country. Both Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell governed the country during ten consecutive years, and Lord Burleigh toiled unceasingly on behalf of his Queen during no less than forty years. One-man government exercised through a single responsible and all-powerful Minister raised impoverished and diminished England to the greatest glory.

With the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603 the line of Tudor monarchs came to an end. To England's misfortune these able, energetic, wise, and far-seeing rulers were succeeded by the weak, headstrong, capricious, and incapable Stuarts, who never felt at home in England, James the First, Charles the First, Charles the Second, and James the Second. They endeavoured to govern through Court favourites. They brought the Crown into contempt. They were followed by foreigners, by dull and weak monarchs, and the prestige of the Crown declined still further. The capable William the Third, a Dutchman, was succeeded by Queen Anne, the daughter of James the Second, whose husband was a Danish Prince, and at her death, in

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1714, the Crown was given to George the First, the Elector of Hanover, a grandson of a daughter of James the First. He was installed by the aristocracy, which desired to keep all power in its own hands. George the First, like a Venetian Doge, was to be merely a shadow-king, a puppet of those who had made him. He felt a stranger in England, he never liked the country and the people, he did not know English, he painfully communicated with his Ministers in broken and ungrammatical Latin, and he was told by those who had installed him that his whole duty consisted in wearing his crown, drawing his pay, and saying ditto to his Ministers. According to Coxe's 'Walpole,' the French Ambassador reported to his Government on July 20, 1724, when George the First had been King for ten years :

The King, leaving the internal government entirely to Walpole, is more engaged with the German Ministers in regulating the affairs of Hanover than occupied with those of England. . . . He has no predilection for the English nation, and never receives in private any English of either sex. . . . He rather considers England as a temporary possession, to be made the most of while it lasts, than as a perpetual inheritance to himself and family. He will have no disputes with the Parliament, but commits the entire transaction of that business to Walpole, choosing rather that the responsibility should fall on the Minister's head than his own.

As the foreign King did not preside over the Ministerial Councils, whose proceedings he could not follow owing to his ignorance of English, the Ministers decided without him in his absence. Thus the present form of Cabinet government arose.

George the Second, who had a German consort, felt almost as much a stranger in England as did his father. He did what he was told by his Ministers, whose omnipotence became still more firmly established. He told Chancellor Hardwicke 'The Ministers are the King in this country.' The wives of George the Third, George the Fourth,

and William the Fourth also were German Princesses. Monarchy and Government drifted apart. England became an oligarchy. Her government, as that of Venice, fell into the hands of aristocratic factions which dominated Parliament, filled all offices with their relatives and friends, fought one another for place and power, and divided the country against itself. They ruled largely by intrigue and corruption and they desired to enjoy power without responsibility.

The Cabinet is a Committee of the Privy Council from which it has sprung. The Act of Settlement of 1700 provided :

That from and after the time that the further limitation by this Act shall take effect, all matters and things relating to the well governing of this kingdom, which are properly recognisable in the Privy Council by the laws and customs of this realm, shall be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council as shall advise and consent to the same.

England's new rulers wished to replace the divine right of kings by the divine right of party leaders. Personal responsibility was felt by the men in power to be an inconvenience. The paragraph quoted was repealed in 1706. The fiction of the joint responsibility of the Cabinet was created in order to make the responsibility of individual Ministers unascertainable. The British Cabinet Council, like the Venetian Council of Ten, its prototype, sits in secret. Nothing is transacted in writing. No notes are allowed to be taken. No records of the proceedings are kept for the information and guidance of future generations. As in a conspiracy, no traces are left which might help to attribute the responsibility for decisions arrived at to any individuals or enable posterity to discover the reasons why they were taken.

Committee government through a Cabinet has proved as improvident, dilatory, inefficient, and wasteful in England as it has in Venice. The British Government was a by-

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word of inefficiency during the rule of the Georges, except in the time of the elder Pitt, the great Lord Chatham. Then it suddenly became most efficient because Pitt's powerful personality absolutely dominated his nominal colleagues. Under his energetic direction England once more enjoyed one-man rule. Pitt converted defeat, humiliation, and disorder into efficiency, order, and victory. His ministerial colleagues were his subordinates. Important decisions were taken by an inner Cabinet composed of Pitt, Holderness, and Newcastle. Basil Williams, in his excellent 'Life of William Pitt,' has briefly and correctly described his government as follows :

Much as he asked from his subordinates, Pitt gave more himself. He had trained himself for directing campaigns by his military studies, for diplomacy by his industry in acquiring a knowledge of French history and standard works on treaties and negotiations. . . . Where his own knowledge was deficient he was always ready to learn from those better informed. . . . His regular system of intelligence from foreign countries was admirably organised. . . . All these advantages—a well-ordered office, his own industry and knowledge, good intelligence—were subservient to the daemonic energy with which he executed his plans. His maxim was that nothing was impossible. When an admiral came to him with a tale that his task was impossible, 'Sir, I walk on impossibilities,' replied Pitt, showing his two gouty crutches, and bade him be off to the impossible task. . . .

Pitt's Cabinet, on the whole, worked well with him, for the members rarely ventured to oppose him. Newcastle was cowed and could always be brought to reason by a threat of resignation by Pitt ; Holderness was too devoid of convictions to give much trouble ; the Lord Keeper Henley had not found his feet ; Temple was devoted to his brother-in-law, and not yet jealous ; Anson and Bignonier were really no more than chiefs of the Navy and Army staffs ; Legge was timid ; Halifax, of the Board of Trade, was only admitted on sufferance ; Devonshire and Bedford

took little part ; Hardwicke was kept in order by Granville, who had generally dined and pleased himself with unpalatable truths about his colleagues ; and Mansfield, if he ever had an opinion to express, was reduced to silence by Pitt's withering ' The Chief Justice of England has no opinion to give on this matter.'

Pitt made Cabinet government a success by subordinating the Ministers to his imperious will and his vast ability, by not allowing his so-called colleagues to restrain his daemonical energy and his all-embracing genius.

To those who have studied English history at its source it is clear that Great Britain was most progressive, that her government was most efficient, and that her diplomacy and army were most ably handled in the time of the Tudors, of Cromwell, and of the elder Pitt, when she enjoyed the advantages of one-man government. England's experience confirms the views of Richelieu, Bismarck, Frederick the Great, Napoleon the First, Alexander Hamilton, and of the greatest statesman of antiquity given in these pages.

Unfortunately the British Cabinet tends to become from year to year more unwieldy and more inefficient. A friendly and discriminating American critic, Professor Lowell, wrote in his classical book, ' The Government of England ' :

The number of members in the Cabinet has varied very much at different times, and of late years it has shown a marked tendency to increase. . . . The development of the parliamentary system has made it necessary for the Cabinet to have an ever stronger and stronger hold upon the House of Commons ; and, therefore, the different shades of feeling in the party that has a majority in that House must be more and more fully represented in the Cabinet. This alone would tend to increase the number of its members ; but far more important still is the fact that a seat in the Cabinet has become the ambition of all the prominent men in Parliament. Consequently the desire to be included is very great, and the disappointment correspondingly acute. For these various reasons there is a constant pressure to

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increase the size of the Cabinet. The result is not without its evils. A score of men cannot discuss and agree on a policy with the same readiness as a dozen. There is more danger of delay when action must be taken. There is a greater probability of long discussions that are inconclusive or result in a weak compromise. There is, in short, all the lack of administrative efficiency which a larger body always presents, unless, indeed, that body is virtually guided and controlled by a small number of its own members.

The unwieldiness and inefficiency of British Cabinets are still further increased by a very important factor which Professor Lowell has not mentioned. The Prime Minister and other influential Ministers who wish to control the national policy through the Cabinet endeavour to strengthen their position by keeping some of the ablest men outside the charmed circle and by introducing into it a number of nonentities, a bodyguard of their own, which increases their influence and voting power and correspondingly diminishes the Cabinet's efficiency. This residuum of nonentities is naturally sometimes fought for by the leading Ministers who wish to secure its support. Lord John Russell significantly wrote to Lord Lansdowne on May 28, 1854 : ' It seems to me that the presence of many able men in the Cabinet tends to discordance of opinion and indecision.' In the third volume of Morley's ' Gladstone ' we read, ' A slight ballast of mediocrity in a Government steadies the ship and makes for unity.'

Great Britain is governed by a Cabinet composed of the most eminent party leaders and of those of their followers whom they wish to have near at hand. The management of Army and Navy, the direction of the diplomatic service, &c., are political prizes, are ' spoils of office.' The highest administrative positions have become political perquisites. They are given to men not for their administrative qualifications, but exclusively on account of their political and social influence without any regard to their aptitude. High office is often given to politicians who have had no practical

experience whatever in administration, and sometimes to men who are utterly unfitted for a Ministerial post. No one can faithfully serve several masters. As a politician-minister has probably a business of his own to attend to and must devote much time to party politics in the House of Commons, he can attend only perfunctorily to the business of State. Naturally, disorder, delay, and stagnation in departmental administration is the result. In former ages the national Government was mismanaged by Court favourites. Their place has been taken by party favourites.

The Cabinet is supposed to decide all important questions unanimously. The Army, the Navy, the Diplomatic Service, the national finances, &c., are nominally directed by a single amateur, but in important questions each service is directed by the combined wisdom of some twenty amateurs. One of these knows a little of the business in hand, and the remaining twenty-one know less. Thus, a party politician, who all his life has done nothing except make speeches, has suddenly to take over the functions of a general, an admiral, a diplomat, an expert on agriculture, an authority on shipping and finance, &c., in rapid succession. To do this efficiently he must have a greater and more universal genius than was vouchsafed to Napoleon the First or to the elder Pitt. Jack-of-all-trades are masters of none. Napoleon wrote to Berthier on October 24, 1803 :

L'expérience prouve que le plus grand défaut en administration générale est de vouloir faire trop ; cela conduit à ne point avoir ce dont on a besoin.

In former ages when matters were simple, when the public services were rudimentary, when a few clerks and a door-keeper could handle the business of one of the great Government departments, it was perhaps possible for an amateur to direct successfully a department of State. Now, when the administrative departments have grown to gigantic size, and when the Services have become all-embracing and highly technical, none but great experts can satisfactorily

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manage a great department. Aristotle wrote in the fourth century before Christ :

A State requires many assistants and many superintendents. . . . We observe that the division of labour greatly facilitates all pursuits, and that each kind of work is best performed when each is allotted to a separate workman. To the complicated affairs of Government this observation is particularly applicable.

If a careful division of administrative labour, if Government by specialists was recognised to be necessary in the tiny Greek City-States 2300 years ago, how much more necessary then is expert government in a modern world-empire of 400,000,000 inhabitants ?

Blackstone wrote in the time of Frederick the Great in his celebrated ' Commentaries ' :

It is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial or mechanical : a long course of reading and study must form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws ; but every man of superior fortune thinks himself born a legislator.

During the last three centuries British national organisation has progressively deteriorated.

Napoleon wrote at St. Helena *un mauvais général vaut mieux que deux bons*. War is a one-man business. The greatest generals of all time—lack of space prevents giving their opinions in this place—have stated that nothing is more dangerous in warfare than to allow military operations to be directed by a military council, by a council of experts. The great War was for a long time directed not by a council of military experts, but by a council of politicians, by the Cabinet. When Mr. Churchill was reproached for the failure

of the Dardanelles Expedition, Mr. Asquith declared in the House of Commons that Mr. Churchill was not to blame, that it had been approved of 'by the Cabinet as a whole,' and the House and the country were perfectly satisfied with that explanation. No one asked whether that expedition had been originated and approved of by the experts! As long as military operations are jointly directed by a body of amateurs, disaster is more likely to be the result than success. The British Government, as hitherto constituted, is not the organisation of efficiency, but its negation. It is an organisation similar to that which caused the downfall of Poland. It is the organisation of disorganisation. Amateurs are bound to govern amateurishly, and their insufficiency will be particularly marked if they have to run an unworkable Government machine and are pitted against perfectly organised professionals.

The assertion that inefficiency is inseparable from democracy is not true. Democracy means popular control, but popular control need not mean disorganisation. It need not mean government by amateurs. A highly successful business may have a number of amateur directors, but these will in reality be merely supervisors. The actual management and direction will be left to an expert manager. Similarly, a jury of twelve good men and true does not expound the law, but leaves that technical duty to a single expert, the judge. The fact that democracy and the highest efficiency are compatible is illustrated by the British police, which is at the same time the most democratic, the most efficient, and the least corrupt police force in the world. However, the London police are directed not by a board of politicians, but by a single great expert, who possesses vast powers, and who is controlled by politicians to whom he is personally responsible. Committees are excellent for investigation and deliberation—twenty eyes see more than two—but they are totally unsuitable for decisive and rapid action, especially in the age of railways and telegraphs. Only one man can usefully command a ship,

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conduct an orchestra, manage a business, or direct a State, especially in difficult times.

The rules of good organisation are simple and few. They demand

(1) That a single man of the highest directing ability should be in sole control and should be solely responsible.

(2) That he should be supported by a number of expert assistants, and that he should be able to draw either on their individual or their combined advice, according to the nature of the problem before him.

(3) That every man should have only one job, and that every man should attend only to his own job.

A commercial business directed jointly by twenty-two amateur directors of nominally equal authority, who can only act when they are unanimous, would go bankrupt in a very short time. A business so incompetently organised does not exist. If such an organisation is totally unsuitable for a business where, after all, only a sum of money is at stake, how much more unsuitable then is it for a nation and empire where the existence of 400,000,000 people is at stake? The British Empire has poured out lives and treasure without stint, and the results achieved so far—the action of the Fleet excepted—have been far from encouraging. The return for the gigantic sacrifices made has been totally inadequate. The strength of Great Britain and of the Empire cannot indefinitely be wasted with impunity. The organisation of Great Britain cries for immediate reform. Continuance of organised disorganisation, of haphazard warfare, directed by inexperienced committees, may have the gravest consequences to this country.

A democracy has a great advantage over a monarchy by being more able to adapt its constitution to changing conditions. The wonderful vitality of Ancient Rome was largely due to its adaptability, to the fact that the State had an institution, the Dictatorship, by which the Republic could rapidly be converted into a monarchy in time of danger. Machiavelli has told us in his 'Discorsi':

Among the institutions of Rome, that of the Dictatorship deserves our special admiration. The ordinary institutions of a Commonwealth work but slowly. No Councillor or magistrate has authority to act alone. In most cases several must agree, and time is required to reconcile their differences. Hesitation is most dangerous in situations which do not brook delay. Hence every republic ought to have some resource upon which it can fall back in time of need. When a republic is not provided with some such safeguard, it will either be ruined by observing its Constitutional forms, or it will have to violate them. However, in a republic nothing should be done by irregular methods, for though the irregularity may be useful, it would furnish a pernicious precedent. Every contingency cannot be foreseen and provided for by law. Hence those republics which cannot in a sudden emergency resort to a Dictator or some similar authority may in time of danger be ruined.

The Dictator was originally called *Magister populi*. According to Dionysius he was nominated by the Senate and approved of by the people. Later on he was appointed by the Consuls, the highest civil authorities, whom he superseded. He was not a high-handed tyrant but a popular leader elected by the representatives of the nation. While the Consuls could act only with the co-operation of the Senate, the Dictator could act on his own responsibility. However, his power was limited. He was appointed only for six months. He had no power over the Treasury, but had to come to the Senate for money. The power of the purse remained with the representatives of the nation. Rome was repeatedly saved from ruin by a Dictator when its Civil Government was unable to deal with the situation. We may learn from Rome's example. A Dictator is wanted.

As the Cabinet in its original shape has proved totally unsuitable for conducting a great war, an inner Cabinet of six has been evolved. It remains to be seen whether six can successfully accomplish the work of direction which, according to the greatest statesmen and the practical experience of all time, should be left to a single man. If the committee

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of six should prove unsatisfactory, the Government should frankly declare its inability to deal efficiently with the situation and ask Parliament, without delay, for power to effect the necessary constitutional changes. The leading politicians themselves must surely recognise that they cannot successfully direct a war. The simplest way of concentrating control into one hand would obviously consist in increasing the authority of the Prime Minister, making him solely responsible to Parliament for the conduct of the national business in all its branches, making the other Ministers distinctly his subordinates and appointing to the direction of every Department not politicians but the best experts that can be found. Only the Prime Minister should attend Parliament, for ministers cannot at the same time attend to Parliament and their Departments. The greatest administrative experts would undoubtedly furnish a far stronger advisory council to the Prime Minister than a Cabinet of politicians, however eminent and of whatever party. Statesmanship and party politics must be kept strictly apart. The direction of the nation and the leading of the House require totally different qualifications. To enable the Prime Minister to give his undivided attention to national affairs the two offices should be separated by law. Otherwise national affairs will continue to be subordinated to party matters and be perfunctorily attended to for lack of time. In addition, an advisory Council modelled upon Napoleon's Conseil d'État, as described in these pages and foreshadowed by Sir John Fortescue in his 'Governance of England,' might be created by resuscitating the moribund Privy Council. The Privy Council might once more become a most valuable institution, a national intelligence department, for investigating matters, preparing laws, &c. Its ranks should be greatly strengthened. At present it includes too many politicians and society leaders and too few experts. It should be composed of the ablest men in every branch of human knowledge and activity. It is noteworthy that at present science is quite unrepresented on that Council.

Wars are not won by speeches. The province of politicians is speech, that of statesmen action. Men of words are rarely men of action, and men of action rarely men of words. Richelieu, Cromwell, Frederick, Napoleon, Bismarck, were wretched speakers, and most great speakers, the elder Pitt excepted, wretched statesmen. To entrust the direction of the State to men of words seems as inappropriate as to entrust a valuable racehorse to a plausible sporting journalist. It is questionable whether another set of amateurs will do better than the present one, for the fault lies chiefly with the system. Government by debating society has proved a failure. It should be abolished before it is too late. The situation seems to call for three reforms: (1) A solely responsible Prime Minister exclusively engaged with national business; (2) the replacing of politician-ministers by the best experts; (3) the creation of an efficient Privy Council to serve as a national intelligence department.

The traditional organisation of Great Britain is an anachronism and a danger. Every statesman must be convinced of its insufficiency and inaptitude. Happily it can easily be modernised and immensely strengthened. The advantage of democracy, which means popular control over the Government, can easily be combined with an efficient and well-ordered administration carried on by experts. If the national organisation were reformed in the manner indicated, Great Britain would no longer suffer disappointment after disappointment in war through inexpert direction and divided councils. She would no longer be surprised by events. The Allies would no longer offer a chiefly passive resistance to Germany's onslaughts. The War would be greatly shortened. Efficiency would be met with efficiency, and greater numbers and resources would rapidly prevail. England's example of reorganisation would no doubt be followed throughout the world. The saying that democracy means improvidence, inefficiency, wastefulness, bungling, amateurishness, and delay would cease to be true. Well-

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organised Great Britain would become an example to democracy throughout the world. The democratic form of government which, in consequence of the War, has lost prestige everywhere, would be rehabilitated and obtain a new lease of life.

CHAPTER X

HOW AMERICA BECAME A NATION IN ARMS:¹

SOME LESSONS FOR PEACEFUL DEMOCRACIES AND THEIR LEADERS²

ON December 10, 1914, Professor C. K. Webster stated in his inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Liverpool:

You will look in vain for the books which can teach Englishmen the connection of their own country with the political life of the Continent during the nineteenth century. Such books cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment in the midst of a national crisis. . . . Few will dispute that the study of our diplomatic history in the past century is of real and immediate importance to-day. Yet the work has scarcely been begun. There is, for example, as yet no adequate record of the part England played in the great reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. . . . Neither Canning nor Palmerston is known to us, except by loose and inadequate records.

This statement is exceedingly humiliating. It seems incredible, but unfortunately it is only too true. While the art of vote-catching, called politics, has been assiduously studied in all its branches, the science of statesmanship in the broadest sense of the word, has been completely neglected. The most important of all human sciences is

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September, 1915.

² The recommendations contained in the following pages have since been adopted.

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apparently thought unworthy of study. It is not taught at any of the British Universities, and it is disregarded by those who strive to obtain place and power by way of the ballot-box. Fifty years ago the United States fought a gigantic war, in the course of which they became a nation in arms. Yet there is in the English language no adequate documentary account of that struggle, from which the Anglo-Saxon democracies may derive the most necessary and the most salutary lessons for their guidance, lessons which should be invaluable to them at the present moment. The fact that the United States introduced conscription during the Civil War is scarcely known in England. In a lengthy article on conscription in the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' an historical and philosophical account of compulsory service in France and Germany is given, but the fact that America introduced conscription is not even mentioned! Ninety-nine out of every hundred well-educated Englishmen ignore the means whereby the United States raised millions of soldiers at a time when their population was very much smaller than that of the United Kingdom is at present.

The main facts and the principal documents relating to the American Civil War are buried deeply in the contemporary journals and in bulky official publications such as the 'Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies' published by the American Government between 1880 and 1900, a work which is about five times as large as the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' but which is practically unusable because it is merely an inchoate, incoherent, and confusing collection of documents which lacks an index. In the following pages an attempt will be made to rescue the most important facts and documents from oblivion and to deduce from them the principal lessons which they supply to the Anglo-Saxon peoples of both hemispheres for their encouragement and their guidance in the present crisis.

The American Civil War began on April 12, 1861, at

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4.30 A.M., when the Southern Army commenced the bombardment of Fort Sumter, which dominates the mouth of Charleston Harbour, and which was garrisoned by Union troops. In the Southern States secession and rebellion had been preparing, both secretly and openly, for a long time. Yet the United States Government had neglected making any preparations for the inevitable struggle. President Buchanan, who was in office from 1857 to 1861, was well-meaning, scrupulously honest, kindly, but weak. He was deeply religious and philanthropical, and he loved peace and his ease. He disliked trouble and wished to leave the settlement of the gravest problem of his country to the next President. Fearing to precipitate the struggle, he made no preparation to meet the crisis, and allowed the Southern forts and arsenals to be seized by the secessionists. Abraham Lincoln had been elected as his successor. He was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, at a moment of the severest tension between North and South, only five weeks before the cannon began to speak. He was a minority President, for the voting at the Presidential contest had been as follows :

For Lincoln	(Republican Party)	1,857,610 votes
For Douglas	(Democratic, non-Interventionist, Party)	1,365,976 "
For Breckinridge	(Democratic, pro-Slavery, Party)	847,953 "
For Bell	(Constitutional Union Party)	590,631 "
Total		4,662,170 votes

As at the Presidential Election of 1912, the largest American party had split in two and had failed to return the President. Only 40 per cent. of the people had voted for Lincoln. His position was one of unexampled difficulty. He was a novice at his office, he had entered it at a moment of the gravest danger, he was quite inexperienced in dealing with national, as distinguished from local affairs, he represented only a minority of the people, and he was surrounded by treason and intrigue. On January 1, 1861, the United States Army was only 16,402 men strong, and of these 1745

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were absent. These few troops were distributed in small parcels all over the gigantic territory of the Union to hold the marauding Indians in check. The Navy had been scattered over distant seas. The arsenals of the North were ill-supplied with arms. Washington, the Federal capital, lay on the border between North and South, within easy reach of the army which the South had collected threateningly close to that city before opening the attack on Fort Sumter. Washington lies on the left bank of the Potomac. It is dominated by the heights on the right bank of that river, and these were in the hands of the insurgents. On April 12, the day when the bombardment of Fort Sumter began, the following telegram was sent from Montgomery, Alabama, the temporary capital of the Southern States, to all parts of the Union :

An immense crowd serenaded President Davis and Secretary [of War] Walker at the Exchange Hotel to-night.

The former is not well, and did not appear. Secretary Walker appeared and declined to make a speech, but in a few words of electrical eloquence told the news from Fort Sumter, declaring in conclusion that before many hours the flag of the Confederacy would float over that fortress.

No man, he said, could tell where the War this day commenced would end, but he would prophesy that the flag which now flaunts the breeze here would float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May. Let them try Southern Chivalry and test the extent of Southern resources, and it might float eventually over Faneuil Hall [in Boston] itself.

Immediately on the outbreak of war the railways and telegraphs around Washington were cut. The city was completely isolated from the outer world. The State of Maryland, to the north of the Federal capital, prevented a few rapidly mobilised Militia troops from New York and Boston reaching the seat of the national Government. Washington was denuded of troops and was hastily barricaded to protect it and the President against a *coup de main*.

The gallant South had furnished to the State a disproportionately large number of able officers and of high officials. Local patriotism was exceedingly strong in the Southern States. Hence many of the best military and naval officers and many of the ablest Civil Servants resigned immediately after the outbreak of the Civil War and joined the Southern forces, crippling simultaneously the Army, the Navy, and the national administration in all its branches. On April 20, eight days after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, General Robert E. Lee, who was considered to be the ablest officer in the United States Service, and who had been offered the active command of the Union Army, resigned his commission to the general consternation of the North, and crossed the border. Altogether 313 commissioned officers resigned and joined the rebellion. According to Moore's 'Rebellion Record,' the Southern States received from the Regular Army the following generals, most of whom resigned their commissions between December 20, 1860, the date when the State of South Carolina seceded, and January 1, 1862 :

Generals	8
Lieutenant-Generals	15
Major-Generals	48
Brigadier-Generals	111

The Secretary of War, in his Report of July 1, 1861, stated that 'but for this startling defection the rebellion never could have assumed its formidable proportions.'

The guns bombarding Fort Sumter had given the signal for the collapse of the Government. The position which was created by the outbreak of the rebellion was graphically described by President Lincoln in his message to Congress of May 26, 1862, as follows :

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union was clandestinely prepared during the winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organisation in the form of a treasonable provisional Government at Montgomery, in Alabama, on the 18th day of February, 1861.

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On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of Civil War by the bombardment and the capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation. Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped, and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces which had been called out by the Government for the defence of Washington were prevented from reaching the city by organised and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organisation for the public defence. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it. . . .

The leaders of the Secession movement had skilfully chosen the most suitable time for action. They believed that at the critical moment all would be confusion at Washington, that, lacking an adequate army and an experienced leader, the Northern States would not dare to act with vigour, that the new President would hesitate to adopt a course which might lead to civil war, and that, if after all war should break out, they would have numerous auxiliaries. The Southern States had a monopoly in the production of cotton. The leaders of the South believed that the demand for cotton in England and France would put a speedy end to any blockade of the Southern ports which the United States might wish to undertake. They thought that the great Democratic Party of the North, which, if united, was far stronger than the Republican Party which had elected Lincoln, would refuse to support the President if he should wish to re-take the Southern forts and arsenals by force. They believed that the industrial North had degenerated and that it would prove an inefficient opponent to the

agricultural South where every man knew how to ride and how to handle a gun.

When the South struck its blow for independence there certainly was confusion in Washington and throughout the States of the North. In describing the condition of the country in 1861 the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War reported : ' There was treason in the Executive Mansion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Representatives, treason in the Army and Navy, treason in every department, bureau and office connected with the Government.' The position of affairs was more fully described in the First Executive Order in Relation to State Prisoners, which was issued on behalf of the President by Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, on February 14, 1862. He wrote :

The breaking out of a formidable insurrection, based on a conflict of political ideas, being an event without precedent in the United States, was necessarily attended by great confusion and perplexity of the public mind. Disloyalty, before unsuspected, suddenly became bold, and treason astonished the world by bringing at once into the field military forces superior in numbers to the standing army of the United States.

Every Department of the Government was paralysed by treason. Defection appeared in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, in the Cabinet, in the Federal Courts ; Ministers and Consuls returned from foreign countries to enter the insurrectionary councils or land or naval forces ; commanding and other officers of the army and in the navy betrayed the councils or deserted their posts for commands in the insurgent forces. Treason was flagrant in the revenue and in the post office service, as well as in the Territorial Governments and in the Indian reserves.

Not only Governors, Judges, Legislators, and Ministerial Officers in the States, but even whole States rushed, one after another, with apparent unanimity into rebellion. The capital was besieged and its connection with all the States cut off.

Even in the portions of the country which were most loyal political combinations and secret societies were formed furthering the work of disunion, while, from motives of disloyalty or cupidity, or from excited passions or perverted sympathies, individuals were found furnishing men, money, and materials of war and supplies to the insurgents' military and naval forces. Armies, ships, fortifications, navy yards, arsenals, military posts and garrisons, one after another, were betrayed or abandoned to the insurgents.

Congress had not anticipated, and so had not provided for, the emergency. The municipal authorities were powerless and inactive. The judicial machinery seemed as if it had been designed not to sustain the Government, but to embarrass and betray it.

Foreign intervention, openly invited and industriously instigated by the abettors of the insurrection, became imminent, and has only been prevented by the practice of strict and impartial justice with the most perfect moderation in our intercourse with nations. . . .

Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone.

At the touch of war all the factors of national strength, the Army, the Navy, and the Civil Administration, had broken down. Consternation and confusion were general. At the head of affairs was a quaint and old-fashioned country attorney from the backwoods, possessed of a homely wit and infinite humour, ignorant of national government, surrounded by treason and besieged by a mob of clamorous office-seekers who blocked the ante-rooms and the passages at the White House, sat on the stairs and overflowed into the garden. Congress was not in session. Washington was isolated and threatened. It was questionable whether the two Houses of the Legislature would be able to meet in the Federal Capital. Many people in the North sympathised secretly with the South. Few officials could be trusted. The position was desperate. Everything had broken down except the Constitution. In the hour of the direst need the

American Constitution proved a source of the greatest strength and it saved the country.

The American Constitution had been planned not by politicians but by great statesmen and soldiers, by the able and energetic men of action who had fought victoriously against England. They had wisely, and after mature deliberation, concentrated vast powers in the hands of the President, and had given him almost despotic powers in a time of national danger. President Lincoln unhesitatingly made use of these powers. It will appear in the course of these pages that the Southern States were defeated not so much by President Lincoln and the Northern Armies as by the Fathers of the Commonwealth, who in another century had prepared for the use of the President a powerful weapon which would be ready to his hand in the hour of peril.

Those who wish to understand the foundations of American statesmanship as laid down by the American nation-builders, should not turn to Lord Bryce's excellent volumes but should go to the fountain-head, to the pages of *The Federalist*. *The Federalist* was published in a number of letters to the Press for the information of the public in 1787-88, at the time when the American Constitution was being painfully evolved by the Convention and was being discussed by the public. The authors of *The Federalist* were three of the greatest American statesmen—Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, and the lion's share was taken by that great genius, Hamilton. *The Federalist* was, and is still, the ablest and the most authoritative exposition of the Constitution. It contains the *Arcana Reipublicae*. It is the American statesman's Bible. It has inspired America's leading men to the present day, and among them Abraham Lincoln. If we wish to understand America's policy in the Civil War we shall do well to acquaint ourselves at the outset with some of the most important views contained in *The Federalist*.

The founders of the American Republic were democrats

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but not demagogues. They were statesmen who feared the rise of demagogues. It is highly significant that we read in the very first letter of *The Federalist*: 'History will teach us . . . that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people ; commencing demagogues and ending tyrants.' The Fathers of the American Commonwealth were not sentimentalists but statesmen and men of common sense. They did not believe that an era of universal peace was approaching or was possible, that monarchy meant war and democracy meant peace, that popular government or 'democratic control,' as it is now usually called, would bring about the millennium. In the sixth and seventh letters of *The Federalist* we read :

. . . Nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it. . . .

. . . There are still to be found visionary or designing men who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific ; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men. . . .

Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies ? Are not the former administered by *men* as well as the latter ? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions that affect nations as well as kings ? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities ? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals ? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war ? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory ? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives

. . . as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion ?

Believing that the United States were likely to be involved in further wars, the founders of the American Republic wished to strengthen the State by making the President powerful and independent, by giving him almost monarchical authority in time of peace and by making him a kind of Dictator in time of war. The United States Constitution states : ' The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several States when called into the active service of the United States.' In time of danger State rights were to disappear, the military independence of the individual States was to come to an end.

Unlike the British Prime Minister, the American President is free from popular and Parliamentary control. He can at any time repudiate a majority of both Houses. He can veto any act of Congress even if it is supported by large majorities, and he has frequently done so, for he is supposed to act solely in the interests of the nation and in accordance with his own conscience without regard to party majorities and party intrigues. He can place at the head of the Army and Navy any man he chooses, or he can command in person and no one can question his action. His Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, are nominated by him, and they are his subordinates. They are the President's, nor the people's, servants. They have no seat and no voice in Congress. They are supposed to stand, like the President, outside and above party, to be servants of the nation as a whole. The Ministers, like the President, cannot be removed by a chance majority. The President and his Secretaries of State are not so constantly hampered in their actions by the fear of losing popularity and office as are British statesmen. The founders of the Commonwealth gave to the President a vast and truly royal authority because they believed that a national executive could be efficient only if it was strong, and that

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it could be strong only if it was independent of party ties and entrusted to a single man. We read in the thirty-seventh letter of *The Federalist*, written by Madison :

The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments ; and that even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections, and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men, whilst energy in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand.

Hamilton, Jay, Governor Morris, John Adams, and other leading men of the time were so much in favour of a strong executive that they advocated that American Presidents, like British Judges, should be appointed for life and should be removable only by impeachment.

The doctrine that a Government, to be efficient, requires not many heads but a single head, that a one-man Government, a strong Government, is valuable at all times, and especially in time of national danger, was more fully developed by Hamilton in the seventieth letter of *The Federalist*. He wrote :

. . . Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks ; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws ; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice ; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge

in the absolute power of a single man under the formidable title of Dictator. . . .

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution ; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government. . . .

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity ; secondly, duration ; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support ; fourthly, competent powers.

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views have declared in favour of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have, with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand ; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.

That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterise the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any great number ; and in proportion as the number is increased these qualities will be diminished.

Great Britain is ruled by a Cabinet, by a number of men who are nominally equal, and the Prime Minister is their President, he is *primus inter pares*. The British Cabinet Ministers take resolutions collectively and they act, at least in theory, with unanimity. As they act unanimously, there is no individual, but only collective, responsibility for Cabinet decisions. Until recently twenty-two Cabinet Ministers were collectively responsible for every important decision, even if the decision required high expert knowledge which few, if any, of them possessed, or if it concerned only a single Department—such as the Army or

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Navy—with which twenty Ministers out of twenty-two in the Cabinet were quite unacquainted. An anonymous author wrote some years ago of the British Cabinet that it had many heads but no head, many minds but no mind. Government by a crowd is a danger in war time. Hamilton clearly foresaw the weakness and danger of governing by means of a committee of politicians, especially in time of war. His opinion is so interesting, so weighty, and so valuable, and it applies with such force to Cabinet Government as practised in Great Britain up to the present crisis, that it is worth while to give it *in extenso*. He stated in the seventieth letter of *The Federalist*, with regard to government by Cabinet, by means of an executive council :

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches anything, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. . . .

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government in the most critical emergencies of the State. And, what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have appeared to disapprove, opposition

then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. . . .

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature ; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constituent of the Executive. It is here, too, that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. . . .

But no favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality. . . .

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed—that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority, a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect ; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable, weight, to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive.

An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds—to censure,

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and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in a public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors, who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

‘I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.’ These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction?

War is a one-man business. To the founders of the American Republic it seemed so essential and so self-evident that only a single hand could direct the Army and Navy efficiently and ‘with decision, activity, secrecy and despatch’ that they thought that the paragraph of the Constitution which made the President Commander-in-Chief of both Services was unchallengeable and required neither explanation nor defence. That paragraph is curtly dismissed by Hamilton in the seventy-fourth letter of *The Federalist*, as follows :

The President of the United States is to be ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of

the Militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.' The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have in other respects coupled the chief magistrate with a council have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone.

Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.

War is a one-man business. The maxim that a nation at war should be directed by a single man, not by a council, which the greatest statesmen and soldiers of all times have recognised and which Hamilton and Washington have preached, has sunk deeply into the American mind. President Lincoln illustrated the necessity of unity in the direction of national affairs in time of war in his homely and inimitable way. He wrote in his Message to Congress of December 8, 1861 :

It has been said that one bad general is better than two good ones, and the saying is true if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other.

And the same is true in all joint operations wherein those engaged can have none but a common end in view and can differ only as to the choice of means. In a storm at sea no one on board can wish the ship to sink, and yet not infrequently all go down together because too many will direct and no single mind can be allowed to control.

President Lincoln, though a great character and a great citizen, can scarcely be called an exceptionally great statesman. He certainly was not brilliant. He

was endowed with homely common sense and was honest, unprejudiced, industrious, conscientious, fair-minded, painstaking, patient, warm-hearted, fearless, determined, patriotic, a democrat but by no means a demagogue. He was a model citizen who quietly and resolutely would do his duty, would do his best, and who was not afraid of responsibility if an important decision had to be taken. At the outbreak of the Civil War, when all the factors supporting the Government's authority had broken down, President Lincoln fell back on the Constitution. He rather relied on its spirit as it appears in *The Federalist* than on its wording, and he did not hesitate to strain his powers to the utmost in order to save the State. On April 15, immediately after the bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter, he called upon the governors of the individual States to raise 75,000 men of State Militia in proportion to their inhabitants and to place them into the service of the United States and under his command. These 75,000 men were called upon to serve only for three months, not because the President or his Cabinet believed that the War would last only ninety days, but because, according to the Act of 1795, the President had authority which permitted 'the use of the Militia so as to be called forth only for thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress.'

A musty law circumscribed and hampered the President's action but it did not hamper it for long. Very soon it became evident that that preliminary measure was totally insufficient, that energy and novel measures were required to overcome the dangers which threatened the Northern States from without and from within. Relying on the spirit of the Constitution and on his duty to defend the Union at all costs, President Lincoln, to his eternal honour, did not hesitate to make illegal, but not unscrupulous, use of dictatorial powers. On April 27 he directed General Scott to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus, if necessary, in order to be able to deal with treason and with opposition in the Northern States. On May 3 he decreed by procla-

mation that the regular army should be increased by 22,714, or should be more than doubled, and that 18,000 seamen should be added to the Navy. At the same time he called for forty regiments, composed of 42,084 volunteers, to serve during three years. President Lincoln candidly explained the necessity for these high-handed and obviously illegal measures as follows in his Message to Congress of July 4, 1861 :

. . . Recurring to the action of the Government, it may be stated that at first a call was made for 75,000 militia, and rapidly following this a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.

Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity; trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.

Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a duty to authorise the commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of course, some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one-

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third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to be unexecuted and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorised to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.

Democracy loves strength, loves plain speaking, loves a man. The President's energetic though high-handed and unconstitutional action was enthusiastically approved by the people throughout the loyal States, and was later on legalised by Congress by means of a resolution.

At the beginning of the war the Northern States were almost unarmed. The Government had completely neglected the Army and Navy. In the country was only a

Buchanan's Secretary of had allowed enals in the e they were muskets the l Armoury, y of the pri- muskets a and armoury ained 15,000 en into the Government limited the , and many air camps in ported from abroad, and prices. The s only about ed, and its was brought of 1861, and The United preparations be created. which had en. During sed and sent whom 53,500 he table on 'Cyclopædia,'

was used to al back upon dy order was id talent for

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organisation of the race asserted themselves. The North was far superior to the South in population, wealth, machinery, and appliances of every kind. In the course of time a large, well-organised, and well-equipped army arose.

At the beginning of 1862 the Southern States were threatened with invasion by large armies. A great forward movement of the Northern forces was ordered to begin on February 22, and rapid progress was being made. Forts Henry and Donelson were rapidly captured from the rebels, Bowling Green and Columbus had to be evacuated, and

Muskets and Rifles.

Prussian muskets	4,006
United States rifles	5,290
Padrei rifles	5,000
Belgian rifles	957
New percussion muskets	7,299
Altered percussion muskets	8,800
Long-range rifles	600
Springfield rifles	1,830
Short Enfields	960
Long Enfields	13,898
Saxony rifles	1,000
Austrian rifles, .54 cal.	3,822
Mississippi rifles, .54 cal.	362

Nashville surrendered. The entire line of defence formed by the Southern States towards the west was swept away, and a march by the Northern troops into the heart of the South-western States seemed imminent. Consternation seized upon the Southern people. The Southern Army of 1861 was composed chiefly of volunteers who had enlisted for twelve months. The voluntary system had yielded all it could yield. It became clear that the Southern States could not successfully be defended by volunteers against the North, that national and compulsory service was needed. The Southern Government was aroused to action, and without hesitation President Jefferson Davis sent a message to the Confederate Congress, in which he laid down that it was the duty of all citizens to defend the State, and in which he demanded the introduction of conscription for all men

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between eighteen and thirty-five years. This most important document was worded as follows :

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States

The operation of the various laws now in force for raising armies has exhibited the necessity for reform. The frequent changes and amendments which have been made have rendered the system so complicated as to make it often quite difficult to determine what the law really is, and to what extent prior amendments are modified by more recent legislation.

There is also embarrassment from conflict between State and Confederate legislation. I am happy to assure you of the entire harmony of purpose and cordiality of feeling which has continued to exist between myself and the executives of the several States ; and it is to this cause that our success in keeping adequate forces in the field is to be attributed.

These reasons would suffice for inviting your earnest attention to the necessity of some simple and general system for exercising the power of raising armies which is vested in Congress by the Constitution.

But there is another and more important consideration. The vast preparations made by the enemy for a combined assault at numerous points on our frontier and seaboard have produced results that might have been expected. They have animated the people with a spirit of resistance so general, so resolute, and so self-sacrificing that it requires rather to be regulated than to be stimulated. The right of the State to demand and the duty of each citizen to render military service need only to be stated to be admitted. It is not, however, a wise or judicious policy to place in active service that portion of the force of a people which experience has shown to be necessary as a reserve. Youths under the age of eighteen years require further instruction ; men of matured experience are needed for maintaining order and good government at home, and in supervising preparations for rendering efficient the armies in the field. These two

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classes constitute the proper reserve for home defence, ready to be called out in case of any emergency, and to be kept in the field only while the emergency exists.

But in order to maintain this reserve intact it is necessary that in a great war like that in which we are now engaged all persons of intermediate ages not legally exempt for good cause should pay their debt of military service to the country, that the burdens should not fall exclusively on the ardent and patriotic. I therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring that all persons residing within the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and rightfully subject to military duty, shall be held to be in the military service of the Confederate States, and that some plain and simple method be adopted for their prompt enrolment and organisation, repealing all of the legislation heretofore enacted which would conflict with the system proposed.

It will be noticed that President Jefferson Davis demanded not only conscription, but practically the total surrender of State rights. He wished the confederation of Southern States to fight like a single State, recognising that concentration increases strength. A Conscription Act was rapidly passed on April 16, 1862.

As conscription for all men from eighteen to thirty-five years did not suffice to fill the depleted ranks of the Southern Army, it was made more rigorous. An order by Brigadier-General John H. Winder dated August 1, 1862, stated :

The obtaining of substitutes through the medium of agents is strictly forbidden. When such agents are employed, the principal, the substitute, and the agent will be impressed into the military service, and the money paid for the substitute, and as a reward to the agent, will be confiscated to the Government. The offender will also be subjected to such other imprisonment as may be imposed by a court martial.

As desertion from the ranks had weakened the Southern Army, the Press appealed to the citizens of the South to

assist in the apprehension of deserters and stragglers. All men and women in the country were exhorted to 'pursue, shame and drive back to the ranks those who have deserted their colours and their comrades and turned their backs upon their country's service.' Still further exertions were required to prevent the Northern troops invading the Southern States in force. Hence, in September 1862, the Confederate Congress passed another Act of Conscription which called out for military service all men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five. The most important part of this Act was worded as follows :

An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An Act to provide further for the Public Defence,' approved April 16, 1862.

The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact That the President be and he is hereby authorised to call out and place in the military service of the Confederate States for three years, unless the war shall have been sooner ended, all white men who are residents of the Confederate States between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five years at the time the call or calls may be made, and who are not at such time or times legally exempted from military service ; or such part or parts thereof as, in his judgment, may be necessary to the public defence, such call or calls to be made under the provisions and according to the terms of the Act to which this is an amendment ; and such authority shall exist in the President during the present war as to all persons who now are or may hereafter become eighteen years of age ; and when once enrolled all persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years shall serve their full time.

Years of fighting reduced the ranks of the Southern armies. They could hold their own against the overwhelming numbers of the North only by extending the age limit of compulsory military service still further, by making conscription still more rigorous. In February 1864 a general military Act was passed which enrolled all

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white men from seventeen to fifty years in the Army. It stated :

1. That all white men, residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of seventeen and fifty shall be in the military service of the Confederate States during the war.

2. That all between the ages of eighteen and forty-five now in service shall be retained during the present war in the same organisations in which they were serving at the passage of this Act, unless they are regularly discharged or transferred. . . .

4. That no person shall be relieved from the operation of this Act by reason of having been discharged where no disability now exists, nor by reason of having furnished a substitute ; but no person who has heretofore been exempted on account of religious opinions and paid the required tax, shall be required to render military service.

5. That all between seventeen and eighteen years and forty-five and fifty years of age shall form a reserve corps, not to serve out of the State in which they reside. . . .

7. That any person of the last-named failing to attend at the place of rendezvous within thirty days, as required by the President, without a sufficient reason, shall be made to serve in the field during the war.

The American Civil War had begun in April 1861. At its commencement the people in the North had believed that, owing to their overwhelming superiority in numbers, in wealth, and in resources of every kind, they would be able to subdue the insurgent States by armies raised on the voluntary principle within a reasonable time. However, the war dragged on interminably. Enthusiasm for volunteering diminished, men became cool and indifferent. Owing to the reduced number of workers wages rose very greatly throughout the Union, and men turned rather to the factory than to the Army. Week by week the expenditure in blood and treasure increased. At last the people in the North began to see the necessity of abandoning the voluntary

system and of imitating the Southern States by introducing compulsory service. It will be of interest to see the way in which public opinion veered round. In his Report of March 17, 1866, the Provost-Marshal-General James B. Fry, the head of the great Recruiting Department of the Northern armies, described this change in opinion under the heading 'Public Recognition of the Necessity of a General Conscription,' as follows :

During the latter part of 1862 the necessity for a radical change in the method of raising troops in order to prosecute the war to a successful issue became more and more apparent. The demand for reinforcements from the various armies in the field steadily and largely exceeded the current supply of men. The old agencies for filling the ranks proved more and more ineffective. It was evident that the efforts of the Government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail without resort to the unpopular, but nevertheless truly republican, measure of conscription. The national authorities, no less than the purest and wisest minds in Congress, and intelligent and patriotic citizens throughout the country, perceived that, besides a more reliable, regular, and abundant supply of men, other substantial benefits would be derived from the adoption and enforcement of the principle that every citizen, not incapacitated by physical or mental disability, owes military service to the country in the hour of extremity. It would effectually do away with the unjust and burdensome disproportion in the number of men furnished by different States and localities.

But it was not easy to convince the public mind at once of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty, contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation. The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment of privileges than to the fulfilment of duties under the General Government, and hence beheld the prospect of compulsory service in the Army with an unreasonable dread. Among the labouring classes especially it produced great uneasiness. Fortunately the loyal political leaders and Press early realised the urgency of conscription, and by judicious agitation gradually reconciled the public to it.

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When the enrolment Act was introduced in Congress in the following winter the patriotic people of the North were willing to see it become a law.

Early in 1863 the Bill introducing conscription was placed before Congress at Washington, and was discussed by both Houses. The debates were brief and the speeches delivered are most interesting and enlightening at the present moment, when the principle of conscription is still discussed not only in Great Britain but throughout the British Empire. Let us listen to the principal arguments in favour of conscription.

~~Now~~ Mr. Dunn, representative of Indiana, urged the necessity of conscription in the following words :

The necessity is upon us to pass a Bill of this character. We have many regiments in the field greatly reduced in numbers. . . . It is due to the gallant men remaining in these regiments that their numbers should be promptly filled up. This cannot be done by voluntary enlistment, on account of the influence of just such speeches as are made here and elsewhere denouncing the war ; many make a clamour against the war as an excuse for not volunteering. Moreover, a draft is the cheapest, fairest, and best mode of raising troops. It is to be regretted this mode was not adopted at first. Then all would have shared alike in the perils and glories of the war. Every family would have been represented in the field, and every soldier would have had sympathy and support from his friends at home. The passage of this Bill will give evidence to the rebels that the nation is summoning all its energies to the conflict, and it will be proof to foreign nations that we are prepared to meet promptly any intermeddling in our domestic strife. The Government has a right in war to command the services of its citizens, whom it protects in war as well as in peace. We, as legislators, must not shrink from the discharge of our high responsibility.

Mr. Thomas, Representative of Massachusetts, stated :

For the last six or nine months a whole party—a strong party—has deliberately entered into a combination to dis-

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courage, to prevent, and as far as in it lay to prohibit, the volunteering of the people of the country as soldiers in our army. Members of that party have gone from house to house, from town to town, and from city to city urging their brethren not to enlist in the armies of the nation, and giving them all sorts of reasons for that advice. . . .

Mr. Speaker, this is a terrible Bill ; terrible in the powers it confers upon the executive, terrible in the duty and burden it imposes upon the citizen. I meet the suggestion by one as obvious and cogent, and that is that the exigency is a terrible one and calls for all the powers with which the Government is invested. . . .

The powers of Congress, within the scope of the Constitution, are supreme and strike directly to the subject and hold him in its firm, its iron grasp. I repeat what at an early day I asserted upon this floor, that there is not a human being within the territory of the United States, black or white, bond or free, whom this Government is not capable of taking in its right hand and using for its military service whenever the defence of the country requires, and of this Congress alone must judge. The question of use is a question of policy only. . . . It is, in effect, a question to this nation of life or death. We literally have no choice.

Mr. Wilson, Senator for Massachusetts, said :

We are now engaged in a gigantic struggle for the preservation of the life of the nation. . . . If we mean to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws, if we mean to preserve the unity of the Republic, if we mean that America shall live and have a position and name among the nations, we must fill the broken and thinned ranks of our wasted battalions.

The issue is now clearly represented to the country for the acceptance or rejection of the American people : an inglorious peace with a dismembered Union and a broken nation, on the one hand, or war fought out until the rebellion is crushed beneath its iron heel. Patriotism accepts the bloody issues of war, rather than peace purchased with the dismemberment of the Republic and the death of the nation.

If we accept peace, disunion, death, then we may speedily

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summon home again our armies ; if we accept war, until the flag of the Republic waves over every foot of our united country, then we must see to it that the ranks of our armies, broken by toil, disease, and death, are filled again with the health and vigour of life. To fill the thinned ranks of our battalions we must again call upon the people. The immense numbers already summoned to the field, the scarcity and high rewards of labour, press upon all of us the conviction that the ranks of our wasted regiments cannot be filled again by the old system of volunteering. If volunteers will not respond to the call of the country, then we must resort to the involuntary system. . . .

Senator MacDougall of California stated :

I regretted much, when the war was first organised, that the conscription rule did not obtain. I went from the extreme east to the extreme west of the loyal States. I found some districts where some bold leaders brought out all the young men and sent them or led them to the field. In other districts, and they were the most numerous, the people made no movement towards the maintenance of the war ; there were whole towns and cities, I may say, where no one volunteered to shoulder a musket and no one offered to lead them into the service. The whole business has been unequal and wrong from the first. The rule of conscription should have been the rule to bring out men of all classes and make it equal throughout the country. . . .

Mr. Sargent, Representative of California, said :

For a want of a general enrolment of the forces of the United States and a systematic calling out of those forces, we have experienced all the inconveniences of a volunteer system, with its enormous expense, ill discipline and irregular efforts, and have depended upon spasmodic efforts of the people, elated or depressed by the varying fortunes of war or the rise or fall of popular favourites in the Army. I believe I hazard nothing in saying that we should have lost fewer men in the field and from disease and been much nearer the end of this destructive war had we earlier availed

ourselves of the power conferred by the Constitution and at last proposed to be adopted by this Bill. For short and irregular efforts no force can be better than a volunteer army. With brave and skilful officers and a short and active term of service, volunteer troops are highly efficient. But when a war is to last for years, as this will have done, however soon we may see its termination, it must depend for its success upon regular and systematic forces. . . . Such filling up is not possible to any degree under the volunteer system, as the Government has had occasion to know in this war. . . .

The practical operation of the volunteer system has been that the earnest lovers of the country among the people, the haters of the rebellion, the noblest and best of our citizens, have left their homes to engage in this war to sustain the Constitution ; while the enemies of civil liberty, those who hate the Government and desire its failure in this struggle, have stayed at home to embarrass it by discontent and clamour. By this system we have had the loyal States drained of those who could be relied upon in all political contests to sustain the Government ; going forth to fight the manly foe in front, the covert foe left behind has opened a fire in the rear. Under the garb of democracy, a name that has been so defiled and prostituted that it has become synonymous with treason and should henceforth be a byword and hissing to the American people, these demagogues in this hall and out of it have traduced the Government, misrepresented the motives of loyal men. . . . The Bill goes upon the presumption that every citizen not incapacitated by physical or mental disability owes military service to the country in its hour of extremity, and that it is honourable and praiseworthy to render such service.

The views given fairly sum up the opinion held by the majority of the American people in the North and by that of their representatives at Washington who passed the Conscription Act without undue delay against a rather substantial minority. The principal provisions of the Act of March 3, 1863, establishing compulsory military service and exempting certain citizens, furnish so valuable and so interesting

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a precedent to the fighting democracies that it is worth while giving them in this place. We read in the Act :

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled : That all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of the laws thereof, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, except as hereinafter excepted, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called out by the President for that purpose.

Section 2. And be it further enacted : That the following persons be and they are hereby excepted and exempt from the provisions of this Act, and shall not be liable to military duty under the same, to wit : Such as are rejected as physically or mentally unfit for the service ; also, first, the Vice-President of the United States, the heads of the various Executive Departments of the Government, and the Governors of the several States. Second, the only son liable to military duty of a widow dependent upon his labour for support. Third, the only son of aged or infirm parent or parents dependent upon his labour for support. Fourth, where there are two or more sons of aged or infirm parents subject to the draft, the father, or if he be dead the mother, may elect which son shall be exempt. Fifth, the only brother of children not twelve years old, having neither father nor mother dependent upon his labour for support. Sixth, the father of motherless children under twelve years of age dependent upon his labour for support. Seventh, where there are a father and sons in the military service of the United States as non-commissioned officers, musicians, or privates, the residue of such family and household, not exceeding two, shall be exempt. And no person but such as herein excepted shall be exempt. Provided, however, that no person who has been convicted of any felony shall be enrolled or permitted to serve in said forces.

In each district a Provost-Marshal, acting under the Provost-Marshal-General, an examining surgeon, and a

commissioner constituted the Board of Enrolment. The enrolling officers were directed to enrol all able-bodied persons within the prescribed ages and to judge of age by the best evidence they could obtain. They were required to make two classes in their returns, the first of all men between twenty and thirty-five years, and the second of all between thirty-five and forty-five years. If we wish to learn how the Conscription Act worked in the unruly North, where an enormous percentage of the population liable to military service consisted of immigrant foreigners who often were ill-acquainted with the English language, we should turn to the Report which the Provost-Marshal-General made to the Secretary of War on March 17, 1866. We read :

The Act of Congress creating the office of Provost-Marshal-General was approved March 3, 1863. I was appointed to it March 17, 1863.

Within a few weeks from that date the network of organisation adopted under the law was extended over the loyal States and the counties and towns of the same, and the principal duties of the Bureau [the Provost-Marshal-General's], to wit, the arrest of deserters, the enrolment of the national forces for draft, and the enlistment of volunteers had been commenced.

When the Bureau was put in operation the strength of the Army was deemed inadequate for offensive operations. Nearly 400,000 recruits were required to bring the regiments and companies then in service up to the legal and necessary standard. Disaster had been succeeded by inactivity, and the safety of the country depended on speedy and continued reinforcement of the Army. The insufficiency of the system of recruitment previously pursued had been demonstrated, and the Army was diminishing by the ordinary casualties of war, but more rapidly by the expiration of the terms for which the troops had engaged to serve. To meet the emergency a new system of recruitment was inaugurated. The General Government, through this Bureau, assumed direct control of the business which had heretofore been transacted mainly by the State Governments. . . .

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The following is a condensed summary of the results of the operations of this Bureau from its organisation to the close of the war :

(1) By means of a full and exact enrolment of all persons liable to conscription under the law of March 3, and its amendments, a complete exhibit of the military resources of the loyal States in men was made, showing an aggregate number of 2,254,063 men, not including 1,000,516 soldiers actually under arms when hostilities ceased.

(2) 1,120,621 men were raised at an average cost (on account of recruitment exclusive of bounties) of 9·84 dols. per man ; while the cost of recruiting the 1,356,598 raised prior to the organisation of the Bureau was 34·01 dols. per man. A saving of over 70 cents on the dollar in the cost of raising troops was thus effected under this Bureau, notwithstanding the increase in the price of subsistence, transportation, rents, &c., during the last two years of the war.

(3) 76,526 deserters were arrested and returned to the Army.

The vigilance and energy of the officers of the Bureau in this branch of business put an effectual check to the widespread evil of desertion, which at one time impaired so seriously the numerical strength and efficiency of the Army.

(4) The quotas of men furnished by the various parts of the country were equalised and a proportionate share of military service secured from each, thus removing the very serious inequality of recruitment which had arisen during the first two years of the war, and which, when the Bureau was organised, had become an almost insuperable obstacle to further progress in raising troops. . . .

The introduction of compulsion acted as a powerful stimulus to voluntary enlistment throughout the Union,¹ and, in consequence of this revival of voluntary enlistment, the number of men compulsorily enlisted was not as great as it might have been, especially as the compulsory system was not exploited to the full. Only a comparatively moderate number of those who by law were declared to be liable for

¹ This was due to the fact that the individual States vied with one another to fill their quota so as to make compulsion unnecessary.

military service were called upon to join the Army. On the other hand, the moral effect of the passing of the Conscription Act was very far-reaching and salutary. The Provost-Marshall-General's Report stated :

The historian who would trace accomplished results to their true and genuine causes must assign to the law constituting this Bureau a most important place among the agencies by which the great work of restoring the national authority has been so happily accomplished. The true turning-point of the War was reached when the first 'draft wheel' began to revolve, under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1863. The general effect of this law throughout the country has been highly favourable to loyalty. No one department has brought its operations so directly and closely home to the people, or has given such a feeling of security, such a confidence in and such assurance of the power of the Government to preserve itself, conquer its enemies, and protect all its citizens. Next to the success of its arms, the ability of the Government to bring men into the field at its call, and the manner in which it has been done by this Bureau in the execution of the 'enrolment act,' in spite of innumerable and apparently insuperable difficulties, has best demonstrated that power.

The Conscription Act of 1863 was a most beneficial measure, but it had several grave defects. It failed to place upon the men liable for military service the duty of coming forward without delay. Hence the Government had to search them out. The Official Report tells us :

Instead of endeavouring to search out and hunt up every person liable to military service through the agency of a vast multitude of petty enrolling officers, upon whose capacity and fidelity it is not possible in all cases to rely, I think the Government should impose its supreme demands directly upon the people themselves, and require them, under the sternest penalties, to report themselves for enrolment. If the Government has a right to the military service of its citizens in times of public peril, rebellion, and war, it

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has a right to secure such services in the simplest, cheapest, and most direct manner.

Enrolled men whose names had been drawn from the wheel for service and who failed to obey the call were liable to the extreme penalty, for the Provost-Marshall-General published the following opinion of the Solicitor of the War Department to all concerned :

When a person has been drafted in pursuance of the Enrolment Act of March 3, 1863, notice of such draft must be served within ten days thereafter, by a written or printed notice, to be served on him personally, or by leaving a copy at his last place of residence, requiring him to appear at a designated rendezvous to report for duty. Any person failing to report for duty after notice left at his last place of residence or served on him personally without furnishing a substitute or paying 300 dols., is pronounced by law to be a deserter ; he may be arrested and held for trial by court-martial and sentenced to death. If a person, after being drafted and before receiving the notice, deserts, it may still be served by leaving it at his last place of residence, and if he does not appear in accordance with the notice, or furnish the substitute, or pay the 300 dols., he will be in law a deserter, and must be punished accordingly. There is no way or manner in which a person once enrolled can escape his public duties, when drafted, whether present or absent, whether he changes his residence or absconds ; the rights of the United States against him are secured, and it is only by performance of his duty to the country that he will escape liability to be treated as a criminal.

Deserters were proceeded against with great energy. Death sentences for desertion were not infrequent, but in many cases they were commuted. Still, from the table given later on it appears that 261 soldiers of the Northern Army were executed. Among these were a good many deserters.

The Union Government had made the unfortunate mistake of allowing men who had been enrolled as liable

for military duty and who had afterwards been 'drafted' for service to escape their duties by the undemocratic expedient of finding a substitute or of paying \$300. That provision was naturally much resented by the poorer classes, and especially by alien immigrants in the large towns. The Opposition made the utmost use of their opportunity, denounced the Government, and incited the masses to resistance. The Provost-Marshal-General's Report tells us that the people were incited against the Government 'by the machinations of a few disloyal political leaders, aided by the treasonable utterances of corrupt and profligate newspapers . . . by a steady stream of political poison and arrant treason.' While the Government was obeyed in the country, these incitements led to sanguinary riots among the worst alien elements in several towns, especially in New York, Boston, and Troy. A large part of New York was during several days devastated by the mob, and the suppression of the rising cost more than 1000 lives. When order had been re-established Mr. Horatio Seymour, the Governor of New York, expressed doubt whether conscription was constitutionally permissible, and asked President Lincoln to obtain a judicial decision on that point. The President replied on August 7 :

. . . We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used.

This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to re-experiment with the voluntary system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate ; and then more time to obtain a court decision as to whether the law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it, and still more

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time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go.

My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged—of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country.

Shortly afterwards conscription was enforced throughout New York with the energetic assistance of Governor Seymour, who clearly recognised the pertinence of the President's arguments.

Let us now consider the principal facts and figures relating to the Civil War.

It began on April 12, 1861, with the bombardment of Fort Sumter ; it ended on April 9, 1865, with the surrender of General Lee and his army to General Grant at Appomattox Court House. Except for three days the war lasted exactly four years. The history of the Civil War is at the same time inspiring and humiliating. It is inspiring because of the patriotism, the heroism, the ability, and the resourcefulness which were displayed by both combatants. Both showed that it was possible to improvise huge and powerful armies. It is deeply humiliating because the Civil War is a gigantic monument of democratic improvidence and of unreadiness, of governmental short-sightedness, and of criminal waste, of bungling, and of muddle. The North possessed so overwhelming a superiority in population and in resources of every kind, and had had so ample a warning of the threatening danger long before the trouble began, that the war would probably never have broken out had the Northern statesmen exercised in time some ordinary foresight and caution, as they easily might have done and as they ought to have done. If some precautions had been taken, and if, nevertheless, the Southern States had revolted, their subjection might have been effected within a few months at a comparatively trifling expenditure of blood and treasure. How crushing the numerical superiority

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striking devotion, but as a whole inferior in education and in a knowledge of the arts and appliances of modern life to the men of the North. The Union had the advantage of the regular Army and Navy, of the flag, and of the prestige and machinery of the national Government; the Ministers from foreign countries were accredited to the United States; the archives of what had been the common Government were also in the possession of the Union. . . .

From the official statistics available it appears that the wealth of the Union was in 1860 about fifteen times as great as that of the Southern States, which were merely producers of food and raw materials. In the course of the war the economic supremacy of the North increased very greatly, for while the manufacturing power of the Northern States expanded rapidly, the economic position of the Southern States deteriorated continually. Northern warships blockaded the coast of the South, and the Southerners could neither sell their staple products—especially cotton and tobacco—nor import the machines, weapons, and manufactures of every kind which they needed. While the North was self-supporting and could freely import from abroad all it required, the South was thrown on its own resources, and before long the people lacked even the most essential things. Hence their sufferings were terrible, while the people in the North lived in relative comfort and affluence.

The people, both in the South and in the North, made a most gigantic military effort. The Secretary of War laid before Congress information from which it appeared that the Northern States furnished altogether the gigantic number of 2,653,062 soldiers. If this colossal aggregate is reduced to a three-years' standard, they furnished no less than 2,129,041 men. If we compare this figure with the total population of the Northern States given above, we find that the North sent to the army 10 per cent. of the total population. The official figures relating to the military effort of the South are incomplete and not reliable.

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Estimates vary. However, when we draw the average of the various estimates it appears that the Southern States furnished to the army about one million men, or approximately 20 per cent. of the white population.

The war entailed colossal losses in men and money. According to the accounts furnished in the Official Record the war losses of the Northern Army were as follows :

Losses of Northern Army

Volunteers	Officers	Men	Total
Killed in action.	4,057	61,654	65,711
Of wounds received in action	2,164	39,912	42,076
Of disease	2,688	218,806	221,494
Accidental (except drowned)	141	3,869	4,010
Drowned	102	4,749	4,851
Murdered	36	468	504
Killed after capture	14	89	103
Suicide	24	340	364
Executed by U.S. military authorities.	—	261	261
Executed by enemy	4	60	64
Sunstroke	5	301	306
Other known causes	61	1,910	1,971
Causes not stated	28	11,987	12,015
Aggregate	9,324	344,406	353,730
Losses of Northern Regular Army	260	5,538	5,798
Grand Aggregate—Regulars and Volunteers	9,584	349,944	359,528

These figures are considered by many authorities to be an under-statement. Some estimate that the Northern States lost approximately 500,000 lives through the war. Through death the Northern Armies lost about 20 per cent. of their men, and the losses come to about 2 per cent. of the whole population. The war losses of the Southern States were approximately as great as those of the North. Apparently about one-half of the Southern Army died, and the deaths caused by the war equal almost 10 per cent. of the white population of the South. Altogether the American States combined lost between 700,000 and 1,000,000 lives in four years' warfare.

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The economic losses caused by the war were enormous. Estimates vary, but the most reliable one gives the figure of 10,000,000,000 dollars, or £2,000,000,000. The war-bill of the United States continues, mounting up through the payment of pensions which entail at present an expenditure of about £30,000,000 a year. The Civil War crippled the North financially for many years, but it ruined the South. Between 1860 and 1870 the taxable wealth of Virginia decreased from 798,249,681 dollars to 327,670,503 dollars; that of South Carolina from 548,188,754 dollars to 166,517,591 dollars; that of Georgia from 645,895,237 dollars to 214,535,366 dollars, &c.

Let us consider now the principal lessons of the Civil War.

If the American statesmen had exercised merely reasonable caution and foresight, the war would probably never have occurred. The principal towns of the South lie near the sea border in spacious bays or up-river. They were protected against an attack from the sea by strong forts. By adequately garrisoning these forts in time, as General Scott, the Head of the Army, had advised President Buchanan, the American Government could have dominated the rebellious towns, and could have cut their connection with the sea, as had been done with the best success at the time of the nullification troubles of 1832. Unfortunately, President Buchanan paid no attention to the views of his military experts.

Washington said in his fifth Annual Address: 'If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.' He and many of the founders of the Republic had pointed out in *The Federalist* and elsewhere that it was dangerous for the country to rely merely on an untrained militia, and had urged the necessity of maintaining an adequate standing army. Unfortunately their warnings were not heeded by the short-sighted and unscrupulous politicians. Had the United States possessed a small

standing army ready for war the Southern States would scarcely have dared to rise, and had they done so their power could easily have been broken. In the opinion of many American military experts a standing army of 50,000 men would have sufficed to end the war in a few months. The disregard of the views of the military experts, and the criminal levity and recklessness of self-seeking politicians cost the United States approximately a million lives and £2,000,000,000. They paid dearly for their previous improvidence and their neglect of military preparations.

When the bombardment of Fort Sumter began, when the army, navy, and the whole administrative and judicial apparatus broke down, the dissolution of the Great Republic seemed inevitable. The Union was saved by a man of sterling character but of merely moderate ability, by a great citizen, but scarcely a statesman of the very first rank. Abraham Lincoln was animated by an unwavering faith in the Union and in the righteousness of its cause. Undismayed by disaster, he rallied the waverers, encouraged the downhearted, and created harmony among the quarrelling parties. When matters seemed desperate, he mobilised the country, raised a huge army, and saved the State by his exertions. Had a Buchanan or a Johnson been in power the Union would undoubtedly have been lost. He did not hesitate to exceed his constitutional powers and to act as a Dictator when the fate of his country was at stake. In Lord Bryce's words, 'Abraham Lincoln wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell.' One-man rule undoubtedly saved the United States.

A democratic Government which at any moment may be overturned by a hostile majority lives precariously by popularity, by votes. Popularity is therefore indispensable to the politicians in power. It is more necessary and more precious to them than national security and administrative efficiency. The result is that a Government which is dependent from hour to hour for its life on the popular

will and the popular whim must be guided by the momentary moods and impulses of the ill-informed masses. It must pursue a hand-to-mouth policy. Fearing to endanger its position by taking the initiative, it will, as a rule, wait for a popular demand for action. It will often refuse to act with foresight and even with common sense, but will readily obey the clamour of the noisiest but least well-informed section of the Press and the public. Hence a democratic Cabinet cannot act with foresight. It cannot unite on necessary, wise, and far-sighted action. On the other hand, the disunited ministers, who are merely waiting for a popular lead, will readily agree on some useless, foolish, or even mischievous measure, provided it is popular, provided it is demanded with sufficient clamour and insistence by the prejudiced, and by those who live by pandering to the short-sightedness and to the momentary moods and emotions of the masses and act as their spokesmen.

The founders of the American Commonwealth, like all great statesmen, recognised that a Government can act with energy, sagacity, foresight, secrecy, and despatch—qualities which are indispensable in critical times, and especially in war—only if there is absolute unity of purpose, if the executive is in the hands of a single man who is assisted by eminent experts. In Great Britain a Cabinet composed of twenty-two personages was supreme. Of these only one man, Lord Kitchener, was a military expert. As, according to tradition, the Cabinet forms its decisions unanimously, it is clear that that unwieldy and inexpert body could act neither with energy nor with secrecy, neither with despatch nor with foresight. It could scarcely act with wisdom or with common sense. It is difficult to secure agreement among twenty-two men. As an energetic and provident policy will probably be opposed by the timorous, or the short-sighted, a compromise between action and inaction, between wisdom and folly, becomes necessary, for otherwise the Cabinet will split. Hence a safe commonplace policy, a weak and dilatory, shilly-shally policy, a

policy of vacillation, of make-believe, and of drift, was likely to be adopted. Foresight became impossible. At best half-measures were taken, and urgently necessary energetic action was delayed until it was too late, until disasters, which could no longer be explained away, had occurred and had demonstrated even to the dullest and to the most obstinate members of the Cabinet the folly of their opposition.

Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Nelson, Moltke, indeed all great generals and admirals whose views are known, have stated that war is a one-man business, that in war the worst possible direction is that of a military council. It is true that great commanders have often called councils of war, but they have done so only for advice, not for direction. If, according to the greatest leaders, it is dangerous to entrust the direction of military or naval operations to a council of war composed of great experts, how much more dangerous then will it be to entrust it to a council of politicians unacquainted with war! Apparently the twenty-two men who formed the late Cabinet had the supreme direction not only of the country's domestic and administrative policy, but that of its armies and fleets as well. Herein lay the reason that more than once during the war we have seen inadequacy, vacillation, hesitation, improvidence, and incompetence; that belated half-measures and quarter-measures have sometimes been taken when immediate and energetic action was imperatively called for. Unanimity, energy, foresight, secrecy, and despatch, in one word, efficiency, is difficult enough in business jointly transacted by twenty-two men belonging to one party. Will it be easier to obtain unanimity in Cabinet decision, will the Government act with greater wisdom, foresight, energy, and rapidity when there is a Coalition Cabinet, when one half the Ministers belong to one party and the other half to the late Opposition?

It is, of course, highly desirable that in a time of crisis the country should possess a strong national Government,

a Government representing not a party but the nation as a whole. However, as a Cabinet cannot possibly act with unanimity, foresight, energy, rapidity, and secrecy, it seems indispensable that the Cabinet should entrust the supreme direction of affairs to a single strong man supported by a small number of expert advisers who are not his equals but distinctly his subordinates. A democracy at war requires for its salvation a kind of Dictator, an Abraham Lincoln, and British statesmen will do well to ponder over the most important views of the founders of the American Commonwealth given in the beginning of this chapter.

Many politicians and numerous organs of the Press have urged that the situation calls for a Dictator, and have regretted that no man of transcendent ability has come forward to whom the Government could be entrusted for the duration of the War. It is, however, perhaps unnecessary to wait for the advent of a Chatham. Government by a single man of moderate, or even of inferior, ability, will probably prove far more efficient than government by twenty-two very able men, non-experts, who possess, at least theoretically, equal power and authority in directing the affairs of the nation. The British Constitution is unwritten, is fluid, is adaptable to the necessities of the moment. It has been created by gradual evolution, and it lends itself easily to the creation of a one-man Government for the duration of the War. The Prime Minister need only be made solely responsible for the conduct of the Government in all its branches during the War. By thus increasing the power of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Ministers would be made responsible merely for their departments. They would be responsible to the Prime Minister, and he to Parliament. Cabinet Ministers could therefore devote themselves practically entirely to their administrative duties. They would become the Prime Minister's subordinates. He would assume sole responsibility for important decisions. He would consult the Cabinet Ministers, but could no longer be hampered in his action by the opposition

of one or several of his colleagues. The direction of affairs would no longer be in the hands of an unwieldy body, such as could not successfully direct any business. The State would possess a managing director, as does every business, and thus foresight, unity, energy, despatch, and secrecy in action might be secured.

Many Englishmen extol the voluntary system and oppose compulsory service because in their opinion conscription, conscription, is undemocratic. Most of these are quite unaware that the greatest, the freest, and the most unruly democracy in the world gladly submitted to conscription half a century ago, and appear to forget that France and Switzerland recognise that the first duty of the citizen consists in defending his country. If the United States found conscription necessary to prevent the Southern States breaking away and forming a government of their own, how much more necessary is the abandonment of the voluntary system when not merely the integrity but the existence of Great Britain and of the Empire is at stake !

The American War was unnecessarily protracted because the North had never enough troops to crush the rebellion. On July 3, 1862, President Lincoln wrote despairingly a confidential letter to the Governors of various States worded as follows :

I should not want the half of 800,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the War in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this. . . .

While the Southern States armed their whole able-bodied population at an early date, the Northern States were late in introducing conscription. Besides, conscription was with

them only a half-measure, as has been shown. They introduced it only on March 3, 1863, two years after the outbreak of the war, and as they failed to arm all available men the war dragged on for two whole years after conscription had been introduced. The four-fold superiority in able-bodied men and the fifteen-fold superiority in wealth would undoubtedly have given to the Northern States a rapid and complete victory had they acted with their entire national strength at the outset.

The United Kingdom and the British Empire have made enormous efforts, but greater ones will be needed. The United States have provided this country with a great and inspiring precedent. The Northern States placed 10 per cent. and the Southern States 20 per cent. of their entire population in the field, as has been shown on another page. If Great Britain should follow the example of the Northern States she alone should be able to raise 4,500,000 men. If she should follow the example of the South she should be able to provide 9,000,000 soldiers. The British losses during the first years of war have been appalling, but they are small if compared with those incurred by the Americans in the Civil War. If Great Britain should lose men at the same rate as the Northern States, her dead would number about 1,000,000. At the proportion of the Southern States her dead would number about 4,000,000. Great Britain and her daughter-States have an opportunity of demonstrating to the world that they have as much energy, resourcefulness, patriotism, and vitality as the men who laid down their lives in the terrible campaign of 1861-65. If the United States were ready to make the greatest sacrifices for preserving their Union, the United Kingdom and the Dominions should be willing to make sacrifices at least as great for the sake of their existence.

The story of the Civil War provides invaluable lessons to this country. It shows that the United States were saved by two factors, by one-man government and by conscription. It shows that far greater exertions than those

made hitherto are wanted by Motherland and Empire—and that they can be made. It shows that the sooner conscription is introduced throughout the Empire, the more energetically national service is enforced, and the more fully the whole manhood of the Empire States is employed in the War, the smaller will be its cost in blood and money, and the sooner it will be over. At the same time, the Civil War furnishes the gravest warnings to the United States. It should show them the danger of unpreparedness. The European crisis may become their crisis as well.

At the dedication of the Soldiers' Cemetery in 1863, Abraham Lincoln pronounced the following immortal words :

It is for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honoured dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

These words are known by heart by every American schoolboy. They may well serve as a memento and as a motto to Englishmen of the present generation and inspire them in the heavy task which lies before them.

CHAPTER XI

AN ANGLO-AMERICAN REUNION ¹

ON Christmas Eve, 1814, in the old Carthusian Convent in the city of Ghent, a peace was signed which brought to an end the Anglo-American War of 1812-14, and on Christmas Eve, 1914, occurred the one hundredth anniversary of that memorable event. To celebrate worthily the Hundred Years' Peace between the British nation and the United States powerful committees were formed in the United States, in Canada, and in this country, and they resolved to observe it by religious services and various festivities, by purchasing, by popular subscription, Sulgrave Manor, Washington's ancestral home in England, by placing a statue of George Washington in Westminster Abbey, by erecting monumental arches and columns on the United States-Canadian boundary, by erecting imposing memorial buildings in London, New York, and elsewhere, by creating a park at the Niagara Falls and a toll-free International Peace Bridge over the Niagara River which separates the United States from Canada, and by giving prizes for improved text-books on Anglo-American history, designed to improve relations between the two countries. Senator Burton introduced a Bill in the United States Senate providing for the creation of a Peace Celebration Committee, and appropriating £1,500,000 to be spent on the celebration provided that the nations of the British Empire would furnish 'such sum or sums as will equal the amount or

¹ *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September, 1913.

amounts thus appropriated.' The War has interfered with the planned celebration, and perhaps it is for the best.

The promoters of the movement obviously intended to celebrate the Hundred Years' Peace by improving the relations between the British and American peoples, and they were prepared to spend money lavishly for that purpose. But would they have achieved their aim by giving large commissions to a number of sculptors, architects, and monumental masons, who might only have succeeded in producing monumental eyesores, and by creating on the Niagara frontier a park and a toll-free Peace Bridge? The Niagara is the American Blackpool. It is visited every year by more than a million cheap trippers, who are conveyed there at a very small price in railway trains which are crowded to their utmost capacity. Apart from the two railway bridges there is already an excellent passenger bridge over the Niagara which people can cross by electric tram for the modest sum of ten cents. Did the promoters of the peace celebrations seriously believe that they could bridge the gulf which until lately unfortunately still divided the British and American nations by constructing promiscuously and at very large expense a number of imposing and possibly unbeautiful stone monuments and a totally unnecessary bridge, which would have no practical benefit except that of saving the trifling sum of ten cents per head to swarms of hilarious excursionists, who, anxious to see the sights on the other side, or to get something to eat, would rush across the toll-free bridge without giving a moment's thought to its symbolical meaning? Were not the excellent people on the Peace Celebration Committees bent upon spending their money and their energy in the wrong direction?

On Christmas Eve the angels sang 'On earth peace, goodwill toward men.' The Peace of Ghent was most auspiciously signed on Christmas Eve, and the idea of celebrating its centenary by taking steps which would increase the goodwill between the two great branches of

the Anglo-Saxon race and secure their peace for all time was excellent. However, experience teaches us that peace and goodwill between nations cannot be secured by wasting money on stone monuments and bridges and that international agitation by private committees does little to bring nations together. From the invasion by William the Conqueror in 1066 to the surrender of Fashoda in 1898 England and France have passionately hated one another and have almost incessantly been at war. Yet to-day France and Great Britain are excellent friends. How has that marvellous and almost incredible change been brought about? By the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904, concluded between Lord Lansdowne and Monsieur Delcassé, which settled all outstanding questions and abolished all friction between the two nations, and by the conclusion of an understanding whereby the two countries have resolved to support one another in case of need. Through the action of their leading statesmen, France and Great Britain have discovered that they need one another and that they ought, in their own interest, to support one another. The long-continued efforts of well-meaning individuals in France and Great Britain to bring the two countries together proved fruitless. It is worth noting that France and Great Britain had become firm friends long before the great War, although many of the text-books used in the French schools still described Great Britain as the hereditary enemy of France, and although many of the books used in the British schools reciprocated the compliment.

After all, the influence of well-disposed private individuals, of bodies such as Chambers of Commerce, and of the schools is very much overrated. Nowadays the people receive their political education not from schoolmasters and social leaders but from the Press. The newspapers exercise a far more powerful influence upon public opinion than school and society combined. Diplomacy, the actions of statesmen, not schoolmasters and social leaders, brought France and Great Britain together overnight, and soon the

French and British nations unlearned what they had been taught about one another in the schools; and learnt to respect and trust one another, and, in case of need, to defend one another.

If statesmanship was able to bring together France and Great Britain, two nations of different race, different ideas, different habits, different thought, and different speech, which have fought one another almost unceasingly during nine centuries, it should surely not be impossible to bring the United States and Great Britain once more together by the conclusion of a second and final peace treaty, by a treaty whereby the two great Anglo-Saxon nations might pledge themselves to support one another in perpetuity in case of a great emergency, by a treaty which would most fitly be concluded on the next anniversary of the Treaty of Ghent, and which would secure their peace and security practically for all time. That would, I venture to assert, be its most appropriate celebration. I shall endeavour to show the necessity of such a treaty in the following pages, but before doing so I think I ought to deal briefly with the causes which until recently have kept the two nations asunder.

The fact that Great Britain and the United States have been at war has been almost forgotten in this country, but it is keenly remembered in America. That is only natural. In the course of her long and chequered history Great Britain has been at war with many powerful nations, but the United States have had only one great foreign war, and, owing to their geographical position, they have had hitherto a possible enemy only in that nation which is supreme at sea. If the American history-books had not contained long and highly-coloured accounts of 'America's fight for freedom against England's tyranny,' and of 'America's heroism and England's treachery,' they would have made very dull and uninspiring reading indeed.

National patriotism demands to be inflamed by the heroic deeds of one's ancestors. The Americans have every reason

to be proud of their fight against England, and it is only right and proper that they have made the most of it and so strengthened their spirit of patriotism and of nationalism. However, although all Americans are proud of their victory over England, a large and constantly growing number of them have begun to recognise that the English nation is not a nation of tyrants and of inhuman monsters, that at the time of the American Revolution not all the wrong was on the side of England and all the right on that of the American Colonists, that the war was caused rather by mutual misunderstandings than by the evil dispositions of the English Government and the English people, and therefore they feel a little ashamed of the patriotic exuberance of some of their countrymen.

Nations are usually welded together by war. Without the Anglo-American war there might have been American States, but these would scarcely have formed a firmly knit American State and an American nation. Besides, no great State, and especially no great democratic State, and no great federation of States, has ever been established without war. In every family of strong, healthy, and high-spirited boys there are fights. However, these do not lead to eternal enmity or to a permanent estrangement, but to increased mutual respect and to a better understanding. There have been great fraternal fights in Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, France, and in the United States themselves, and it was only natural that there should have been such a fight between the United States and Great Britain. Lastly, the losses and sufferings which the Anglo-American war caused to the Americans have been much exaggerated. When I was in the United States I was seriously informed by eminent and competent men that the yearly celebration of the Fourth of July, the day of the Declaration of Independence, when patriotism impels Americans to let off in the streets fireworks and revolvers, had in the course of time claimed a heavier hecatomb of life than the Anglo-American war.

In the American school books Great Britain is usually described as the hereditary enemy of the United States. It is true that much bitterness against the United States prevailed in England long after the conclusion of the Anglo-American Peace Treaty. It was only natural that the loss of our greatest possession created abiding resentment, especially as Americans kept open the sore by numerous provocations and by frequent endeavours to damage Great Britain and Canada. Of course provocation met with counter provocation. However, it should in fairness be remembered in the United States that, notwithstanding all mutual misunderstandings and disputes which have taken place in the past, Great Britain has more than once acted as America's good friend. Great Britain has preserved the United States more than once from the intended intervention of European Powers, she has probably preserved them from dangerous wars, and she has undoubtedly been responsible for the promulgation and the defence of the Monroe Doctrine which has established the principle 'America for the Americans.' The fact that Great Britain was responsible for the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine is so important and is at the same time so little known both in Great Britain and in the United States that it is worth while to give briefly the secret history of that doctrine, which has become the fundamental principle and the sheet anchor of America's foreign policy.

After the Napoleonic Wars a reign of reaction began on the Continent of Europe. The Holy Alliance strove to destroy the democratic governments and institutions which the revolutionary period had called into being throughout the world, and to introduce a universal despotism. At Verona, on November 22, 1822, the Powers which had fought against Napoleon signed a secret treaty, to which, however, only the names of Metternich (Austria), Chateaubriand (France), Bernstorff (Prussia), and Nesselrode (Russia) were appended, for England refused to be a party.

The first two Articles of this instrument are of special interest, for they read as follows :

The undersigned, specially authorised to make some additions to the treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as follows :

Article I. The high contracting Powers, being convinced that the system of representative government is as incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people is with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

Article II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the Press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own States, but also in the rest of Europe.

In Henderson's 'American Diplomatic Questions' we read :

The Congress adjourned with the understanding that France, in the name of the Holy Allies, should send an army into Spain 'to put an end to the system of representative government' which was struggling for existence beyond the Pyrenees. A French army, under the Duc d'Angoulême, crossed the frontier, and after a feeble resistance from the revolutionists restored Ferdinand to a despotic throne. The next step of the allies seemed to be reasonably certain—a movement against the South American revolutionists.

The advisability of taking such a step had already been broached at Vienna, and freely discussed at Verona. Reports of these contemplated movements in the Americas had reached Washington, and had impressed the administration with a deep feeling of concern. It was feared that

France might demand Cuba as a price for restoring Ferdinand.

Through its agents the British Government had become aware of the danger threatening the United States from the Continent of Europe. Mr. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, sought an interview with Mr. Richard Rush, the United States Minister to Great Britain, and Mr. Rush reported the gist of his conversation with Mr. Canning immediately to Mr. J. Q. Adams, the Secretary of State at Washington. Mr. Rush referred to a note which Mr. Canning had previously sent to the British Ambassador in Paris. In that note the British Foreign Secretary had stated: 'As his Britannic Majesty disclaimed all intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, he, Mr. Canning, was satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of Spain's possessions under her dominion either by conquest or by cession from Spain.' Commenting upon this important note Mr. Rush reported to the United States Secretary of State:

By this we are to understand in terms sufficiently distinct, that Great Britain would not be passive under such an attempt by France, and Mr. Canning, on my having referred to this note, asked me what I thought my Government would say to going hand in hand with the British Government in the same sentiment; not, as he added, that any concert in action under it could become necessary between the two countries, but that the simple fact of our being known to hold the same sentiment would, he had no doubt, by its moral effect, put down the intention on the part of France, admitting that she should ever entertain it. . . . Reverting to his first idea, he again said that he hoped that France would not, should even events in the Peninsula be favourable to her, extend her views to South America for the purpose of reducing the colonies, nominally, perhaps, for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her own; but that, in case she should meditate such a policy,

he was satisfied that the knowledge of the United States being opposed to it, as well as Great Britain, could not fail to have its influence in checking her steps. In this way he thought good might be done by prevention, and peaceful prospects all around increased. As to the form in which such knowledge might be made to reach France, and even the other Powers of Europe, he said, in conclusion, that that might probably be arranged in a manner that would be free from objection.

On August 20, a few days after this conversation, Mr. Canning sent to Mr. Rush a letter marked 'Private and confidential' in which he said :

Before leaving town I am desirous of bringing before you in a more distinct, but still in an unofficial and confidential shape, the question which we shortly discussed the last time that I had the pleasure of seeing you. . . . We conceive the recovery of the American colonies by Spain to be hopeless. . . . We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power with indifference. If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other and to declare them in the face of the world ?

If there be any European Power which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such a declaration on the part of your Government and ours would be at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our joint disapprobation of such projects. . . . Nothing could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in such a work.

Commenting upon the foregoing letter Mr. Rush reported to Mr. Adams on August 23, 1823 :

. . . The tone of earnestness in Mr. Canning's note, and the force of some of his expressions, naturally start the

inference that the British Cabinet cannot be without its serious apprehensions that ambitious enterprises are meditated against the independence of the South American States. Whether by France alone I cannot now say on any authentic grounds.

On August 28 Mr. Canning sent to Mr. Rush another 'Private and confidential' letter, in which he said :

I have received notice—but not such notice as imposes upon me the necessity of any immediate answer or proceeding—that as soon as the military objects in Spain are achieved (of which the French expect, how justly I know not, a very speedy achievement) a proposal will be made for a Congress, or some less formal concert and consultation, especially upon the affairs of Spanish America.

Mr. Adams, the American Secretary of State, communicated the news which he had received from Mr. Rush to the President of the Republic, Mr. Monroe, and President Monroe wrote for advice to his eminent predecessors in office, Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, two of the surviving founders of the American Republic, who had co-operated with George Washington and Benjamin Franklin.

Mr. Jefferson replied on October 24, 1823 :

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe ; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. . . . One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit ; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth ; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship ; and nothing would tend more

to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause.

Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Jefferson on November 1; 1823 :

With the British power and navy combined with our own we have nothing to fear from the rest of the world ; and in the great struggle of the epoch between liberty and despotism we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former, in this hemisphere at least.

From the sixth volume of the 'Memoirs' of Mr. J. Q. Adams, who at the time was the United States Secretary of State, we learn that he did not believe that the Holy Alliance had any intention of ultimately attacking the United States ; but, if they should subdue the Spanish provinces, they might recolonise them and partition them out among themselves. Russia might take California, Peru, and Chile ; France Mexico, where she had been intriguing to get a monarchy under a Prince of the House of Bourbon, as well as at Buenos Ayres ; and Great Britain, if she could not resist this course of things, would take at least the island of Cuba as her share of the scramble. Then what would be the situation of the United States—England holding Cuba, and France Mexico ?

The danger that France, supported by the Powers of the Holy Alliance, would interfere on the American Continent was great, and this was generally recognised in America. In the *North American Review* for October, 1823, we read, for instance :

If success should favour the allied monarchs, would they be satisfied with reforming the Government of Spain ? Would not the Spanish colonies, as part of the same Empire, then demand their parental attention ? And might not the United States be next considered as deserving their kind guardianship ?

On December 2, 1823, President Monroe published his

annual message, which contains the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine—one ought really in fairness to call it the Canning-Monroe Doctrine—in the following words :

The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European Powers. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

After the reading of President Monroe's famous message Mr. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, caused the following resolution to be introduced :

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognised by the United States.

Commenting upon the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine

Mr. Henderson wrote in his book, 'American Diplomatic Questions':

If England had, after all, joined the allies in their schemes it is much to be doubted whether the President's message of 1823 would have seriously embarrassed them in the ultimate perfection of their Spanish-American plans; but the realisation that Great Britain, with her powerful navy, endorsed in the main the sentiments of President Monroe cast a gloom over the propagandists of divine right, and the great South American project was abandoned.

The American Civil War broke out in the beginning of 1861. Mexico was at that time in the throes of a revolution, and she refused to satisfy her Spanish and French creditors and to do justice to Great Britain for having broken into the British Legation and carried off £152,000 in sterling bonds belonging to British subjects. The British claims were substantial and *bona-fide*. The French and Spanish claims were more or less doubtful. Great Britain, France, and Spain agreed upon joint action for the protection of their interests, and British, French, and Spanish warships sailed for Vera Cruz with the avowed intention of taking possession of the Custom Houses of two or three Mexican ports for the purpose of satisfying the claims of their Governments. However, within a few weeks after the arrival of these ships, and before the Allies had done much more than seize Vera Cruz, the English and Spanish commanders became dissatisfied with the adventurous action of the French and the English and Spanish forces withdrew in April, 1862. While Great Britain and Spain merely sought to obtain satisfaction for the claims of their citizens, France, taking advantage of the American Civil War, evidently intended to violate the Monroe Doctrine and to establish herself firmly and permanently on the American Continent under the pretext of satisfying some very shadowy demands of her subjects upon Mexico. It is a well-known fact that it was one of the favourite projects of Napoleon the Third

to create on the American Continent a great Latin-American State or Confederation controlled by France, a monarchical counterpoise to the United States. We can therefore not be surprised that the secret instructions which Napoleon the Third sent to General Forey, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Expedition, contained the following statement of France's policy :

If Mexico preserves her independence and maintains the integrity of her territory, and if a suitable Government be constituted there with the assistance of France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its strength and prestige. . . . Mexico thus regenerated will always be favourable to France. . . . As now our military honour is pledged, the exigencies of our policy and the interests of our industry and our commerce make it our duty to march upon Mexico, to plant there boldly our standard, and to establish there a monarchy, if this is not incompatible with the national sentiment of the country, but at all events a government which promises some stability.

Taking advantage of the embarrassment of the United States, Napoleon the Third endeavoured not only to create a powerful monarchy on American soil but to intervene in the struggle between the North and the South with the object of permanently weakening the United States. In Moore's 'Digest of the International Law of the United States' we read :

On October 30, 1862, Napoleon instructed the French ambassadors to Great Britain and Russia to invite those Powers to join France in requesting the belligerents to agree to an armistice of six months, so as to consider some plan for bringing the war to an end. . . . Great Britain promptly and unqualifiedly declined the proposition.

Napoleon's policy was frustrated partly by the mismanagement of the French Generals, partly, and probably chiefly, by the unsympathetic attitude of Great Britain. If Great Britain had actively, or merely passively, supported

Napoleon, the American Civil War might have had a very different ending. The great American Republic might have been divided against itself for all time.

During the Civil War Great Britain rendered undoubtedly very valuable services to the United States. However, Great Britain's attitude towards the United States and her unflinching opposition to European intervention on the American Continent, first by the Holy Alliance and then by France, was soon completely forgotten because of the unfortunate *Alabama* occurrence. So great was America's anger at the *Alabama* incident that when, shortly after the close of the Civil War, the British Government promoted the unification of her Canadian possessions by the creation of a single Dominion, violent objections were made in the United States that Great Britain's action was in violation of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, and the United States Congress considered a resolution which voiced the uneasiness of the country at witnessing 'such a vast conglomeration of American States established on the monarchical principle in contradiction to the traditionary and constantly declared principles of the United States, and endangering their most important interests.' Great Britain agreed to go to arbitration on the American *Alabama* claims. The United States demanded the colossal sum of £9,476,166 13s. 4d. for the damage done by that cruiser. By an impartial international tribunal they were awarded £3,229,166 13s. 4d. (note the 13s. 4d. !), which was paid to them by Great Britain, but even that sum was twice as large as it ought to have been, for, after all claims had been satisfied, there remained a surplus of £1,600,000 in the hands of the United States Government.

During the Spanish-American War of 1898 all Europe was hostile to the United States except Great Britain. Before Manila a collision between the German and the American fleets was prevented with difficulty. France and other Powers seemed strongly disposed to take Spain's part. Once more, joint action by European Powers against

the United States appeared to be impending. Great Britain was sounded, but once more she refused to support or to countenance European intervention. The Power which is supreme at sea once more protected the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1902 Great Britain was induced by Germany to blockade, in company with her, the Venezuelan ports, in order to obtain satisfaction for flagrant wrongs done by Venezuela to her citizens. However, as British public opinion was strongly opposed to co-operation with Germany on the American Continent, Great Britain readily consented to arbitration.

History, as Napoleon the First has told us, is a fable agreed upon, and often it is a tissue of fables. According to many of the popular history books used in the United States schools Great Britain is a Power which, animated by tyranny and selfishness, has always been hostile to the United States. In the United States the fact that Great Britain was largely responsible for the formulation and the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, and that she has consistently defended that doctrine by placing her fleet between the military Powers of Europe and the United States, is scarcely ever mentioned, and the fact that Great Britain is and always has been as strongly opposed to the settlement of one of the great military Powers in the New World as are the United States themselves, is practically unknown. It is an error to speak of the Monroe Doctrine as the leading principle of American policy, for the Monroe Doctrine—one ought in justice always to call it the Canning-Monroe Doctrine—is also a leading principle of British foreign policy. It is an Anglo-American doctrine. Bismarck once described the Monroe Doctrine as 'an international impertinence.' Perhaps it is an international impertinence. Still, the European Great Powers have respected it even at a time when the American fleet was quite insignificant. Why have they done so? Because they knew that the British fleet would, in case of need,

protect the United States. Foreign nations have discovered that the route to New York and to Washington goes *via* London. But for the British fleet the Powers of Europe would long ago have torn the Monroe Doctrine to shreds and have established themselves on the American Continent.

Englishmen, when discussing Anglo-American relations with Americans, are apt to adopt an apologetic attitude because of the mistakes which their Government and their forefathers made in the time of George the Third. That attitude of penitence is, I think, uncalled for. Mistakes were made on both sides at the time of the American Revolution and afterwards; fights between blood relations are natural and common; and since the time of the Anglo-American Peace Great Britain has powerfully supported the United States whenever an opportunity arose, making their interests her own.

The late Professor Seeley's frequently quoted assertion that Great Britain has created the British Empire 'in a fit of absence of mind' is scarcely correct. Great Britain follows neither a policy of absent-mindedness, as Professor Seeley has told us, nor a policy of sordid self-interest as her adversaries maintain. Great Britain follows a policy not of interest but of sentiment. She has consistently striven to enlarge her dominions, not in order to exploit them—it is very doubtful indeed whether on balance her possessions yield a profit to the Motherland—but in the instinctive desire of reserving the vast and fruitful territories of the New World to the Anglo-Saxon race. She has been actuated not by blood-lust nor by lust of conquest but by race-instinct, and she has acquired her vast possessions not for herself but for the Anglo-Saxon race. Therefore she views not with jealousy but with approval America's prosperity and America's expansion. Her policy has been racial, sentimental, and, on the whole, possibly unprofitable to her citizens. That cannot too frequently be stated. If Great Britain's policy were guided by self-interest, envy, perfidiousness, and trade jealousy, as we are so often told, she would

have worked for the downfall of the United States, and would at the same time have avenged her former defeats and ridded herself of a powerful competitor. She has had many opportunities to expose the United States to the greatest dangers, without any risk to herself, by merely allowing the European Powers to attack them, but she has steadfastly resisted their temptations to countenance European aggression.

The great democratic Republic is naturally not beloved by the military monarchies of Europe. They see in it a great danger and desire its downfall. Hence many Continental writers have recommended that a pan-European coalition should be formed against the United States. Time after time the States of the Continent have endeavoured to secure Great Britain's support, or at least her neutrality, in order to be able to encroach upon the Monroe Doctrine or to strike at the United States, but they have always failed. Great Britain's refusal to countenance European aggression, even passively, has sprung from her race instinct, not from her fear of losing Canada. In the first place, the United States would have had no cause to attack Canada if Great Britain merely maintained a strict neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and some European Power or Powers. Secondly, the United States would not find it very easy to conquer the Dominion. Last, and not least, it must not be forgotten that, while the Continental Powers could never obtain Great Britain's support against the United States, Great Britain herself would probably very readily have received the support of the Continental Powers against the great Republic had she gone to war with that country. If, for instance, President Cleveland's high-handed action regarding Venezuela in 1895 should unhappily have led to an American attack upon Canada, Great Britain need not have stood alone. That fact should be borne in mind by all those on both sides of the Atlantic who believe that Great Britain's attitude towards the United States has in the past been dictated by her fear of losing Canada.

An Anglo-Saxon reunion is highly desirable upon ideal grounds, and it is equally necessary to the British Empire and to the United States for the most potent practical reasons. The first instinct of nations, as of individuals, is that of self-preservation, and their principal requirements are peace and security. At first sight the British Empire and the United States appear to be very differently situated. The one is a widely scattered island-Empire which is extremely vulnerable, being exposed to attacks on many sides, while the other is a firmly knitted and homogeneous Continental State, difficult to attack and impossible to conquer. However, these outward geographical and structural differences merely obscure the fact that the British Empire and the United States are similar in character, that they have identical interests, that they are threatened by the same dangers, that they suffer from the same disadvantage of lacking powerful standing armies, that both can be attacked only by sea, and therefore depend upon their fleet for their security from attack, and that consequently both are equally strongly interested that neither one of the great military Powers nor a combination of military Powers should become supreme at sea.

Admiral Mahan, the great American naval writer, said, in 1890, in the *Atlantic Monthly* :

While Great Britain is undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and by the strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial understanding with that country is one of the first of our external interests. Both nations doubtless, and properly, seek their own advantage ; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and justice, drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their instincts. Whatever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual standards of right will certainly follow. A formal alliance between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facilitate a co-operation

beneficial to both ; for if sentimentality is weak, sentiment is strong.

If we look more closely into the circumstances of the British Empire and of the United States, we find that they are in a very similar position. The United States are no longer an invulnerable continental State. Their interests, which were formerly purely continental, have become world-wide. By the acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, Guam, Samoa, the Panama Canal, and by their interest in Cuba and many other islands and territories which are of great strategical importance to them, they also have become a widely scattered and very vulnerable Empire, and their vulnerability is all the greater, as the United States army and navy are considerably weaker than are the British army and navy. The loss of the magnificent Pearl Harbour on the island of Oahu, which lies midway between the Pacific Coast and Asia, would, as is generally recognised in America, be as serious a loss to the United States as the loss of Gibraltar would be to Great Britain, and the loss of the Panama Canal would probably be more serious to them than the simultaneous loss of the Mediterranean route and the Cape route to the East would be to Great Britain and the British Empire.

In 1894 Admiral Mahan published in the *North American Review* a paper entitled 'Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion,' in which he said :

Partners, each, in the great commonwealth of nations which share the blessings of European civilisation, Great Britain and the United States alone, though in varying degrees, are so severed geographically from all existing rivals as to be exempt from the burden of great land armies ; while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in chief measure, for the intercourse with other members of the body of nations upon which national well-being depends.

To Great Britain and the United States, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human

progress, is entrusted the maritime interest, in the broadest sense of the word.

I am convinced firmly that it would be to the interests of Great Britain and of the United States and for the benefit of the world that the two nations should act together cordially on the seas.

Admiral Mahan was right. As Great Britain and the United States have no enormous standing armies, as they are not likely ever to have standing armies capable of facing those of the great military States, and as they do not desire to become a nation in arms in the continental sense, they must perforce control the seas so as to be able to keep the huge armies of Europe, and perhaps of Asia as well, at arm's length. Let the great military nations of Europe share the rule of the land in Europe, but let the Anglo-Saxons share between them the rule of their own seas in which they are equally vitally interested. Whether Great Britain or whether the United States rule the seas is, after all, of minor importance. The thing that matters is that the seas should be ruled by the peaceful Anglo-Saxons and not by a great military nation.

Providence and the wisdom and energy of its early rulers and colonisers have greatly favoured the Anglo-Saxon race. A glance at the map shows that practically all the most valuable and the most promising territories and strategical positions in the world are owned or controlled by the Anglo-Saxon nations. To civilised nations the value of extensive territories lies chiefly in this, that they afford an outlet to their surplus population. The more thinly populated territories situated in a temperate zone are, the greater is their value to them.

The policy of powerful nations is guided not by their momentary dispositions but by their great and abiding interests. Self-preservation is their first instinct and their first duty. All the great military nations of the Continent of Europe, Russia alone excepted, and China and Japan, are greatly over-populated, and are therefore in urgent

need of territories in a temperate zone, for, without the possibility of expansion under the national flag, they are bound to stand still and then to decline in relative power and influence. The future belongs evidently to those countries which possess vast reserves of thinly populated territories. How happy, in this respect, is the position of the United States and the British Empire will be seen from the following table :

Population at Last Census

United Kingdom .	In 1911	45,216,665	people = 372·6	per sq. mile
Japan	" —	49,582,505	" = 335·8	"
Germany . . .	" 1910	64,925,993	" = 331·0	"
Italy	" 1911	34,687,000	" = 313·5	"
China Proper .	" —	407,253,029	" = 266·0	"
Austria . . .	" 1910	28,571,934	" = 246·7	"
France	" 1911	39,601,509	" = 191·2	"
Hungary . . .	" 1910	20,886,487	" = 166·6	"
Russia in Europe .	" 1897	105,413,775	" = 55·2	"
British Empire .	" 1911	417,148,000	" = 36·8	"
United States and Possessions .	" 1910	101,840,367	" = 13·7	"

The British Empire and the United States have room for hundreds of millions of people. Therefore it is only natural that the military Powers, which have a population of 200 people and 800 people and more per square mile, look with longing and envy to the vast, fruitful, highly mineralised and thinly populated territories, situated in a temperate zone, which are owned and controlled by the Anglo-Saxon nations, especially as these hold in addition all the most important strategical points which command the approaches to their world-wide possessions.

The Continent of America lies midway between over-populated Europe and over-populated Asia. Its east coast is coveted by the overcrowded European, and its west coast by the overcrowded Asiatic, nations. How thinly some of the most desirable parts of the United States are populated is seen by comparing the size and the population of some of the American States with the size and population of some great empires. The German Empire has a

territory of 208,770 square miles and a population of 64,925,998. The single State of Texas is considerably larger, for it contains 265,896 square miles. Yet Texas has a population of only 3,896,542. Per square mile there are 14.8 people in Texas and 331.0 in Germany. As Texas has a rich soil, an excellent climate, and great natural resources, it could probably support a population of 40,000,000.

It has often been asserted by men anxious to make mischief that the Japanese are casting covetous eyes upon California. They have certainly every reason to envy the Americans the possession of that paradisaical country, but they are scarcely likely to contemplate seriously its acquisition. Still the temptation is there. The Empire of Japan contains 147,657 square miles, while California contains 158,297 square miles. Japan has 49,582,505 inhabitants, but California, though it is slightly larger than Japan, has only 2,377,549 inhabitants. Per square mile there are 335.8 people in Japan but only 15.3 in California. The two other American States on the Pacific Coast, Oregon and Washington, extend to 165,826 square miles, and their population is only 1,814,755. How vast the territories of the United States are may be seen from the fact that the United States without Alaska are exactly twice as large as is the enormous Empire of China, that they are fifteen times as large as Germany, and twenty-five times as large as the United Kingdom.

The nations of the world envy the British Empire and the United States, not so much for their industries, their trade, and their wealth, as for their boundless latent resources, which promise to give them the dominion of the world, or at least world-wide predominance, if they are united. The United States receive perhaps a greater share of ill-will than does the British Empire. They are disliked owing to their enormous wealth, their ruthless energy, their aggressive methods, and especially owing to the Monroe Doctrine. On the Continent of Europe it is generally con-

sidered, and not without reason, that by that doctrine the United States have virtually declared a protectorate over the whole of Central and South America, and that they will annex these countries when time and opportunity are favourable.

The Monroe Doctrine is an American doctrine, not an international one. It is, as Bismarck truly remarked, an international impertinence. It can become generally accepted and respected only if the United States are strong enough to defend it against all comers. Hitherto they have been able to leave the defence of the Monroe Doctrine largely to Great Britain, as has been shown in the foregoing pages. Many thoughtful Americans believe that, in view of the insufficiency of their military and naval armaments, the Monroe Doctrine is a provocation to the world at large and a danger. A distinguished American military author, Mr. Homer Lea, wrote in 'The Valor of Ignorance,' a book which received the highest praise from President Roosevelt :

In the history of mankind never before has one nation attempted to support so comprehensive a doctrine as to extend its political suzerainty over two continents, comprising one-fourth of the habitable earth and one-half of its unexploited wealth, in direct defiance of the whole world and without the slightest semblance of military power.

The Monroe Doctrine is Promethean in conception but not so in execution. It was proclaimed in order to avoid wars ; now it invites them.

The Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval and military power sufficient to enforce its observance by all nations, singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more provocative of war than any other national policy ever attempted in modern or ancient times.

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine requires undoubtedly a fleet strong enough to defend America against any Power or any conceivable combination of Powers. It can be defended only by irresistible force. In Admiral Mahan's words, 'There is no inalienable right in any

community to control the use of a region when it does so to the detriment of the world at large.' The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is not founded on right but on might.

The Panama Canal will greatly increase the vulnerability of the United States. A distinguished United States Government Commission, presided over by Admiral Walker, reported :

The Canal is but one link in a chain of communications of which adjacent links are the Caribbean Sea on the east and the waters of the Pacific, near the Canal's entrance, on the west. Unless the integrity of all the links can be maintained, the chain will be broken. The Power holding any one of the links can prevent the enemy from using the communication, but can itself use it only when it holds them all. The Canal would be a prize of extraordinary value ; it would be beyond the reach of reinforcement if the enemy controlled the sea.

The enormous importance of the Canal becomes clear by giving the matter a little thought. If, for instance, in a war with the United States, Japan should seize the Panama Canal, she could attack the Atlantic coast of the Republic. and if Germany should seize it she could attack the United States simultaneously on her Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

Of late all the great military Powers have increased their navies with feverish haste. Between 1900 and 1913 the naval expenditure of the eight Great Powers has exactly doubled, increasing from £87,000,000 to £174,000,000, while their military expenditure has increased by only 40 per cent. Germany trebled her naval expenditure from £7,900,000 in 1900 to £23,400,000 in 1913, and so did Austria and Italy by increasing theirs from £6,400,000 to £18,100,000 during the same time. The Japanese also have greatly increased their fleet. The Great War has been largely a maritime war, a war for maritime objects, for sea power and colonies.

Germany and Japan and many other countries urgently require colonies. The fact that Germany requires them is

of course known, but it is generally believed that Japan has acquired adequate outlets for her surplus population in her wars with China and Russia. That is not the case. Her new possessions are very densely populated, and therefore give very little scope to the Japanese. The population of Korea is 115.9 per square mile, that of Formosa is 215.6 per square mile, and that of Kwantung is 341.6 per square mile; while that of California is only 15.3, and that of Mexico 17.7 per square mile.

Twenty years ago the German Emperor proclaimed 'Germany's future lies upon the water.' Not only Germany but the other great and over-populated military States of Europe and Japan as well have become convinced that their future also lies upon the water, that they can secure sufficient elbow-room only by wresting adequate territories situated in a temperate zone from those nations which, fortunately for them, lack large armies. Herein lies the reason that the great military States have been creating large navies with the utmost speed, and the danger is great that some of them should at some time or other combine for the purpose of destroying the land monopoly of the Anglo-Saxons and of securing for themselves 'a place in the sun,' as the German Emperor picturesquely called it. Besides, the Anglo-Saxon nations are not loved abroad. Democracy dislikes militarism and militarism fears, hates, and despises democracy.

For many years American military and naval men have been watching Germany and Japan with concern, and have been wondering what attitude Great Britain would adopt in case the United States should be involved in a war either with one of these nations or with both, and what attitude the United States should adopt should Great Britain be seriously menaced by Germany. Admiral Mahan wrote in his book 'Naval Strategy,' published in 1911:

If Germany should wish to embark her fleet in a trans-Atlantic venture, how far will her relations with other European States allow her to do so?

Should our Pacific coast citizens precipitate us into a war, or even into seriously strained relations, with Japan. that pressure upon us would add to the force of Germany's fleet.

Where ought Great Britain to stand in case we have troubles with Germany? And where ought we to stand in the reverse case?

Great Britain does for the moment hold Germany so far in check that the German Empire can do no more than look after its European interests; but should a naval disaster befall Great Britain, leaving Germany master of the naval situation, the world would see again a predominant fleet backed by a predominant army, and that in the hands not of a State satiated with colonial possessions as Great Britain is, but of one whose late entry into world conditions leaves her without any such possessions at all of any great value. Although the colonial ambitions in Germany are held in abeyance for the moment, the wish cannot but exist to expand her territory by foreign acquisitions.

It is this line of reasoning which shows the power of the German navy to be a matter of prime importance to the United States. The power to control Germany does not exist in Europe except in the British navy.

Admiral Mahan, the most eminent naval writer of modern times, recommended the co-operation of Great Britain and the United States, not for ideal reasons, but because he believed that Anglo-American co-operation on the seas is a necessity.

Great possessions are to their owners a responsibility and a danger unless they are adequately guarded. Neither the United States nor Great Britain are likely ever to possess standing armies that can be pitted against the vast military hosts of the Continental Great Powers and of Japan, because the spirit of the people is impatient of compulsion, restraint, and discipline, in time of peace. As it takes a long time to improvise armies, they must put their trust in their fleets.

Before the Great War the American fleet was weaker

than the German fleet and was inferior to it in organisation, in certain types of ships, and in armaments, especially in reserve stores of guns and ammunition. The American fleet was then on paper about 50 per cent. stronger than the Japanese fleet, but it seemed questionable whether the American fleet equalled the Japanese fleet in organisation, preparedness, and efficiency.

The British fleet is the strongest in the world. It is more powerful than it has ever been, but with the advent of the submarine, the influence of maritime power has been greatly weakened unless it is overwhelming.

The great military nations of the world naturally base their hopes of expansion at the cost of the Anglo-Saxons—as the world is divided they can expand only at the cost of the Anglo-Saxons—upon the inadequacy of the Anglo-Saxon fleets and the disunion of the two great Anglo-Saxon nations, for they know full well that it would be hopeless to challenge Anglo-Saxon supremacy on the seas if Great Britain and the United States were firmly united. In endeavouring to build up large navies they may in the future strain their resources to the utmost, hoping that by combining they will be able to overwhelm, or to overawe, either Great Britain or the United States. While Great Britain and the United States may in the future not be able to defeat single-handed any conceivable combination of naval Powers which may attack them, they can face the world if they are united. Herein lies the necessity for their reunion. Admiral Mahan wrote in his book 'Retrospect and Prospect': 'As the world is now balanced, the British Empire is in external matters our natural, though not our formal, ally.'

The race instinct is strong on both sides of the Atlantic. In Great Britain and in the United States it is instinctively felt that one nation depends for its security largely upon the other, and that neither nation can allow the other to go down. The United States and Great Britain are in the same boat. Great Britain realises that it would be a calamity to see the United States defeated by a great military nation,

which would probably settle on the American Continent and militarise it, and the United States recognise that they would become the immediate neighbours of the military Great Powers of Europe if the British fleet should be destroyed. So far militarism in its most objectionable form has been restricted to the European Continent and to Japan. The defeat of the United States or of Great Britain might bring about the militarisation of the world.

The greatest interest of the overcrowded military nations of Europe and Asia is expansion. The greatest interest of the Anglo-Saxon nations is peace, security, and the restriction of armaments. These blessings can scarcely be obtained by the federation of the world, dreamt of by the late Mr. Stead, or by the federation of Europe, proposed by other dreamers, but only by the federation of the Anglo-Saxon nations. Experience shows that the world can be at peace only if it is controlled by one nation. It will be at peace only when the *pax Romana* has been replaced by the *pax Britannica*, by the peace of the Anglo-Saxons, when the military Great Powers have, owing to the growth of the Anglo-Saxon nations, become military small Powers. The world must either become Anglo-Saxon or fall a prey to militarism.

The arguments in favour of an Anglo-American Reunion are overwhelming. Great Britain and the United States are one in language, spirit, and tradition—in short, in all the things that count. The argument that they cannot combine because one is a monarchy and the other is a republic is a fallacious one. Both are democracies. They differ only in the outer form, but not in the essence and the spirit, of their government. Great Britain has an hereditary president and the United States have an elected king. Rightly considered, Great Britain is the more democratic nation of the two. The King of England has far less power than the President of the United States. Besides, the will of the people is more likely to prevail in Great Britain than in the United States, because Great Britain has an unwritten,

flexible, and therefore truly democratic, constitution, while the United States have a written, almost unchangeable, and therefore somewhat antiquated, constitution. Kingdoms and republics may be joined in a single federation. The Empire of Germany, for instance, contains three republics. Last, but not least, democratic nations combine not because their outward forms of government are identical but because they are of one race and have the same interests. The United States and Great Britain should be united on a basis of race solidarity and of the identity of their vital interests. The objection that Great Britain is a European nation with European interests is contradicted by Professor Coolidge, of Harvard University, in his book 'The United States as a World Power,' as follows :

Are we to regard Imperial Britain as a European Power, when the greater part of her external interests and difficulties are connected with her situation on other continents? Are not the vast majority of Englishmen more in touch in every way with Australians, Canadians, Americans than they are with Portuguese, Italians or Austrians of one sort or another? What strictly European interests does England represent?

Rome was not built in a day. The reunion of the Anglo-Saxon nations will take time, but it is bound to take place for it is logical and inevitable. The growth of the military Powers and the rapid increase of their fleets must automatically bring about an Anglo-Saxon reunion earlier or later. The Hundred Years' Peace would, I think, be most appropriately celebrated by the conclusion on its next anniversary of a treaty of defence by the two great Anglo-Saxon nations, of a treaty which would guarantee to them their peace and the secure possession of their territories, and which would deprive foreign nations of the temptation to attack them singly. Such a step would slacken, or bring to a stop, the naval armament race.

Great Britain extends a fraternal hand to her kinsmen across the sea. How completely she has forgotten the revolt

of her colonies may be seen by the fact that Earl Grey proposed in 1913 to erect the statue of George Washington in Westminster Abbey among England's heroes, and to present by public subscription Sulgrave Manor, the ancient family home of the Washingtons in England, to the American nation. Never in the history of the world has a revolutionary leader been more greatly honoured by those against whom he took up arms.

Since the time when these pages were written the Great War, which I had foreseen and frequently foretold, has broken out, the United States have joined the Allies in their fight for freedom and against tyranny, a new chapter has been opened in the history of the world. An Anglo-American reunion has come within the limits of possibility. The World War may wipe out completely the memory of past misunderstandings and of ancient wrongs. The firmest cement between nations is the remembrance of dangers borne in common.

The fathers of the American Republic who had cut themselves adrift from England, thought that the Great Republic should pursue a purely American policy. In his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, his political testament, Washington laid down the principles of America's foreign policy in the following words, which are known to every American citizen :

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct ; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it ? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. . . .

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and

experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican Government. . . .

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *Political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humour, or caprice? 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.

The policy of isolation and non-interference recommended by Washington and his contemporaries has had to be abandoned. America has become a true World-Power. Commenting upon Washington's Farewell Address and the necessity of abandoning the traditional policy of the United States, I wrote in *The Nineteenth Century Review* in May, 1914, in commenting upon the Mexican imbroglio :

Washington wrote in his Farewell Address, 'Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation.' That assertion was formerly correct, but is so no longer. Nowadays Great Britain is vitally interested in American, and the United States are equally vitally interested in European, policy. Neither can safely allow that the position of the other should become jeopardised.

Both are vitally interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Both are vitally interested in seeing the military Great Powers of the world divided against themselves. If these should combine, or if one of them should obtain the supremacy in Europe, it might mean the end not only of Great Britain but also of the United States.

When Washington wrote, ' 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,' the United States could stand alone. At that time a combination of military Powers possessed of powerful navies was inconceivable. Besides, formerly the United States could be attacked by no European nation except Great Britain, because all the other nations lacked ships. As the United States cannot safely meet single-handed a joint attack by the Great Powers, they must endeavour to meet a hostile combination by a counter-combination. If serious complications should arise out of the Mexican War, we must stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States, with or without a treaty of alliance. In defending the United States against a joint attack of the military Great Powers we defend ourselves. Policy should be not merely national but should be racial. Accidents have divided the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, but necessity may again bring them together. Herein lies the hope of the future. We may not approve of Mr. Wilson's policy, but we must bear in mind that he has acted with the best intentions. America's troubles are our troubles. We cannot afford to see the United States defeated or humiliated. The present moment seems eminently favourable not only for offering to the United States our unconditional support in case of need, but for approaching them with a view to the conclusion of a carefully limited defensive alliance. Such an alliance would be the strongest guarantee for the maintenance of the world's peace. The Mexican War may have the happiest consequences upon Anglo-American relations, and it may eventually bring about an Anglo-American reunion.

At the time these lines were written the political horizon

of Europe seemed free from clouds. On the other hand, it appeared possible that the Mexican trouble might involve the United States in difficulties with some European military Power or Powers. It seemed more likely that Great Britain might have to come to the aid of the United States than the United States to the aid of Great Britain. Providence has willed it otherwise, and perhaps it is better so. If, as is devoutly to be hoped, the Anglo-American brotherhood in arms should lead to the establishment of a great brotherhood in peace of all the English-speaking peoples—to an Anglo-American reunion—a great step would have been taken in strengthening the cause of freedom and the peace of the world. The British Empire and the United States combined would not dominate the world. Anglo-Saxondom has no desire for such domination. Possessing only small standing armies, merely a police force, other States need not fear their aggression. On the other hand, the numbers of their citizens, the power of their industries which can be mobilised for war, and their great wealth, would make the combined Anglo-Saxon nations the most powerful factor in preserving the peace of the world, while their own peace would in all probability be secured by their reunion for an indefinite period. Nowhere in the world does the white population increase more rapidly than in the United States and in the British Dominions. To all who have the welfare of the Anglo-Saxon race at heart it must be clear that not the least benefit of the Great War would consist in the reunion of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, in the recreation of the British Empire in its greatest glory. The hope to secure the peace of the world by arbitration treaties or by some great international organisation such as a federation or a great league of nations, may prove an illusion. All attempts to eliminate war by mutual agreement among States have failed since the time when the Greek States created their Amphyctionic Council. All endeavours to link together the satisfied and the land-hungry nations and to combine them for the defence of the

territorial *status quo* may prove futile. The peace of the world can most easily be maintained not by creating an artificial and unnatural partnership between nations of different and, perhaps, irreconcilable aims and interests, a partnership which will break down at the first opportunity, but by creating a permanent partnership between the freedom-loving and peace-loving Anglo-Saxon nations which in addition have the advantage of belonging to the same race, of speaking the same language, of having the same ideals, the same laws, and the same traditions. A British-American union devised for the protection of their possessions against foreign attack should be the most powerful instrument imaginable not only for protecting the future peace of the Anglo-Saxons but also for protecting the peace of the world.

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